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ABSTRACT
The task of this thesis is to show that a renovated Marxism can offer a comprehensive 
explanation for the erosion of political commitment in contemporary liberal capitalist 
cultures. Post-Marxism forms the point of departure for the explanation to be 
developed. An evaluation of this work suggests that the problem is related to the 
forms of subjectivity instituted by neo-liberal capitalism. A renovated dialectical 
Marxism offers the means of filling the gaps in the post-Marxist account. Renovation 
requires a specific anti-economistic, anti-deterministic reading of two distinct but 
related strands of the Marxist corpus. The first of these is the theory of capitalism as 
total mode of life, as found in the work of Marx and Althusser. The second is the 
account of proletarian revolution developed by Marx and Gramsci. Both strands are 
read as accounts of subjectivity. The second is also read as an analysis of the 
constitution of collective political commitment. A comparison of the two will show 
that the subjects produced by neo-liberal capitalism are incapable of the kind of self- 
disciplined political commitment needed to undertake and complete demanding 
collective tasks. This conclusion is only possible, however, if a psychoanalysis 
rendered in historical institutional terms (mainly that of Freud and Lacan), is 
articulated to a renovated Marxism, as argued for by Althusser. In addition to the 
work of Althusser, that of Habermas on the bourgeois public sphere and Castoriadis 
on institutions suggest the means of articulating psychoanalysis to Marxism. The 
resulting theory offers a comprehensive explanation of the realities of contemporary 
social relations as instituted by neo-liberalism since the early 1980s, specifically as 
manifested in the erosion of political commitment.
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CAPITALISM AND COLLECTIVE ACTION:
A MARXIST ACCOUNT OF THE EROSION OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT 
IN LIBERAL CAPITALIST CULTURES
Chapter one
Introduction: the problem posed
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a Marxist explanation for the erosion of 
political commitment in liberal capitalist cultures.1 In effect, the purpose is a dual 
one, in that the task of providing the explanation is linked to that of demonstrating the 
continuing relevance of Marxism as an explanation of such cultures. However, 
Marxism needs reinvigorating and replenishing if this relevance is to be demonstrated 
and if it is to be rendered fit for the explanatory task in hand. Before outlining the 
requirements of such a task, I must explore the nature of the problem to be addressed.
I
It has become a journalistic and political commonplace in recent years that 
populations in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures are resistant to contributing (in 
whatever form) to the advancement of collective purposes. The difficulty of carrying 
out programmes requiring collective political commitment, whether of a radical or 
reformist kind, has been identified and discussed by both radical and mainstream social 
scientists.2 As committed a Marxist as E.M. Wood has recently come to the 
conclusion that the more capitalism is institutionalized the less likely is the kind of 
communal action required for revolutionary transformation.3 Bauman and Calhoun
1 By liberal capitalist cultures I mean contemporary apparently post-industrial (or de-industrializing) 
cultures whose earlier industrialization followed (up to a point) a free market model (the AngloSaxon 
cultures of England, United States and Australia). The concept of culture is used here to refer to the 
total way of life of a given population. This is culture as a particular way of relating to nature and 
other humans, or culture as all learned behaviour. This broad conception is considered to be of little 
use in the social sciences for two reasons: one, it is so all-encompassing as to lack any analytical 
purchase on the empirical world; two, the distinctive and insulated, autonomous cultures which its use 
presupposes are not to be found in the contemporary world. While these criticisms are well made, the 
inclusive conception remains useful for certain explanatory purposes, as I hope to show in this thesis. 
For a general account of the debates about culture, see Bauman (1973); Haferkamp (1989); Wuthnow et 
al (1984).
2 Bowring (1997) offers a useful survey which centres on Etzioni (1993). See also Boswell (1990); 
Lichterman (1996); Urry (1985).
3 See Wood (1991). Wood (1995) offers an excellent argument for the need for a revitalized Marxism, 
one, that is, drained of economic and technological determinisms. Geras (1990a) argues that the 
problem is exaggerated.
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both offer well-argued cases against the Marxian revolutionary scenario and, indeed, 
the logic of E.P. Thompson's great work on this question is that it is economism - 
meaning individualized self-interested motivations for collective action - rather than 
revolutionary fervour that is to be expected from proletarians, as opposed to artisans.4 
Turning to the contemporary period, the work of Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe5 
offers a refutation of the orthodox Marxist account of revolutionary action; one which 
requires us to interrogate the notion of economism and its myriad implications which 
informs the work of Bauman, Calhoun and indeed of Wood. The post-Marxism of 
Laclau and Mouffe will be the object of discussion in a later chapter. A discussion of 
this work will afford the opportunity to go beyond the kinds of explanations 
suggested by Bauman and Calhoun by alerting us to the importance of subjectivity. 
It will thereby open up the possibility of explaining the erosion of political 
commitment in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures; that is to say, in strongly 
individuated, fragmented cultures.
From theorists in the mainstream social sciences, the work of Mancur Olson, 
who takes the centrality of the calculating, self-interested subject as given, expresses 
most decisively the impossibility of effective collective action on the part of large or 
'latent' groups, i.e. classes and nations, in the absence of coercion or selective 
incentives.6 Other commentators, such as David Selboume, reject the givenness of 
such subjects and focus on the role of a discourse of rights in their constitution. Here 
the fragility of liberal democracies and the accompanying need for the education of 
citizens are stressed. Education for citizenship will inculcate 'a sense of place and 
time', a sense of 'the past human effort' which has brought us where we are today; it 
will be a 'collective moral education' of the 'next citizen body'. In other words, what 
is called for here is a kind of collective action oriented to the moral and cultural
g
revitalization of the population as a community.
In a recent contribution to this debate which emphasizes the need to enhance our 
capacity for collective action, (albeit one which refrains from offering solutions to the 
problem) John Dunn focuses on the problem of collective action as it pertains to the 
declining efficacy of the modem state's capacity for action. He sees the problem as 
one of an increasing gap between the undiminished powers of states and growing 
demands made on those powers. If there is a crisis of the nation state, he suggests, it 
emanates from the emergence of 'formidable new threats to human security' in the 
shape of ecological degradation and 'global economic dynamics' rather than a
4 See Bauman (1982); Calhoun (1982); Thompson (1968).
5 Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Laclau (1990).
6 Olson (1971).
7 These are statements made by Selbome during an interview on 'The World at One', BBC Radio 4, 
22 October 1996. The systematic presentation of these ideas is to be found in Selboume (1994).
8 See Bellah et al (1985); Etzioni (1993).
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'transitory, quasi-cyclical decline in political self-confidence'. While Dunn also 
mentions the possibility that the debility of states may lie in the 'cognitive limitations' 
or 'intemperate and inveterate greed' of their subjects, he unfortunately fails to discuss 
these factors.9
What is notable about most of these recent analyses (hints in the Dunn article 
apart) is the reluctance to consider the role of the major economic and cultural changes 
which have marked the populations of these countries since the late 1970s and the 
political enhancement of the effects of these changes through the institutionalization 
of neo-liberalism.10 Analyses are partial, relating to specific spheres - the cultural, the 
familial, the political, the international or ecological - rather than to the combined 
effects of processes and activities in all of the spheres which make up the social 
totality in capitalist cultures. This partiality or incompleteness results in a failure to 
get to the root of the matter; it produces a focus on the symptoms, rather than causes, 
of the problem. We need to look elsewhere for a satisfactory account of some of the 
key causes for the depletion of contemporary states' capacities to pursue programmes 
requiring voluntary sacrifices on the part of their citizens. Mention of Olson
above reminds us that there already exists a considerable body of literature on social 
movements and collective action in the modem world. This literature will offer clues 
about the constitution of political commitment. It is neither possible nor necessary 
to carry out a comprehensive review of this literature here.11 Rather what will be 
needed is a general indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the most notable 
contributions in this area in relation to the task in hand.
The best of this literature adopts a clear historical sociological focus which 
encompasses different and related levels of analysis. Tilly is the exemplary figure 
here who, from his earliest work, appreciated, on the one hand, the significance of the 
'lived experience' of groups involved and, on the other hand, the institutional effects of 
large-scale processes such as war, taxation and urbanization. The question of 'lived 
experience', as E P Thompson points out in a rather confused discussion of the topic,
is crucial to rendering a satisfactory account of the preconditions for and
12characteristics of collective action, one which was not neglected by Marx himself. 
Since this is a topic which has been neglected by a scientistic, objectivistic Marxism 
(the 'Marxism of the parties' to borrow Wallerstein's term13) it is important to find the 
theoretical means of assessing its character and causal weight. In The Vendee, Tilly
9 Dunn (1994), pp. 11, 14.
10 But see Bowring (1997); Sandel (1984).
11 Melucci (1996) includes an extensive survey of the collective action literature. See also Eyerman 
& Jamison (1991); Traugott (1995).
12 For more on Thompson's difficulties with the concept of experience, see the debate in Samuel 
(1981).
13 Wallerstein (1991).
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offers us a method of inferring the effects of social change on individuals at the level of 
'lived experience' by means of the concept of 'community organization' and relates 
these effects to readiness to participate in collective action.14 'Community 
organization' refers to the characteristics of social relations deriving from occupation, 
location in a social hierarchy and intensity and scope of involvement in the external 
world.
Another noteworthy contribution in this genre has been made by Calhoun 
(referred to above), whose objective is to assess accounts of collective action in terms 
of theories of community.15 His conclusion, based on an investigation of radical 
collective action in early nineteenth century England, is that such action requires a 
combination of affective, cognitive and organizational components which are found 
together rarely, if at all, in the modern world. This is because the affective 
component depends on the kind of communal group membership which either has 
disappeared or is fast disappearing in the contemporary world. Not only that, but 
the kinds of knowledge and organization required to provide the necessary scope and 
effectiveness for such action are such as to undermine such membership even where it 
does exist.
Tarrow adds an additional dimension to this body of work by focussing on the 
centrality of 'political opportunity structures' in facilitating or discouraging collective 
action. Here the state takes on great significance in terms of Tarrow's distinction 
between pre-modem forms of collective action 'embedded' in 'specific social structures' 
and a modem 'modular' 'general' 'indirect' and 'flexible' form which emerged in North 
America and Europe during the late eighteenth century.16 Particular structures, he 
argues, 'give rise to characteristic forms of collective action'. From a 'traditional 
repertoire' characterized by personalism and immediacy (e.g. violent attacks on 
particular individuals held to be responsible for a deplored state of affairs) context and 
issue specificity - and therefore inflexibility - we move to a modem repertoire 
characterized by generalizability or modularity, impersonality, organization and 
sustainability. Arising out of profound structural changes, the new form, unlike the 
old, has 'the capacity ... to produce sustained sequences of collective actions against 
powerful opponents that mark them off from the riots, charivaris and illuminations of
17the past'. Strikes and collective bargaining constitute important examples of such 
action.
This claim of Tarrow's is of particular interest if it is related to accounts of 
collective action which focus on the contemporary period. The work of Eder,
14 See Tilly (1964).
15 Calhoun (1982). These questions are pursued further in Calhoun (1991). Urry (1985) applies 
Calhoun’s analysis to contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.
16 Tarrow (1994) p. 40.
17 Ibid. p. 46.
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18Melucci, Offe and Habermas, while differing in many key respects, shares an 
interest in (and in some cases a distrust of) kinds of social movements and collective 
action which eschew the modem forms of organization and mobilization discussed by 
Tarrow. Here, bureaucratic forms of collective action - whether Leninist or liberal 
democratic - are rejected.19 The kind of action which Tarrow identifies as modem is 
now seen as either expressive of or complicit with the peculiarly modern form of 
domination captured by the Weberian term 'rationalization'. What Melucci, for 
example, emphasizes is the concern of these contemporary groups to reinstate the 
conditions for direct, immediate, local, face-to-face relationships. The organizational 
form of these small groups is an expression of rejection of the instrumental rationality 
of dominant institutions; it expresses 'being' rather than 'doing'. Furthermore, this 
'being' is a being marked by short-term, reversible commitments, multiple and 
challengeable leadership and ad hoc, temporary organizational structures. Hence the 
use of the term 'nomad' by Melucci. These groups are highly resistant to any 
attempts to 'solidify' or institutionalize a way of life or set of social relationships. 
Their members must be left free to remake or refashion themselves at will. Their 
action is limited action in limited areas for limited periods of time. Rejecting 
permanent organization and bureaucratic coordination as they do, they are easily
marginalized or undermined by individualist and instrumentalist cooptation. In fact,
20to speak of collective action or social movement here may be misleading. What we 
find instead are networks of multiple memberships with constantly changing means of 
identification. Neither in theory nor in practice is this kind of action to be equated
with the 'anti-systemic' movements to be found reacting against capitalism during the
21nineteenth century and against colonialism during the 1950s. From the point of 
view of the 'nomads' whose movements are analyzed by Melucci, such action is in 
itself a form of domination. 'Nomads of the present' refuse to support bureaucratic 
action but also do not engage in communal action of the kind to be discussed further 
below. Their rejection of the former does not lead them into the kind of sustained and 
effective political commitment which is required for the attainment of challenging 
collective purposes.
Following this analysis, we may be led to the conclusion that the decline in 
collective political commitment of the kind with which this thesis is concerned, arises 
from a healthy critical attitude towards a modernity whose emancipatory face is 
merely a mask for inherent and unavoidable domination. This may be part of the 
story, but it is unlikely to be the most significant part. Post-Marxism offers us
18 See Eder (1985, 1993); Habermas (1981); Melucci (1989, 1996); Offe (1985).
19 Boggs (1986) offers a very useful overview of new kinds of radical action.
20 See Boggs (1986); Touraine (1988).
21 See Arrighi et al (1989).
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reasons for looking beyond this kind of explanation, as will be seen, but post-Marxism 
itself does not go far enough for reasons which will be discussed. While all of the 
contributions looked at above help to fill gaps in our understanding of the nature of 
collective action, they neglect a fundamental level of explanation which it is the 
purpose of this thesis to develop by means of an enhanced account of Marxism. The 
argument to be made here is that a return to certain Marxist sources will allow us to 
make all of the arguments discussed above while at the same time indicating the 
remaining theoretical issues to be resolved.
What will be added to the indispensable contributions of the writers just 
discussed is a more theoretically informed and precise specification of the mechanisms 
which produce the specific kinds of subjects available (or not available) for political 
mobilization. This will be done by means of a return to the work of Marx and 
Gramsci on proletarian revolutionary action which is read here as an account of the 
constitution of collective political commitment. Collective action undertaken with a 
view to attaining demanding collective goals will be referred to from now on as 
transformative communal action. Transformative communal action is radically 
democratic collective action in which knowledgeable, self-disciplined, social subjects 
voluntarily and self-consciously engage so as to achieve collective purposes. This is a 
form of collective action which is contrasted with, at one extreme, the kind of 
communal action found in pre-capitalist cultures and, at the other extreme the 
impersonal, planned, bureaucratic action of which Weber speaks.22 Action of the 
latter kind is compatible - up to a point - with individualized self-interested collective 
action of the type mentioned above. By bringing out the assumptions informing the 
Marxian and Gramscian analyses of these matters, we may explore in greater and more 
theoretically informed detail the institutional context which made their shared notion 
of collective action both thinkable and apparently feasible. My argument will be that 
claims about both the need for and character of the collective action in question only 
make sense in relation to a specific conception of the human individual, i.e. the 
'bourgeois subject'. The bourgeois subject is the introspective, apparently self-
23creating, self-activating, self-disciplined but also socially-oriented subject. The 
availability of the theory and (to a certain limited extent) actuality of this bourgeois 
subject informs both Marx's critique of capitalism and his conception of the 
proletarian collective actor as a radically democratic formation. Insofar as this subject 
fails to materialize, then so will the kind of action looked for by Marxists and so will, 
too, the kind of political commitment with which this thesis is concerned. The 
argument will be that while early liberal capitalist institutions were (up to a point)
22 Weber (1991), pp. 196 - 244.
23 For more on this see Cascardi (1992); Habermas (1992); Touraine (1995).
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productive of the bourgeois subject,24 changes emerging from and necessary to the 
flourishing of capitalism produced quite different socially and cognitively debilitated 
subjects for whom sustained and dedicated attention to collective goals became 
difficult, if not impossible.
n
My claim is that Marxism offers us the best means of understanding the erosion of 
collective political commitment in liberal capitalist cultures. This is because 
Marxism affords the possibility of developing a rigorous and systematic account of 
the constitution of first, culturally specific capitalist forms of subjectivity and second, 
political commitment of the kind with which this thesis is concerned. Here Marxism 
is read as consisting of two distinguishable but related strands: first is the account of 
capitalism as mode of life or culture as offered by Marx and Althusser; second, the 
account of proletarian revolutionary action as offered by Marx and Gramsci. Both 
strands are read as accounts of subjectivity. A comparison of the two will show that 
the subjects produced by liberal capitalism are incapable of the kind of self-disciplined 
political commitment needed to undertake and complete demanding collective tasks.
It should be noted that Marxism will need to be refurbished and expanded if it is 
to fulfil the task undertaken in this thesis. The rationalism and economism which 
mark so many Marxist studies have had deleterious consequences for theories of 
collective action since they have marginalized or even effaced the importance of 
subjectivity and of the 'nonrational'. Put another way, they have marginalized or 
effaced the centrality of 'lived experience'.25 Rationalism has marginalized the role of 
a felt sense of personal commitment to collective purposes and economism has hidden 
from view the importance of non-economic spheres of activity. What gets lost in 
these approaches is the realization that Marxism involves the study of social life as a 
constantly evolving stream of inter-related processes and relations which are both 
productive of and reproduced by subjects of a specific kind. Our social relations, 
subjectivities and purposes and our knowledge of these need to be understood 
historically and socially. Rationalistic, economistic Marxism is the product of the
24 But also, at the same time, and necessarily, the proletarian subject.
25 This orientation tends to express itself in a preoccupation with the concept of exploitation, at the 
expense of that of alienation or fetishism. See, for example, Roemer (1982, 1995); Wright (1978, 
1993). Przeworski (1985), pp. 92 - 97 argues for methodological individualism as a means of dealing 
with the problem of subjectivity in Marxism. Wright (1997) offers an interesting contemporary 
example of an 'orthodox' exploitation-centred analysis which attempts to deal with the problem of 
'consciousness'. In the absence of a dialectical method, Wright is left with the 'micro/macro' 
dichotomy as his only apparent resource. The result is the most banal kind o f analysis. For an 
account of the emergence of orthodox or vulgar Marxism, see Colletti (1976ii). For a more general 
account of the problem of economism in Marxism, see Baudrillard (1975); Thompson (1978a).
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very capitalism which it seeks to criticize. What this means is that we need to 
apply 'the materialist conception of history to the materialist conception of history 
itself, as Korsch once put it.26
The application of Marxism to Marxism itself shows that many Marxists have 
failed to be sufficiently historical and dialectical in their work which has been informed 
by an analytic rather than dialectic ontology and method productive of an economistic
27and objectivist conception of materialism. Such an approach falls into an 
'objectivism' which takes subjectivity or 'consciousness' as a derivative phenomenon 
requiring no serious attention since its 'contents' can be read off from the real, lawful 
mechanisms which produce it. Hidden from the view of such Marxists is the 
possibility that supposed consequences or epiphenomena (for example, in relation to 
collective action, the 'lived experience' of actual members of the working class) can in 
their turn become causal. These shortcomings have proved crippling in relation to the 
task of understanding the preconditions for transformative communal action, or, for 
the constitution of political commitment. The rectification of these shortcomings will 
be effected in this thesis by articulating psychoanalysis to a materialist dialectical 
Marxism.
I now turn to give a summary account of the thesis which follows.
About the thesis
Having identified the problem and the inadequacies of existing accounts of the 
problem, I go on in chapter two to develop a non-reductive dialectical Marxist 
approach derived from the work of Marx himself28 and supplemented by that of the 
Japanese Uno School of Marxism29 and of Althusser.30 As mentioned above, the 
method requires an historically-informed focus on capitalist cultures characterized as 
constantly-changing totalities of necessary and necessarily related processes, relations 
and practices. The Marxian conceptual distinction between transhistorical and 
historical abstractions will be of use in helping to maintain that focus. The method 
also requires a recognition of the significance of three different levels of analysis: of 
'pure' capitalism, of stages of capitalism and of spatially-historically specific 
manifestations of capitalism in social formations. The utility of this move is clarified
26 Korsch (1970), p. 92. See also Callari & Ruccio (1996).
27 Cohen (1978) is one of the most sophisticated examples of this school of Marxism. See also Shaw 
(1978).
28 Marx (1973b, 1976).
29 Albritton (1986, 1991)
30 Althusser (1990i, 1990ii)
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by means of the Unoist school of Marxism. Finally, Althusser's work on totality and 
contradiction affords the means of conceptualizing relations between the different 
spheres of capitalist cultures. This work also opens the way to the articulation of 
psychoanalysis to Marxism. For the moment, the utility of the Freudian conception 
of overdetermined causality and Althusser's use of the distinction between 
displacement and condensation should be noted.
Chapter three engages with the substance of the argument. It begins to show the 
relationship between forms of subjectivity and political commitment - by way of an 
exploration of the work of Laclau and Mouffe, whose post-Marxist analysis of radical 
collective action is read as an account of the erosion of political commitment in 
contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.31 The important clues offered in this work 
include the subject effects of capitalism's peculiar and unprecedented structural 
'looseness' and relatedly (at least by implication) the utility of psychoanalysis in 
explaining these effects. Here we will note the way in which the concept of 
overdetermination is adapted to account for different kinds of subject effects. These 
clues are followed up in subsequent chapters. Lacunae include the absence of an 
institutional analysis of the constitution of subjectivities, so chapter four makes good 
this deficiency through an examination of three different works concerned with 
institutions and subjectivity - works by Castoriadis,32 Habermas33 and Althusser.34
Castoriadis offers a basic and general framework for using the concept of 
institution. Habermas and Althusser enable us to consider institutionalization during 
two different capitalist stages - early liberal and organized capitalism respectively. 
This work also enables us to expand on the post-Marxist account of capitalism 
discussed in chapter three. Habermas's work shows how capitalism's 'decentred 
structure' or 'relative structuration' is institutionally expressed so as to produce 
apparently coherent active bourgeois subjects. Althusser's work on the Ideological
35State Apparatuses (ISAs) shows how the docile proletarian subjects required by 
organized capitalism may be constituted. Here again, we will note the significance of 
the psychoanalytic components in these accounts. Having brought together two 
different kinds of institutional analysis and discussed the contrast between bourgeois 
and proletarian subjects, we will be in a position to undertake an institutional account 
of'pure' capitalism derived from Marx's Capital 1.
The return to Marx will enable me, in chapter five, to begin the task of 
constructing the institutional framework which produces the fluid, unstable and 
atomistic subjects which post-Marxism sees as an obstacle to the constitution of a
31 Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Laclau (1990).
32 Castoriadis (1987).
33 Habermas (1992).
34 Althusser (1984i, 1984iii).
35 Althusser (1984i).
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transformative communal actor. In this chapter Marx's Capital 1 is read as an account 
of capitalism as culture; of capitalism as producer of social relations and therefore of 
subjects of specific kinds. This is a realist explanation of how capitalism would 
function given the complete and successful transformation of a population in line with
36its requirements. Such a transformation would produce subjects marked by a 
peculiar kind of social and cognitive debility whose character is expressed in the 
individual/society and subjective/objective dichotomies.
Chapter six considers Marx's analysis of the overcoming of this debility in the 
emergence of transformative communal action. This is communal action as it would 
emerge out of pure capitalism. The argument here will be that, as Capital 1 is an 
account of 'pure' capitalism, so the analysis of collective action offered in The 
Communist Manifesto (CM) is an account of 'pure' proletarian communal action. 
Here Marx sets out to show how the atomistic, self-interested subject instituted by 
liberal industrial capitalism gives way to the active social subject capable of intense 
and dedicated political commitment to collective (communal) purposes i.e. the subject 
capable of engaging in a form of association described by Marx as 'active union'. 
Having teased out some of the theoretical implictions of this underdeveloped concept, 
I turn next to undertake its further development with the help of Gramsci's work.37
Gramsci is faced with the problem of conceptualizing (so as to constitute) 
political commitment under conditions of the kinds of fragmentation and unevenness 
that mark social formations. The significance of his work here is that he analyzes 
the institutional means of reconstituting - under conditions of radical fragmentation - 
social relations which are experienced as morally imperative. Furthermore he 
discusses this in terms of the reconstitution of subjectivity (and therefore of social 
relations) through the reconstitution of knowledge. That is to say, he discusses 
knowledge from an institutional point of view. Unfortunately, he does not have 
available to him a psychology which would enable him to offer a systematic account 
of the mechanisms involved. The completion of his theory (and the completion of my 
argument) requires the systematic articulation of psychoanalysis to Marxism.
In chapter eight I turn to develop more systematically the psychoanalytic 
component of the theory, some of whose characteristics will have been suggested in 
earlier chapters. This component can be articulated to Marxism by means of the kind 
of analysis undertaken by Marx in relation to the classical political economists i.e. by 
showing the way in which Freud tends to conflate universal and historical 
abstractions, thereby naturalizing the state of affairs which he theorizes. Freud's 
theory of the Oedipal family completes Habermas's work discussed in chapter four: 
Lacan's theory of the decentred subject completes that of post-Marxism and
36 Outhwaite (1987).
37 Gramsci (1971, 1985, 1995).
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Althusser. Finally, Freud's account of sublimation and of the origin of intellection and 
of the transition from primary to secondary process functioning will enable me to 
analyze, more rigorously and systematically than was possible in earlier chapters, the 
subject effects of pure capitalism as well as the social relations required for the 
institution of a transformative communal actor.
In the final chapter I return to the contemporary period so as to reevaluate the 
problem of political commitment - first discussed in chapter three - in the light of 
subsequent findings. It will be shown that Marx's account of 'pure' capitalism 
expresses most forcefully many of the realities of contemporary social relations as 
instituted since the early 1980s in liberal capitalist cultures. The fluid contemporary 
decentred subject, like the bourgeois and proletarian subjects who preceded him38, is 
the overdetermined product of a multiplicity of institutional changes which render the 
experience of coherence, self-discipline and self-activation extremely difficult, or even 
impossible. Put another way, the debility described by Marx has been intensified 
during the contemporary disorganized stage of capitalism. At this point I shall hope 
to have made clear that what Laclau and Mouffe are discussing are, in effect, subjects 
governed largely by the primary process, subjects, that is, incapable of the delayed 
gratification and sustained direction of attention (and therefore sustained pursuit of 
specified goals) which characterize subjects governed by the secondary process. 
Since the Marxian and Gramscian conception of communal action requires such 
subjects, it seems that post-Marxism's claim about the difficulty (or even 
impossibility) of constituting such collective action (as well as more modest intra- 
cultural forms of political commitment) is correct, but not necessarily or solely for the 
reasons which it provides.
38 As the use of the masculine pronoun is a theoretical necessity in the psychoanalytic parts of this 
thesis, this usage will be retained throughout in the interests of coherence and consistency.
Chapter two
Outline of method and approach
This chapter consists of three parts. The first part is an exploration of Marx's method 
for studying industrial capitalism.1 The method is a materialist dialectical method 
related to the conception of capitalism as a totality or whole characterized by 'the 
concentration of many determinations' or as 'a unity of the diverse'. This totality, 
unity or whole is, furthermore, a contradictory and therefore dynamic unity of 
relations, processes and practices.2 The second part expands on Marx's method with 
the aid of the Japanese Unoist school of Marxism.3 This school helps us to get at the 
source of the rationalism and economism characterizing orthodox or 'scientific' 
Marxism. One of its central claims is that Capital 7  offers an account, neither of 
actually existing capitalism nor of the historical transition from feudalism to capitalism 
in England but rather of 'pure' capitalism as totality.4 Capital 7 is a logical analysis 
involving a thought experiment which enables Marx to identify the real properties (or 
causal powers) of a capitalism undiluted by pre- or anti-capitalist social relations. If 
we are to avoid the rationalism and economism resulting from applying the resulting 
set of categories to the empirical realm, we must develop an intermediate level of 
analysis relating to stages of capitalist development. The third part takes up 
Althusser's expansion of the Marxian dialectical method in 'Contradiction and 
Overdetermination ' (CO)5, 'On the Materialist Dialectic'(OMD)6 and Reading 
Capital1, an expansion which is undertaken with the explicit goal of combatting 
economistic and deterministic Marxism. Althusser insists on the necessity of 
conceptualizing capitalism as a mode of life or culture; as a totality or whole which 
has a uniquely fragmented structure. This structure is made up of instances or 
practices within and between which contradictory relations hold and to which linear or 
expressive conceptions of causality cannot apply. Althusser’s contribution to the 
method adopted in this thesis is that, first, he offers a range of concepts which enable
1 Since this not a thesis about methodology, the subleties, details and complexities o f the debates 
which flourish around the question of Marx's method will not be dealt with here. A succinct account of 
these debates as they relate to the present work can be found in Kain (1986), ch. 1. The summation of 
my position is that I reject both 'continuist' and 'discontinuist' accounts of Marx's theoretical and 
methodological trajectory and reject in addition any notion of a radical split between a 'scientific' and 
'critical' Marx (although such distinctions are certainly and usefully applicable to Marxists). See 
Gouldner (1980).
2 Marx (1973b), p. 101.
3 Albritton (1986, 1991).
4 See also Althusser & Balibar (1970), pp. 194 - 6; Althusser (1977i, 1990v); Colletti (1976i); 
Giddens (1973), ch. 1; Mattick (1993); Moseley (1993).
5 Althusser (1990i).
6 Althusser (1990ii)
7 Althusser & Balibar (1970).
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us to think about relations between the fragments in a non-reductive way and second - 
and relatedly - he points towards the means of articulating psychoanalysis to 
Marxism.
I
Marx's method
In talking of Marx's method we need to be aware that Marx himself had very little to 
say about this.8 Method is related on the one hand to a theory and, on the other, to 
the specific object which the theory claims to analyze and explain.9 In this 
connection, Marx's own complaint about one interpretation of his work should be 
noted. Here is his response to the critic who
insists on transforming my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in 
Western Europe [the section on primitive accumulation in Capital 1] into a 
historico-philosophical theory of the general course fatally imposed on all 
peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves 
placed, in order to arrive ultimately at this economic formation which assures 
the greatest expansion of the productive forces of social labour, as well as the 
most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. That is to do me 
both too much honour and too much discredit.10
There is no master key in the shape of a 'supra-historical', 'historical-philosophical 
theory' which will yield us understanding of all human phenomena. Marx's method of 
inquiry was developed to explore the nature of industrial capitalism as it emerged in 
England during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His project was a 
critical one of revealing the total cultural novelty of capitalism in terms of the kinds of 
social relations which it produced and required for its functioning. This revelation 
was intended to encourage the emergence of a transformative communal actor with the 
power to replace capitalism by a superior form of culture in which the human 
potential for freedom, creativity and sociality would be realized to its fullest and most 
diverse extent. The method which Marx developed to advance this project (and 
theory to which the method is necessarily or internally related) remains of vital 
importance in helping us to understand the character of the contemporary liberal
8 See Althusser (1990ii, 1996); Althusser & Balibar (1970); Bhaskar (1980); Carver (1975); Lukacs 
(1971i); Marx (1978), ch. 2; Meister (1990); Rattansi (1989); Tribe (1989).
9 Althusser (1990vi).
10 Letter to the Editorial Board of Otechestvennye Zapiski, quoted in Shanin (1983), p. 136.
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capitalist world which exemplifies those fundamental characteristics which Marx first 
identified and criticized. First, a word about the theory.
Marx's theory is both historical and materialist. It is historical in the 
fundamental sense that it claims human nature to be the constantly-changing cause and 
consequence of productive action on nature. It is materialist in the sense that it takes 
productive action on nature as its object of study. Production is used here in a broad 
sense to embrace all human activity. It therefore precedes the culture/economy split 
and necessarily embraces the conceptual or meaningful.11 In other words, Marx's 
materialism is not a reductive or mechanical materialism. Rather it is a materialism of 
'sensuous activity' or practices, therefore of a kind which transcends the misleading 
dichotomy of 'ideal' and 'material' whose origins are explored so revealingly in The 
German Ideology.12 The object of study then becomes, not production somehow 
conflated with the 'matter in motion' of mechanical materialists, but rather real, 
concretely-existing individuals engaged in social relations and practices which are 
necessarily but not only material. From this point of view, cultures are conceptualized 
as modes of production or totalities consisting of logically and empirically interlinked 
(internally related) sets of relations, processes and practices grounded in the 
essentially human and constantly changing activity of production conceived in a broad 
sense. More specifically, the bourgeois mode of production is a radically new kind of 
totality which is characterized by the proliferation of ever-changing fragmentations 
relating to the kind of division of labour and differentiation of spheres which 
commodification requires.
The question of the 'completed bourgeois system' and its wholly novel character 
will be a central one in this thesis. For the moment, the cognitive significance of the 
emphasis on the totality, rather than on its parts, should be noted. Unlike other 
social sciences, Marxism, or historical materialism, wants to produce knowledge of the 
totality, rather than of specific aspects of the totality. It is therefore, as E.P. 
Thompson notes, 'the discipline in which all other disciplines meet.'13 If it is to fulfil 
its theoretical and political tasks it must be open to the findings of those other 
disciplines. Openness to psychoanalysis will be the key to completion of the present 
task. In order to understand what this openness means in methodological terms, I 
shall consider Marx's use of the work of the classical political economists.14
The economic categories developed by Smith and Ricardo offer Marx a means of 
approaching the bewildering complexity of the concrete world in a systematic
11 For more on this, see D'Amico (1981).
12 Marx & Engels (1976); See Sayer (1983), ch. 1. Jordan (1967) offers an exhaustive discussion of 
the differences between mechanical materialism and Marx's materialism, or naturalism, to use the term 
which Jordan prefers.
13 Thompson (1978a), p.70. See also Jameson (1983a).
14 See Kain (1986); Sayer (1983).
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manner.15 This way of proceeding by means of an existing body of theory is present 
in Marx's work from the beginning: first capitalism as civil society and political state 
is explored through the work of Hegel and Bruno Bauer in the 'Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right' and 'On the Jewish Question' respectively;16 then capitalism as 
economic system is explored through the work of the bourgeois political economists 
(and of socialists such as Proudhon) in the 1844 Manuscripts,17 The Poverty o f  
Philosophy18 and the Grundrisse.19 Through a deconstruction of these theories (i.e. a 
revelation of their historical and class specificity and of the consequences of the failure 
on the part of theorists to notice this) Marx expects to move on to a fuller, more 
scientific account of capitalism. In order to understand why Marx considers pre­
existing bodies of theory to be useful points of departure in developing a critical 
theory of capitalism, it will be necessary to say something about Marx's conception of 
praxis.20
Marx on praxis
Praxis refers to human activity of a certain kind; activity, that is, informed by a 
clearly-conceived purpose or set of purposes. The concept is an expression of 
Marx's conviction that reality as sensuous human activity is always, in however 
minimal a sense, conceptual and that it produces (or at least can produce) out of itself 
thought which is active, that is, which is oriented in an active way to the world of 
which it is in some sense the expression.21 For Marx, knowledge of the world is 
obtained through an active process of engagement with that world, not through 
passive observation and absorption of that world as the eighteenth century mechanical 
materialists had maintained. Once gained, that knowledge can be used to reproduce or 
transform the world in question through praxis. In a sense which will be explored 
further below, there is a dialectical relationship between thought and reality.22 This 
is because human beings are creatures who are capable of forming purposes in relation 
to a pre-existing reality. They are capable of becoming actively conscious, not only 
of that reality, but of their own relationship to that reality. Self-consciousness is
15 In fact we can identify three starting points in Marx's analyses of capitalism: first, empirical reality 
as manifested in the Blue Books etc., second, Marx's own concepts, third, the categories of political 
economy. See Zel6ny (1980), ch. 4. See also Nicolaus (1973).
16 See Marx (1994).
17 Marx (1977).
18 Marx (1978).
19 Marx (1973b).
20 See Lutacs (1971i).
21 Livergood (1967); Lobkowicz (1967).
22The social scientist needs to maintain a distinction between the 'real' object and the object of 
knowledge; between the intransitive and transitive dimensions o f the process of knowledge production. 
For more on this, see Althusser (1990ii); Althusser & Balibar (1970), pt. 1; Bhaskar (1978, 1989); 
Collier (1989). See also Horkheimer (1972ii, 1972iii).
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expressed most systematically in philosophy. However, philosophy merely 
interprets the world. It confines itself to the level of contemplation and fails to 
engage with the actual. The role of science is to provide the kind of knowledge which 
will render new kinds of praxis possible; to change the world rather than merely to 
interpret it. It should be noted though that the advent of science heralds not the 
elimination but rather the transcendence of philosophy. Transcendence is here used in 
the Hegelian dialectical sense to refer to a process of simultaneous negation and 
preservation. Marxian scientific concepts are also always philosophical or, put 
another way, science renders philosophy active rather than contemplative.24
It follows from what has been said that for Marx, the development of knowledge 
is closely connected to real social movement. Movement or development within the 
world is necessarily bound up with human action (praxis) in the world and is therefore 
always in some sense categorial or conceptual development. Political economy is the 
theoretical expression of that movement in relation to the modem capitalist world. If 
one wants to understand that world then political economy is the place to begin:
[I]t is this political economy which has to be regarded on the one hand as a 
product of the real energy and real movement of private property (it is a 
movement of private property become independent for itself in consciousness 
- the modem industry as Self - as a product of modem industry - and on the 
other hand, as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and 
development of modern industry and made it a power in the realm of 
consciousness.25
In brief, political economy is both caused and causal. It is a reflection, from a specific 
point of view, on emergent entities in an existing reality, a reflection which first 
identifies and thereafter renders more systematic categories of persons, activities and 
processes in that reality. Historically, this particular theoretical rendering of an 
emergent state of affairs became the basis (necessary but not sufficient) for facilitating 
specific developments by eliminating or discouraging activities and processes which 
would have prevented their flourishing 26 So political economy is knowledge which 
has served in the redirection, rather than merely reproduction, of an existing state of 
affairs. But it could only fulfil this function because it constituted reliable, or 
scientific knowledge.27 So, for example, political economists such as Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo produced scientific knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the real 
properties) of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century English capitalism. They
23 See Nicolaus (1973), p. 32.
24 See Kosik (1976).
25 quoted in Kain (1986), p. 19.
26 See Corrigan (1980); Corrigan & Sayer (1985); Kanth (1986); Polanyi (1957).
27 See Cohen (1978), Appendix I.
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began the important work of class analysis and of identifying the true source of value. 
Political economy expresses certain aspects of capitalism quite satisfactorily through 
the concepts of value, money, capital, labour and the commodity. These concepts are 
grounded in concrete developments in the England of the Industrial Revolution which 
is, as Marx notes, the locus classicus of 'the relations of production and forms of 
intercourse' corresponding to the capitalist mode of production.28
However, the categories of political economy are marked by a kind of structural 
flaw or fundamental category error in that they consistently naturalize the historically 
specific social relations of capitalism. They do this by conflating transhistorical 
abstractions - labour, raw materials, tools - and historical abstractions - commodities, 
money, capital.29 The effect of this conflation is that the socio-cultural and historical 
are naturalized and universalized, so that political economy can depict itself as having 
discovered the natural laws of economic production. Moreover, the unselfconscious 
use of the analytic method by political economy leads to the reification of entities 
abstracted from the social relations in which they are necessarily embedded, e.g. 
'individual', 'labour', etc.30 Political economy conceptualizes the social world as an 
aggregate of isolated, independent, atomistic entities having contingent rather than 
necessary relations with one another. The assumption is that these isolated entities 
can be captured at a specific moment in time through the method of abstraction and 
studied in that isolated, frozen state. The analytic approach which is adopted by 
political economy, as well as by most of the social sciences, abstracts entities from a 
complex reality, that is, separates in thought what is inseparable in reality, then reifies 
that separation by confusing the analytic category with the social entity which is now 
left as an apparently free-standing unit having only external and contingent, rather 
than internal and necessary relations with other apparently free-standing entities. 
The world is seen as an assemblage of clearly bounded objective entities which exist 
independently of each other. One of two approaches is then used to explain the 
relationship between these apparently free-standing entities and to solve the problem 
of the relationship and causal weight of apparently opposing phenomena (e.g. 
structure/agency, determinism/voluntarism, economics/politics, society/individual, 
material/ideal, rationality/affect) which the process of abstraction establishes. The 
first approach is dualism, which claims the total distinctiveness and separateness of 
these entities and so the impossibility of explaining one in terms of the other. The 
second is reductionism, which reduces one to the other. Neither of these approaches 
is satisfactory because both of them do cognitive violence to cultures as they really
28 Marx (1976), p. 90.
29 See Sayer (1983, 1987). See Castoriadis (1978) and Garnett (1995) for claims that Marx himself 
was not immune to this tendency.
30 See Cullenberg (1996), pp. 127 - 30.
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function.31 The method which Marx developed was worked out in the light of the 
cognitive and social violence which analytic abstraction inflicts on the phenomena 
which it seeks to know. As will be seen, it was through the use of the dialectic 
method that Marx sought to transcend the inadequacies of the method of political 
economy.
Marx and the dialectic
The premise of the Marxian dialectic, as Lukacs has put it, 'is that things should be 
shown to be aspects of processes'.32 Hence cultures are constituted as social 
relationships in flux rather than as an aggregate of radically separate 'things' or atoms. 
The task of Marxian dialectics is to translate the 'things' and 'facts' produced by 
political economy back into processes carried by social relations. Such a translation 
will provide a full account of the 'concrete reality' of industrial capitalism while at the 
same time revealing, first, the way in which that reality has transformed social 
relations and, second, the likelihood or otherwise that somehow out of this concrete 
reality will emerge the kinds of social relations necessary to constitute a 
transformative communal actor.
This is the materialist dialectical method, as opposed to the idealist dialectic of 
Hegel. Hegel's dialectical logic is an a priori method based on logical analysis. It exists 
at the conceptual rather than the practical empirical level. For Hegel, the latter is 
composed of abstract, or disconnected entities whose connections are achieved only in 
thought.33 Because Hegel had made the dialectical nature of thought the basis of 
concrete reality, that is, he saw the actually existing social world as a manifestation of 
the Concept, he failed to achieve his goal of transcending the thought/being (or 
ideal/material) dichotomy. Marx does this by stressing the necessary material or 
embodied character of conceptual thought as well as the necessarily conceptual 
character of human activity, as mentioned before. Although he himself refers to the 
need to invert the Hegelian dialectic, the notion of inversion is, as Althusser claims, 
unsatisfactory since it leaves the dialectic fundamentally unchanged.34 I shall return
31 Habermas (1988) offers a thoughtful account of the difficulties raised by these approaches in the 
social sciences. See Giddens (1984) for an ambitious (but ultimately unsatisfactory) attempt to resolve 
the structure/agency problem. Archer (1995) offers the most thorough and systematic account of the 
weaknesses of Giddens's approach.
32 Lukdcs (1971ii), p. 179.
33 See Gould (1979), ch. 1.
34 See Engels (1936; 1966); Lenin (1961); Meikle (1985). Nicolaus (1983); Shamsavari (1991) offer 
useful accounts of the Hegelian element (which they see as wholly beneficial) in Marx's mature thought. 
See also Jameson (1974), ch. 5; Mattick (1993); Nicolaus (1973); Thompson (1978a), p. 63, sees 
dialectical logic as tending to overwhelm the empirical in Capital 1, but this is because he 
misunderstands the character of that work. See also Piccone (1972).
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to this question in section three of the present chapter. For the moment, let us see 
what Marx himself says about this:
My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the 
Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which 
he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of'the Idea', is 
the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance 
of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material 
world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought...
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It 
must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell.35
This statement needs some interpretation and qualification if it is to be seen as 
compatible with the extremely subtle analysis which Marx himself carries out in 
Capital 1. As it stands, it seems to be an expression of a vulgar materialist account of 
the world, an account which is incompatible with some of Marx's own most powerful 
insights (as captured most compellingly and succinctly in the Theses on Feuerbach) 
about the inadequacy of both materialism and idealism.36 In any case, the logic of the 
dialectic is a logic whose rigorous use requires the transcendence of all such 
dichotomies. It is the stress on the 'general forms of motion' which must be 
maintained here as that which connects Marx's dialectic to that of Hegel, this being a 
reference to the dialectic as a process whose dynamism is propelled by necessary 
contradictions. Apart from this, it is Marx's 'difference from' rather than 'opposition 
to' the Hegelian dialectic which needs to be borne in mind. Marx's use of the 
dialectical method is not accurately captured by either the 'inversion' or 'kernel' 
metaphors. Rather than turning Hegel's dialectic upside down Marx is transforming it 
so as to effect the transcendence of the ideal/material dichotomy. In effecting this 
transcendence, he is at the same time rendering the method capable of capturing the 
character of the capitalist totality in a way which recognizes the causal weight of the 
material as well as of the conceptual without falling into a reductive or mechanical 
materialism.37
35 Marx (1976), Postface to the Second Edition, pp. 102 - 3.
36 Marx in Marx & Engels (1976), pp. 3 - 5 .
37 Althusser (1990i, 1990ii); Bhaskar (1987), pp.115 - 145. See also Oilman (1976, 1993).
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The Marxian dialectic and contradiction
The dialectic as method is needed because capitalism is a contradictory totality of 
multiple and complex determinations. These are the result of the new kind of 
division of labour and differentiation of spheres needed for the realization of the law 
of value. This is what renders capitalism inherently contradictory and at the same 
time cognitively elusive. As we have seen above, the analytic method captures merely 
the appearances of this novel and bewildering form of culture. The dialectical method 
is needed to penetrate capitalism's opacity in order to arrive at accurate knowledge of 
its functioning. While Marx himself makes a general claim for the universality of the 
dialectic, he also notes the peculiarly dialectical character of capitalism.38 For Marx, 
the dialectic
includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous 
recognition of its negation, its inevitable destruction ... it regards every 
historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore 
grasps its transient aspect as well.
Following this statement of the general applicability of the dialectic, Marx goes on to 
refer to the uniquely contradictory character of capitalism, whose movement 'is full of 
contradictions'.39 It is because capitalism is essentially contradictory that the 
dialectical method is needed. Here, the dialectic is used in an empirical sense, as will be 
seen. However, a more fundamental philosophical usage will also be necessary when 
we come to look at Marx's account of human nature and revolution. For the moment, 
though, we can concentrate on contradiction as an empirical phenomenon.
Marx writes about empirical contradictions in his work on crises, in Theories o f  
Surplus Value II. There he notes
An 'absolute contradiction' is a condition in which the opposites, which 
compose the contradiction constitutive of the essential unity, pull apart from 
each other and cease to interpenetrate. The mediations holding them together 
in the unity break down, leaving each of them free and independent, bringing 
the life process of the whole entity to a standstill.40
One example of such 'pulling apart' is that of the production and circulation of 
commodities in industrial capitalism. These processes are separated both spatially 
and temporally and therefore risk being pulled apart in the manner just cited. 
Contrast this with earlier forms of exchange (trucking and bartering), where buying and
38 For more on this, see Rader (1979).
39 Marx (1976a), p. 103.
40 Quoted by Meikle (1985), p. 119.
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selling constituted one concrete activity engaged in by the direct producers of goods in 
concrete markets; in which buyer was also seller and seller was also buyer. Here what 
is produced for exchange must be seen as a use-value by a potential buyer who, in 
turn, must have something useful to offer in exchange. Without this complementary 
usefulness, no exchange takes place. However, since exchange is only a marginal 
activity, production being mainly for use by the producer, no disaster follows the 
absence of exchange here. Contrary to this, there is a kind of 'double jeopardy' in the 
culture in which production for exchange predominates. First, because buying and 
selling are 'pulled apart' - because there are phases through which the commodity has 
to move in order to realize its value - it is vulnerable to failures in such realization. 
Second, since production for exchange is predominant - it is the form on which the 
collectivity depends - failure of realization is potentially disastrous. So, production 
is likely to be crisis-ridden due to the necessary fragmentation involved in commodity 
production and distribution; crises arise from the existence of contradictions between 
necessary and interdependent elements of the productive system. Or, as Marx says 
'crisis is nothing but the forcible assertion of the unity of phases of the production 
process which have become independent of each other'.41 As we see, contradiction
is here used in an empirical rather than metaphysical sense to capture the character of 
relations between necessary elements of industrial capitalist totalities which are 
marked by a kind of fragmentation which allows of the relatively independent 
development of these necessary elements.
Those who criticize the Marxian usage of contradiction do so from a position 
which emphasizes the logical character of the concept. Here contradiction is held to 
be a property of propositions rather than of social relations or processes. For such 
thinkers, to identify contradictions in reality is to make a category mistake.42 
Marxists are split on this question in that while some of them accept the account of 
contradiction of which I have offered a very truncated version above, others stress 
that contradiction is a logical, rather than metaphysical or empirical entity while at the 
same time denying that Marx was guilty of its alleged misuse.43 In general, criticisms 
derive from the fear that the abandonment of analytical logic portends the 
abandonment of science. Such a fear rests on a failure to understand the character and 
task of the Marxian dialectical method. The method does not require the 
abandonment of rigour or of the law of non-contradiction as it relates to propositions. 
On the contrary, rigorous and logical analysis remains a necessary moment in the 
process of knowledge production. However, the abstraction required for such 
analysis needs to be accompanied by an awareness of the necessary violence which
41 Marx (1951), p. 383.
42 Colletti (1975).
43 See Edgley (1979); Norman & Sayers (1980); Shamsavari (1991); Wilson (1991).
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such abstraction perpetrates on the rich complexity and constant movement of the 
world. Such awareness is manifested in a process-centred dialectical approach which 
stresses the relational character of entities in the social world and which also, 
therefore, emphasizes the necessary fluidity of the concepts which we use to 
appropriate that world in knowledge.44
n
Marx's method: some amendments and developments
I derive my method from a particular reading of Marx by the Japanese Unoist school 
(as interpreted by Albritton).45 Through the use of this method the peculiar 
character of social relations institutionalized by capitalism can be discussed with 
maximum clarity and systematicity. First, it shows us how to avoid the problem of 
conflating transhistorcal and historical abstractions. Second, and relatedly, it enables 
us to trace the theoretical and methodological sources of the extreme abstractness of 
much Marxist work and of the determinism and economism which result from this 
abstractness.46 Third, through its focus on the character of dominant use-value 
production, it enables us to think more systematically about the kind of lived 
experience or 'everydayness' instituted by capitalism.
This particular method posits three levels of analysis as follows: first, an abstract 
level of the theory of the logic of capitalism; second, an intermediate level of theory 
informed by a non-teleological conception of stages of capitalism drawn from the 
historical development of dominant forms of capitalism; third, an historical level 
which is concerned with specific individual examples of capitalist development (what 
Althusser describes as social formations). This three-level approach is consistent with 
Marx's own purposes and usages, as mentioned above, and avoids the conflation of 
the logical (level 1) and the historical (level 3) which almost inevitably produces 
economistic, deterministic readings of the historical development of capitalism and of 
social formations.47
The three levels are not absolutely separate; rather, there is a dialectical 
relationship between different levels in that the theory of pure capitalism is based on 
the work of the early political economists who were deriving their categories from
44 See Oilman (1976); Sayer (1987).
45 Albritton (1986, 1991).
46 These characteristics are also a function of the capitalist mode of life which necessarily shapes 
Marxists as well. However, attentiveness to theoretical and methodological problems can help us to 
mitigate distortions coming from this source.
47 Colletti (1976ii, 1976iii); Lukdcs (1971i, 1971iii).
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developments in late eighteenth- century England i.e. the emergence of a new kind of 
'economic activity' which made the idea of a purely economic realm thinkable. In 
short, the categories of the purely capitalist culture are historical categories; they 
emerge out of a specific socio-historical conjuncture. So, the categories used at level 
one are informed by actual, historical developments, those which are analyzed at level 
three. Similarly, the analysis carried out at level two is guided by concepts derived 
from level one to search for the types of use value production most representative of 
how capital accumulates at a particular time. The research process, although not the 
presentation of the research itself, will require a constant movement back and forth 
between the different levels so as to guard against the dangers of idealism or 
empiricism; of rationalism or economism. In effect, there is not an absolute 
separation between the different levels; it is rather that the temporal and spatial scope, 
the level of generality and the vantage point will be different at each level.
I shall now provide a brief outline of the different levels.
Level one: the theory of pure capitalist society
The theory of pure capitalist culture is developed in Capital 1. This work
is a kind of mental experiment which removes the economic and isolates it from
sources of interference so as to identify its laws of motion. So:
[I]n the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical reagents 
are of assistance. The power of abstraction must replace both. But for the 
bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour, or the value- 
form of the commodity, is the economic cell-form ... The physicist either 
observes natural processes where they occur in their most significant form, and 
are least affected by disturbing influences, or, wherever possible, he makes 
experiments under conditions which ensure that the process will occur in its 
pure state. What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of 
production, and the relations of production and forms of intercourse 
[Verkehrsverhaltnisse] that correspond to it. Until now, their locus classicus 
has been England. This is the reason why England is used as the main 
illustration of the theoretical developments I make.48
[Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications 
of economic categories, the bearers [Trager] of particular class-relations and 
interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic 
formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than 
any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he
48 Marx (1976) Preface to First Edition of Capital 1, p. 19.
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remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself 
above them.49
While the work contains historical material (relating to e.g. the necessary origins of 
capitalism in a feudal 'primitive' accumulation process, the class struggles over the 
length of the working day) this tends to be used either to reveal the fundamental 
novelty of capitalism (to be discussed in chapter five) or to illustrate a theoretical 
(logical) claim.50
Marx imagines a population constituted purely by industrial capitalism, meaning 
a population ruled by the law of value. He is assuming a system of capitalist 
industrial production in which the different spheres are functional for such 
production.51 This would be a system in which the radical imaginary of capitalism52 
- productivism - would have been institutionalized at all levels of activity and 
behaviour. Such a system was imaginable in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries because of cultural changes taking place at that time. Imagining the system 
(rendering its connections visible) became the basis for political action intent on 
ensuring that the emergent system would flourish. To a significant degree, nineteenth 
century English life was coming to approximate the pure capitalist model.53
However, Marx issues his own warning about the dangers of assuming a fully 
instituted pure capitalism and about the necessity for an historical approach. Here is 
what he says in Capital 3:
It is assumed that the laws of capitalist production operate in their pure form. 
In reality there exists only approximation; but this approximation is the 
greater, the more developed the capitalist mode of production and the less it is 
adulterated and amalgamated with survivals of former economic conditions.54
Yes, we can acquire knowledge of the 'pure form' of the 'laws' of capitalism, but we 
must be aware that these pure laws are nowhere allowed free expression. They are 
tendential laws which will seek but never wholly attain full expression in actually 
existing social formations. As stated before, Marx is carrying out a thought 
experiment whereby he is attempting to isolate purely capitalist elements in a complex 
social totality. This work of isolation or abstraction is intended to produce 
knowledge of the real properties of capitalism. Here, the thought experiment of the
49 Ibid., p. 92.
50 See Zel&ny (1980).
51 The base-superstructure model can be seen as a metaphor expressing this position - an extremely 
misleading metaphor since it conveys the idea of a static contradiction-free state of affairs. See 
Althusser (1984i); Rader (1979).
52 The term 'radical imaginary' is borrowed from Castoriadis (1987).
53 See Corrigan & Sayer (1985); Kanth (1986); Polanyi (1957).
54 Marx (1981), p. 172. This statement assumes great significance in relation to the contemporary 
period in the Anglo-American world in which such survivals have been virtually eliminated.
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social scientist substitutes (although inadequately) for the actual experiment of the 
natural scientist. Both are attempting to produce a realist account of the phenomena 
which they are studying.55 If we adopt this point of view, then the interpretation of 
the quotation on page 27 above will be, not that real individuals in real historical 
situations are bound to act as 'pure' labourers or capitalists, anymore than entities in 
the non-human natural world behave in the empirical natural world of rich and chaotic 
contingency as they do when isolated under laboratory conditions. Once the 
(cultural-historical) laws are institutionalized they have to do battle with pre-existing 
institutions which may or may not be hospitable to capitalist laws. Once the pure 
law 'strives' to become the empirical law then it becomes a matter of historical, rather 
than logical analysis to trace the extent to which it operates as the theory would have 
it do. Failure to understand this was partly responsible for the aridities of orthodox 
Marxism.56
I now turn to discuss level two, the level of stage theory, at which level, Albritton 
claims, questions about action are to be located.
Level two: stage theory
Stage theory is the mediating level of theory which enables us to use the theory of 
pure capitalism so as to understand historically specific requirements of capitalism as 
these are dictated by the nature of the predominant use value produced. Level two is 
arrived at neither by deduction from pure theory nor by abstraction from a complex 
reality. For Unoists, it is the result of a search, guided by level one concepts, for the 
types of use value production most representative of how capital accumulates at a 
particular time; English wool manufacturing during the mercantilist stage; cotton 
during the liberal stage; German steel during the 'organized' stage; US micro-electronics 
for the contemporary disorganized stage.57 The criterion for identifying the dominant 
or representative use value is the extent to which such production advances the 'law of 
value' or commodification. For example, it is this criterion that dictates the choice of 
wool rather than iron for the mercantilist period. However, identifying the 
predominant use value also enables us to explore more systematically the character of 
'everydayness' instituted by the particular stage of capitalism. It therefore helps us
55 See Sayer (1981).
56 See Colletti (1976ii, 1976iii).
57 These stages are partly but not wholly derived from the Unoist school. I deviate from its account 
in that I replace its imperial and consumer stages by organized and disorganized stages respectively. 
This is becuase I wish to emphasize the characteristics which have the most significant subject effects.
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to analyze the subject effects of different kinds of production. This is the specific 
usefulness of Unoist stage analysis here.
It should be noted that stage theory is not about 'stagism'; it is not a teleology, in 
other words. The transition from one 'stage' to another can only be identified and 
theorized after the event. This is because the transition requires political action 
which may not emerge or which may emerge but fail to achieve its purpose. This level 
could only be developed following the first major capitalist crisis and the steps taken 
to prevent that crisis from resulting in total breakdown. So this level requires a 
movement beyond Marx, to take up various accounts of imperialism developed
around the turn of the century.58
The following is a brief description of the different stages through which 
capitalism has passed up to now:
(a) The mercantilist stage During the mercantilist stage, the law of value had a 
minimal grasp on reality, being realized mainly through long-distance trade.59 
At the same time, the success of the putting-out system initiated the two-fold 
separation of agriculture and manufacture and of humans and the land. This 
was because, first, spinning and weaving now became full-time activities, hence 
setting in motion the division of labour between agriculture and manufacture; 
second, as the price of wool improved, land enclosures for the purpose of 
sheep-rearing became more common, the result of which was the separation of 
large numbers of the rural population from the land.60
It was during this stage that the beginnings of a new body of knowledge 
about new kinds of productive (economic) activity began to emerge. As long­
distance trade began to flourish during the seventeenth century, new, 
impersonal, relationships at a distance began slowly to assume more salience in 
the everyday English world. This led to systematic attempts to develop 
mental models of these changes. These attempts resulted in the acceptance of 
the idea of a single abstract market and of the quantitative conceptualization of 
the properties of people, land and movable goods.61 What we find here is the 
beginning of the instantiation of abstract relationships oriented to impersonal, 
purely 'economic' exchanges involving commodities and money in place of 
tactile, concrete, face-to-face relationships oriented to 'trucking and bartering' 
in local embodied markets. We have the beginnings of the instantiation of the 
law of value, in other words and the beginnings of the theory of political 
economy.62 At this point, emerging political economy, as well as more purely 
political theory, functioned as a radical critique of patriarchal theories 
privileging a hierarchical culture of estates e.g. Locke's critique of Filmer 63
58 See Hilferding (1981); Hobson (1938); Lenin (1982); Luxemburg (1963).
59 Brenner (1993).
60 Marx discusses these developments under the rubric of 'primitive accumulation' in Part Eight of 
Capital 1.
61 See Appleby (1978); Gunn (1969). Tribe (1981) charts the development of the categories during 
the eighteenth century.
62 See Marx (1951).
63 See Dunn (1982).
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(b) The liberal stage At this time systematic attempts were made to institute 
fully the law of value. The putting-out system gradually gave way to the 
factory system; the 'formal subsumption' of labour gave way to the 'real 
subsumption' of labour.64 Insofar as the latter became fully instituted, the 
labour process was subordinated completely to capital; the individual labourer 
lost all control over the conditions and content of the labour process. The 
character of dominant use-value production, i.e. cotton, required relatively 
simple and self-sustaining institutions and mechanisms of reproduction. 
Albritton notes here that, because its capital requirements were comparatively 
modest, state interference during this stage was minimal, at least compared to 
that required during the organized stage. In purely 'economic' terms, this may 
have been the case. However, it should be noted that deliberate attempts to 
bring about 'cultural' change were required at this time. The work of the state 
was crucial at all stages along the road of capitalist development.65
It was during this stage that the theory of pure capitalism (notably 
Ricardian political economy) was fully developed. The theory of pure 
capitalism had its political counterpart in Benthamite utilitarianism which 
conceives of 'industrialism' and 'industrialists' as harbingers of general well­
being and progress.66 As we have already noted, this body of theory was the 
basis of Marx's radical critique of industrial capitalism.
(c) The organized stage During this stage, (referred to by Albritton as the 
'Imperial' stage), the law of value weakened. This was related to the character 
of the dominant form of use-value production, i.e. iron and steel, which 
required the mobilization of large amounts of capital and credit. The result 
was the growth of limited-liability joint-stock companies and the development 
of the banking system in which banks provided large amounts of credit for the 
major capital investments of heavy industry. The term finance capital was 
coined by Hilferding to refer to the resulting merger of industrial-capital and 
banking-capital. It was Hilferding also who used the term organized 
capitalism to capture the character and tendencies of this new stage: the 
centralization and concentration of production and capital; changes in 
productive forces sparked by the development of new industries; the increased 
role of knowledge and science; imperialism; the organization of class conflict 
and the more intimate relationship of politics and economics.67 Gradually, 
over a period that extended from the end of the nineteenth century until the 
end of the 1960s (note that Albritton's imperial stage ends in 1945), the state 
came to take on the tasks of regulating social reproduction and distribution. 
This came to full fruition after 1945 with the full blossoming of welfare-state 
capitalism. In this way, the state was an agent of decommodification;68 it 
either regulated closely or was directly involved in the provision of goods 
which were seen as outside the sphere of commodification. However, it was 
during this period, too, that a new norm of mass consumption became
64 Note though that these developments were very uneven. The real subsumption of labour by capital 
came nearest to full realization in England but was not complete even there by the end of the nineteenth 
century. For more on this, see Arrighi (1994); Mayer (1981); Merriman (1979).
65 Corrigan & Sayer (1985); Kanth (1986); Polanyi (1957).
66 See Halevy (1972).
67 See Arrighi (1994); Lash & Urry (1987); Piore & Sabel (1984).
68 See Offe (1985).
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established; a norm of working-class consumption emphasizing individual 
ownership of commodities.69 So, whereas commodification retreated in some 
areas, it made significant advances in others. In fact, and paradoxically, 
decommodification in one area was dependent on increased commodification in 
other areas. The active, interventionist state was dependent on a flourishing 
capitalism engaged in free trade in the world market.
During this stage, 'theoretical ideology' (Althusser's term) moved from 
liberal economics to Keynesianism70 and neo-Marxism began to develop 
accounts of imperialism and of the 'cultural’ basis of proletarian docility to 
supplement Marx's historical materialism.71
(d) The disorganized stage From about the mid-1960s on, a new global crisis 
of capital became apparent. Its emergence was related to the inflationary 
fiscal policy pursued by the United States as a result of its involvement in the 
Vietnam War. Following the Nixon Shocks in 1971, the international monetary 
system carried inflation from one country to another. In addition, the oil price 
increases in 1973 reflected the decline in US and European control over the 
terms of exchange. The well-defined set of rules produced by the Bretton 
Woods agreement and the hegemonic power of the US which underpinned 
those rules were beginning to disintegrate. The high price of petrol reduced 
the ability of petrol-importing countries to buy industrial goods; real income 
had to fall. The corollary of this process was that the allocation of resources 
became increasingly difficult and subject to disputes and conflicts.72 Allied to 
these changes, and exacerbating their destabilizing effects in advanced capitalist 
countries, was the spread of industrial capitalism to 'peripheral' areas of the 
world, notably East Asia. At this time, East Asian countries began to 
experience more rapid growth rates than were found in Europe. What emerged 
from disorganizing capitalism was the movement of industrial production to 
non-western parts of the world and the emergence of 'post-industrial' or 
'knowledge/service' societies in the west.73 At the same time, new 
technologies - micro-eloectronics, computerization, VCRs - were giving 
capitalism a new flexibility and mobility.
As organized capitalism gave way to disorganized capitalism, 'theoretical 
ideology' began to move from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism and radical 
theorizing began to move from neo-Marxism to the variety of 'post' theories 
which is found in the contemporary world.74
It is at the level of stage theory that questions of agency can be posed. These 
questions should not be framed in terms of 'structure' or 'agency'. This opposition is 
an illusory opposition in that it is the result of abstracting from the rich complexity of 
the concrete and reifying the resulting abstractions. It is a misleading dichotomy
69 Aglietta (1987).
70 Gourevitch (1986).
71 See e.g. Baran & Sweezy (1966) and Marcuse (1986a).
72 Lash & Urry (1987), ch. 8.
73 Bell (1973) produced one of the earliest accounts of 'post-industrial society'. See also Gershuny 
(1978).
74 Boyne & Rattansi (1990); Plant (1992).
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which needs to be eliminated so that the question becomes one of asking what 
repertoires of action are instituted by different cultures. At the level of stage theory, 
the answer to this question can only be provided in the shape of tendencies. For 
example, the tendency is towards state-directed and/or coordinated bureaucratic, 
corporative forms of action during the organized stage. It is at the third level - the 
historical level - that the detailed research taking full account of the complexities of 
specific historical conjunctures takes place.75
Level three: the historical stage
This is the historical level at which the complexity and specificity of concrete 
historical changes can be explored by means of conceptions developed at level two. 
So, for example, the very general claim that Keynesianism gave way to neo-liberalism 
would be explored in relation to specific contexts e.g. England, France or Germany in 
the 1980s where pre-existing social relations would affect the speed of and extent to 
which this generalization was 'made flesh'.76 The 'laws' of pure stages of capitalism 
would here be analyzed as tendencies which might or might not find a hospitable 
environment in specific social formations. As my work will be situated at the first 
two levels I need discuss this stage no further. In this thesis, I shall be 'thinking in 
extremes'77 in the sense that I shall assume the fullest possible institutionalization of 
the laws of capitalism. This thinking in extremes should enable us to understand the 
erosion of political commitment in liberal capitalist cultures because in these cultures 
the pure form of capitalism comes close to full realization during the 1980s.
In conclusion, I now move on to discuss Althusser's methodological prescriptions in 
CO, OMD and RC,78 These include the reinstatement of the concept of totality and 
the expansion of the concept of contradiction to capture the relationship between the 
different spheres of activity which constitute capitalism. This expansion involves the 
use of the concepts of relative autonomy, of practice and of overdetermination. 
These constitute the means of expanding the Marxian materialist dialectic (while 
divorcing it from that of Hegel) so as to arrive at an account of the causal powers of 
'superstructures' without falling into idealism.
75 It should be noted that references to these stages o f capitalism are references to their 
institutionalization in liberal capitalist cultures.
76 See Gourevitch (1986).
77 Althusser (1990vi), p. 209.
78 Althusser (1990i, 1990ii); Althusser & Balibar (1970).
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mAlthusser on Totality79
It should be stated at once that the concept of totality needs to be shorn of its 
metaphysical, romantic and teleological trappings if it is to be theoretically useful.80 
Following Althusser, it is used here in a theoretical sense to refer specifically and 
solely to the peculiar character of capitalist cultures, although it should be noted that 
Althusser himself is insufficiently attentive to this distinctiveness, as will be seen in 
chapter four.81 Althusser’s work is useful here insofar as it suggests the means of 
developing and expanding Marx’s dialectical method.82 It does this first by 
reminding us that capitalism is a total mode of life or culture and second by proposing 
(although unfortunately not developing in any serious sense) a new theoretical 
language to explain the relations between the different spheres which constitute this 
culture. From this point of view, the task is to transcend reductive analyses i.e. 
economism (orthodox Marxism) and idealism (Hegelianism or 'historicism'83). These 
offer linear and expressive conceptions of causality respectively which fail to capture 
the specific kind of complexity that characterizes capitalist cultures. They both 
produce misleading and (for Althusser) politically dangerous evolutionary-teleological 
explanations of the capitalist world.
The expansion of the Marxian dialectic requires the ejection of notions such as the 
'inversion' of that of Hegel, as noted in section one above. Inversion results in a 
mechanical materialism (an economism/determinism) every bit as misleading as 
Hegelian idealism.84 It is because of the constitutive and contradictory complexity 
of capitalist cultures that economism and Hegelianism are deficient as accounts of 
causality. Both offer simplistic accounts of the relations between the fragments. 
Economism is simplistic in the sense that it conceives of the totality on the 
topographical model of the base-superstructure, thereby offering a linear, one-to-one 
deterministic conception of causality: the 'base causes the superstructure'.85 
Historicism is simplistic in the sense that it holds that the totality expresses one
79 Althusser in his later work replaces the concept of totality by that of whole, for reasons that I find 
unpersuasive. See Althusser (1990vi), p. 219. See Cullenberg (1996); Gordy (1983).
80 Jay (1984).
81 Benton (1984) offers the most comprehensive account of Althusser's theory. Elliott (1987) is useful 
on the political context within which this theory was produced.
82 See Levine (1981). Althusser initiates a research programme. He does not produce a coherent and 
well-developed body of theory, but he suggests the ways in which others can do so.
83 See Jameson (1983a), p. 27 n.12 for a useful note on Althusser's usage of this term.
84 As has been suggested in the first section of this chapter, these notions, although encompassed in 
some of Marx's own comments on the matter, are inadequate as characterizations of the dialectical 
method as used by Marx himself.
85 Althusser (1990ii), p. 213.
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principle which informs and 'causes' all of the fragments constituting the totality.86 
In effect, the base/superstructure model also constitutes an expressive totality so that 
orthodox Marxism incorporates elements of both linear and expressive causality. 
Both accounts become in the end functionalisms and it is with the intention of 
rectifying these functionalisms that Althusser attempts to theorize fundamentally 
different kinds of causality by means of the concept of overdetermination. His 
attempt is read here as a realist account of a peculiar kind of causality which is found 
in capitalist cultures. Capitalism's 'necessary way of acting' (Sayer's phrase87)is 
captured by the notion of displacement (structural or 'metonymic' causality88). This 
is one form of overdetermination. The other form is discussed in CO as condensation 
i.e. a ruptural, potentially revolutionary causality. These terms will be explored 
further below. First, though I turn to discuss Althusser's account of the spheres in 
terms of practices, a development which enables us to transcend the ideal/material and 
agency/structure dichotomies.89
Totality as practices
The whole as conceptualized by Althusser is made up of differences in 'spheres of 
activity, practices and objects... in efficacy.'90 The different spheres engage in 
different practices namely, economic, political and ideological. These practices are all 
seen as productions as follows:
By practice in general I shall mean any process of transformation of a 
determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a transformation 
effected by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of 
'production'). In any practice thus conceived, the determinant moment (or 
element) is neither the raw material nor the product, but the practice in the 
narrow sense: the moment of the labour o f transformation itself, which sets to 
work in a specific structure, men, means and a technical method of utilizing the 
means.91
86 We should note here, then, the anti-functionalist thrust of Althusser's work, the comments of his 
critics notwithstanding. Among the latter, see Barrett ((1993); Callinicos (1976); Collier (1979); 
Johnson (1979). See Lock (1988) for a more balanced discussion.
87 Sayer (1981), p. 7.
88 Althusser & Balibar (1970), ch. 9, esp. p. 188.
89 Althusser's choice of practice to replace the Marxian (and Gramscian) concept of praxis is related to
the need to distance himself, not only from the assumed 'voluntarism' of the Gramscian approach, but
also from that of Sartre. See Althusser & Balibar (1970), ch. 5.
90 Althusser (1990ii), p. 219. See also Geras (1972).
91 Althusser (1990ii), pp. 166-7.
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I take the term determinant here to refer to the culturally specific character of these 
practices; that is to say, practices consist in materialized meaning. This will be 
discussed further in chapter four.
In using the language of 'raw material', 'production', 'labour' in relation to spheres 
of action normally labelled as 'superstructural', Althusser is accomplishing two things 
at once. First, he is undermining simplistic base-superstructure models of causality; 
he is questioning the conception of capitalist culture as a hierarchy of social activities 
(practices) which identifies one, the economic, as fundamentally different from and 
determinant of the others. Two, he is also, (by implication at least) rejecting the 
material/ideal dichotomy which is often conflated with the base/superstructure 
dichotomy. On the one hand, activities in the different spheres are all characterized as 
practices which are described in terms normally used only in relation to economic 
production, so that activities in the different spheres have something in common. On 
the other hand, the economic sphere is not the privileged locus of 'matter', as the 
economic/material conflation would tempt us to think. To equate the material and the 
economic is to naturalize the economic, in effect, to drain it of the symbolic or of 
meaning. It is to fall into the trap of classical political economy.92 Matter is 
present in different ways in all of the different spheres. At the most obvious level, all 
practices are carried on by human beings who are necessarily material entities. 
However, as human material beings they are also necessarily 'symbolicized' beings. 
They are material constituted symbolically, culturally, or (to use the term preferred 
by Althusser) ideologically.93 It therefore follows that while practice in the economic 
domain may appear to be more 'material' than practice in other spheres, because it 
may be labour on 'brute' matter or nature, that labour is not (and cannot be) 'brute'. It 
is labour performed by subjects constituted by ideology. Here the materiality of 
practice, or of labour, is of a different order than the materiality of nature insofar as 
nature has not been penetrated by the human or symbolic.94
Practice in the political and ideological spheres is oriented to the production and 
maintenance of social relations and of subjects of a specific kind, respectively. Again, 
these practices are material in the strong sense that they are necessarily embodied in 
human beings and they are essential to the maintenance of the economic because the 
economic sphere all by itself is incapable of producing out of its own resources the 
kinds of social relations and subjects which production (as narrowly conceived) 
requires. The totality is a 'complex unity' of practices, including the economic, the 
political and the ideological, all of which are essential to its maintenance and all of
92 See Ricoeur (1984), ch. 9. See Althusser & Balibar (1970), Ch. 7 for an account o f the 
construction of the 'economic' by classical political economy.
93 As will be seen in chapter three, post-Marxism prefers the term discourse.
94 See Colletti (1976i); Jordan (1967) for more on the concept of matter.
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which are composed of ’ideal' and 'material' elements.95 This is the reality which the 
concepts of practice, of structural causality, overdetermination and relative autonomy 
are attempting to grasp. These concepts constitute a theoretical development of 
Marx's account of the dialectic and contradiction discussed in section one above. The 
concepts of overdetermination and of relative autonomy are intended to grasp the 
possible effects of the necessary contradictoriness of these practices i.e. their 
tendency to pull apart, as discussed in section one above. It is because of the 
constitutive role of non-economic practices and of the contradictory relationship that 
necessarily obtains between the different practices that the notion of one 'pure' 
fundamental contradiction between the 'forces' and 'relations' of production is wholly 
inadequate as an account of causality in capitalist cultures. These, far from being 
expressive totalities are totalities in which different spheres (composed of specialized 
practices) have relative autonomy, meaning sufficient freedom from other levels to 
develop in ways that may be antithetical to the maintenance of a functioning whole.96 
At this point it will be useful to say a word about the concept of relative autonomy.
Relative autonomy: Althusser uses this concept to theorize the simultaneity of 
connectedness and separation (of interdependence and apparent independence) which 
characterizes relations between the different spheres in capitalist cultures. The 
concept represents a theoretical development of Marx's concept of contradiction. The 
fundamental point about the totality as conceived by Althusser is that every sphere 
(level or instance) is constitutive of the totality; every sphere is both caused and 
causal. The relationship between the spheres is internal, rather than external. 
Without the economic sphere, the political and ideological spheres would not exist; 
without the political and ideological spheres, the economic spheres would not exist. 
If practices within these constituent spheres drift too far apart from one another, a 
point will come when the needs of the totality express themselves through a crisis. 
Political activity will then be needed to reconstitute functionality i.e. to reassert the 
'determinance' of the economy. 97 That is to say, the economy, all by itself, cannot
95 There is also, of course, 'theoretical practice', one of the most controversial areas of Althusser's 
corpus (Althusser (1990ii). I cannot go into this matter here, beyond noting that Althusser's 
insistance on the exteriority of this practice to the others is interpreted here as a political decision 
intended to overcome 'pragmatism' (i.e. Stalinism) in Communist Party politics. In theoretical and 
sociological terms it is an incoherent position. But see also Althusser (1990vi).
96 Complexity is intensified in social formations i.e. in actually existing capitalist cultures in which 
more than one mode of production (culture) is active. The result is a multiplicity of contradictions 
arising from different relations within and between different modes of production coexisting within one 
social formation whose 'total' character is guaranteed (insofar as it is guaranteed) by the state. See 
Althusser (1990i).
97 Insofar as the different levels cohere and form a totality, it is due to the functioning of the state, the 
key institution for ensuring that the fragments, or levels, fulfil their necessary tasks (Althusser (1990i). 
The 'lonely hour’ of the fundamental contradiction (or of economism) might arrive in the totally 
abstract world of pure caitalism. Althusser’s expanded account of the dialectic and contradiction rules 
this out, however and his own gesture in the direction of orthodoxy makes no sense whatsoever in
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determine anything. In fact, such talk is literally meaningless.98 It appears to make 
sense because of the culturally specific fragmentation which capitalism requires and 
because of its need to subsume all under the imperative of the law of value. 
Economism naturalizes this historical requirement of capitalist culture." I shall now 
go on to discuss Althusser’s usage of the concept of overdetermination. This will 
point us towards psychoanalysis and the kinds of psychoanalytic conceptual 
borrowings which may be of use in this thesis.100
Overdetermination
This concept, borrowed by Althusser from Freudian psychoanalysis, is used to 
clarify the difference between the Hegelian and Marxian conceptions of 
contradiction.101 That is to say, it is used by Althusser to refer to a kind of causality 
which is neither linear nor expressive. It appears that overdetermination is expressed 
in two different forms, namely, displacement and condensation. Although it is not 
clearly stated in Althusser's own work, the implication is that displacement is the 
'normal' or functional kind of causality in capitalist cultures, whereas condensation 
represents ruptural or revolutionary causation. This is also the sense in which these 
two concepts are used (although again in an underdeveloped way) by post-Marxism, 
as will be seen in chapter three. Post-Marxism also indicates a further implication of 
these conceptual borrowings from psychoanalysis which I shall come to in a moment, 
that is to say, the theoretical relationship which they suggest between force (matter- 
energy) and meaning.
However, the importance of the concept of overdetermination for Althusser is 
that it focuses our attention on the true and unavoidable complexity of contradictions 
in capitalist cultures. Overdetermination
designates the following essential quality of contradiction: the reflection in 
contradiction itself of its conditions of existence, that is, of its situation in the 
structure in dominance of the complex whole. This is not a univocal 
'situation'...since it [contradiction] reflects in itself, in its very essence, its 
relation to the unevenness of the complex whole.102
relation to the relative autonomy account of causality. See Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 99; also 
Resnick & Wolff (1987), p. 93. We will consider the Marxian view in chapter six.
98 Althusser (1990i), p. 108.
99 We need to be clear that Althusser’s own conception of'last instance’ economic determination is 
incompatible with the dialectical approach which he himself advocates. His own assertion that 'the 
lonely hour of the "last instance" never comes1 is an acknowledgement of this. Althusser (1990i), p. 
113. See also Althusser (1990ii), p. 206 for the claim about the totality as a structure in dominance 
whose character is ultimately determined by the ’economy1.
100 See Althusser (1990ii), p. 206. See also Balibar (1996); Resnick & Wolff (1987, 1996); Roberts 
(1996).
101 Althusser (1990i), p. 101.
102 Althusser (1990ii), p. 208.
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However, if contradiction is not 'univocal' neither is it 'equivocal', meaning 'the product 
of the first-comer among empirical pluralities, at the mercy of circumstances and 
'chance'... Quite the contrary, once it has ceased to be univocal and hence determined 
once and for all, standing to attention in its role and essence, it reveals itself as 
determined by the structured complexity that assigns it to its role, as ... complexly - 
structurally-unevenly-determined' or, more elegantly, 'overdetermined'.103 'All 
contradictions are under the sway of the great law of unevenness'.104 Uneven 
development is not
external to contradiction, but constitutes its most intimate essence. So the 
unevenness that exists in the 'development' of contradictions, that is, in the 
process itself, exists in the essence of contradiction itself.105
Insofar as there is a 'principal contradiction', it is produced by displacement or 
substitution and only becomes 'decisive' or explosive through condensation or fusion. 
In fact, uneven development just is 'these same phenomena of displacement and 
condensation observable in the development process of a complex whole'.106
The implications of these conceptions of causality in relation to the task in hand 
will be explored further in chapter three. Before concluding, I need to discuss a further 
implication of Althusser's conceptual borrowings from psychoanalysis, borrowings 
which point us towards the means of thinking beyond the individual/society 
dichotomy in a completely new way. In order to explain this claim, I need to make a 
few brief comments on Freud.
Freud on overdetermination
The concept of overdetermination is used by Freud in his Interpretation o f Dreams to 
explain the difference between manifest and latent dream contents.107 It refers to the 
distribution and redistribution of psychic energy according to the principles of 
displacement i.e. the transfer of energy from one object to another or of condensation,
103 Ibid., p. 209.
104 Ibid., p. 210
105 Ibid., p. 213.
106 Ibid. In OMD Althusser, in rejecting the charge of 'pluralism' or 'hyperempiricism', cites Lenin 
as his inspiration for this notion of causality, quoting his words as follows: 'That the revolution 
succeeded so quickly ... is only due to the fact that, as a result of an extremely unique historical 
situation, absolutely dissimilar currents, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary 
political and social strivings have merged, and in a strikingly, "harmonious" manner ...' (Lenin 'Letter 
from Afar [No. 1]', Selected Works, Vol. II p 35 quoted in Althusser (1990ii) p. 177 fn. 13. The 
influence of Mao Zedong's paper 'On Contradiction' is also cited (ibid. p. 182). See Liu Kang (1990) 
for more on this.
107 Freud (1976) chs. 6 & 7.
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i.e. the fusion of the energy transferred from several different objects in one object, or 
nodal point, which stands for all of the others. As we see from the quotation from 
Althusser cited above, it is the latter principle of distribution and redistribution which 
results in a 'crisis' or 'explosion'. Condensation can result in the cathecting 
(investment) of one object with a huge quantity of energy, or force. Freud accounts 
for these distributional processes by means of the 'Censor' i.e. the voice of culture or 
the 'super-ego' whose task it is to ensure that 'forbidden things' are not allowed to 
emerge into consciousness.108 In effect, force is used in two senses here; psychic 
energy or force seeks to evade or deceive social energy or force. In addition, force and 
meaning are brought together to account for 'symptoms' or, more specifically, for the 
manifest content of dreams. Freud is offering an account of psychic processes which 
brings together the cultural, biological and psychological.109 The concept of 
overdetermination refers to a complex process involving the 'intersection of meaning 
and (psychical) force or energy' whose attempt to evade cultural force culminates in 
the 'emergence' of an entity e.g. a symptom, an image.
Overdetermination and culture
We can now begin to understand that in using the language of psychoanalysis in this 
way - although apparently adapting it to the requirements of a 'structural' account of 
causality - Althusser is, in fact, opening up to Marxism the possibility of explaining 
the character of cultural membership in a way which will transcend the 
individual/society dichotomy. Althusser's own analysis of these matters will be 
explored in chapter four. For the moment, it should be noted that psychoanalytic 
concepts can help us to understand cultural membership in terms of the relationship 
between force (matter-energy) and meaning. Moreover, it affords the means of 
understanding how the redistribution of force and meaning required to institute new 
meanings (or to reconstitute political commitment) can be brought about. It is in this 
sense that Althusser's work leads directly to that of post-Marxism, as will be seen in 
chapter three. Unfortunately, neither body of work offers lucid and systematic 
theoretical developments in this area. Nevertheless, they are indispensable points of 
departure. The contemporary theoretical preoccupation with the Freudian concepts 
of displacement and of condensation (as well as their translation into the linguistic 
concepts of metonymy and metaphor) offers clues to the wholly novel features of 
capitalist cultures which will be followed up in this thesis. For the moment, what 
needs to be noted is that metonymic causality is here taken to be the 'normal' or 
functional state of affairs for capitalism, but that this kind of causality needs constant
108 Ibid., p. 650.
109 See Ricoeur (1970).
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political supervision if it is to be maintained in good working order.110 So the 
concept of metonymic or structural causality will be interpreted here as a kind of 
causality which produces the possessive decentred subjects of liberal capitalist 
cultures.111 It produces a kind of fluid and volatile relationship between force and 
meaning which is antithetical to the requirements of communal transformative action. 
The latter requires a process of condensation, interpreted here as a relatively fixed 
point of force/meaning. It will be the task of later chapters to elaborate on this 
claim.112 So these concepts will be used here to understand the cultural-biological- 
psychic requirements for both stability and change. They encapsulate the 
requirements for relative stability in radically fragmented and contradictory capitalist 
cultures (metonymic causality or displacement) and for the initiation of transformative 
communal action in such cultures (metaphoric causality or condensation). Used in 
this way, they become dialectical concepts productive of synthesizing explanations 
for multi-faceted cultural phenomena.
The systematic development of Althusser's rather hesitant and rudimentary 
borrowings from psychoanalysis enables us to engage in a non-reductive analysis of 
both culture and individual as nodal points of meaning and matter-energy.113 So his 
use of psychoanalytic concepts to explain social causality opens the way for Marxism 
to develop a non-reductive account of constitutive social phenomena - the psyche and 
meaning - which orthodox Marxism has treated as epiphenomenal and therefore failed 
to understand. The account needed is one which falls into the trap of neither 
economism nor idealism. Such an account is crucial if we are to understand the failure 
of political commitment in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.
Conclusion
The method used in this thesis is an organic, dialectical method derived from the work 
of Marx. By directing our attention to the theory and reality of totality, this method 
allows us to develop realist accounts of processes and practices in capitalist cultures. 
It allows of the exploration of constitutive connections between phenomena (meaning
110 It is this fact of capitalist cultures that functionalism expresses. See Parsons (195 la).
111 MacPherson (1964).
112 Althusser uses these concepts in CO to attempt an explanation of the replacement of one culture by 
another. This is an explanation at the level of a social formation. His example here is the Bolshevik 
Revolution, an example which invites us to think about, on the one hand, the role of the state and, on 
the other, a group of radical intellectuals with the support of a tiny working class. In Russia, the 
revolutionary rupture was brought about by a combination of exceptional unevenness, a weak state 
incapable of undertaking the task of establishing a functional relationship between the multiplicity of 
radically uneven spheres and a revolutionary party prepared to fill the resulting power vacuum. 
Without the latter, die crisis would not have led to a revolution.
113 See Ricoeur (1984), ch. 8; Strawbridge (1984).
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social relations, processes and practices) which tend to be kept apart when considered 
through the theoretical and conceptual lenses provided by the conventional 
disciplinary division of labour. Dialectics takes as its theoretical object contradictory 
(therefore dynamic) totalities made up of necessary and necessarily related but 
relatively autonomous elements. Contradictoriness is equated with proneness to 
crisis. Crises may or may not erupt into 'revolutionary situations'.
The dialectical method also alerts us to the necessary connectedness between 
theory and practice and therefore reminds us that pre-existing theories need to be 
taken seriously as accounts of the world. It therefore opens the way for the 
articulation of these to Marxism itself in a fruitful way. Here we have noted the 
tendency in liberal capitalist theorizing (as exemplified in the work of classical 
political economy) to naturalize the cultural-historical. The concepts of 
transhistorical and historical abstractions are used to analyze and correct this 
tendency which, as will be seen, marks most of the work with which we will be 
concerned.
It has also been necessary to expand on Marx's work so as to understand post- 
Marxian theoretical and 'practical’ developments. Here Unoist Marxism has been 
found useful in relation to both of these. It helps us to understand the theoretical and 
methodological sources of the rationalism and economism which have characterized 
much of Marxist theorizing as well as the significance of different stages of capitalism. 
In relation to the first, the crux of the matter is the status of the key Marxian text 
Capital 1 which is taken here to be an account, not of the historical emergence of 
English capitalism or of the characteristics of actually existing forms of capitalism, but 
rather of pure capitalism. Realization of the dangers of rationalism and economism 
inherent in the attempt to clamp the categories of pure capitalism straight onto 
empirical, 'impure' social formations has alerted us to the need for a mediating level of 
analysis, that of stages of capitalism. As noted above, these are constructed post hoc 
and have no teleological implications. In addition, attention to stages of capitalism 
has the advantage of alerting us to the significance of the specific character of 
dominant use value production for the constitution of 'lived experience' whose 
political significance should become evident as the argument proceeds. Finally, 
Althusser's work has provided us with an additional range of concepts needed to think 
about capitalism as total mode of life or culture. These include totality, practices, 
overdetermination and relative autonomy; concepts which enable us to think beyond 
the economic and to theorize the radical fragmentation and contradictoriness of 
capitalist cultures in a way which takes account of the constitutive role of extra- 
economic spheres. While Althusser’s analysis is seriously underdeveloped, it has 
been found nevertheless that his conceptual innovations facilitate thinking beyond 
dichotomies and reductivisms i.e. beyond a mode of thought which is inadequate to a
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true understanding of the relations between different spheres and practices 
constituting fragmented capitalist cultures. In chapter three, we will see how post- 
Marxism develops Althusser's ideas so as to account for the relationship between 
subjectivity and political commitment. The continuities and discontinuities which this 
work exemplifies in relation to that of Althusser will be fruitful sources of further 
theorization on the problem of political commitment. Indeed Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy can be read as a meditation on just this problem, as will be argued.114 It can 
also (and relatedly) be read as an account of subjectivities in liberal capitalist cultures 
as these are shaped by the disorganized stage of capitalism.
Before concluding, it should be noted that discussion of theories in subsequent 
chapters is undertaken from the point of view of the initial problem. What is 
produced is not primarily exegesis but rather specific readings which may or may not 
be considered to be true to the original spirit of the theories in question. However, 
some exegesis is required to demonstrate the continuing utility of the theorists in 
question, given the strong contemporary tendency to dismiss their writings out of 
hand. At the same time, I would argue that all of the readings are emergent properties 
of the relevant bodies of work i.e. they proceed from teasing out the logics of the 
theories in question. In addition, these theories (as well as the theory whose 
development is undertaken here) need to be thought of as part of a totality in process. 
Their place in the totality and their historicity need to be appraised. We need to be 
attentive to the context within which these works are produced and the theoretical and 
political problems which they are intended to address and resolve. Such attentiveness 
will enable us to assess which parts of the work are oriented to the resolution of 
short-term immediate problems (and which therefore may be presented in an overly- 
polemical and one-sided form) and which are of more enduring significance.
114 Laclau & Mouffe (1985).
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Chapter Three
Disorganized capitalism and the death of society
Introduction
In this chapter, a preliminary exploration of the erosion of political commitment in 
contemporary liberal capitalist cultures will be undertaken. The vehicle of this 
exploration will be the work of Laclau and Mouffe, to be referred to as post- 
Marxism.1 With the help of post-Marxism we can begin to understand the way in 
which cultures simultaneously institute forms of subjectivity and repertoires of 
action. More specifically, we can begin to theorize the 'subjective' effects of the 
'objectivity' of fragmented capitalist cultures as explored in chapter two. The notion 
of the decentred subject which underpins post-Marxism's account of the problem of 
political commitment is understandable in terms of the plethora of contradictory 
practices produced by capitalism, particularly in its disorganized form. So the 
decentred subject is taken here to refer to the culturally specific form of subjectivity 
produced by disorganized capitalism in liberal capitalist cultures rather than to the 
inevitable universal character of all forms of subjectivity as posited by Althusser and 
Lacan, among others.2 It is the product of displacement, or of metonymic causality, 
as will be explained further below.
Post-Marxism sets out to replace the deterministic and economistic theories of 
orthodox Marxism3 by an open-ended account which will convey more accurately the 
character of contemporary culture while at the same time offering the theoretical 
means of constituting a more democratic political transformative practice than is 
available in Marxism itself.4 Since voluntary individual participation is a requirement 
of such action, it is necessary to take the point of view of those to be mobilized; to 
offer a ‘subjectivist' rather than ‘objectivist' account of the world. The concepts of
1 This is the self-description of the work of Laclau & Mouffe (1985). The following discussion is 
based mainly on this work and on Laclau (1990).
2 Althusser’s work on the subject will be discussed in chapter four, Lacan’s later in this chapter, as 
well as in chapters four and eight. For more on Foucault, see Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982); Honneth 
(1995), ch. 6.
3 It is in the light of the extremely fluid and volatile form of subjectivity instituted in liberal capitalist 
cultures (and of the extremely fluid culture of which this subject is both result and cause) that the 
inadequacies of the orthodox Marxist theory of collective action become clear. Indeed post-Marxism's 
theorizing is undertaken in the first instance as a deconstruction of this theory. Unfortunately, because 
if its impoverished reading of the Marxist canon, it deprives itself of much needed help from that 
quarter, as should become evident as we proceed. See Geras (1990b). Post-Marxism's response to 
Geras is in Laclau & Mouffe (1990).
4 Laclau & Mouffe (1985) refer to 'advanced capitalism'. Laclau (1990i) refers to ‘disorganized 
capitalism', deriving this usage from the work of Lash & Urry (1987).
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identity and antagonism answer to this necessity. In line with this requirement, the 
Marxist elements in the theory are those concerned with identity-formation - i.e. 
elements of the works of Gramsci and Althusser. These are assimilated to elements of 
poststructural linguistics and of Lacanian psychoanalysis. In addition, though, and 
most usefully, post-Marxism develops (although in a rather haphazard way) 
Althusser's psychoanalytic borrowings by (in effect) normalizing displacement 
(metonymic causality). The result is an 'ontology of flux' (Dews' phrase).5
The first section of this chapter will investigate this 'ontology of flux' whose 
advent is signified by post-Marxism by two conceptual moves: the first is from 
society to the social; the second is from production to discourse. It is post-Marxism's 
contention that the first of each of these two pairs of terms secrete the possibility of 
essentialism and therefore of antidemocratic politics. So, society conceptualizes an 
impossible fixity; the social reminds us of that impossibility. Production 
conceptualizes a stable, evolving, world of law-driven processes; discourse 
conceptualizes a radically fluid and contingent world. Having examined the subject 
effects of such a world, we will go on in the second part of the chapter to explore the 
political implications of these effects, as these have an impact on our problem. Here 
post-Marxism's theorization of radical collective action will be explored. The nature 
of the required political tasks are indicated by the Gramscian and Althusserian 
concepts of hegmony, articulation, interpellation and overdetermination. The third 
part suggests ways in which we can build on the contributions of post-Marxism by 
developing a number of key analytical distinctions which will enable us to theorize the 
materiality of discourse. This will enable us to evaluate the features and potentialities 
of specific discourses in ways not allowed for by the theory as it stands. In the 
absence of these distinctions, post-Marxism tends to dissolve into an idealist and 
naturalizing account of the culturally-specific phenomena with which it is concerned.
I
Post-Marxism offers an account of the world as radically and necessarily volatile. This
is a world governed by the principle of movement which has been discussed in chapter 
two using the concept of displacement. As was seen there, displacement is taken to 
refer to a kind of causality found in capitalist cultures. It is now time to discuss this
suggestion in more detail with specific reference to the problem at hand.
What displacement suggests is a constant slippage (metonymic movement) from 
one sphere or practice to another. It is because of this movement that the culture of
5 Dews (1987).
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pure capitalism is experienced as volatile and it is this experience that post-Marxism 
expresses so powerfully. It is in this way that I interpret its claim that there are no 
pre-given subjects, classes, nations or societies.6 For post-Marxism, these terms 
suggest a state of affairs characterized by fixity, permanence or of closure, a state of 
affairs nowhere to be found. In effect, these entities are purely conceptual, positing 
what is empirically unachievable. Post-Marxism's argument for making this claim will 
be explored in this section. This is composed of naturalistic and historical elements. 
The former include the necessary discursive character of all human social life and the 
peculiar psychic character of human beings. The latter include the peculiar structural 
character of capitalism which allows and indeed requires individual subjects to take up 
a variety of changing 'subject positions' both at one point in time and over time,7 and 
the possibly related availability of a 'surplus of meaning' of which the discourse of 
democracy is the most significant. I shall consider each of these in turn. The 
discussion of the first of these will require a brief exploration of Saussure's linguistic 
theory.8
From society to the social
The linguistic turn in social theory
Post-Marxism shares with other 'post' forms of thought the claim that the social world 
is linguistically constituted.9 This is related to the claim that neither nature nor the 
logic of history dictates forms of the social. For post-Marxism, it is this fact of 
human life that the philosophy of language enables us to reveal. Human beings are 
constituted by language as particular kinds of subjects with particular kinds of 
relations to one another and to nature. So language is not merely a tool used to refer in 
a transparent manner to an independently-existing state of affairs. Not only is this 
referential theory of language inaccurate, but it is held by post-Marxism to be 
responsible for essentialist thinking.10
In order to understand the theoretical and empirical implications of the linguistic 
turn as manifested in post-Marxism, a few remarks on the structuralist account of 
language will be required. Saussure's work, which constitutes the point of departure in
6 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), ch. 3.
7 Melucci (1996) discusses some of the identity effects of this situation, in terms of the constitution of 
collective actors.
8 Saussure (1974).
9 Coward & Ellis (1977); Foucault (1974). I have been using the concept of culture to refer to this 
inescapable fact of human life.
10 See Mouzelis (1988); Sandler & Diskin (1995) on post-Marxism’s views on essentialism.
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this area, posits language, or signification, as an arbitrary system of differences in 
which elements gain their meanings from their relations with other elements of a 
structure rather than as free-standing entities with a self-sufficient meaning.11 The 
elements of structure of a language are signs which have two aspects: the signifier 
(sound or word) and the signified (meaning). The signifier is the material embodied 
element (in the sense that the sound is emitted and received through the human 
senses); the signified is the intelligible element. The link between these two aspects is 
arbitrary as is that between the sign and the referent. The meaning of the signified is 
established through relationships of difference with other signifieds. Signs are 
necessarily elements of systems and are only comprehensible within systems of 
significance, never on their own. The structure is a system of difference which creates 
and sets in place both signifiers and signifieds.
In order to establish a systematic theory of language, one that would account for 
the myriad speech acts of everyday life, Saussure established some distinctions and 
exclusions; in other words he developed a method for the study of language. The 
primary distinction is that between langue and parole; the primary exclusions are of 
diachrony and of referentiality. In relation to the first, we should note that langue is 
the system of language which produces parole, the individual expressions of that 
system. Langue is a structure; it is synchronic or static. Parole is the expression of 
the structure in its movement; it is diachronic. In relation to the second (the 
exclusions), Saussure bracketed out both diachrony and the referent of the sign. In 
privileging the sign over its referent Saussure was not implying that referentiality is 
insignificant. On the contrary, Saussure identified two dimensions to the exchange of 
terms of langue. The first of these is the structural dimension, involving relationship 
to other elements within a linguistic system, as mentioned above. The second is the 
functional dimension, involving a relationship to something outside the linguistic 
system. Saussure's bracketing of the referent was a methodological move with no 
ontological implications. However, his work offers some encouragement to those 
seeking to minimize the importance of the referent or, put another way, it appears to 
licence idealistic accounts of the world.12 This is a key point to which I shall return 
later. I shall also return to the analytical and empirical significance of the 
structure/functional distinction.
Two key moves shape the poststructuralist adaptation of a social science 
structuralism derived from Saussure's linguistic structuralism.13 The first is the 
elimination of the level of langue as permanent source and producer of the empirical, 
ephemeral, changing world of parole and second, the marginalizing or even elimination
11 Saussure (1974).
12 Ibid., p. 109.
13 For more on this see Merquior (1986).
47
of the sign/referent relationship. The combination of these two moves produces a 
model of the world as a world of flux, fluidity, slippage, transitoriness and 
undecidability. In effect, Saussure's methodological bracketing is translated into an 
ontological claim.
Post-Marxism's version of post-structuralism is filtered through deconstruction. 
The Derridean claim that nothing exists outside the text is a claim that language lacks 
an ultimate ground or 'transcendental signified'.14 The death of the 'transcendental 
signified' is an important component of post-Marxism which goes along with the 
rejection of structuralism's emphasis on an unobservable systemic level which 
produces empirical phenomena. What is retained from structuralism is the claim that 
the identity of phenomena is relational while what is eliminated is the relative fixity of 
these phenomena which the notion of systemness endows. Hence the replacement of 
the concept of society (implying closed, therefore fixed system) by that of the social 
(contingent and open therefore unfixed).15 As Laclau says:
[W]e renounce the fixation o f ... identities in a system ... the social must be 
identified with the infinite play of differences, that is, with what in the 
strictest sense of the term we call discourse - on the condition, of course, that 
we liberate the concept of discourse from its restrictive meaning as speech and 
writing.16
Note here the equation of discourse and 'infinite play of differences'. The social 
world is now conceptualized as a signifying chain which distributes individuals 
(signifieds) in constantly changing, contingent therefore indeterminate social 
relations.17 Put another way, individuals as subjects are bearers of meanings or 
identities whose character - because purely relational - is held to be thereby 
contingent, arbitrary and unstable. These meanings are either imposed on the 
individual subject from outside or are chosen or accepted by the subject. It is not clear 
which is more likely to be the case here. Whichever is the case, the important point is 
that subjectivities are taken to be inherently and necessarily fluid and volatile; that 
identity in the strong sense is unavailable.18 We have here a rather odd equation of 
discourse, contingency and volatility. This is an equation which will need further 
discussion later.19 For the moment, let us explore further the post-Marxist account 
of discourse.
14 See Derrida (1967).
15 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 113.
16 Laclau (1990i), p. 90.
17 This indeterminacy is held to be an innate characteristic of both language and of the individual 
organism, as will be seen later.
18 See Melucci (1996), ch. 4.
19 See Mouzelis (1988), pp. 113-4.
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Post-Marxism and discourse
It should be noted that in privileging meaning over materiality, post-Marxism is not 
thereby intending to produce an idealist account of the world. In fact, discourse is 
defined in material terms; it includes both linguistic and non-linguistic elements so it is 
neither linguistic nor extralinguistic, but prior to both. It is post-Marxism's expressed 
intention to transcend the ideal/material dichotomy by showing that the world is 
necessarily both matter and meaning.20 Put another way, no purely physical entity, 
act or process is available to us unmediated by discourse or meaning. Merely physical 
acts will have different meanings and therefore different effects in different contexts or 
discourses. A discourse is a 'systematic set of relations' which endows physical 
actions, individuals and processes with meaning, which, therefore, makes them 
social.21 Once an action, individual or process becomes part of a set of social 
relations, it ceases being merely physical (ens) and becomes social (esse), therefore 
historical, therefore transitory. What follows is that the social and the discursive are 
coterminous. The world, both social and natural, is only available to us through 
discourse. Discourse, then, is not a level of the social but the social itself.22 It 
follows from this, as already indicated, that human individuals are always also 
discursively constituted. It will be useful to examine this matter in a little more detail.
Discourse and the constitution o f the subject
For post-Marxism, the category of the subject refers, not to the subject adumbrated 
by humanisms, but rather, to 'subject positions' within a discursive formation.23 
Discursive formations are systems of discourses which constitute, organize and 
distribute social relations and subjects of specific kinds. Individuals are subjects in 
rather than o f  discourses; there is no pre-existing independent originary 'subject' to 
which discourse or language merely refers.24 Looked at from this point of view, the 
humanist 'subject' is the overdetermined result of a specific kind of discursive 
formation; it is merely one historically and culturally distinct form of the subject. 
Since subject positions partake of the open character of every discourse, it follows 
that the subject also is marked by this openness. It is not and cannot be a 'unified and
20 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 108.
21 The Marxian concept of praxis, the Althusserian concept of practice - and, as will be seen in chapter 
four, the Castoriadian concept of the imaginary - also embrace meaning and materiality, as does indeed 
the Althusserian concept of ideology. These are all different ways of referring to the cultural form 
which human sociality necessarily takes. This will be discussed further in chapter four.
22 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 107.
23 Ibid., p. 115
24 This is a theme which will reemerge in chapter four.
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unifying essence'.25 There is no subject, either 'in' or 'for itself. That it may appear 
to be so derives from the existence of an 'ensemble of social practices, of institutions 
and discourses' which, by acting on one another in a mutually reinforcing manner, have 
constituted the humanist subject 'Man'.26 That is to say, the illusion of autonomy 
and coherence deriving from an apparently transparent and unified consciousness is 
the overdetermined product of discourses, therefore institutions, which are 
complementary rather than contradictory, or, which all move in the same direction. 
'Man' is 'a fundamental nodal point' i.e. the outcome of a hegemonic political activity 
whose character will be discussed further later.27 Insofar as fixity exists, it is the 
outcome of self-conscious political action oriented to the articulation of interpellations 
which constitute the subject into a coherent and relatively stable unity.28 The 
success of such projects (always necessarily relative and vulnerable to subversion) can 
induce in the subject concerned a sense of self-evidentness or obviousness which 
renders his subjectivity apparently ‘natural'.
It is the necessary precariousness (both 'objective' and 'subjective') of such fixing 
that post-Marxism wishes to insist upon. This it holds to be a universal 
characteristic of human social life (since discourse is a universal property of human 
social life). At this point, post-Marxism appears to be virtually naturalizing the state 
of affairs which it describes, which is another way of saying that it is reintroducing 
essentialism by the backdoor.29 However, it is not immediately obvious that the 
essentializing of the discursive requires us also to essentialize unfixity. Indeed post- 
Marxism is itself aware that such a claim will not hold up to scrutiny. So it offers in 
addition an explanation derived from the character of the human psyche, as follows.
The psychic turn in post-Marxism
The psychic account of social volatility emerges out of post-Marxism's theory of 
social antagonisms. Whereas Hegemony and Socialist Strategy uses antagonism as a 
political concept referring to specific kinds of social relations, (which will be discussed
25 Ibid., p. 116
26 Ibid., p. 117.
27 The constitution of this nodal point will be the object of more detailed attention in chapter four.
28 The concept of articulation was first used by Althusser and Balibar (1970) to capture the complexity 
of modes of production. For more on this see Foster-Carter (1978). This usage relates principally to 
the linking of different 'instances' o f a complex social formation, to the necessary co-existence and 
interdependence of elements of the totality (Marx's 'limbs of the social system'). See Althusser and 
Balibar (1970) p. 95. The concept of interpellation is used by Althusser (1984i) to refer to the 
process (of'hailing' or addressing) whereby individual human organisms are constituted as subjects of a 
specific kind.
29 See Fuss (1989).
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further below), Laclau later, following a suggestion of Zizek30 gives it a 
psychoanalytical gloss, as will be seen. It will be useful to discuss this here because 
it offers us a major clue as to the character of subjectivity instituted by disorganized 
capitalism.
As noted earlier, antagonism is one of those concepts that enable post-Marxism 
to theorize the social from the point of view of its participants, from the point of 
view of 'subjectivity' rather than of 'objectivity'. It refers to the consequences of an 
innate, unavoidable psychic characteristic which produces a sense of lack in 
individuals. In order to understand the argument about the human predisposition to 
antagonism, we need to explore briefly Lacan's account of the psyche as captured by 
the concepts of the imaginary, the symbolic and the red.31 The imaginary refers to a 
specific stage in the emergence of the human subject - the mirror stage at which an 
illusory sense of self-mastery and coherence is experienced by the small child.32 The 
symbolic refers to the point at which the child is humanized (subjected to the Law of 
Culture).33 The real refers to the biological, to that which is the ground of the 
imaginary and the symbolic but which is never wholly captured (humanized) by the 
symbolic. The symbolic does not have direct access to the real so it cannot in any 
sense represent it. The consequence is that the real is capable of disturbing the fragile 
social and psychical equilibrium constructed by the imaginary and the symbolic, those 
orders which constitute reality for the subject. The real 'is there... ready to burst in 
and submerge what the "reality principle" has constructed under the title of the 
"external world'".34 So it both precedes the symbolic and remains after the 
inscription of the symbolic. It is responsible for the irreducible contingency of the 
social. The sense of lack which is the source of antagonism arises from the 
unavoidable 'gap' that exists between the real and the symbolic. Logically, then, the 
sense of lack is constitutive of (and accounts for the innate volatility of) the socio­
cultural. As Laclau puts it: 'Every signifier fails to represent the subject and leaves a 
residue: something fails to be reflected in the mirror-world of reflections'.35
The concept of lack enables us to consider interpellation from the point of view 
of the individuals or groups interpellated. It also enables us to consider further the 
political significance of antagonism.36 Antagonism is the 'experience' of 'the limit of 
the social', that is, of the impossibility of closure, wholeness, or 'full' identities.37 It 
is the outcome of 'lack of being' of the individual, of the inability of the symbolic or
30 See Laclau (1990iv), p. 235; Zizek (1989), p. 125; Zizek (1990).
31 See Lacan (1979; 1980i).
32 Lacan (1980i).
33 Dews (1987), ch. 2; MacCannell (1986); Wilden (1980).
34 Lacan quoted in Dews (1987), p. 104.
35 Laclau & Zac (1994), p. 32.
36 Laclau (1990), p. 206.
37 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), pp. 124, 125. See also Laclau (1990iv).
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discursive order to capture completely the real. It is this experience of 
incompleteness, or emptiness which is at the basis of antagonism, in the post-Marxist 
sense. In other words, antagonism arises (in a way which will be discussed further 
below) out of the innate incapacity of discourse (culture) to capture completely the 
human individual. However, antagonism does not emerge necessarily out of this fact 
of human social life. The psychic account alone cannot explain how the 'lack of being' 
takes on political significance. In effect what is in question is an historically and 
culturally specific state of affairs which I now go on to discuss.
Capitalism, dislocation and flux
As we have seen, the fundamental claim of post-Marxism is that human social life is 
necessarily meaningful. It is because of this that a referential or literal theory of 
language is rejected. There is no necessary one-to-one relationship between meaning 
and materiality or between meaning and an existing state of social affairs. Social 
relations marked by 'an ultimate literality which would reduce them to necessary 
moments of an immanent law' cannot be constituted.38 Since social relations (and 
therefore 'subjects') are always discursively constituted (as opposed to being 'given' 
by the natural biological character of human beings or by an unavoidable logic of 
history) these relations are always open to being reconstituted in a new way.
However, the impossibility of 'literality' has not been universally and 
transhistorically appreciated, as post-Marxism is well aware. In explaining this point, 
it moves towards a cultural-historical analysis of the basis of unfixity, although it 
continues to hold unfixity to be the real state of affairs which can, under historically 
specific conditions, be experienced as fixity. The latter is found in cultures with a 
low technological level of development where production is carried out by means of 
fundamentally repetitive practices. This gives rise to the illusion that the being of 
objects (esse), which is a purely socio-cultural construction, belongs to the things 
themselves. Systems of articulations of meanings (of subject positions and therefore 
of identities) are rigid and (from the point of view of the subjects concerned) 
unchanging rather than flexible and volatile. Second nature can therefore be taken for 
nature tout court. We may suppose that peasant communities (for example) are 
clearly bounded, relatively self-sufficient and enduring entities that, in the absence of 
outside interference, reproduce (rather than transform) themselves. We must assume 
that, the discursive (therefore relational) constitution of their identities 
notwithstanding, social relations and therefore identities are of a relatively durable
38 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 98
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kind. On the fixity-unfixity spectrum, they are very close to fixity. They therefore 
have a strong sense of collective identity which becomes the basis for a strong form of 
political commitment once the group considers its way of life to be under threat from 
an external human force.39
Consciousness of the contingency of human social life comes about as a result of 
two developments whose connections are not traced by post-Marxism. The first of 
these is the advent of capitalism which requires myriad new 'subject positions' and 
therefore, logically, myriad new meanings. It therefore heralds the end of the rigid 
systems of articulations found in pre-industrial cultures. In addition and connectedly, 
the development of capitalism leads to the dissolution of the clear, empirical 
boundaries between communities which had served to maintain 'closed systems of 
differences'. Moreover, capitalism's speeding up of history reveals the historicity of 
being and encourages a belief in the human capacity to create new worlds. Thus the 
ontological and philosophical bases for strong and fixed identities begin to dissolve.
Capitalism, particularly during its disorganized stage, displays a number of novel 
structural features, some of which have been discussed in chapter two. We do not 
need to explore post-Marxism's rather sketchy account of this novelty.40 What we 
do need to consider is post-Marxism's evaluation of the subject (and therefore 
political) effects of this structural novelty. Indeed this is where post-Marxism makes 
its major contribution to the task of this thesis.
For post-Marxism, disorganized capitalism is characterized by a 'relative 
structuration' which produces a radically open world of proliferating possibilities of 
new kinds of freedom.41 This is because capitalism's peculiar structural character 
renders it comparatively powerless in terms of locating individuals as subjects in a 
system of relatively permanent social relations.42 From this point of view, the 
'emergence of the subject' is merely 'the result of the collapse of objectivity'.43 That is 
to say, capitalism's 'relative structuration' forces individuals into freedom. A few 
words on this conception of the subject will be useful at this point because it will 
bring to our attention a tension (or even contradiction) in accounts of subjectivity 
which we will meet again when we come to discuss Althusser's work on the 
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) in chapter four.
39 Ibid., ch. 4. See also Calhoun (1982); Tarrow (1994).
40 See Laclau (1990i), pp. 39 - 59.
41 Unlike e.g. Marcuse (1986a), Laclau considers neither commodification nor bureaucratization to be 
significant obstacles to the institution of radical democracy under capitalism. S o , '... the prospects 
opened by the bureaucratic revolution are much broader than anything it can control in terms of its own 
logic'. Laclau (1990i), p. 54.
42 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 96.
43 Laclau (1990i), p. 61.
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Capitalism and subjectivity
As we saw earlier, the subject as 'Man', whose emergence is associated with the 
emergence of capitalism, is held to have been the result of an 'ensemble of dispersed 
positions' connected by relations of overdetermination. The subject as 'Man' is the 
subject under the illusion that he is a self-contained, coherent, self-motivating entity. 
As we have seen, the reference to 'nodal points' (in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy) 
presupposes that the constitution of the subject in this way was the result of a 
successful hegemonic project. In Laclau's later work, however, the subject 'is merely 
the distance between the undecidable structure and the decision'.44 In other words, 
the subject emerges out of the inability of capitalism to 'fix' individuals, that is, to 
provide the conditions necessary for the formation of a stable sense of identity. Due 
to this innate indeterminacy of capitalism, subjects are also indeterminate (decentred). 
This indeterminacy is the source, apparently, of freedom 45 Decentred subjects are 
subjects whose culturally specific lack of fixity forces them into a state of being which 
can be equated with (or is the basis for?) freedom. It is capitalism's innate structural 
'undecidability' which opens a space for the apparently free action of subjects. Here, 
the subject is a subject faute de mieux, as it were.
Are these two incompatible accounts of the subject 'Man', or accounts of the 
emergence of two different kinds of subjects out of two different stages of capitalism? 
The answer to this question is not clear from the texts under discussion. If we 
extrapolate from the account of hegemonic projects to be discussed further below, it is 
possible to reconcile the two accounts by taking capitalism's structural attributes to be 
the necessary but not sufficient condition for the constitution of the subject of 
freedom. In addition to this, what is needed is a hegemonic project oriented to the 
creation of an institutional nexus productive of such a subject. However, in the 
quotation just cited Laclau seems to be suggesting that the subject somehow 'finds' 
himself 46 So we are bound to remain in some confusion. This is a matter which 
will require further exploration in later chapters of this work when the clues offered 
by post-Marxism will be followed up. For the moment, it will suffice to note this 
significant ambiguity about subjectivity which we will encounter again in Althusser's 
work (although in a different form).
I now turn to the second historically specific source of cultural and subjective 
volatility, as identified by post-Marxism. This is the 'death of the transcendental
44 Ibid., p. 39.
45 Kaviraj (1989) develops a similar argument.
46 Giddens (1991) offers a similar account of subjectivity in the contemporary world.
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signified' and the related production of a 'surplus of meaning' or discourses, the most 
important of which is the discourse of democracy.
The death of the 'transcendental signified'
The death of the 'transcendental signified' (God) as adumbrated by Derrida is, for 
post-Marxism, an important source of the 'surplus of meaning' which underpins the 
cultural volatility with which we are concerned.47 It eliminates the fixed point of 
meaning for subjects and therefore undermines their sense of groundedness or fullness 
in relation to the supernatural realm. Whereas capitalism reveals the malleability of 
the natural world and therefore natural sources of'givenness' or 'objectivity', the death 
of the ‘transcendental signified' removes their supernatural sources. One outcome is 
the discourse of democracy which offers a powerfully subversive interpretation of 
social hierarchies, an interpretation whereby subordination becomes the basis for 
antagonism. This comes about in the following way.
Relations of subordination are relations whereby one party is subject to the 
decision-making of another. So long as these are seen as natural or 'god-given' they 
cannot be antagonistic. Discourses of subordination, those endowing unequal 
relations with the character of positivity (of naturalness, or 'god-givenness') can only 
be transformed by the emergence of other discourses challenging such a 
characterization. The discourse of democracy introduces the possibility of 
interpreting and transforming relations of subordination in this way. The 
interpretation of social hierarchies incorporated into this discourse rests on the 
transformation of relations of subordination into relations of oppression and the 
interpretation of the latter as relations of domination, therefore as illegitimate.
At this point, we can begin to see the political significance of the intrapsychic 
sources of volatility as described earlier. The power of democracy is related to the 
psychic problem captured by the term lack (discussed above) which leaves individuals 
open to interpellations offering fullness. Democracy offers a convincing explanation 
of a state of affairs experienced as unsatisfactory by necessarily incompletely 
humanized subjects.48 Democratic discourses are necessarily radical in that they 
undermine the taken-for-grantedness of social hierarchies and thereby offer an account 
of subjects' 'lack of being' with potentially radical implications. They encourage the 
belief that 'lack of being' is a remediable scandal; that fullness is attainable. They 
therefore encourage the search for the experience of fullness. It is in these ways that 
democratic discourses contribute significantly to the volatility of capitalist cultures.
47 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 112.
48 Ibid., p. 155.
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To sum up, the combination of myriad interpellations constituting individuals as 
articulations of different positionalities and of the intra-psychic predisposition 
referred to by the concept of lack generates the ontology of flux. On the one hand, 
this cultural volatility affords the possibility of constituting new kinds of 
commitments and therefore of new kinds of collective action On the other hand, it 
militates against the constitution of powerful and durable collective actors of any kind. 
In the next section, I shall consider post-Marxism's prescription for the constitution 
of such actors. What this requires, in effect, is that displacement be replaced by 
condensation. It should be noted here that Post-Marxism tends to reserve the 
concept of overdetermination for the latter form of causality, which is, as will be seen, 
the achievement of hegemonic politics.
n
Capitalism, hegemony and the logic of difference
The term the 'logic of difference' is used by post-Marxism to capture the character of 
the radically pluralist politics found in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures. It is a 
logic whose character can be understood in relation to the concept of displacement in 
that it produces radically pluralist and constantly changing forms of political 
allegiance. Or, in post-Marxist terms, the logic of difference refers to the 'limitation' of 
forms of antagonism produced by the cooptation of proliferating new positions as 
these emerge in response to the requirements of capitalism.49 At the same time, this 
politics of cooptation is not read by post-Marxism as a politics which has the 
capacity to neutralize all significant opposition.50 What capitalist cultures produce, 
apparently, are not docile subjects whose critical faculties are nullified through 
bureaucratic impositions or the seductions of consumerism, but, on the contrary, an 
apparently permanently mobilized, fragmented and self-aware population; a 
population predisposed to myriad forms of self-assertion in the political realm.51 
The remainder of this section will be taken up with a discussion of the requirements 
for the constitution of 'nodal points' out of such a population. The constitution of 
'nodal points' - of stable collective identities conceptualized as relatively fixed 
condensations of force (social and psychic) and meaning - is the work of hegemonic 
politics.
49 The term 'logic of equivalence' is used to refer to this earlier, simpler form of politics. See ibid. ch. 
3.
50 As is argued by Marcuse (1970), for example. See Laclau (1990i), p. 82.
51 This seems to be an expression of the politics of difference. For more on this see Butler & Scott 
(1992). See also Brown (1993).
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Politics and hegemony
Hegemony refers to the constitution of a collective political identity oriented to radical 
collective action under the conditions of acute fragmentation and instability instituted 
by liberal capitalist cultures.52 Post-Marxism derives this term from the work of 
Gramsci who uses it to refer to a specific kind of alliance - a historical bloc - in which 
the constituent members (individual and collective) are fused into a new unity with a 
strong affective-moral sense of membership and of communal purposes.53 This 
alliance is unique in that, through the process which produces it, the identities of 
constituent groups are transformed through their mutual relationships, this 
transformation producing a radically new collective identity and thereby an enhanced 
capacity for collective action of a radical kind. Post-Marxism's introduction of the 
concept of 'nodal point' to theorize the character of this alliance is a significant 
contribution to Gramsci's account of hegemony, since it directs our attention to the 
psychic constituents of collective action, as will be seen below. What post-Marxism 
rejects is Gramsci's retention of a necessary class basis which it sees as an unfortunate 
remnant of economism and essentialism in his thought.54 In effect, classes are not 
the sole social agents, since subjects are not constituted solely by location in relations 
of production but are rather the product of 'a precarious articulation among a number 
of subject positions'.55 So we must note at this point that the post-Marxist 
historical bloc is quite different from the Gramscian historical bloc, as the reference to 
'a precarious articulation' makes clear. Precariousness is not the mark of the strength 
of purpose and of moral commitment looked for by Gramsci, as will be seen in 
chapter seven. In any case, the commitment to radical democracy as conceptualized 
by post-Marxism seems to preclude such ambitions.
The concept of hegemony is internally related to that of articulation which, as 
mentioned above, refers to the process which is intended to constitute unity out of 
plurality.56 In order to understand the character of the task involved in initiating this 
process, it is important to note at this point that the social always presents itself as 
society; as 'a closed space where each differential position is fixed as a specific and 
irreplaceable moment'.57 Moments here are subjects who are fixed in positions which 
endow them with a comparatively strong sense of identity (sense of coherence,
52 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p.139
53 Ibid., p. 136. Gramsci's work will be discussed in chapter seven.
54 What it neglects is a systematic consideration of the role of organic intellectuals and of the crucial 
process of the constitution of the concrete phantasy. These will be discussed in chapter seven below.
55 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 58.
56 Ibid., ch. 3.
57 Ibid., p. 127.
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stability). Elements are subjects who are not so fixed. Insofar as subjects have been 
the object of sustained and mutually supportive interpellations (or, put another way, 
have occupied a relatively coherent set of subject positions), then they are likely to 
experience a strong sense of identity. For example, as we will see in chapter four, 
bourgeois subjects are examples of such subjects in that they have been fixed 
(relatively) or endowed with a sense of identity by virtue of their several and mutually 
reinforcing positionings within a discourse or discourses. The initiation of a new 
hegemonic articulatory practice involves the creation of new signifying chains of 
equivalences (an organic ideology). These will have the effect of delinking moments 
from existing chains of equivalence thereby rendering them open to political 
mobilization by means of new interpellations. By implication, then, an important 
political task is to determine which positions are susceptible to this rupturing and 
therefore are open to articulation to a new chain of equivalences.
We must assume that individuals as elements feel acutely the sense of lack which 
is held to be constitutive of all human beings. They are therefore open to 
interpellations by discourses promising fullness. Where elements are more numerous 
than moments, we may assume a conjuncture describable as an 'identity crisis'.58 
Such conjunctures constitute an opportunity for radical politics. The task of a 
politics concerned to constitute a radical collective actor is to articulate 'floating' 
elements/meanings to a new democratic discourse, thereby transforming them into new 
moments. Where this transformation is successful, a new nodal point or collective 
identity will have been created and therefore a new collective actor capable of 
instituting a new radically democratic discourse.
Collective actor as nodal point
As we have seen, post-Marxism takes the discursive constitution of the social to be a 
standing source of volatility. It is (along with the other phenomena discussed in 
section one above) what makes the hegemonic project both possible to initiate and 
almost impossible to complete.59 Temporary or relative fixity can be constructed, 
however; the flow of differences can be brought to flow more sluggishly or even to 
appear still. The constitution of fixity (which, for post-Marxism, is always 
necessarily temporary and fragile), is captured by the term 'nodal points', as 
mentioned above, a term derived from psychoanalysis and theoretically related to the 
concepts of condensation and overdetermination discussed in the third section of 
chapter two. The differences between the Freudian and post-Marxist usage of these
58 See Laclau (1977)
59 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), pp. I l l ,  112
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concepts (insofar as these differences can be established) reveal some of the 
consequences of the fear of 'essentialism' which is so markedly present in post- 
Marxism.
It was seen in chapter two that Freud uses the concept of overdetermination to 
refer to the relationship between force and meaning and the outcome of this 
relationship as revealed in the manifest content of dreams. Recall that the individual 
psyche is forced into evasive manoeuvres, as it were, through the presence of culture 
in the shape of the super-ego which forbids certain desires. Put another way, it seeks 
to prevent the cathexis (investment) of psychic energy to particular kinds of 
meanings. The redistribution of energy (or its cathexis to 'innocent' objects or 
meanings) is a way of evading (by misleading) the subject's internal censor. Where 
condensation takes place, the force attaching to a number of different meanings is 
accumulated in one which comes to stand for all the rest. Where displacement takes 
place, the energy attaching to one meaning is transferred to another. Here force (both 
social and psychic) and meaning are joined in a causal sequence of a specific kind. 
While, for Freud, neither principle of distribution can result in durable cathexes, post- 
Marxism, following Althusser's adaptation discussed in chapter two, develops the 
concepts to distinguish between two forms of identity-formation: one (condensation) 
resulting in commitment to radical and communal political goals, the other 
(displacement) resulting in preoccupation with individual self-maintenance or 
development. In addition to this, post-Marxism gives the concepts an idealist 
emphasis as follows.
As was discussed in chapter two, Althusser took over the concept of 
overdetermination - albeit with reservations - to refer to a non-deterministic form of 
causality in the cultural rather than psychic realm, but opening the way for a non- 
reductive Marxist account of the psychical and biological components of 
cultures. Correctly remarking that Althusser's extension of this concept to Marxism 
'had more than a superficially metaphoric character', Laclau and Mouffe go on to say:
For Freud, overdetermination is no ordinary process of 'fusion' or 'merger' - 
which would at most be a metaphor established by analogy with the physical 
world, compatible with any form of multi-causality; on the contrary, it is a 
very precise type of fusion entailing a symbolic dimension and a plurality of 
meanings. The concept of overdetermination is constituted in the field of the 
symbolic, and has no meaning whatsoever outside it. Consequently, the most 
profound potential meaning of Althusser's statement that everything existing in 
the social is overdetermined, is the assertion that the social constitutes itself as 
a symbolic order. The symbolic - i.e. overdetermined - character of social 
relations therefore implies that they lack an ultimate literality which would 
reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law.60
60 Ibid., pp. 97 - 8.
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What is effaced here, or at least marginalized, is the fact that Freud is dealing with the 
material (in the sense of force or matter-energy as described above) world also. Given 
the claim that discourse is being used in a material sense - i.e. that it necessarily refers 
to practices - it might be supposed that the material referent of Freud's conception of 
overdetermination would find its place in post-Marxism's usage. Post-Marxism will 
claim that the discursive (and so the symbolic referred to in the above quotation) 
necessarily incorporates the material.61 However, its simultaneous rejection of 
dichotomies and of dialectics leads it to efface the empirical and theoretical sources 
and effects of these dichotomies which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.62 
Here the effect is that, authorial intentions notwithstanding, the lack of differentiation 
in post-Marxist discourse analysis is such as to neutralize the material, as will be 
argued in section three of this chapter.63 Force, both psychic and social, as well as 
biology, the necessary material basis of both psyche and social, is here lost sight of in 
the privileging of the symbolic. This idealist tendency reappears in the authors' 
appropriation of Lacan's translation of Freud's symbolic-biological-social categories of 
condensation and displacement into the linguistic categories of metaphor and 
metonymy. Here again the necessary material-energetic basis of the distribution and 
redistribution of meanings is lost.64
It may be argued that the Lacanian account of psychic processes apparently 
accepted by post-Marxism has dealt with the question of biology through the concept 
of the real which conceives of the elusive unhumanized remainder as a permanent 
ineliminable subversive force. However, while the real (biological) does constitute a 
force for Lacan (and for post-Marxism) this is a purely negative force.65 What this 
means is that the social or discursive is at the same time all powerful (because 
everything is discursive) and relatively powerless (because discourse cannot guarantee 
the fixity of its interpellations). The full implications of this conception of the social- 
psyche relation will be explored fully in chapters four and eight. For the moment, we 
need to note that, according to this view, what the subject experiences is a 'lightness of 
being', an inability (or refusal) to engage in long-term relations or in dedicated, 
sustained action of any kind. The further implication is that sociality (the capacity to 
engage in enduring and felt social relations) is not a characteristic of such subjects.
61 As Laclau & Mouffe (1990) do in response to Geras's criticisms.
62 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 110.
63 See Albritton (1993) for an argument about the dangers of collapsing distinctions which he sees as 
a questionable tendency in the 'post' problematic. See also Landry & MacLean (1991).
64 See Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 110. This matter will be discussed further in chapter eight.
65 From a poststructuralist point of view, it is politically dangerous to allot the biological more than a 
purely negative significance. To endow it with 'positivity' would incur the risk o f a slide into the 
'metaphysics of presence' and therefore into antidemocratic discourses. We may assume that post- 
Marxism shares this view, given its repeated admonitions regarding 'essentialism'.
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The psychoanalytic component of post-Marxism's account of identity would lead 
us to expect that relationships will be strongly felt. Contrary to some interpretations 
of his work, Freud assumed that human individuals, although a-social or even anti­
social at birth, would necessarily become social as a result of their development.66 
What we find in post-Marxism, though, is a radically individualistic account of human 
beings and subjectivity. The concept of lack requires such an individualistic focus 
and we find no hint anywhere in the work that sociality might be a good in itself for 
the individuals under discussion. Maybe we can interpret resistance to new 
interpellations, which is allowed for, as a manifestation of such sociality, or capacity 
to engage in durable social relations. We are given no encouragement to do this, 
however. In fact, little by way of explanation is offered for this surprising and 
presumably exceptional tenacity on the part of the fragmented contemporary 
decentred subject. It is almost as if we are presented with a Hobbesian individual 
engaged in endless 'computing' about the costs and benefits of commitment to different 
projects or discourses.67
These problems arise from post-Marxism's rather perfunctory and untheorized 
adoption of Lacanian concepts which leads to the introduction into its account 
(whether wittingly or unwittingly is not clear) of Lacanian assumptions which force 
us to conclude either that culture is underpinned by battles between id and super-ego 
with no room at all for the emergence of ego or, more strongly, that capitalist cultures 
constitute subjects without either egos or super-egos. Since transformative communal 
action requires ego, in a sense to be developed in the remainder of this work, we must 
conclude for the moment on the basis of the post-Marxist account that such action is 
not an option in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.
To sum up, overdetermination here refers to a process of incorporation whereby a 
relatively durable form of political commitment to the achievement of collective 
purposes is constituted. This is the outcome of hegemonic politics which consists in 
the interpellation of groups and individuals as members of a new collective subject. 
These interpellations consist in reinterpretations of existing 'subject positions' from 
the point of view of the proposed action. These reinterpretations must offer to 
satisfy the myriad demands and needs of the plurality of subjectivities - both 
individual and group - to be mobilized, while at the same time demonstrating a 
common or unifying element connecting their claims. Acceptance of commonality 
yields a new collective identity i.e. it retains elements of the old identities while at the 
same time absorbing them into the new all-embracing collective identity.
66 This will be discussed further in chapter eight.
67 In relation to this, it should be noted that Laclau, in his later work, returns to Hobbes to explain 
such stability as does exist in terms of the need for order. Note the implication here that sociality is a 
cost rather than a good in itself. See Laclau (1994). The problem of sociality is addressed by Mouffe 
(1992) under the rubric of citizenship.
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However, as we have seen, post-Marxism appears to eliminate (or render 
negligible) the moment of force (of cathexis of energy) from this concept. Meanings 
(interpellations) are not - indeed cannot be - forceful in the sense that they are 
cathected in a durable and devoted manner. So collective identities are also not 
forceful; they are not or cannot be retained, sustained and therefore acted upon for any 
length of time. Hence the apparently endless need for articulating new 'chains of 
equivalence' if group projects requiring political commitment are to get under way. 
The volatility of the social is double-edged in relation to the initiation of radical 
collective projects in that it leaves subjects open to new interpellations while at the 
same time leaving them unwilling or unable to commit themselves to these 
interpellations for any length of time. Identities are put on and discarded apparently 
at will (although in fact, if Lacan is to be believed under the imperative of a tragic 
search for an unattainable sense of fullness or fixity). A new hegemonic discourse 
must be composed of interpellations promising fullness but, as we know, this is a 
promise that can never be kept. Given the discursive competitiveness provoked by 
the 'surplus of meanings' available to subjects seeking satisfaction, and given the 
absence of any suggestion that sociality is in itself a source of satisfaction for such 
subjects, it seems unlikely that the subjects discussed by post-Marxism will feel much 
sense of obligation to the wider group.
I now turn to the final section of this chapter in which the attempt is made first, 
to clarify post-Marxism's contribution to our understanding of subjectivity and 
political commitment and second, to suggest ways in which the discursive approach 
can be rendered more systematic and more empirically adequate.
m
Having explored in some detail the post-Marxist theory of identity and action, we 
have found that its portrait of the contemporary world (of liberal capitalist cultures) 
forces the conclusion that any kind of sustained political commitment to the 
achievement of collective purposes is highly unlikely. This conclusion is reached on 
the basis of the centrality of a relatively stable and satisfying sense of identity to any 
kind of action or commitment and of the inability of such cultures to provide this. 
The strong thrust of post-Marxism is that the contemporary period of disorganized 
capitalism is witnessing a qualitative change in terms of forms and processes of 
identification. It is in this area that the work has made its most useful contribution, 
drawing our attention to the extraordinary fluidity of identities - therefore of 
subjectivities - now. While other theorists of collective action have also pointed this 
out, (for example Melucci, as discussed in chapter one), post-Marxism offers us some
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of the theoretical means of arriving at a systematic explanation of this state of affairs. 
It does this by developing further (however haphazzardly) the attempt to fuse 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, by bringing together more explicitly than does 
Althusser a range of concepts - hegemony and overdetermination, interpellation, 
articulation and nodal points - which will enable us to theorize further the character of 
subjectivities as these relate to the requirements for collective identity-formation. In 
effect, these concepts also enable us to theorize further the relationship between 
meaning and materiality, or meaning and power, for when we are talking about identity 
we are talking about the meanings available to or thrust upon subjects. What is in 
question here, though, is not meaning as phantasy, but rather the meanings which have 
action or inaction consequences for those subjects. If identities are as easily 
changeable, or as lightly borne as post-Marxism assumes, then actions that get in the 
way of the pursuit of fullness, or actions requiring self-discipline and long-term 
commitment, are unlikely to be undertaken or, if undertaken, then lightly abandoned. 
This is the implication of the post-Marxist view. Unfortunately post-Marxism has 
not given us sufficient theoretical means to understand quite why this is the case. 
This is because it fails to develop a framework of concepts enabling it to make the 
kinds of fine distinctions which are necessary if discourse analysis is not to dissolve 
into idealism. Materiality is asserted without being theorized and, connectedly, any 
phenomena which do not fit the main thrust of the argument are mentioned without 
being theorized or without being accounted for (e.g. resistance to new interpellations, 
as mentioned above).68
Let me now suggest various distinctions which can enable us to build on the 
insights offered by this approach so as to produce a more rigorous and realist account 
of the phenomena whose political consequences post-Marxism has accurately 
characterized. These distinctions will be discussed under the following headings:
1. Discourse as transhistorical abstraction
2. Discourse and referentiality
3. Discourse as practice
68 For charges that post-Marxism is an idealism, see Geras (1990b); Mouzelis (1988); Wood (1986). 
See Laclau & Mouffe (1990) for their response to this charge. For a defense of post-Marxism, see Daly 
(1994).
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1. Discourse as transhistorical abstraction
The concept of discourse, as deployed by post-Marxism refers to an anthropological 
constant or universal human attribute. Discourse is therefore what Marx describes as 
a 'rational' or transhistorical abstraction, that is, one which draws our attention to an 
element common to all cultures.69 It is the conflation of transhistorical and historical 
abstractions that produces the naturalization of the historically-culturally specific, as 
we noted in chapter two. Discourse as transhistorical abstraction tells us no more 
and no less than production as such. Moreover, an exclusive focus on discourse is 
likely to be as reductive as an exclusive focus on production as narrowly conceived. 
The discursive turn attains its usefulness and significance in relation to a social science 
which has effaced the theoretical and empirical importance of meaning in the 
constitution of the social. As the theoretical turn to production in mid-nineteenth 
century Marxism derived its critical status and significance in relation to an idealist 
philosophy (while at the same time courting the danger of merely expressing the 
emergent commonsense of industrial capitalism), so the theoretical turn to discourse 
derives its critical status and significance in relation to a vulgar materialist version of 
Marxism or a naturalizing economic liberalism. In other words, as the productivist 
turn signalled a shift in problematic in the mid-nineteenth century, so too does the 
discursive turn in the late twentieth century. This shift is not purely theoretical but is 
refracted through institutional changes in the world; it is telling us something about the 
world outside of the academy. What precisely and how much it is telling us is 
another matter. For the moment my point is that discourse as transhistorical 
abstraction can in itself tell us very little. In order to make the concept more useful, it 
is necessary to stress the specificities of historical discourses. While Laclau and 
Mouffe do occasionally make a distinction between the discursive (as transhistorical 
abstraction) and discourses,70 this distinction does not inform their analysis in any 
systematic fashion. Furthermore, they have a tendency to equate all discourses; a 
failure to note that there are qualitative differences between discourses, not only in 
relation to the scope and ambition of their claims (shove-ha'penny discourse at one 
extreme; capitalism at the other) but to the resources available to different discourses 
attempting to become hegemonic, discourses, that is, claiming the potential for 'fixity'.
In fact, Althusser's intention in his work on ideology is to draw the attention of 
Marxists to what post-Marxism quite rightly insists on - the necessarily discursive, or 
symbolic, or cultural character of human life. Furthermore, his use of ideology to 
capture meaning has the virtue of pointing to the specificity of particular kinds of 
discourses i.e. those which are either seeking, or have already attained the power to
69 Marx (1973b), p. 85.
70 See Laclau & Mouffe (1990); Laclau (1990iv).
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become dominant, to constitute a way of life for a whole population, or to constitute 
subjectivities. Put another way, Althusser's ideology can be equated with post- 
Marxism's hegemonic discourses. This point will be taken up in chapter four.
2. Discourse and referentiality
In order to understand the different characteristics and powers of specific discourses 
and to avoid the drift towards idealism, we need to make conceptual distinctions that 
will enable us to focus on referentiality. A return to Saussure, whose conceptual 
innovations in relation to the study of language were noted in the first section of this 
chapter, will be helpful at this point.
These innovations consisted of the conception of sign as composed of signifier 
(sound) and signified (meaning). Another dimension of the sign (its functional 
dimension) is its referent. It is important here to remember that Saussure, for purely 
methodological reasons, bracketed the referential dimension of the sign. He also 
insisted that the relationship between signifier and signified is not necessary but rather 
arbitrary, as is the relationship between sign and referent. Furthermore, signs gain 
their meaning, not as things in themselves, but from their relations to other signs 
within a system (structural dimension).
For reasons which are not absolutely clear, Saussure's 'arbitrariness' as a reference 
to convention (as opposed to nature) was translated into 'randomness' and 
'fleetingness', a translation against which he himself warned.71 So that which is not 
natural becomes necessarily random and therefore completely unconstrained. Yet the 
equation of arbitrariness with randomness, indeterminacy or instability is not self- 
evident but needs to be supported by argument. Arbitrariness can be translated as 
randomness only if it is believed that the social world itself has become random. 
Now, post-Marxism has offered us arguments to that effect, but they are put forward 
at a very high level of generality and are marked, in addition, by a neglect of the 
institutional dimension and, relatedly, by a reticence about the necessary materiality 
of discourses. In effect, problems relating to functionality, referentiality and practical 
adequacy are effaced. In order to clarify this point, I shall say a few words about 
Saussure's comparison of linguistic and monetary systems.72
A given coin is related to other coins and terms in a monetary system; it derives 
its identity from its location in a system of differences, in other words. This is the 
structural dimension. However, it must also be related to (exchangeable with) real 
goods of some value outside the system (functional dimension). Similarly, a given
71 Saussure (1974), pp. 68 - 9.
72 See the discussion in Baudrillard (1993), ch. 1.
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signified is related to other signifieds in a linguistic system (and derives its identity or 
meaning from its location in a system of differences), but it must also be exchangeable 
for (refer to) something outside the system. The purpose of money is use-value; 
money which cannot be exchanged for real useful objects in the world is meaningless, 
or valueless. The purpose of language is designation; language which cannot be used 
to communicate with others about real objects in the world is meaningless, or 
valueless. The two dimensions (structural and functional) are separate but linked. In 
other words, meaning has two components, structural (relations between signs within 
a linguistic system) and functional (relations between signs and their corresponding 
material objects in the world).
It is important to incorporate these distinctions into our analysis because they 
remind us of the problem of 'use-value1, or practical adequacy in relation to discourse. 
While the discursive as transhistorical abstraction pre-exists all functionality and 
meaning, actually existing discourses o f certain kinds will persist as discourses only 
because they are capable of fulfilling certain essential functions. In effect, language is 
both constitutive and referential. To elide the referential is to elide the materiality of 
discourse. It is this elision which in part underpins the 'ontology of flux'. It is this 
elision which supports the interpretation of the contingent as the volatile, or which 
underpins, for example, the claim that: 'Necessity only exists as a partial effort to limit 
contingency'.73
In the case of individual subjects, awareness of the referential function draws our 
attention to their materiality or embodiment as well as to their location in social 
embodied relations. Both the biological and social necessarily limit the 'free play of 
differences' which is claimed by post-Marxism to be an innate characteristic of 
discourse. The social fact necessarily encompasses the natural fact and this 
constitutes a check on volatility. The fact that functionality (e.g. the need to fulfil 
certain vital material bodily needs) is discursively constituted should not lead us to 
think that discourse can reconstitute functionality just as 'it' wishes. The natural 
element of life, which cannot be separated from the socio-cultural, constrains quite 
significantly the 'play' of differences. Discourse itself is both a natural and social fact 
of human life and therefore partakes of the constraints deriving from these two 
sources. This claim will become clearer as I go on to discuss the third criterion for 
cleansing discourse analysis of its idealizing tendency.
73 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 114 (my emphasis).
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3. Discourse as practice
We noted in chapter two the utility of Althusser's dichotomy-transcending concept of 
practice, particularly when informed by an awareness of the different modes in which 
matter exists and can be transformed. Here we are particularly concerned with the 
human organism as an organism with properties or causal powers rendering him open 
to constitution as an apparently self-activating being with consciousness. 
(Chimpanzees cannot be constituted in this way, as is testified by many failed 
attempts to do so.74) Human organisms have the capacity to become subjects 
through subjection to ideological practices. Ideology is a practice that works on 
specific raw materials (human infants) so as to produce specific kinds of 
subjectivities.75 This practice requires different modes of materiality for its 
successful completion. Apart from the human organism, it requires both 'theoretical 
ideology', a text or body of meanings which will constitute the ideologizing practice 
and the social power to institute its practice.76 This body of meanings will have 
been produced, reproduced or transformed by pre-existing embodied subjects and will 
be recorded or stored in texts taking various material forms. Moreover, this body of 
meanings will have been derived from (either as expression or transformation of) pre­
existing practices.77
The focus on practices and modes of materiality requires us to attend to the 
different capacities, functions and powers of different kinds of discourses. It enables 
us to address questions about the practical adequacy of different discourses i.e. about 
their capacities to constitute specific modes of matter in specific kinds of ways for 
specific purposes. It enables us to avoid the slide into idealism which an exclusive 
focus on meaning tends to induce. In the absence of these analytical distinctions, it is 
all too easy to equate meaning with text. Reducing materiality to textuality can be a 
disastrous move precluding any understanding of cultures, for the following reason.
Materials vary in their malleability; in their openness to specific kinds of 
practices. In contemporary liberal capitalist cultures, texts are modes of changing 
materiality (from print to electronics) which may be produced, reproduced, 
transformed or effaced with astonishing speed.78 Post-Marxism has discussed 
subjectivity as if the human organism has the characteristics of a contemporary text. 
It takes the human organism to be an apparently malleable but also extremely volatile 
substance. This malleability and volatility are held to be the overdetermined result of 
both transhistorical 'facts of life' and historically-culturally specific developments
74 See Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh (1993).
75 Althusser (1990ii), pp. 166 - 7; Sprinker (1987), ch. 7.
76 Here I am assuming literate cultures.
77 This point will be explored further in chapter four.
78 Poster (1990, 1995).
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which for the first time make us aware of these facts. In pushing us towards this 
conclusion, post-Marxism is virtually naturalizing the state of affairs in question. In 
effect, it is allowing a new kind of essentialism into its discourse.79 It is not 
sufficiently historical in its approach. It gives us a powerful account of the 
experience of the decentred subject but its account of how this subject is constituted is 
badly flawed. Discourses do have different functions and different causal powers and 
it is necessary to take account of this. Post-Marxism appears to be unaware of the 
problems arising from the neglect of this question. The solution to this problem 
requires an account of institutions and a theory of materiality and its modes.80 It 
requires us to be alert to the dehistoricizing effects of conflating transhistorical and 
historical abstractions.
Conclusion
Post-Marxism is read here as an analysis of the erosion of political commitment in 
liberal capitalist cultures. Through its development of Althusser's psychoanalytic 
borrowings, and its adaptation of his distinction between displacement and 
condensation, post-Marxism has produced a useful (but underdeveloped and 
unsystematic) account of the lived experience of decentred subjects i.e. of subjects 
constituted by a multiplicity of positionalities or interpellations which may or may 
not be congruent with one another. Such subjects lack the capacity and/or the 
inclination to engage in sustained long-term social relations or to enter into serious 
political commmitments. In effect, post-Marxism is drawing our attention to a 
peculiar and culturally unprecedented characteristic of capitalist culture with which 
we will be concerned throughout this thesis: the privatization of sociality. By this 
term I refer to the reduction of the experience of the felt social bond to an individual 
voluntary - rather than culturally imperative - matter. The significance of this 
characteristic in relation to our problem cannot be overstated. Its origins will be 
investigated in chapter five where Marx's theory of pure capitalism will be seen to get 
to the source of this peculiar cultural characteristic.
So post-Marxism has offered valuable clues to the kind of investigations required 
to complete the task undertaken in this thesis. These clues will be followed up in later 
chapters which will also seek to fill the gaps which have been identified in this body 
of work, as well as to correct its naturalizing bias. In chapter four, the lack of 
institutional analysis will be made good. In this chapter we will set out to show that
79 Fuss (1989) is useful on this characteristic o f anti-essentialist theorizing. See Mouzelis (1988) on 
post-Marxism's anti-essentialism.
80 See Mouzelis (1988); Osborne (1991). Jordan (1967) is useful on the philosophy of matter.
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an analysis in terms of institutions rather than discourses can further our 
understanding of the processes which constitute individuals as particular kinds of 
subjects. More specifically, we will investigate the way or ways in which the 
'relative structuration' of capitalist culture is institutionally expressed and will 
consider further the contribution to be made by psychoanalysis to the resolution of 
the problem in hand. This will help us to think more systematically about the 
significance of the two different models of the subject which are suggested by post- 
Marxism, namely, the bourgeois subject and the decentred subject (the subject by 
default) as well as about the different kinds of collective action in which these 
different subjects are likely to engage.
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Chapter Four
Subjectivity, meaning and materiality 
Introduction
Having examined post-Marxism's account of social fluidity in liberal capitalist 
cultures, I have suggested that this account is impoverished because of its failure to 
develop the range of analytic distinctions needed to theorize the materiality of 
discourse. Suggestions as to what these might be were made in the final section of 
chapter three. One important problem is the neglect of institutions. It is through 
institutions that discourses emerge and become materialized in different ways. 
Without an account of institutions the mechanisms which produce social (and 
psychic) volatility cannot be identified and questions about the practical adequacy of 
discourses cannot be addressed. More specifically, we need to consider how the 
structural distinctiveness - 'relative structuration' - of capitalist cultures is 
institutionally expressed and, relatedly, how 'nodal points' are constituted out of the 
indeterminacy which is apparently the defining characteristic of social relations, 
experience and subjects in these cultures. This will require a further exploration of the 
possibility of articulating psychoanalysis to Marxism. In addition, and relatedly, we 
will begin to explore the character of the bourgeois subject who is taken here to be a 
significant source of inspiration for the Marxian and Gramscian emancipatory goal and 
therefore for the account of communal transformative action required for the 
realization of that goal. These are the tasks to be undertaken in this chapter.
The first section will offer a general account of institutions as developed by 
Castoriadis.1 Whereas Castoriadis shares post-Marxism's concern to emphasize the 
constitutive role of meaning in human life, he also addresses directly the question of 
institutions in a way that makes a theoretical space for questions of materiality and 
functionality. In addition, he draws our attention to a novel and significant 
characteristic of capitalist institutions. This characteristic consists in the claim to 
have identified pure functionality and rationality. We will need to note the subject 
effects of this characteristic as it becomes expressed in institutions.2 The second 
section will follow up post-Marxism's interesting and suggestive remarks about the 
constitution of the subject 'Man' by looking at Habermas's work on the bourgeois 
public sphere.3 This will allow us to put institutional flesh on the bones of post- 
Marxism's claim that this subject was constituted by an 'ensemble of social practices,
1 Castoriadis (1987).
2 See Bowring (1996); Gorz (1989); Habermas (1984, 1987a).
3 Habermas (1992).
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of institutions and discourses' acting on individuals in a mutually reinforcing manner 
so as to constitute them as 'nodal points'.4 It will also enable us to consider further 
the significance of modalities of materiality (practices) and of the practical adequacy 
of discourses. Moreover as it will have indicated the institutional requirements for 
the constitution of the bourgeois subject, it will enable us to assess the possible 
subject effects of different kinds of institutional change. The third section addresses 
the problem of relative structuration through Althusser's essay on Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs).5 Here we will see that, for Althusser, relatively stable 
identities or subjectivities are the product of myriad institutions informed by the same 
ideology and functioning under the guidance of the state. From the point of view of 
capitalism, it is the state - through the ISAs - that must ensure (or attempt to ensure, 
not at all the same thing) the production of the kinds of subjects needed to bear the 
necessary relations of production. We will note here the significance of adopting a 
comprehensive or inclusive conception of capitalism and contrast Althusser's usage 
with that of post-Marxism, which equates capitalism with the 'economy'. Whereas 
post-Marxism maintains that capitalism has an 'outside' i.e. that relations of 
production form only one element of the totality of relations in which individuals are 
involved at any one time,6 Althusser sees capitalism as a total mode of life (culture) 
which has the tendency to gain and maintain control of every aspect of human life 
(although, as we have noted in chapter two, the contradictory character of capitalism 
stands as permanent source of crisis and therefore of possible subversion).7
Each of these works offers something that is lacking in post-Marxism and each of 
these works, in addition, tells us something significant about institutionalization which 
will enable us to think more systematically about meaning, materiality and the 
constitution of social relations. I turn first to Castoriadis.
4 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 117.
5 Althusser (1984i).
6 See Laclau (1990i).
7 See also Habermas (1984, 1987a).
ICastoriadis on meaning and materiality
According to Castoriadis, the purpose of institutions is the 'fabrication' of individuals 
as particular kinds of subjects with particular kinds of thoughts, feelings, projects, 
behaviours. Subjects are materializations of discourses, or, in Castoriadis's terms, of 
imaginary significations. However, institutions do not capture individuals 
completely; individuals have the psychic capacity to resist total institutionalization. 
Drawing on psychoanalysis, Castoriadis conceives of this as an inherent, irreducible 
pre-cultural attribute which expresses itself in the ability to create representations: 
'One must admit that originary phantasmatization, which I term the radical 
imagination, pre-exists and presides over every organization of drives, even the most 
primitive ones, and that it is the condition for the drive to attain psychical existence.'8 
It is the ineradicable capacity for creativity which produces the radical imaginary, or a 
predisposition to institute radically new cultures. Clearly, although Castoriadis shares 
with Lacan the view that the psyche is not completely captured by culture, he 
interprets the 'remainder' in much more positive terms than does Lacan. In it he finds 
the psychic resources for the transformation of institutions. He also provides an 
historically informed philosophical analysis of institutions which will enable us to 
begin to understand what it is about capitalist cultures that produces the kind of 
subjects described by post-Marxism and therefore what it is which renders the 
problem of political commitment so acute in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.
Castoriadis defines the institution as a 'socially sanctioned, symbolic network in 
which a functional component and an imaginary component are combined in variable 
proportions and relations'.9 The imaginary here relates to the human capacity to 
imagine that which does not already exist, to create new images. However, notice here 
that human imagination is put to work on practical or functional problems. The 
definition draws our attention to the question of practical adequacy which was elided 
in the post-Marxist discursive account of the social.
The imaginary provides answers to questions about the character of a particular 
culture - about its identity, its desires, its goals, its relation to the rest of the world, 
and so on. Institutions posit the culture as existing, not only as an empirical but as a 
qualitatively distinct phenomenon. It is in terms of this distinctness that its 
'functional' requirements are posited. There are no pure 'functional' needs distinct 
from particular cultural identities, in other words. Certainly no collectivity can exist
8 Castoriadis (1987), p. 287. See Habermas (1990); Leledakis (1995), ch. 8; Whitebook (1981-2).
9 Castoriadis (1987), p. 32. See also Castoriadis (1989) & (1991), chs. 3 & 7.
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without organizing the production of its material life and its reproduction as a 
collectivity. However production and reproduction are not dictated either by natural 
laws (the real) or by rational considerations (the rational) alone. Nature (the real), 
perception (the rational) and imagination contribute to the instituting of human 
collectivities as particular kinds of collectivities. What is real for every culture - 
nature, social relations, subjectivity - is necessarily constituted by a categorial 
framework which is the work of the imagination. The imaginary (the meaningful) and 
the functional are fused in a unity or, put another way, the distinction between the 
imaginary and the functional is analytical rather than empirical or ontological. 
However, the capacity to separate them in thought lays the basis for a radical 
imaginary claiming to split them in reality. This is what happens in capitalist 
cultures and this has notable consequences for the formation of social relations and 
therefore of subjects.
The Imaginary Component
Existing societies are the imaginary10 actualized through institutions. The imaginary 
of a society is the element
which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which 
overdetermines the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is 
the creation of each historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing 
and of conducting its own existence, its world, and its relations with this 
world, this originary structuring component, this central signifying-signified, 
the source of that which presents itself in every instance as an indisputable 
and undisputed meaning, the basis for articulating what does matter and what 
does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the objects of practical, affective 
and intellectual investment, whether individual or collective.11
It is 'imaginary significations' which provide the answers to these questions. As 
mentioned before, the imaginary posits the culture as existing, not only as an empirical 
but as a qualitatively distinct phenomenon. For Castoriadis, the 'qualitatively 
distinct' is imaginary in the radical sense that it is not given in perception. It derives 
from the human capacity to imagine something absolutely new. From this point of 
view, the nation is the modem form of the radical social imaginary which provides 
answers to these fundamental questions about the character of collectivities.12
10 This is quite different from the Lacanian concept, to be discussed further below.
11 Castoriadis (1987), p. 145.
12 Castoriadis (1997) considers this imaginary signification to have lost its effectivity in the 
contemporary world.
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Central significations are not 'of something, nor are they attached or related to 
something except in a second-order sense. On the contrary, they are what brings into 
being the co-belonging of objects, acts and individuals which, in appearance, are 
heterogeneous. They are at the origin of subjects, not at the disposal of subjects. 
They are that by reason of which subjects exist as subjects and as these particular 
subjects. The fact that reflection can attempt to intend them explicitly is secondary 
and the foundation for the possibility of such a reflection lies in social imaginary 
significations.
However, the radical imaginary cannot conjure institutions out of the air. 
Institutions are always caught up in the constraints of the 'natural stratum'. Moreover 
they are always inserted in an historical continuum and, therefore, shaped by what is 
already in existence. So they are not freely created and recreated. They are 
expressions of the real, the rational and the historical. Instituting society 'leans on' the 
first natural stratum and is always in a relation of 'reception/alteration' with what has 
already been instituted. So, it also 'leans on' already instituted subjects. 'The 
position of meaningful figures or of figured meaning by radical imagination leans on the 
being-thus of the subject as a living being, and is always found ... in a relation of what 
had already been represented by and for the psyche'.13 I take the 'being-thus of the 
subject as a living being' to refer to the everyday experience of that subject. 
Castoriadis fails to clarify the nature of this relationship between 'what is' and 'what 
could be'.14 However, it is clear that, the individual capacity for radical imagining 
notwithstanding, a given instituted imaginary will constrain radically new 
institutionalization. Little more is said about such constraints, though. In this 
respect, Castoriadis offers us little more than post-Marxism. As will be seen in 
chapter seven, Gramsci's 'concrete phantasy' proves to be a more useful 
conceptualization which will enable us to think more systematically about these 
matters.
The functional component
The functional aspects of institutions are captured by Castoriadis through the 
concepts of teukhein and legein. By the former is meant 'an organized totality of 
efficacious operations with a "material" basis'; the latter refers to the 'ensemblist- 
identitary dimension of language and ... of social representing'.15 Teukhein refers to
13 Castoriadis (1987), p. 370.
14 for a discussion of the inadequacies Castoriadis's account of the social/psyche relation, see Bookchin 
(1982); Habermas (1990); Whitebook (1981 - 2).
15 Castoriadis (1987), p. 261.
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'doing'; legein refers to representations of 'doing'. Teukhein and lege in are expressions 
of 'identitary-assemblist logic' which constitutes terms as
distinct and definite elements, solidifying the pre-relation of referral into 
relation as such, organizing the holding-together, the being-in, the being-on, the 
being-proximate into a system of determined and determining relations 
(identity, difference, belonging, inclusion), differentiating what they distinguish 
in this way into 'entities' and 'properties', using this differentiation to 
constitute 'sets' and 'classes'.16
Identitary logic involves thinking as thinking something determined; saying as saying 
something determined; being as being something determined. In other words, the 
world is represented as divided into identifiable, separate, bounded elements which 
can be immediately known and therefore acted upon. The identitary-assemblist 
assumes a determinate answer to questions. It opposes 'definiteness-determinacy- 
distinctness-lim itation' to 'indefiniteness-indeterm inacy-indistinctness- 
unlimitedness'.17
Clearly Castoriadis's 'identitary-assemblist logic' is the logic of analytical thinking, 
whose cognitive and social effects I have begun to discuss in chapter two. Analytical 
thought fragments nature (including human nature) so as to render it susceptible to 
knowledge oriented to control.18 It requires a wholly depersonalized, abstracted 
orientation towards the world which it renders in wholly disenchanted or profane 
terms. The full institutionalization of this orientation is attempted only in capitalist 
cultures for reasons which will be explored further in chapter five. Now, however, I 
return to the question of totality and fragmentation as it relates to the constitution of 
subjects.
Capitalism and the differentiation of spheres
We have noted before that capitalist cultures produce an historically and culturally 
unprecedented fragmentation of human activities through the division of labour and 
the differentiation of spheres. We have begun to approach this matter in the first 
instance through Althusser's account of contradiction and overdetermination (chapter 
two) and we have seen further that this characteristic of capitalism - captured by the 
term dislocation - is deemed by post-Marxism to constitute the basis for the
16 Ibid., p. 344.
17 Ibid., p. 353.
18 See also Habermas (1987b).
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emergence of a constantly changing plurality of subjectivities, which it tends to equate 
with emancipation (chapter three).
What the differentiation of spheres refers to is the 'splitting' and parcelling out 
between different spheres - the economic, the political, the familial and the cultural - 
of a totality of social action. This splitting demands or allows different values, 
orientations and behaviours in the different spheres. Activity in the economic and 
political spheres is (or should be) rational, 'functional' and impersonal, oriented to 
strangers for specific and limited purposes; activity in the intimate sphere of the 
family is (or should be) loving, loyal and affectionate; activity in the cultural sphere is 
expressive and aesthetic.19 The differentiation of spheres and the accompanying 
distribution of dispositions - rationality, affect, expressivity - are associated with the 
belief that the modem world institutes a purely functional form of culture whose 
institutions are guided wholly by a specific kind of rationality preoccupied with 
efficient and effective action upon 'things'; a form of rationality which Castoriadis 
characterizes as 'identitary-assemblist logic', as we have seen. The claim that the 
spheres of economic and political activity should be rational and functional is related 
to the claim that the modem world has liberated (or offers the possibility of liberating) 
pure humanity from the shackles of custom, tradition, superstition; that it has 
liberated (or offers the possibility of liberating) pure functionality from cultural 
constraints. Liberated, culture-free rationality will be the basis of a liberated, self- 
activating subject and liberated functionality will be the basis of mastery of the natural 
world.20 It is on the basis of this 'fateful differentiation of cultural components' that 
capitalism can represent itself as transparently rational, productive, objective and 
universal, or as Sahlins puts it: '[e] very thing in capitalism conspires to conceal the 
symbolic ordering of the system'.21 It is on this basis that spheres of activity can be 
assessed in terms of 'utility' and pronounced to be rational or irrational. It is on this 
basis that activities considered to be outside the sphere of pure rationality and utility 
can be considered to be somehow optional, or surplus to strict social requirements; a 
matter for private, individual choice apparently without social implications or 
consequences.
Capitalism and the state are 'first order institutions' (Castoriadis's description) of 
the modem world which are avowedly characterized by pure functionality. They are 
also the institutions which oversee a complex, never to be precisely delineated, multi­
faceted nexus of processes whereby different aspects of human activity became 
detached and institutionalized in separate spheres over a period of about two hundred 
years in Western Europe. The impersonal economic and political spheres result from
19 Giddens (1990); Habermas (1984, 1987a).
20 However, the very notion of a pure 'functionality' is in itself a cultural notion, as we have seen.
21 Sahlins (1976), p. 220. See also Gudeman (1986).
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the disembedding of individuals from pre-modem corporate relationships found in the 
extended family, guilds, clans or tribes, and their reincorporation into the state.22
Questions about the institutional composition of these different spheres, about 
the way in which these constitute individuals as fragmented or coherent subjects will 
be addressed in the remaining two sections of this chapter. I turn first to Habermas's 
work on the bourgeois public sphere.23
II
Habermas's work will be discussed here as an account first, of the the way in which 
the differentiation of spheres during the early liberal phase of capitalism was 
institutionally expressed and second, of the significance of specific institutions - in 
particular the bourgeois patriarchal family - in constituting the bourgeois subject. It 
was the bourgeois class which first generated the conditions for producing a new kind 
of critical attention (public opinion) to public objects which issued in a demand 
(couched in universalist terms) for human liberation. It is important, then, to 
investigate the institutional nexus out of which emerged this new kind of attention and 
this new kind of demand, which, as I am arguing, informs the Marxian and Gramscian 
projects and which, furthermore, helps us to understand the requirements for the 
constitution of political commitment in liberal capitalist cultures.
Politics and subjectivity: the bourgeois public sphere
Briefly, Habermas traces the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere during the second 
half of the eighteenth century in England, France and Germany. This bourgeois public 
sphere was a 'forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, 
readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public 
opinion'24 Here debate took place over the rules governing 'relations in the basically 
privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour'.25 
The bourgeois public sphere, which was constituted by the 'private' sphere mediated 
between 'society' (as an aggregation of private individuals) and the newly 
depersonalized state i.e. the state which had attained 'relative autonomy' from the 
person of the monarch.26 As the state apparatus began to assume an independence
22 See Giddens (1990); Kalberg (1993).
23 Habermas (1992).
24 Ibid., pp. 25 - 6.
25 Ibid., p. 27.
26 For historians' views on this see Gunn (1969); Kamen (1984);
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from the personal sphere of the monarch, the courtly society began to drift towards 
the town where it came to have an influence on the emerging new bourgeoisie. What 
might be described as the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, Habermas's 
'bourgeois avant-garde of the educated middle class' acquired the art of critical rational 
public debate through its contact with the courtly world. It was when the court lost 
its central position in the public sphere that 'reason' could 'shed its dependence on the 
authority of the aristocratic noble hosts' and 'acquire that autonomy that turns 
conversation into criticism and bons mots into arguments'.27
'Civil society' thus emerged in the towns and consisted, not only in free economic 
activity, but also in cultural-political activity carried on in coffee houses, salons or 
table societies. Both in England and France, from the time of the Glorious Revolution 
onwards, the coffee houses and the salons were the institutional means of fabricating a 
public sphere in which free private individuals could debate in a consequential way - 
or even constitute - the issues of the day.
These private people had developed specific subjectivities through a nexus of 
institutions, including that of the intimate family. The intimate sphere consisted in 
the property-owning, non-producing bourgeois patriarchal family. Individual 
productive property which was at the free disposal of the family head underpinned 
the family's autonomy and the father's authority. An increasingly rich cultural 
sphere composed of printed material of various kinds as well as theatres, museums 
and concert halls, was essential for the formation of the specific identity of the liberal, 
introspective and autonomous subject.28 The emerging constitutional state was to be 
the guarantor of property and other liberal rights and of the impersonal functioning of 
the free market. In short, the different spheres were mutually constitutive although 
apparently governed by different values and logics. Some elaboration of this is in 
order.
In his account of the public sphere Habermas presupposes the Freudian model of 
the patriarchal bourgeois family. This family instituted 'permanent intimacy' as 
against older forms of communality found in the extended and directly productive 
family. It was the 'wellspring of a specific subjectivity'29 It served as the essential 
humanizing agent whereby the bourgeois subject came to be formed in 'strict 
conformity with societally necessary requirements'. At the same time, what the 
individual concerned experienced was a new kind of psychological freedom.30 This 
was because the conformity in question was based on self-mastery rather than 
habituation. Self-mastery required that the individual not merely do the right thing,
27 Habermas (1992), p. 31.
28 See Cascardi (1992) and Touraine (1995).
29 Habermas (1992), p. 43.
30 Ibid., pp. 47, 46.
78
but do it for the right reasons. This is the Freudian Oedipal theory of subject 
constitution which stresses the role of the stem patriarchal father in the production of 
the individual (male) capacities just mentioned.31 Habermas is here drawing on the 
theory as socialized and historicized by the earlier Frankfurt School.32
The parents/child relationship was part of a wider set of institutions all of which 
served to inform and reinforce the particular kind of individuation which seems to 
have flourished in certain strata of the new bourgeoisie for about a hundred years from 
the mid-eighteenth century. The privatization of the family was expressed and 
advanced in architectural changes whereby lofty raftered halls were replaced by 
separate rooms having distinctive functions. The house became a home for each 
individual rather than for the family as a whole. It was a place where privacy could 
be enjoyed.
In this respect literature, which could be read in privacy within the redesigned 
family home, was of particular importance in constituting the introspective, self- 
disciplined individual. Reading here was active and educational, oriented to self- 
improvement through the critical absorption of philosophy and literature, of moral 
weeklies and critical journals. It was, in addition to the cultural products of concert- 
halls, theatres and museums, the vehicle whereby bourgeois individuals developed a 
subjectivity marked by psychic inwardness (introspection) and self-consciousness.33 
This was an inwardness, though, which was not solely concerned with self-cultivation 
but was also to be constitutive of the new politically significant phenomenon called 
public opinion. The products of the new dedicated cultural sphere made an important 
contribution to the constitution of a new kind of subject equipped with a strong sense 
of self and a strong social sense.34 This social orientation found its first expression in 
literary salons which therefore functioned as a kind of training ground for more 
explicitly political discussions in the more masculine environment of coffee houses.35 
The coffee houses were the congenial public spaces within which culturally and 
socially nourished individuals interacted with one another so as to produce an 
informed and self-confident collective public opinion.
The capacity to produce subjects who were at once inwardly- and outwardly- 
directed was linked to the economic functions of the patriarchal family as property- 
owner, or, as Habermas puts it: The economic demands placed upon the patriarchal
30 This will be discussed further in chapter eight.
32 See Adorno & Horkheimer (1979); Horkheimer (1972i). For accounts of the Frankfurt School, see
Held (1980); Jay (1973).
33 Whyte (1960) gives a useful account of the emergence of self-consciousness in the modem world.
34 This is the individual that Durkheim was later to refer to as the Kantian individual, in contrast to 
the self-interested, calculating utilitarian individual. See Durkheim (1973).
35 See Ryan (1992) for a feminist criticism of Habermas. For an account of the role of clubs and salons 
in constituting an active and effective public opinion in prerevolutionary France, see Kennedy (1982, 
1988).
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conjugal family from without corresponded to the institutional strength to shape a 
domain devoted to the development of the inner life.'36 Autonomy was maintained 
through the ownership and control of productive property as the heads of bourgeois 
families had a crucial social role to play where production was being transferred from 
the family to a dedicated economic sphere. The inner sense of certainty formed in 
the familial and cultural spheres was internally, necessarily related to the outer sense 
of certainty derived from ownership and control of means of production as well as 
from participation in the more congenial public sphere. The bourgeois subject, while 
culturally constituted, experienced himself as both 'in' and 'for' himself.37
In this case, the constitution of a collective political actor of the kind required 
to act on and in the world with self-awareness and controlled devotion to the 
collective goal - bourgeois self-assertion against monarchy and aristocracy - required a 
combination of 'private' and 'public' institutions having mutually reinforcing effects. 
That is to say, the different spheres within which the bourgeois subject acted - the 
intimate or familial, the economic, the cultural, the public - would all produce, 
reinforce and sustain individual characteristics of rationality, self-discipline and 
public-spiritedness while at the same time allowing for the expression of non-rational 
or affective orientations in the intimate sphere, of expressive, aesthetic and social 
orientations in the cultural sphere which in turned merged into the congenial public 
sphere where sociality joined 'interest' in the discussion of matters of shared concern. 
Not only would the political identity of the (male) bourgeois allow of effective 
political action but it would fulfil the human requirement for recognition and for a 
sense of place and human relationship. In short, the institutional nexus in question 
would have 'fabricated' subjects (members of the bourgeois class) for whom 
objectivity (outside) and subjectivity (inside) were continuous in that the world 
within which these subjects moved (objectivity) could be seen as the outcome of 
actions by these subjects, or as the product of their subjectivities. So bourgeois 
subjects could experience themselves as coherent, originary subjects.
For the moment, Habermas's work enables us to think about the point of 
emergence of capitalism as a radically new culture with the material and theoretical- 
conceptual resources required to sustain relatively durable, stable, self-confident and 
action-oriented subjectivities; subjects of a kind captured by the term 'Man'. Here 
was a discourse which, in post-Marxist terms, managed, through the successful
36 Habermas (1992), p. 157.
37 Here I am borrowing Adorno’s phrase. See Adorno (1974), p. 16. This interpretation of the 
bourgeois subject differs from that of e.g. Schneider (1975), chs. 5 - 7 .  Schneider’s bourgeois subject 
is constituted by abstract, rationalizing institutions and therefore resembles more the possessive or 
utilitarian subject. See MacPherson (1964). I suggest that MacPherson overstates his case and that 
the individual posited by him could only have come into being following capitalist industrialization 
(the real subsumption of labour under capital). The significance of this should become clear in chapter 
five.
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completion of a hegemonic project, to constitute 'nodal points' at the level of both 
individual and group. This was done through the constitution of 'chains of 
equivalence' between the subject positions borne by each individual and between the 
individuals who made up the group. Group and individual, individual and individual, 
were mutually constitutive in a way which reinforced the sense of coherent 
subjectivity. The relational aspect of identity is here quite clear. However, what 
was required for the sense of competence which produced the capacity to act was also 
a strong inner sense of a self, of an essential, unique being who would remain over in 
his own right, as it were, even in the absence of social relations.
Habermas's work shows both the historical and cultural specificity of a 'human 
nature' claimed by liberals to be universal, natural, or given.38 It shows, in effect, that 
the bourgeois subject is constituted by a range of private and public, economic, 
familial and cultural institutions.39 While Habermas himself does little with the 
psychoanalytic material - indeed the Oedipal model is scarcely more than mentioned - 
he does indicate how we can go on to produce better accounts of the fusion of force 
(both social and psychic) and meaning as manifested in this particular institutional 
nexus. He also shows that the subject can be decentred without being dissolved. 
That is to say, it is possible to deconstruct the subject in the way that Habermas does 
in this work without also concluding that the subject is pure illusion. It is possible to 
conclude that the historically and culturally specific bourgeois subject was a subject 
who realized and exercised innate human 'causal powers' or essences; in this case, 
sociality, rationality and imagination.40 Furthermore, we may also provisionally 
conclude that the bourgeoisie (or at least the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie) 
engaged in transformative communal action which required the fusion of a specific 
kind of knowledge and an imperative (moral/affective) sense of group membership.
38 One of the outcomes of this particular hegemonic project was the claim that one culturally specific 
form of human being represents humanity as such. A defining characteristic of liberal capitalist 
cultures is the claim to have discovered 'pure' or 'universal' rationality and functionality. This claim 
secretes the possibility (and has produced the actuality) of essentialism as domination, of the claim that 
one culturally specific form of human being is the best possible form of human being whom all should 
strive to emulate. It is in this context that talk about human nature and human causal powers are 
viewed as politically dangerous.
39 The extent to which a new radical bourgeoisie was in existence during this period is a matter of 
some controversy. For works which confirm (in broad terms) Habermas' account, see Kramnick 
(1990) and Eley (1992). According to Eley: 'The value o f Habermas's perspective has been 
fundamentally borne out by recent social history in a variety of fields' (p.294). The researches o f Perkin 
(1985) suggest a different view, namely that the English bourgeoisie was reluctantly radicalized by 
means of the Com Laws in 1815.
40 For the account of causal powers invoked here, see Bhaskar (1989a, 1989b). However, it needs 
stressing that subjectivity of this kind would require continuous effort and self-discipline for its 
maintenance. It could not be a once for all achievement.
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From bourgeois to proletarian subject
The strenuous disciplinary demands of the emergent capitalist culture were secured 
through the class-specific institutions discussed briefly above. The active social 
subject was, in this instance, a bourgeois subject. Universalist claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding, effective participation in the public sphere required a form of 
cultivation beyond the resources of the non-bourgeois.41 For the majority, individual 
conformity to the new disciplinary requirements of emerging industrial production 
was induced in a variety of ways ranging from early paternalistic arrangements 
whereby social relations were based on the principle of kinship, to later, more large- 
scale and impersonal institutions which sought to fabricate disciplined, docile 
individuals through surveillance, or the 'gaze'42
However, the bourgeois subject was a fragile and vulnerable achievement.43 
As Habermas points out, private and public spheres were marked by ambiguity, 
or, more strongly, by a contradiction,in the sense that the bourgeois was a privatized 
individual who was both
owner of goods and persons and one human being among others, i.e., bourgeois 
and homme. This ambivalence of the private sphere was also a feature of the 
public sphere, depending on whether privatized individuals in their capacity as 
human beings communicated through critical debate in the world of letters, 
about experiences of their subjectivity or whether private people in their 
capacity as owners of commodities communicated through rational-critical 
debate in the political realm, concerning the regulation of their private 
sphere.44
This constitutive contradiction held the likelihood of degeneration into a politics of 
'interest'. The inherent dynamic of capitalist culture is to fragment the individual - to 
render a sense of internal coherence difficult or impossible to achieve. The dichotomies 
instituted by capitalism - public/private, society/individual - have the effect of forcing
41 Translation of theoretical into empirical openness would have required a community of petty 
commodity producers, as Habermas himself points out (p. 86). Note here the conflicts about 
interpretations of property in relation to citizenship rights during the French Revolution. See, inter 
alia, Comninel (1987); Rose (1983); Rude (1988); Soboul (1964).
42 For a brief discussion of the variety of disciplinary procedures used during the nineteenth century, 
see Perrot (1979). See also Foucault (1979), Pollard (1963) and Thompson (1967, 1978b). 
According to Thompson (1978b) paternalistic relations were predominant in England until the 1840s. 
In France, on the other hand, according to Pollard, paternalistic relations survived to a significant 
extent until the end of the century. The work of Elias (1994) remains an indispensable guide to the 
long-term emergence of'discipline'.
43 Cascardi (1992) and Touraine (1995) both describe the bourgeois subject as under permanent threat 
from the contradictions (between subjectivity and rationalization) of'modem' culture.
44 Habermas (1992), pp. 55 - 6.
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the individual into opposition to the social. The individual comes to have 'rights' 
against other individuals and against 'society' as a whole.45 Thus the social becomes 
that which threatens the individual rather than being the very basis for all forms of 
individuality. As the social becomes hollowed out, a specialized institution - the 
state - becomes necessary to reinstate bureaucratically ineliminable social needs. The 
social then becomes the 'public' in a new bureaucratic (as opposed to 
Aristotelian/republican) sense 46
From the point of view of the totality, the kind of functional, mutually 
constitutive relationship between different spheres needed to maintain early bourgeois 
culture would have demanded, in addition to enabling structural conditions, an 
unprecedented combination of political judgement and skill and of the freedom to 
exercise such judgement and skill in the appropriate manner. As further 
differentiation followed with the development of industry, and as mass politics came 
to replace the elite politics in operation during the period with which Habermas is 
concerned, the problems of functionality and coordination would become acute and 
bureaucratic forms of coordination would become increasingly necessary. Now, 
discipline would have been imprinted through drilling; mastery would have been 
imposed and would require no sense of an individual 'interior' or 'consciousness' of 
which the disciplined activity would be the direct expression. Whereas the bourgeois 
subject would have been the Kantian apparently autonomous individual, the new 
proletarian subject would have been (ideally) the docile and therefore heteronomous 
individual. In the final section of this chapter I turn to Althusser for his account of 
subjectivity as it is constituted under such fragmented and impersonal bureaucratized 
conditions.
m
From discourse to ideology
Althusser's account is useful here for several reasons. First, it indicates (although it 
does not systematically develop) a method for articulating psychoanalysis to 
Marxism. It thereby advances the project of theorizing meaning and materiality in a 
non-reductive way. Second, it shows how the fragmentation which is one of the 
defining characteristics of capitalist cultures is institutionally expressed and how 
integration of the different institutions can somehow be achieved so that the full 
subject effects of displacement are not experienced. Third, it expresses the subject
45 See Bernstein (1991).
46 Donzelot (1993); Keane (1984).
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requirements of organized capitalism and therefore affords the possibility of 
contrasting different forms of subjectivity in a way which will advance the argument 
of this thesis. However, it must be noted at the outset that Althusser's attempt to 
theorize the political significance of cultural membership is no more than an attempt, 
as he himself notes.47 It is an underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory body of 
work which nevertheless breaks new ground and therefore represents a theoretical 
breakthrough of great significance. While post-Marxism took up some of the 
theoretical tasks whose necessity was indicated by Althusser, it also unfortunately 
abandoned some of his insights. For example, it rejects Althusser's conceptual means 
of theorizing materiality and meaning - the concept of ideology - on the grounds that 
it suggests a misleading and politically dangerous essentialism. This essentialism 
resides, apparently, in Althusser's claim that ideology is a necessary 'level' of social 
formations which fulfils the 'functional requirements of the logic of reproduction'.48 
It is the emphasis on functionality and reproduction which causes offence here, since 
in other respects the concept is doing precisely the same work as does 'discourse' in 
post-Marxism. However, since, as we have seen, the neglect of functionality induces 
an idealist tendency in discourse analysis Althusser's preoccupation with 
functionality is to be welcomed.
As the discussion proceeds, we will notice marked similarities between 
Althusser's account of identity-formation and that of post-Marxism. Both decentre 
the subject in a radical sense and both incorporate Lacanian elements into their 
accounts of subjectivity; both insist on the constitutive role of meaning in social life; 
both allot a central role to capitalism in the constitution of subjectivities. 
Nevertheless, post-Marxism theorizes flux and Althusser theorizes fixity 
(apparently). These differences are overdetermined by both the explicit theoretical- 
political interests of the writers concerned and by the different stages of capitalism 
which inform their respective analyses. The theorization of fixity is an expression 
(not sufficiently distanced from its theoretical object as will be argued later) of the 
constitution of subjectivity during the organized stage of capitalism.49
47 Althusser (1984i), n.l ,p.  1.
48 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), p. 109. Laclau does acknowledge that the concept remains useful if it is 
equated with the concept of misrecognition or 'non-recognition o f the precarious character of any 
positivity'. What is in question here is the failure to recognize that the cultural is historical rather 
than natural. This is one of Marx's usages of the concept which has been incorporated into that of 
Althusser. Laclau seems unaware of this lineage. See Laclau (1990ii), p. 92.
49 Smith (1984) notes this at the end of his book on Althusser but otherwise makes nothing of it.So it 
is not accidental that Althusser's work is written before the dissolution of organized capitalism has 
become manifest and at a time when the rectification of existentialist Marxism and 'socialist humanism' 
seems a matter of political (therefore theoretical) urgency. Althusser's theoretical anti-humanism and 
his related ejection of the concept of praxis from his theoretical vocabulary is related to his polemics 
with humanist Marxism as his much criticized (apparently conventionalist) conception of science can 
be explained as a response to Stalin's notorious interventions in the realm of science. See Benton 
(1984); Elliott (1987).
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Ideology as culture50
‘Experience is ideology in action'. Althusser (1996), p. 75
Althusser uses the concept of ideology (ideology 'in general') to argue, against 
humanists, that individual subjects are not originary, or 'given' but rather, constituted 
in history, which is to say, in specific spatio-temporal, cultural ways. While Marx 
had shown that this is the case by pointing to the historical specificity of the 
atomistic subject, Freud's discovery of the unconscious enables us to produce a more 
scientific account of this fact of human life.51 This is the implication of Althusser's 
statement in the ISAs essay that there is an 'organic link' between his claim for the 
etemality of ideology and that of Freud relating to the unconscious.52 Unfortunately 
this claim is not supported by argument at this point, although it is discussed in 
greater detail in 'Freud and Lacan' (FL).53 What we need to note for the moment is 
that Althusser considers that a Marxist account of subjectivity requires the 
articulation of psychoanalysis to Marxism.54 Freudian psychoanalysis shows up a 
serious gap in Marxism which it is Althusser's purpose to fill. It shows that subjects 
cannot be taken for granted but are, rather, the end result of an arduous process of 
humanization. It is to this fact of human life that the concept of ideology alerts us. 
Ideology is a concept which embraces power, meaning and materiality.55 As will be 
seen, it refers to culture as organized practices kept in place by relations of power. It 
is these practices which transform the infant human organism into a subject.
Althusser distinguishes between ideology in general and historically specific 
ideologies.56 The former refers to the necessarily cultural constitution of human
50 Althusser himself equates ideology and culture. See Althusser (1984iii), n.2, p. 154.
51 Althusser (1996).
52 Althusser (1984i), p. 35.
53 Althusser (1984iii).
54 Althusser (1996).
55 This is an aspect of Althusser's work which appears to have escaped the notice of many of his 
critics, Thompson (1978a) being a notable example here. See Anderson (1980) for a discussion of this. 
See also Wood (1995).
56 It should be noted at the outset that Althusser's concept of ideology does different theoretical work 
in different contexts. At times, it is used in relation to the classification of knowledge. Theoretical 
ideology is theory which is functional for an existing state of affairs and is contrasted with science as 
theory which is oriented to the transformation of (therefore is dysfunctional for) an existing state of 
affairs. (See Althusser, 1990iii p. 231. See also Collier, 1989; Resch, 1992 for discussions of 
Althusser's conception of science.) At other times, ideology is used to show how individual subjects 
are constituted in history, which is to say, in specific spatio-temporal or cultural ways. To complicate 
matters further, ideology is also occasionally used to refer to science (Marxism) as it comes to guide 
the revolutionary activity of the proletariat. What these different conceptions of ideology have in 
common is their reference to the 'practico-social' function. That is to say, ideology is necessarily 
implicated in practices (in the strong sense i.e. o f an immediately practical kind) including 
revolutionary practices. This is the common element uniting Althusser's usages of the term. The 
concept of ideology embraces power, meaning and materiality. For positive evaluations of Althusser's 
account of ideology, see Sprinker (1987). See Therbom (1980) for a serious attempt to develop
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individuals as subjects; it is a transhistorical abstraction. The latter refers to the 
historically and culturally specific forms which cultures take; it is an historical 
abstraction. I shall here discuss the latter as a capitalist specific historical/empirical 
abstraction, while noting that different stages of capitalism will necessarily have 
different ideological characteristics.
Ideology as transhistorical abstraction
Ideology in general has the function of humanizing individual organisms. The way in 
which it carries out its functions is described by Althusser in terms of three theses. 
The first point to be noted is that ideology functions by interpellating individuals as 
subjects. The raw materials on which ideological practice 'labours' are human infants 
(or infants to-be-humanized), the goal of this labour being the production of specific 
kinds of subjects 'equipped to respond to the demands o f their conditions o f  
existence'57 Second, this interpellation takes place through practices rather than 
through concepts or bodies of ideas.58 Ideology is not in the first instance about 
'consciousness'; it is practiced before it becomes conscious and may never be self­
consciously known.59 It is the practice of ideology which constitutes consciousness; 
which in part endows ideology with its 'obviousness' and therefore with its 
extraordinary power. The importance of this 'obviousness' cannot be overstated and 
is brought out by Althusser in his use of the concept of the imaginary which leads to 
the third thesis. This is the claim that ideology constitutes subjects through 
recognition-misrecognition; it requires subjects to live their ideological (imaginary) 
relations as natural, obvious, taken-for-granted relations and this state of affairs (the 
nonconsciousness of the cultural and historical specificity of ‘consciousness’) is 
possible because ideology begins to shape the subject-to-be even before his birth. 
Subjects of a specific kind are formed through practice-driven processes of 
identification whose real nature must be obscured from the subject if he is to function 
effectively as a subject i.e. if he is to do what is required of him by his culture.60
We need to consider in some detail the third fundamental attribute of ideology, 
that is, its constitution of real relations as imaginary relations,61 since the concept of 
the imaginary is central to Althusser's account of ideology but is the object of repeated
Althusser's ideas in this area. Callinicos (1993), p. 47 finds little of merit in Althusser's work on 
ideology.
57 Althusser (1990iii), p. 235.
58 Althusser (1984i), p. 39.
59 Althusser (1990iii), p. 233.
60 For more on this, see Castoriadis (1987); Dews (1991). See Touraine (1995) for a different 
perspective. Strathem (1992) analyzes the problems which arise when the taken-for-grantedness of 
culture becomes eroded.
61 See Althusser (1984i), pp. 36 - 39. Here 'real' appears to refer to socio-cultural generative 
mechanisms (not directly experienceable) rather than the Lacanian real.
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misunderstanding, encouraging, as it does in its commonsense meaning, the conflation 
of ideology and illusion.62 The recognition/misrecognition moment which characterizes 
the imaginary is a more accurate characterization of the character of ideological 
(cultural) membership.63 It will be necessary to discuss Althusser's (highly 
selective) appropriation of psychoanalysis in order to show why this is the case.
Marxism and psychoanalysis
For Althusser, psychoanalysis affords Marxism the means of producing a non- 
reductive account of subjectivity.64 He sees, though, that if psychoanalysis is to 
play this role, it must be cleansed of the kind of 'functionalism' to be found in 
American (ego-centred) adaptations of the theory, whether this functionalism takes 
the form of biologism or sociologism.65 For Althusser, it is Lacan who heroically 
attempts to return psychoanalysis to its original Freudian purity by reinstating the 
unconscious as its fundamental theoretical object. What the return to the unconscious 
signifies for Althusser is the precarious hold exerted upon the individual by the socio­
cultural. In reinstating the unconscious, Lacan is at the same time reinstating 'the 
"effects", prolonged into the surviving adult, of the extraordinary adventure which 
from birth to the liquidation of the Oedipal phase transforms a small animal conceived 
by a man and a woman into a small human child.'66 Humanization is 'the long forced 
march which makes mammiferous larvae into human children, masculine or feminine 
subjects.' 67 Note the language here ('mammiferous larvae') which suggests a radical 
discontinuity between the to-be-made-human infant and the human being as subject. 
Note also the language of war, of victimhood, of 'wounds suddenly opening again in 
psychotic explosion' which suggests that humanization is nothing but suffering for the 
infant. The infant posited by Althusser (following Lacan) appears to be wholly 
nonhuman (pure animality), as resistant to the disciplines and as blind to the joys of
62 The equation of ideology with culture precludes its equation with illusion. Illusion appears with 
the theoretical naturalization of culture (theoretical ideology).
63 Althusser's privileging of the imaginary is related to his political project of denaturalizing capitalist 
culture (particularly as it is manifested in 'socialist humanism') so as to enhance its contradictoriness. 
Althusser (1990iii).
64 See Althusser (1984iii) p. 143. S6ve (1978) offers the most systematic and convincing arguments 
for the claim (rejected by 'orthodox' Marxists) that Marxism needs a psychology. While 
acknowledging certain fundamental compatibilities between psychoanalysis and Marxism, he rules the 
former out because of its neglect, as he sees it, of labour. However, Save's objection loses its force 
once it is accepted that Freud does in fact open the way to theorizing labour (precisely in Marx's usage 
of this term) by means of the concept of sublimation. This will be discussed in chapter eight.
65 See Lacan (1980ii); also Greenberg & Mitchell (1983).
66 Althusser (1984iii), p. 157. There is a voluminous literature on this. See Freud (1984fvi); Lacan 
(1980). For further discussions see, inter alia,the papers in McCabe (1981); Mitchell (1974, 1984); 
Rose (1986); Wilden (1980).
67 Althusser (1984iii), p. 158.
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humanization as we must assume other kinds of animals to be.68 Put another way, 
the relationship between individual and socio-cultural (i.e. the pre-existing world of 
humanized social relations) appears to be contradictory somewhat in the sense 
discussed in chapter two.69
In relation to this point, it is important to note that Althusser celebrates and 
adopts Lacan's structural-linguistic interpretation of the Oedipal complex as conveyed 
by the centrality of the symbolic and the signifying chain.70 The infant is humanized 
primarily by the 'Law of the Symbolic', or of 'Culture'. It is this Law which 
constitutes the unconscious and therefore subjectivity. The linguistic account of the 
formation of the unconscious71 is intended to counteract the biologism of certain 
forms of psychoanalysis by privileging the social or symbolic moment in the 
constitution of the subject, thereby stressing the discontinuity between the biological 
and the symbolic. We should note here the contrast with the psychoanalytic account 
suggested by Habermas; one which stresses lived, directly experienced and face-to- 
face relations with biological parents. The significance of this contrast will be 
explored further in chapter eight.
Althusser celebrates Lacan's linguistic emphasis while at the same time remaining 
highly selective in his adoption of Lacanian psychoanalysis.72 This selectiveness 
relates to his privileging of the imaginary, rather than the symbolic, in characterizing 
the small child's entry into culture. Lacan presents the imaginary as the moment in 
which the child recognizes himself as a separate, apparently independent entity. 
However, this moment of recognition is also a moment of misrecognition in that the 
child has not yet reached the stage at which he can function independently of his 
mother. For Lacan, this is a pre-cultural moment (because of its imagistic and pre- 
linguistic character) and therefore prior to the emergence of the subject. For 
Althusser it constitutes both the founding constitutive moment and the necessary 
means of understanding the true character of cultural membership.
This moment matters to Althusser because he wants to stress, first, the 
simultaneity of recognition/misrecognition which marks all human cultural 
membership and second, the pre-linguistic character of ideology. The imaginary 
moment takes place at a time when the apparently natural relationship between the 
human infant and its mother has not been broken up by the intrusion of the father. 
To bring together the concepts of imaginary and ideology as Althusser does is to 
underline his rejection of any unmediated, natural, biological relationship between
68 The difference is that this particular kind of animal, unlike other kinds of animals, has the potential 
to be humanized. Nothing much is concluded from this remarkable distinctiveness, though.
69 See Freud (1985iv) for an account of this contradiction.
70 Althusser (1984iii), p. 159.
71 See Lacan (1979), p. 20.
72 See Lock (1996); Macey (1994).
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human beings, even the apparently most universal and natural relationship of the 
mother and her infant. As we noted before, the child becomes a member of his culture 
through practices which begin to form his subjectivity in advance of the acquisition of 
language, 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness'. It is for this reason that ideology 
retains its great power, even where the most self-conscious and systematic attempts 
are made to overcome it. Althusser's account of the process of cultural incorporation 
is intended to aid such attempts by alerting us to the real character and power of the 
processes whereby the socio-cultural constitutes subjects.73
To sum up, ideology is the law of culture whereby the humanization of the small 
biological being is effected. Ideologies are the cultural-historical, specific, particular 
forms which this humanization takes. The imaginary captures the 'second nature', 
obvious, taken-for-granted, apparently unmediated character of human relationships 
which are, in fact, from the very beginning, ideologically (culturally or discursively) 
constituted. Althusser's retention and privileging of the imaginary signals the 
importance of the simultaneity of recognition/misrecognition as the identifying 
characteristic of ideology. Ideology is that which allows the small (to be humanized) 
being to recognize himself (his place, relations etc.) as 'natural', as 'autonomous', as 
'given', or, to 'misrecognize' the ideological-cultural-social as natural. The impersonal 
'Law of the Father' is imposed through impersonal cultural force on an individual 
having no attributes, apparently, apart from the urge to resist. However, whereas 
vacancy becomes an active sense of'lack' in the Lacanian model, it appears at times to 
translate into infinite malleability in the Althusserian account, as we will see.
Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasizes both the weight and the fragility of the 
cultural or symbolic. The cultural is weighty because it is the very bedrock of the 
subject. The cultural is fragile because of innate human resistance to humanization. 
Althusser theorizes (capitalist) culture's weightiness in terms of the ISAs. He does 
not theorize adequately (or indeed at all) this resistance to humanization which he 
notes so vividly in FL. We have traced its source to the Lacanian notion of the 'lack' 
in our discussion of post-Marxism in chapter three. This interpretation will be 
scrutinized further in chapter eight and we will return to this question of the apparent 
docility of the proletarian subject, in chapter nine. For the moment, we need merely 
note that given the alleged resistance to humanization, and the multiplicity of 
contradictions found in capitalist cultures (as discussed in chapter two), the fixing of 
the individual in one stable cultural form of subjectivity so that reliable and predictable 
behaviour can be guaranteed is a hazardous process whose outcome cannot be assured. 
Althusser's essay on the ISAs is an attempt to show how successful outcomes (from a 
systemic point of view) may be achieved.
73 See Resch (1992) for an account of Althusser as realist.
89
Ideology as historical abstraction: The ideological state apparatuses (ISAs).74
The ISAs essay constitutes Althusser’s most sustained (but nevertheless 
programmatic) account of the ideological constitution of individuals as subjects.75 
This is also an account which, through the concept of the ISAs, allows us to think 
about institutionally separated dimensions of capitalist culture - subjective and 
objective, meaning and force, public and private - within a common conceptual 
framework. In this essay Althusser attempts to expand on the few lines written by 
Gramsci about ideology in the Prison Notebooks76 and, as did Gramsci, Althusser 
relates his account of ideology to an expanded Marxist account of the state. That is to 
say, what we find is the claim that the state is not merely repressive but needs to be 
seen as having a range of ideological functions related, in the first instance, to the 
unavoidable species need for humanization and, in the second instance, to the specific 
need of the capitalist mode of production for a unifying coordinating institution 
capable of guaranteeing that the necessary practices of the capitalist totality will hold 
together so as to ensure reproduction. What this means is that the state must be 
capable of having the 'infrastructural power'77 needed to achieve effects in every 
sphere of activity. Althusser's listing of the ISAs is an expression of this need.78
Here it is important to return to the concept of totality. This concept becomes 
theoretically significant when human groups no longer function as unself-conscious 
totalities whose parts cohere through regular embodied, concrete, face-to-face 
relations. A tribe will be a 'real-concrete' totality for whose members functional 
failures or crises will be immediately, experientially apparent and for which 
explanations (however inadequate we may consider them to be) will be readily 
available. Here humanization is effected routinely; it is a process which changes only 
slowly and unself-consciously. Productive, familial, cultural tasks are all of a piece in 
a culture which is not fragmented into dedicated, specialized spheres of activity which 
are separated both in time and space. Social relations, skills and orientations are 
reproduced 'on the spot' in a self-evident, obvious way.
74 Read carelessly and in isolation from CO, Althusser’s essay on the ISAs can be charged with 
functionalism. See Barrett (1993); Callinicos (1976); Collier (1979); Johnson (1979). Such a charge is 
without foundation, though, when we recall Althusser’s concern to eliminate functionalist thinking 
from Marxism by way of the ejection of Hegelianism and economism. As noted earlier in this chapter, 
the maintenance of functionality between the different spheres of practice which constitute the capitalist 
totality requires the most demanding combination of accurate knowledge of relations between the 
spheres, good political judgement and the power to exercise that judgement. The ISAs essay assumes 
this combination but it does not thereby involve functionalism. See Lock (1996), who offers a more 
nuanced analysis than those cited above. For a useful discussion of Marxism and functionalism see 
Noble (1984).
75 At the same time, it is merely an outline of a research project.
76 Gramsci (1971), pp. 375 - 7; Althusser (1990i), p. 114.
77 See Mann (1984).
78 Althusser (1984i), p. 17.
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Capitalism lacks the immediacy and transparency of earlier modes of production, 
as we have seen. In contrast to all earlier cultures, reproduction of the total capitalist 
way of life is carried on in different spheres so the production of the required kinds of 
subjects becomes an extremely onerous task. It is a problem whose solution is partly 
secured by first, the creation and maintenance of a coordinating institution - the state - 
which is capable of ensuring that systemic requirements are met and second, by 
constituting a radically new kind of subject, one who can and will do the right thing all 
by himself (although this requirement must be modified in relation to the proletarian 
subject). Fragmentation will be expressed to a greater or lesser degree in social and 
geographical mobility which dissolves the kind of density and 'multiplexity' of social 
relations which, in pre-capitalist cultures ensure an ongoing and sustaining process of 
reinforcement of subjectivities of the required kind.79 Fragmentation has the strong 
tendency to eliminate the kind of concrete 'fixing' of identities and activities found in 
relatively static cultures in which individuals are enmeshed in overlapping and 
mutually-reinforcing directly experienced social relations.80 The subject constituted 
by industrial capitalism is a radically separate, individuated and apparently 
autonomous subject. He is the embodiment of a radically new kind of culture, of a 
nexus of force and meaning which is maintained (insofar as it is maintained) under the 
supervision of the state. As discussed in chapters two and three above, the 
contradictory character of capitalist cultures represents a permanent source of 
volatility, of the interruption or subversion of the process of subject constitution. 
As should be clear from the Lacanian analysis of subjectivity which Althusser 
attempts to articulate to his account of ideology in general, an additional source of 
volatility is located in the apparent resistance of the individual organism to the 
process of humanization (although I shall be arguing in later chapters that these two 
are connected).
It should be abundantly clear, then, that cultural incorporation (the constitution of 
subjectivity) cannot be a seamless, coherent and totally successful process in 
capitalist cultures. What is required is that the multiplicity of different institutions 
(apparatuses) and practices which make up the totality be governed by the same 
ideology, so that the individual is subjected to interpellations which are mutually 
reinforcing rather than contradictory.81 If such ideological control or closure is 
effected, a relatively coherent and obedient subject may be produced because ideology 
will retain the 'obviousness' or taken-for-grantedness which gives it its great power.
79 See Urry (1985).
80 Calhoun (1991) is useful on this question.
81 It is in this way that we can understand Althusser's controversial claim (derived from Gramsci) that 
the ISAs traverse the 'public' and 'private' realm. In any case, 'public' and 'private' are politically 
enforced distinctions and boundaries which may be (and have been) changed from time to time. See 
Kanth (1986).
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However, as we know, such ideological closure is impossible in capitalist cultures 
because of their constitutive contradictory character.
In any case, Althusser's turn to psychoanalysis suggests that we must go beyond 
the notion of ideological closure in order to understand the power and durability of 
cultural membership. In this respect his work contains, by implication at least, two 
different accounts of the constitution of subjects. The first, with its emphasis on 
familial ideology and the Oedipal model, appears to accept the Freudian account 
which centres on identifications and cathexis (to be discussed further in chapter eight). 
The Freudian model requires a painful and long-drawn out process of accommodation 
to the reality principle (the resolution of the Oedipus complex) which produces the 
bourgeois subject. Through the resolution of the Oedipal complex the individual 
manages, however precariously, to reconcile his need for gratification with specific 
cultural requirements. At the same time, the individual comes to develop a strong 
sense of a self with enduring and specific inner 'contents'. The constitution of the 
apparently autonomous subject is a process of active and painful engagement between 
the subject and others, in particular the father, with whom the subject has an 
ambivalent relationship. This is a highly personal, affect-laden process. An account 
of this process will be offered in chapter eight. For the moment, it need only be 
noted that the subject posited by Althusser, while requiring, apparently, the sense of 
autonomy required by bourgeois subjects (for whom actions are the product of 
deliberations internal to that subject), appears in fact to be capable of having little 
sense of self beyond that constituted by a strong resistance to humanization.
However, there is (again by implication) a second model of subject-constitution 
in Althusser's ISAs essay. This is encapsulated in Althusser's paraphrase of Pascal's 
thought: "'Kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you will believe'".82 This 
formulation implies a total malleability on the part of the individual. It also implies 
though that cultural values are internalized. In this sense it is compatible with the ego 
psychology which Althusser, following Lacan, wishes to see overturned.83 In 
certain respects (internalization apart) it resonates with behaviourist rather than 
psychoanalytic accounts of humanization and with mechanical materialism rather than 
realism. To this degree, it is (quite significantly) congruent with Foucault's account of 
the production of docility.84 Althusser's own explanation of this as a 'reshuffle', 
rather than an 'inversion' of idealism is wholly unpersuasive, amounting, as it does, to
82. Althusser (1990i), p. 42. We should note here as well Hirst's criticism that Althusser himself 
has not completely escaped the 'humanist' account of subjectivity since he assumes a coherent subject 
whose 'consciousness' and actions are congruent. See Hirst (1979). However, this would appear to 
confirm rather than refute Althusser's account of ideology.
83 See Jacobson (1954) for an account of identification produced by imitation and therefore apparently 
compatible with Althusser's formulation just cited. Richards (1989b), ch. 2 is useful on this question.
84 Foucault (1979).
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no more than a verbal trick. Not only is this model incongruent with Althusser's own 
project of dethroning mechanical materialism, but it is irreconcilable with the account 
of humanization offered in 'FL' and belied earlier in the ISAs essay by the reference to 
the 'teeth-gritting... "harmony"' secured by the ISAs.85
I suggest that Althusser's account of subject-constitution is contradictory for two 
related reasons. First, it expresses in a rather unsystematic and radically 
underdeveloped way the fact that capitalism institutes different kinds of subjectivity 
i.e. bourgeois (early liberal), proletarian (organized) and decentred (disorganized). 
Second, the rudimentary and sketchy character of Althusser’s psychoanalytic 
borrowings prevents him from noticing Lacan's departures from Freud; departures 
which might have alerted him to empirical differences in subjectivities.An interrogation 
of Lacan's claimed return to Freud (which will be undertaken in chapter eight) will 
point us in the direction of a fuller explanation of the rather strange state of affairs 
uncovered in chapter three. It will suggest the possibility (already implicit in 
Althusser's 'imprinting model') that capitalist cultures may bind individuals purely 
through social force, through habituation and overt coercion, rather than through 
cathexis. If this is the case, then political commitment can scarcely be expected to 
manifest itself. However, the question of internalization and the proletarian subject 
will be taken up again in chapter nine.
Before concluding, I need to point out that Althusser's work, like that of post- 
Marxism, is flawed in that it tends to conflate transhistorical and historical 
abstractions. More specifically, Althusser is taking Lacanianism as an account of 
subjectivity tout court when in fact it is an account of capitalist forms of subjectivity, 
as has been suggested in chapter three and will be argued further in chapter eight. The 
result is a naturalization of the cultural and the effacement of the total novelty of 
capitalist culture.
In ways which will be explored further in chapter five capitalism is historically 
deviant in terms not only of the radically fragmented culture which it necessarily 
institutes but of the character of subjectivity and experience which results from that 
fragmentation. While Althusser does not concern himself unduly with the radical 
novelty of capitalism in terms of the experience which it provides for the populations 
it shapes, he does occasionally make reference to it.86 For example, he notes in 
Reading Capital: 'history has reached the point and produced the exceptional, specific 
present in which scientific abstractions exist in the state o f empirical realities, in which 
science and scientific concepts exist in the form of the visible part of experience as so 
many directly accessible truths.'87 Certain passages in 'Is it simple to be a Marxist in
85 Althusser (1984i), p. 24.
86 Geras (1971), pp. 73 - 77.
87 Althusser & Balibar (1970), p. 124.
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philosophy?' offer further examples. In this essay, Althusser notes how capitalist 
relations in different spheres of activity 'abstract' from the real man 'in order to treat 
him as a simple "bearer of the legal relation", as a simple subject of law, capable of 
owning property, even if the only property which he possesses is that of his naked 
labour power.' Note the following:
[T]he man of production, considered as an agent of production, is only that for 
the capitalist mode of production; he is determined as a simple 'support' of a 
relation, as a simple 'bearer of functions', completely anonymous and 
interchangeable, for if he is a worker he may be thrown into the street, and if 
he is a capitalist he may make a fortune or go bankrupt. In all cases he must 
submit to the law of a production relation, which is a relation of exploitation, 
therefore an antagonistic class relation; he must submit to the law of this 
relation and its effects. If you do not submit the individual concrete 
determinations of proletarians and capitalists, their 'liberty' or their personality 
to a theoretical 'reduction', then you will understand nothing of the terrible 
practical 'reduction' to which the capitalist production relation submits 
individuals, treating them only as bearers of economic functions and nothing 
else.88
Human beings are subjected to the tyranny of the many abstractions required by 
capitalist production. These abstractions in the form of specialized legal, political 
and ideological relations 'brand men in their flesh and blood, just as the production 
relation does.'89 This paper of Althusser's reflects quite powerfully Marx's intuitions 
about the strange character of capitalist institutions, as will be seen in chapter five. 
Unfortunately, this aspect of capitalist social relations is not explicitly theorized in 
Althusser's work on ideology, although it is indirectly (and probably unwittingly) 
expressed in the choice of Lacanianism. In general, though, Althusser has a regrettable 
tendency to forget about the novelty of capitalism and he does not explicitly theorize 
this as a problem for the constitution of political commitment to challenging collective 
tasks. As we will see in chapter seven, Gramsci will afford the material to fill this 
particular gap.
In conclusion, I return to Habermas's work on the public sphere to bring out some 
relevant aspects of the institutions of organized capitalism not noted by Althusser.
88 Althusser (1990v), p. 238.
89 Ibid.
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The structural transformation of the public sphere
If we follow the logic of Habermas's argument about the structural transformation of 
the public sphere, we will note two aspects of institutional change which are not 
brought into view in Althusser's analysis; namely, the family and culture.90 Changes 
in these areas contributed to the transition from the active bourgeois subject to the 
passive and 'privatized' proletarian subject whose character is expressed in Althusser's 
dictum: 'kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you will believe'. In fact, 
Habermas, following the analysis of various members of the Frankfurt School, dated 
the decline of the bourgeois subject to the transition from liberal to organized 
capitalism, a transition which transformed the family head from independent property 
owner to functionary in a system over which he had no control. In addition, the 
cultural sphere was transformed through a new kind of commodification which altered 
the content of cultural products so that these were no longer of the kind needed - 
educational, critical, challenging - to constitute the introspective, critical subject. 
Now cultural products were designed to amuse, to entertain, to pacify, rather than to 
stimulate and educate. They debilitated or rendered empty and vacant the individuals 
who consumed them, therefore reinforcing the debilitating effects produced by changes 
in the industrial production process.91
Althusser's account of the ISAs complements the 'culture industry' account 
provided by the Frankfurt School.92 Both are accounts of the different institutional 
mechanisms whereby docile proletarian subjects are produced. This is not to deny 
that there are major differences between the French and German authors here. For 
one, the Frankfurt School takes seriously the existence of the bourgeois subject and 
sees the emergence of the docile subject in terms of decline. Yes, individuals are 
shaped in a profound sense by socio-historical factors, but the individual is not 
exhausted in the cultural. There is an intransigent remainder which is not merely the 
unhumanized, unhumanizable Lacanian real.93 Althusser, through the ideas of 
'misrecognition' stresses the 'irreality' of all subjects. His hostility to 'humanism' 
prevents him from engaging in a comparative evaluation of subjectivities in terms of
90 But Althusser does express awareness of the importance of familial ideology, perhaps here marking 
some unease at the Lacanian abstraction of culture by means of the symbolic. See Althusser (1984iii), 
p. 163, n. 4.
91 Habermas (1992), ch. 6.
92 It should be noted here that, Foucault's repudiation of Marxism notwithstanding, his account of the 
disciplines makes sense in terms of the trajectory delineated by the Frankfurt School. As Foucault 
acknowledged towards the end of his life, he would have spared himself much labour had he been 
acquainted with the work of the Frankfurt School. See Poster (1984). See Adorno & Horkheimer 
(1979) pp. xiv-xv, 154, 155 for strong statements which prefigure Foucault's account o f power, 
discipline and the decentred subject.
93 Adorno & Horkheimer (1979), p. 241.
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their humanizing/dehumanizing effects.94 However, this anti-humanism (in the strong 
version which he appears to espouse95) is in itself only thinkable under conditions 
produced by capitalism, as will be made clear in subsequent chapters. Furthermore 
(and here Althusser's critics are correct) this strong version of anti-humanism 
precludes the possibility of transformative action of the kind looked for by Althusser 
himself. Here the failure to be sufficiently historical becomes quite crucial.
Conclusion
Two tasks have been undertaken in this chapter, both intended to fill some of the 
lacunae - relating to the failure to consider discourse as institution - in post-Marxism's 
account of subjectivity. First, a general account of institutions - derived from the 
work of Castoriadis - was provided. This afforded the theoretical means of 
acknowledging the constitutive role of discourse without at the same time effacing 
materiality and functionality. At the same time, we have been alerted to a peculiar 
characteristic of capitalist cultures i.e. their claim to have discovered pure 
functionality as expressed in Castoriadis’s concept of identitary-assemblist logic. 
Second, an analysis of two different accounts of the institutional expression of 
capitalism's uniquely fragmented culture were provided. The first of these - 
Habermas's exploration of the bourgeois subject - initiates reflection on the subject 
requirements for the constitution of political commitment in capitalism's fragmented 
culture. We need to register here the character of experience - not yet overwhelmed 
by the abstract and impersonal - which constitutes the bourgeois subject. Recall that 
the bourgeois public sphere is a congenial public sphere of largely face-to-face 
relationships. During this early stage of capitalism - before the real subsumption of 
labour under capital - the social bond remains visible and directly experienceable. 
The second account - that of Althusser - introduces the notion of the proletarian 
subject who is apparently both resistant to humanization (a-social) and docile. This 
docility appears to be the the outcome of internalization induced by habituation. 
Matters are far from clear, though. It is necessary to conclude that Althusser's 
account of subjectivity is underdeveloped and apparently contradictory. In order to 
benefit from it, a more systematic analysis of the social relations (and therefore 
subjectivities) constituted by capitalist cultures is required. Finally, in order to
understand the problem of political commitment we need to historicize subjectivity 
without reducing it to pure illusion. We need to consider the ways in which different
94 Althusser (1990iii).
95 But see Althusser (198411, pp. 84, 85; 1990v) where a weaker version is implied. See also 
Sprinker (1987).
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forms of subjectivity serve to develop or stunt specific human causal powers. This 
will require the strengthening of both the institutional and the psychoanalytic 
components of the accounts offered by Habermas and Althusser. This task will be 
begun in chapter five, where a return to Marx’s account of pure capitalism will lay the 
basis for understanding the cultural specificity of the Lacanian concept of lack and 
therefore of the resistance to humanization which we have found naturalized in the 
work of Althusser and post-Marxism.
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Chapter five
The radical imaginary of pure capitalism 
Introduction
The task to be undertaken in this chapter is an investigation of Marx's account of pure 
capitalism as developed in Capital 1. In this work, Marx carries out a thought 
experiment consisting in the creation of capitalism as a closed system. The purpose 
of imagining the institutionalization of pure capitalism is to arrive at knowledge of 
capitalism's innate powers and tendencies and to set out the likely effects of the full 
realization of these powers and tendencies. This is capitalism instituted so as to 
render a population maximally functional for the production of surplus value. What 
this requires is the institution of fetishized social relations. Capital I  is read here as 
an account of such relations. From this point of view, Marx's account of capitalism, 
far from being an outdated analysis applicable only to the nineteenth century, as 
Laclau claims,1 remains the necessary basis of an account of disorganized capitalism 
since it is only with the advent of disorganized capitalism that fetishized relations 
become virtually fully instituted in liberal capitalist cultures.2
We have noted in previous chapters that capitalism is a culture which fragments 
human activity and dispositions in a wholly novel way. It is now time to engage in a 
more precise exploration of this culture in terms of the social relations and therefore 
subjects which it constitutes. As was suggested in chapter four, a major clue is 
provided by Althusser who notes that 'scientific abstractions exist in the state o f 
empirical realities'.3 This state of affairs will be investigated now by means of 
Marx's account of pure capitalism. Having examined this account, we will be in a 
better position to appreciate the significance of Althusser’s analysis in terms of the 
problem at hand.
Pure capitalism will be read here as a mode of production which naturalizes and 
universalizes identitary-assemblist logic through the institutionalization of 
abstractions. The argument to be pursued in a later chapter will be that disorganized 
capitalism represents the nearest equivalent to date to the pure form of capitalism. 
This is what helps to account for the apparent vacancy, fluidity and lack of sociality 
of the decentred subjects described by post-Marxism and other post-structuralist 
writers.4 The subject effects in question may be described under two broad headings. 
First, there is the divorce of subjectivity and objectivity which diminishes the
1 Laclau (1990i), pp. 5 - 41.
2 Luk&cs (1971ii) offers the best account of this.
3 Althusser & Balibar (1970), p. 124.
4 Foucault (1979). For a criticism, see Honneth (1995), ch. 6.
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individual cognitively. Second, the divorce of society and the individual diminishes 
the individual socially and affectively. These effects have been conventionally 
described under the rubrics of fetishization and alienation.5 The institutions which 
bring them about will be described in this chapter. The claim that transformative 
communal action - and therefore the (individual) capacity to form binding 
commitments to the achievement of collective goals - requires the overcoming of these 
effects will be made and developed in chapter six.
Marx and the theory of pure capitalism
The radical imaginary of capitalism and the 'everydayness' which it institutes will be 
explored here by means of Marx's theory of 'pure' capitalism as discussed in chapter 
two above. Marx was the first theorist to attempt a comprehensive institutional 
evaluation of capitalism. This evaluation is read here as an account, not of a 
specialized form of activity carried in in a dedicated 'economic' sphere, but as a total 
way of life, or culture.6 Marx's theory of 'pure' capitalism is developed most 
systematically in the Grundrisse and Capital. While these works will be the primary 
focus of attention, it will be necessary to refer back to the earlier, more explicity 
philosophical works so as to avoid economizing the later texts. As Kosik points out: 
'The relationship of economics and philosophy is not just another partial aspect of 
Marx's work ... Rather, it provides access to the very essence and specificity of 
Capital'P Alertness to the philosophical components of the apparently purely 
economic concepts used by Marx will ensure against loss of awareness of the overall 
project of these works which is to reveal the nature of the radical discontinuity 
between capitalism and all previous cultures.8
The source of this pure capitalism is the theory and practice of industrial 
capitalism as it was institutionalized in nineteenth century England. It was at this 
time and in this place that liberal industrial capitalism found its first systematic 
theoretical and institutional expression. But since complete institutionalization was 
resisted in the first instance by the determined attempts to reinstate pre-industrial 
modes of production and, in the second instance, by working-class struggles against 
commodification, it cannot be said that 'pure' capitalism was the outcome of this
5 See Lukdcs (1971i); M6sz£ros (1975); Oilman (1976); Postone (1993).
6 See Dupre (1983); D'Amico (1981); Lichtman (1982), ch. 7.
7 Kosik (1976) p. 97. See also Dupre (1983) and Hyppolite (1969). S6ve (1978) offers an excellent 
account of the way in which early philosophical concerns (in this case specifically about the concept of 
'man') 'pass into' the later Marxian work. See especially ch. 2.
8 Cohen (1982); Lefort (1978). As Cohen points out, Capital can be read as a cautionary tale about 
the kind of world which pure capitalism would institutionalize, if left unchecked. Cohen (1975) points 
out the danger of conflating logical and sociological categories.
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process.9 Nineteenth century England had the character of a social formation rather 
than pure mode of production. This needs to be borne in mind throughout this 
discussion. What is in question in this chapter is not a sociology of nineteenth 
century English capitalism but rather an account of capitalism's innate properties and 
therefore strong tendencies; tendencies whose realization depends on the presence or 
absence of counteracting tendencies deriving either from pre-capitalist cultures or from 
new forms of anti-capitalist cultures emerging out of capitalism itself.
It is important to note that the representation of capital in Capital I  is a critical 
representation. The social relations institutionalized by capitalism are assessed both 
in relation to those which have preceded capitalism and those that are possible and 
desirable given the potential displayed by humanity as a species and given the most 
complete expression of that potential under capitalism itself. The representation 
constitutes a critique made from the point of view of the achievement of a radical 
collective goal of universal human emancipation.10 This goal was only conceivable 
because Marx held that human beings have certain essential 'species specific' 
capacities. The discussion of 'pure' capitalism is developed so as to understand the 
character of a specific culture (industrial capitalism) from the point of view of a 
'species being' possessing species specific capacities whose simultaneous realization 
and stultification (dehumanization) is effected by that specific historical culture. It 
will be necessary, then, to grasp Marx's conception of 'species being' as a preliminary 
to exploring further his account of pure capitalism. It will be seen that this 
conception is understandable in relation to the emergence of the bourgeois subject, as 
discussed in chapter four.
Marx's Account of Human Nature
Marx's critique of capitalism and his revolutionary project derive from his Aristotelian 
view of human nature as an organism whose distinguishing characteristic is the 
potential for action on and in the world.11 This is 'human nature in general' which is 
'modified in each historical epoch'.12 What is distinctively human about human nature 
(as opposed to the rest of nature) is this capacity to act creatively on nature so as to 
produce a world.
9 See Calhoun (1982); Kumar (1988), ch. 6; Polanyi (1957).
10 McCamey (1990).
11 Note though, the expansion of the concept of action  by Marx to incorporate directly useful 
(functional) productive as well as political and theoretical activity. This characterization of materially 
productive activity marked a radical departure from all previous social theory. See Dupre (1983) for 
more on this. For more on Marx and Aristotle see Gilbert (1984); Margolis (1992); McCarthy (1992); 
Meikle (1985).
12 Marx (1976a), p. 759. See Lichtman (1982), ch. 3.
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Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. 
It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a 
species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for 
him. Only because of that is his activity free activity.13
The essence of human nature lies in its capacity for developing 'consciousness' and 
thereby for engaging in 'free activity'.14 Human capacities 'in general' or 'outside of 
history' are discussed by Marx by way of concepts of 'power' {Kraft) and 'need' 
(Bedurfnis). 'Natural powers' (capacities, functions, abilities) are those which human 
beings share with other animals; 'species powers' are those which make human beings 
uniquely human. Species powers are always in the process of change; they are 
potentials,15 Human need is need for something outside the individual; it is need for 
an object. The human being is an object with powers which are only realizable 
through other human beings possessing similar powers, as well as through other 
natural and humanly created objects. It is through relations between human beings 
and the rest of nature that human species powers are developed. Natural powers 
constitute the basis or framework, as well as constraint, within which species powers 
are developed. In fact, this distinction between natural and species powers is an 
analytical rather than empirical distinction. The human senses are clearly natural 
powers; however they are always exercised in a human, socio-historical (cultural) 
way. Whereas all human beings share a 'species-character', the way in which and the 
extent to which this human potential is realized or stunted is culturally and 
historically specific. Human nature is also always socio-cultural nature and socio­
cultural nature is also always historical. The cultural character of human activity is 
expressed by Marx as follows: 'the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife 
and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of 
hand, nail, tooth'.16 The social dimension is expressed as follows:
Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social 
animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. 
Production by isolated individuals outside of society - something which might 
happen as an exception to a civilized man who by accident got into the 
wilderness and already dynamically possessed within himself the forces of 
society - is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language 
without individuals living together and talking to one another.17
13 Marx (1977), p. 68.
14 Petrovic (1988).
15 Oilman (1976).
16 Marx (1973b), p. 92.
17 Quoted by Oilman (1976), p. 105, from Introduction, Marx (1973b), p. 84. (I have used Oilman's 
translation here.)
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The historical dimension of human nature is expressed in a striking fashion by Marx 
as follows: The forming  of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the 
world down to the present.'18
The human essence, says Marx in the Sixth Thesis, 'is no abstraction inherent in 
each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations'.19 It is not 
'an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals in a natural 
way'.2® What unites human beings is their sociality; it is only through social being 
that the 'species being' of humans is realized. The essence of human beings is 
creativity (or, more accurately, the capacity to transform - rather than merely 
reproduce - what is given) which is only activated by means of social relations. More 
strongly, the impulse to create is (necessarily) related to the need for recognition from 
and relationship with other human beings. It is social relations which transform the 
human animal into the human being.21 Freedom is the socially available opportunity 
to develop one's many-faceted capacities in relation to other human beings. It is the 
outcome of specific kinds of social relationships which may or may not be found in 
particular cultures; the active unfolding and expression of a variety of powers and 
needs. Insofar as opportunities exist for the cultivation of human (therefore social) 
'free conscious activity', a culture will be 'rich'; insofar as such opportunities are 
unavailable, a culture will be 'poor'. The more 'needs' one has, the more richly human 
one becomes.22
The interpretation of Marx's conception of human nature is subject to intense 
controversy, marked by extreme opposing positions which privilege either an 
'essentialist' (humanist) Marx or a 'scientific' (anti-humanist) Marx.23 Both positions 
are easily supported by quotations from Marx's own works as will be obvious from 
the above. The Paris Manuscripts is full of statements which offer support to the 
'essentialist’ viewpoint; the Theses on Feuerbach as well as remarks scattered 
throughout the mature works, offer support for the 'scientific’ viewpoint. However, 
these dichotomous terms are incapable of capturing the dialectical character of both
18 Marx (1977), p. 96.
19 Marx (1976b), pp. 3 - 1 1 .  See Marcuse (1972ii) for an excellent discussion of the concept of 
essence. This is an argument against the 'reduction of the problem of essence to one o f logic and 
epistemology' (p. 47) in favour of a usage which relates to 'the critical consciousness of "bad" facticity, 
of unrealized potentialities' (p. 46.)
20 Marx & Engels (1976), p. 4.
21 See Kosik (1976), ch. 3 on the dialectic of animality and humanity in Marx.
22 See Heller (1976) on the philosophical and economic use o f these terms by Marx; also M^szaros 
(1975, 1995).
23 Geras (1983); Soper (1986) stress the continuity in Marx's work on this question. Discontinuity is 
claimed most forcefully by Althusser (1970, 1990iv). See Depew (1992), Margolis (1992), for 
opposing accounts, Aristotelian essentialist and unAristotelian historicist respectively. See Castoriadis 
(1978) and Garnett (1995), both of whom, from quite different points of view, identify both  
essentializing and historicizing elements in Marx's work.
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Marx's account of human nature and of the relationship between his early and late 
works.24
Marx's conception is neither humanist in the sense that he holds to a fixed human 
nature with determinate, universal forms of social being; nor 'scientific' in the sense of 
a refusal to posit any innate human characteristics. It is, rather, a kind of realism 
(transcendental critical realism) in the sense that it is a claim that entities (social and 
natural) have real capacities or powers which may or may not be realized or exercised 
at the level of actuality.25 As does Marx, transcendental critical realism holds to an 
ontology of 'levels'; beneath the empirical level of the actual, there is a generative or 
real level at which we find real powers, innate capacities or properties. These 
powers, capacities or properties may or may not be activated so as to produce 
phenomena, processes or events at the level of the actual. The real level is arrived at 
through an inferential process of conceptual analysis beginning at the level of the 
empirical26 The essential human attribute of creativity can be inferred from the great 
variety of social forms, relationships and artefacts found in history. This realist 
approach is congruent with the apparently contradictory claims of Marx cited above, 
the claims that all human beings share a species character and that human nature is an 
'ensemble of social relations'. Individual members of the species can only be 
humanized in the myriad forms of social relations revealed in the historical record 
because they possess innate species powers which render them open to such 
humanization.
Marx's conception of essence is also strongly Aristotelian and if we bear this in 
mind we can avoid a misunderstanding of his language of'necessity' as a deterministic 
language. Necessity in the Aristotelian sense is related to the essence of a thing and 
refers to changes which develop that essence in contradistinction to 'accidental' 
changes which either hinder or do not advance that development27
So, for Marx, human beings are creatures with the innate capacity for creativity 
and sociality; they can produce a great variety of needs as well as a great diversity of 
social relations and of material and ideal entities for the satisfaction of those needs. 
However, this capacity requires social conditions of realization. It is expressed or 
suppressed in a great variety of historically and culturally specific forms. I now turn 
to elaborate Marx's account of the character of human action. This will serve as an 
introduction to the kind of action institutionalized by pure capitalism.
24 See S6ve (1978), fh. 27 pp. 161 - 167 for a discussion of this question which is also a critique of 
Althusser's anti-humanism.
25 See Bhaskar (1989a, 1989b).
26 See Bhaskar (1989a) ch. 5 for an account of the inferential method.
27 Meikle (1985).
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Human Nature and Action
Human action as labour
The Marxian account of human action as praxis was touched on in chapter two. It 
will now be necessary to discuss this in greater detail. Labour is a central concept in 
Marx's account of human nature, as well as of capitalism.28 Labour is the point at 
which animality and humanity, at which causality and purposiveness meet. Through 
labour the species being of the human being is realized.29 This is not labour as toil, 
but rather labour as transformative action, or, put another way, labour as discursively 
constituted. Here labour or production is a concept which is logically prior to the 
culture/economy split.30 Unfortunately, the naturalization of the 'economy' which 
has been effected by orthodox Marxism has effaced this dimension of Marx's thought.
The character of imaginative, expressive, satisfying and useful human activity is 
captured most vividly by Marx in Capital 7, in the following passage:
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee 
would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its 
honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of 
bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in 
wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already 
been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. 
Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also 
realises [verwirklicht] his own purpose in those materials.31
Although this is Marx's account of human labour, it also serves as an example of 
praxis. Praxis is world-making integrated human activity which is informed by theory 
and which is also the expression of human creativity and sociality.32 It is 
multifaceted social activity combining cognitive, creative, expressive, useful and 
affective elements. The architect needs knowledge of the real properties of the 
materials used to construct the building, as well as knowledge of the environment 
(both natural and social) in which the building is to be placed. This is a labour 
process during which the individual architect acts in a highly-trained, skilled, confident 
manner on nature so as to produce a useful and beautiful artefact for a fellow human-
28 Postone (1993) claims that labour, rather than property relations, is the central critical category in 
Marx's work.
29 See Kosik (1976) ch. 4; Arendt (1958) ch. III. See D'Amico (1981) for a discussion of Arendt's 
(and Habermas’s) misreading of Marx here.
30 D'Amico (1981).
31 Marx (1976a), p. 284.
32 I am aware that in certain places eg Capital III, Marx sees praxis as taking place in the 'realm of 
freedom' only. This is praxis as activity undertaken purely for its own sake and by this criterion, 
labour as described in Capital I would not constitute praxis. See Gorz(1989); Postone (1993) with 
whose position on this I concur. See Rattansi (1982) for an opposing argument.
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being. The architect expresses himself in relation to nature, to the object produced 
(the building) and to the fellow human-being for whom the object is produced. In the 
process, the architect also receives recognition from his fellow human-being as a 
skilled and productive labourer. Here, labour becomes
attractive work, the individual's self-realization, which in no way means that it 
becomes mere fun, mere amusement... Really free working, e.g. composing, is 
at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense 
exertion. The work of material production can achieve this character only (1) 
when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the 
same time general character, not merely human exertion as a specifically 
harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which appears in the 
production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an 
activity regulating all the forces of nature.33
Here Marx is offering an Aristotelian notion of 'self-realization' some of whose 
institutional prerequisites were explored in chapter four. For Marx, this mode of 
being becomes theoretically available to all following the development of capitalism. 
Furthermore, it is this mode of being which has produced the great bourgeois 
revolutions.34
Labour as praxis is activity carried out in the full awareness of human (social) 
powers, of social functions fulfilled and recognized by others. It is activity in which 
the 'objective' and 'subjective' elements form a unity at the individual level; that is, the 
production process requires an individual possessing both the skills to produce a 
useful and beautiful object and full consciousness of the social and natural 
requirements of the overall process of production. This is fully human production 
the practice of which will advance the humanization of individual human beings. It is 
important to note that, in acting upon nature, human beings produce not only a world, 
but themselves. The character of action and of the world produced through that 
action will affect the character of the human being. There is a dialectical relationship 
between world and human being as mediated by labour. Note the following account of 
'human' production offered by the young Marx in 'Excerpts from James Mill's 
Elements o f Political Science':
[L]et us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each 
of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. (1) In 
my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, 
and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation o f my life during the 
activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual 
pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and
33 Marx (1973b) pp. 611 - 2. Note here the striking resemblance to Freud's account of sublimation 
(to be discussed in chapter 8).
34 Feher (1984).
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hence a power beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment or use of my product 
I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied 
a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential 
nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of 
another man's essential nature. (3) I would have been for you the mediataor 
between you and the species, and therefore would become recognized and felt 
by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a 
necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be 
confirmed both in your thought and your love. (4) In the individual 
expression of my life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have 
directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my 
communal nature.
Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our 
essential nature. This relationship would moreover be reciprocal, what occurs 
on my side has also to occur on yours.35
This passage expresses the character of face-to-face human relationship, of mutual 
recognition, respect and usefulness which, given the nature of human beings, might be 
instituted in a future community built on the achievements of capitalism. Human 
nature is communal nature; it is essentially (potentially) active, self- and other­
conscious. Humanization is the process of developing this human nature; 
dehumanization is a process which impedes its development. As will be seen 
shortly, Marx sees pure capitalism as a system which both humanizes and 
dehumanizes; it has both progressive and regressive characteristics.
Capitalism and Action
Historically, empirical human beings are very unlikely to conform to their species 
essence (insofar as this is equated with freedom in the sense used above) until 
capitalism provides the preconditions for the universalization of such conformity. 
Prior to capitalism, humanity's creative powers were realized very patchily and 
unevenly. It is capitalism which creates the conditions whereby the enrichment of the 
individual can for the first time keep pace with the enrichment of the species.36 It 
does this, though, in a rather one-sided way. It is one-sided in that, while the 
preconditions (material abundance) for creative many-sided activity are developed, the 
social relations of capitalism are such as to eliminate the conditions for sociality. 
While it creates the preconditions for human enrichment, it is essentially, necessarily 
incapable of providing this enrichment, according to Marx. Capitalism which is the
35 Quoted in Adamson (1985), p. 83.
36 See Introduction, Marx (1973b); Heller (1976).
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peak of species enrichment is also the peak of individual impoverishment. This is 
because the defining, essential characteristic of capitalism is the expansion of surplus 
value for the purpose of private appropriation (profit); or, put another way, it is the 
institutionalization of the law of value.37 As we will see, this law requires individuals 
who behave in a specific kind of controlled, predictable manner, as functionaries of 
capitalism rather than as fully human actors.38 In order to understand this claim, it is 
necessary to explore further the social relations instituted by capitalism, as described 
by Marx.
Capitalism and Social Relations
Marx's purpose in the Grundrisse and Capital I  is to establish beyond doubt the 
radical discontinuity between capitalism and all earlier cultures 39 In these works, the 
theoretical object becomes capitalism rather than the whole of human history. As 
discussed in chapter two, these are works concerned with the logic of capital rather 
than with history, the logic of capital being derived from the liberal industrial practice 
of capitalism as refracted through the concepts of political economy. Where Marx 
uses historical material it is mainly to show the contrast between capitalism and what 
went before it. As mentioned above, this contrast consists in the imperative 
ceaselessly to expand production so as to increase profit-taking. Other ways of 
conceptualizing the contrast are internally related to this imperative. One of these is 
of particular interest in relation to the topic of transformative communal action. This 
is the contrast between the communal structure of all pre-capitalist cultures in which 
the individual is embedded in the group (so that the opposition individual/society is 
unthinkable) and the atomistic structure brought about by capitalism whereby the 
individual is given theoretical primacy over the group.40 What was preserved in all of 
these earlier cultures (be they 'Asiatic', 'Antique', or 'Germanic') regardless of changes 
brought about by the emergence of the State, war, etc., was the communal character of 
social relations. So:
In all these forms ... there is to be found: (1) Appropriation ... of the natural 
conditions of labour, of the earth as the original instrument of labour as well as 
its workshop and repository of raw materials. The individual relates simply 
to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [relates] to them as the 
inorganic nature of his subjectivity ... (2) but this relation ... to the earth, as the 
property of the labouring individual ... is instantly mediated by the naturally
37 Garnett (1995).
38 Gorz (1989); Kosik (1976).
39 Cohen (1982); Lefort (1978).
40 Marx (1973b), Notebook V, esp. p. 488. See also Lefort (1978).
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arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed and modified presence 
of the individual as member o f a commune ... An isolated individual could no 
more have property in land and soil than he could speak.41
Capitalism replaces this communal and conservative principle by an individualistic 
and revolutionary principle. Hence the exceptionality and complete novelty of 
capitalism, which for the first time separates 'inorganic conditions of human existence 
[land/nature] and ... active existence [human social action], a separation which is 
completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital'42 This 
separation is both cause and consequence of the privileging of production over human 
beings. In terms of the character of their social relations, all pre-capitalist cultures 
experience neither evolutionary nor revolutionary but 'repetitive' history; that is to 
say, underlying all social upheavals, they experience a repetition of communal social 
relations. It is largely in the durability of such communal social relations that pre­
capitalist cultures show their superiority over those of capitalism. For these cultures 
'the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, 
religious, political character' and the social character of the human species-being is part 
of the 'everydayness' institutionalized in these cultures. That is, individuals feel 
themselves embedded in a network of social relations characterized by face-to-face, 
personal, felt interdependence.
With the advent of capitalism, for the first time, the 'human end-in-itself is 
sacrificed to the aim of production.43 It is in its transformation of production 
relations, or, more accurately, its transformation of social (human) relations into 
production relations, that capitalism displays simultaneously its progressive and 
dehumanizing aspects. Through its progressive side capitalism reveals more than any 
other culture the productive, creative powers of the human species and creates the 
material and technical preconditions for universal human flourishing. At the same 
time, it is capitalism which impedes the further development of such productive 
powers as well as concealing the social character of all human powers and the real 
power of individuals as social individuals. Capitalism institutionalizes personal, 
individual independence and impersonal dependence. In relation to questions about 
transformative communal action and collective political commitment, the importance 
of this can scarcely be overstated.
Marx deploys several concepts (including 'inversion', 'alienation', 'ideology', 
'fetishism' and 'reification') to refer to the peculiar and historically unique character of 
social relations instituted by this new 'mode of production'. These concepts will 
help us to think of the 'everydayness' established by pure capitalism. They all refer
41 Quoted in Lefort (1978), p. 626, from Marx (1973b), p. 485.
42 Marx (1973b) p. 489. Square brackets mine.
43 Ibid., p. 488.
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to aspects of the one-sided, fragmented, mystificatory character of capitalist 
institutions. They refer to overlapping, mutually-reinforcing aspects and forms of 
institutionalization, which produce cumulative and apparently irresistible effects upon 
and within individuals. These effects include a new kind of individuation, that is, 
atomization.
The character and effects of atomization are described by Marx and Engels in a 
passage in The Holy Family which deserves lengthy quotation:
Speaking exactly and in the prosaic sense, the members of civil society are not 
atoms. The specific property of the atom is that it has no properties and is 
therefore not connected with beings outside it by any relations determined by 
its own natural necessity. The atom has no need, it is self-sufficient; the world 
outside it is absolute vacuum, i.e., it is contentless, senseless, meaningless, just 
because the atom has all its fullness in itself. The egotistic individual in civil 
society may in his non-sensuous imagination and lifeless abstraction inflate 
himself to the size of an atom, i.e., to an unrelated, self-sufficient, wantless, 
absolutely full, blessed being. Unblessed sensuous reality does not bother 
about his imagination; each of his senses compels him to believe in the 
existence of the world and the individuals outside him and even his profane 
stomach reminds him every day that the world outside him is not empty, but is 
what really fills. Every activity and property of his being, every one of his 
vital urges becomes a need, a necessity, which his self-seeking transforms into 
seeking for other things and human beings outside him. But as the need of one 
individual has no self-understood sense for the other egotistic individual 
capable of satisfying that need and therefore no direct connection with its 
satisfaction, each individual has to create that connection; it thus becomes the 
intermediary between the need of another and the object of that need.44
In this passage we find the key to understanding some of the most important elements 
of the new kind of enchantment instituted by capitalism. The passage is an early 
expression of the loss of a sense of personal interdependence, of the experience of 
reciprocity between independent producers and of social being; of the illusory 
character of feelings of personal independence. Capitalism institutes a strange kind of 
social ineptitude and a new kind of social ignorance. It is to different aspects of this 
state of affairs that the concepts listed above refer. Brief comments on each of these 
follow.
Inversion: This refers to the capacity (indeed requirement) of capitalism to turn the 
world upside-down or inside-out, a capacity which severs the link (at the phenomenal 
level) between individual activity and its consequences, between individual production 
and product. The effect is that the subject becomes the predicate and the predicate
44 Marx & Engels (1975) pp. 162 - 3.
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becomes the subject. The human being becomes 'effaced', particularly in the activity 
of labour. Wherever we find inversion, we find a mystified relationship between 
individual and the world; a relationship which involves the subordination of the 
individual to the world. In effect, we find the passive individual, one who functions 
according to the requirements of the world seen as an 'alien power'.
Alienation: This is a concept which refers to the cognitive and affective effects of the 
institution of the law of value; it refers to separation and loss of control in relation to 
the kind of labour process required by industrial capitalism; separation from oneself, 
from one's fellow human being, from the production process and from the product 
produced by the production process. This separation and loss of control is first 
discussed in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts which also traces the way 
in which industrial capitalism brings about the reduction of human needs to the need 
to 'have', this being one of the most notable aspects of the 'one-sidedness' of the 
subject institutionalized by capitalism.45
Ideology: This refers to the fragmentation brought about by the division of labour, 
one, therefore preceding industrial capitalism, but realizing its full fragmenting effects 
only under industrial capitalism. These effects relate largely to the way in which 
subjects know reality.46 In The German Ideology Marx and Engels are primarily 
interested in the 'cognitive' effects of the division of labour which I describe here as the 
disjunction between objectivity and subjectivity. (However, the social effects - the 
individual/society split or loss of awareness of the social nature of human being - are 
at least as significant, as we know from the Grundrisse and Capital.) The division of 
labour produces a world which is not immediately knowable in its essence; it is 
opaque at the level of everyday experience; it presents itself to the group in an 
intrinsically mystifying way. Because the division of labour produces 'specialists', 
the danger and even likelihood is that these specialists will attribute excessive 
significance to their own domain of action. It is in this way that Marx and Engels 
account for philosophical idealism, or the 'German ideology'. The 'ideologists turn 
everything upside-down' because:
The occupation assumes an independent existence owing to division o f labour.
Everyone believes his craft to be the true one. Illusions regarding the
connection between their craft and reality are the more likely to be cherished
by them because of the very nature of the craft.47
45 Marx (1977); Avineri (1968); Dupre (1983); M£sz£ros (1977); Rossi-Landi (1990).
46 See Marx & Engels (1976).
47 Ibid., p. 92.
110
However, mystification becomes complete only when commodity production is 
instituted on a general basis. It is at this point that the form of mystification referred 
to as 'fetishism' manifests itself.
Fetishism: Fetishism is related to inversion in that human attributes and powers are 
transferred from human beings to their products.48 It is a characteristic of the 
capitalist world which results from the translation of value and its subjective 
producers into exchange value. That is to say, it comes about when commodification 
pervades all of the institutions of capitalism (when even the labour power of the 
producer becomes a commodity). It is a 'relatively late phenomenon' found when the 
commodity shapes, both the production process and subjects as well. It comes about 
with the 'real' (as opposed to 'formal') subsumption of labour, of which more will be 
said later. Fetishism sets up a fundamental disjunction between human creators and 
the created world. It therefore brings about institutionalized forgetfulness of the 
human capacity for transformative action.49
In short, all of these concepts refer to different aspects of the institutionalization 
of the law of value. They all make sense, and assume their theoretical and critical 
function in relation to the conception of human nature discussed above and in contrast 
to the whole of human history preceding the emergence of industrial capitalism. 
What is common to all of these concepts and the reality to which they refer is the 
concept and reality of abstraction. We need to consider abstraction as a process of 
instituting particular kinds of fetishized social relations productive of the subject as 
homo oeconomicus. This is abstraction made empirical through the constitutive 
capitalist institutions of abstract labour, commodification and monetization, to be 
discussed further below. As I have suggested above, the overall effects of capitalist 
abstraction are captured in the objectivity/subjectivity and society/individual 
dichotomies. However, these changes do not spring up all at once. A long process of 
transition is required. Here the discussion of that transition will be limited to an 
account of two of its stages: first, the formal subsumption of labour; second, the real 
subsumption of labour.
The law of value instituted: from formal to real subsumption of labour
In terms of the periodization informing this study, the transition from the formal to 
the real subsumption of labour under capital marks the passage from the mercantilist 
to the liberal stage of capitalism. Marx's account of the differences between
48 Meszdros (1975); Oilman (1976).
49 See Dupre (1983).
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'conditions of life' experienced by workers under the two stages will serve to bring out 
more clearly the novelty of liberal industrial capitalism from the point of view of the 
worker.50 We will see that during the early stage, the replacement of personal 
paternalistic relations by impersonal contractual wholly instrumental relations in the 
workplace constitute a movement in the direction of the individual/society dichotomy. 
There is an accompanying loss of personal independence on the part of the worker. 
However, until the advent of industrialization, the subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy 
cannot emerge to any significant degree.
The formal subsumption o f labour
This term refers to the first stage of the direct subordination o f the labour process to 
capital. During this phase, the master and journeyman become transformed into 
capitalist and worker. Unlike the master-journeyman relationship which is 
immediately personal and social, the relationship between capitalist and worker is one 
between buyer and seller.
Before the process of production they ... confront each other as commodity 
owners and their relations involve nothing but money; within the process of 
production they meet as its components personified: the capitalist as 'capital', 
the immediate producer as 'labour', and their relations are determined by labour 
as a mere constituent of capital which is valorizing itself.51
However, at this stage there is no change in the process of production which the 
capitalist takes over without modification. True, the work becomes more intensive 
because directed and supervised by the capitalist, and the hours of work are 
lengthened as the capitalist seeks more and more surplus value. In addition, the raw 
materials and probably the tools, as well as the end product, all belong to the 
capitalist. But the worker remains master of the tools and materials which he uses, 
therefore the production process remains transparent. Production remains 
production on a human scale and is visibly the activity of cooperating individuals.52
The formal subsumption of labour marks the phase of manufacture which grows 
out of handicraft production. By manufacture is meant the simultaneous 
employment of a large number of workers in a workshop together with the mass of 
means of production needed for their use. It will not be necessary here to give an 
account of the ways in which manufacture develops out of handicraft. It will suffice 
to note that manufacture either introduces or further develops the division of labour or
50 See Marx (1976a), chs. 13-16,  Appendix.
51 Ibid., p. 1020.
52 See Kosik (1976), ch. III. Arendt (1958) has some interesting things to say about this difference.
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it combines together various handicrafts that were formerly separate. While the 
process of production is broken down into its different partial operations, each 
operation continues to be carried out by hand and therefore retains the handicraft need 
for strength, skill and proficiency. Even though the individual worker may be 
allocated a narrow specialized element of the productive process which he is required 
to retain for life (he is 'subdivided' and therefore prevented from developing his skills); 
even though a hierarchy is established between skilled and unskilled, it remains the 
case that a long period of apprenticeship is still necessary for many skills and that the 
skilled predominate over the unskilled. The handicraftsman remains the 'regulating 
principle of social production' until abolished by machines. Moreover, skilled 
workers are seen as 'self-willed and intractable', not really fit to be 'a component of a 
mechanical system'.53 Docility and total domination are made possible and 
necessary with the advent of machines.
To summarize, the formal subsumption of labour under capital did not allow of 
the institutionalization of a new kind of capitalist subject. While instrumental 
relations between buyers and sellers of labour power were coming to replace 
paternalistic relations between master and journeyman, and while the 'upward 
mobility' to which the journeyman could realistically aspire was fast becoming 
unavailable to the new kind of worker, it nevertheless remained the case that the 
workshop required a greater preponderance of skilled workman than would the 
factory. Skilled workmen did not acquire their skills from the capitalist who might 
be (but was not always) a former master craftsman. So they were likely to have 
important knowledge not possessed by the capitalist. In addition, the division of 
labour remained at a level where the production process overall retained its 
transparency both in terms of its social character and its knowledge requirements. 
Handicraftsmen were capable of asserting themselves in relation to the capitalist. 
They were engaged subjects whose 'consciousness' was a constitutive element of the 
production process. They were active beings with a strong sense of their world and of 
their place in it. At this point, the objectivity /subjectivity dichotomy had not yet 
been instituted, although there was a movement towards the society/individual 
dichotomy. Movement in this direction would be accelerated following the 
replacement of tools by machines.
The real subsumption o f labour
The dynamic of this development was the imperative to increase production so as to 
realize surplus value as capitalist profit. Whereas the formal subsumption of labour
53 Ure (1835) p. 20, quoted in Marx (1976a), p. 490.
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involved new kinds of instrumental and asymmetrical social relations established 
between embryonic capitalists and workers, allowing of the enhancement of 
production and of surplus value, the fact was that production (albeit made more 
'efficient' by new practices of constant supervision and the lengthening of the working 
day) could not be increased beyond the bodily capacities of the workers. The 
introduction of machinery and of production in the factory which would cut the 
limiting direct relationship between the pace of production and the bodily abilities of 
the worker required that money be transformed into capital and that the wage contract 
become the predominant form of social relationship between capitalists (a new class 
of owners of the social power to produce) and workers (a new class of owners of 
labour power and of nothing but labour power). Now the sole object of production 
becomes exchangeability and the use value of a commodity enters the capitalist's 
calculations only in relation to exchangeability.
The real subsumption of labour under capital requires the mutually constitutive 
institutions of abstract labour, the commodity and money. These institutions will 
now be investigated in a little more detail.
1: Abstract labour
Industrial capitalism is the most complex form of society ever developed. However, 
the categories which express its relations and character are simple or abstract 
categories from which all particularity, all substance, have been eliminated. That is to 
say, they are categories which view phenomena strictly from the point of view of one 
of their aspects. This is because social relations are the outcome of real processes of 
abstraction of individuals, of production and circulation processes, from the 
specificity of local communities, from the immediacy and concreteness of actual 
exchanges (individual production of use values to be exchanged in actual local markets 
for other use values by means of 'trucking and bartering'). This peculiar character of 
institutions under industrial capitalism is brought out in the Grundrisse, in Marx's 
remarks about labour as conceptual and actual abstraction.54
"'Labour'" says Marx, 'is as modem a category as are the relations which create 
this simple abstraction'.55 It is only with the beginning of industrial capitalism that 
simple labour, labour without description or qualification, abstract labour, in a word, 
becomes both conceptually and actually available. It was Adam Smith who first 
threw out 'every limiting specification of wealth-creating activity' thereby departing 
from the physiocratic concern with specific, or embedded labour i.e. agricultural
54 Marx (1973b), Introduction. See also Berki (1983).
55 Marx (1973b), p. 103.
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labour. The abstraction 'labour' became available because the mode of production had 
developed to a specific stage.
As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest 
possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, 
to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. On the other 
side, this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a 
concrete totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours 
corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer 
from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance 
for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in 
reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased 
to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form ... the 
point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the 
category 'labour', 'labour as such', labour pure and simple, becomes true in 
practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modem economics places at 
the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient 
relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an 
abstraction only as a category of the most modem society.56
In effect, abstract labour becomes everyday reality - part of the lived experience of 
workers - for the first time with the advent of the machine. However, the 
institutionalization of machine production becomes thinkable only following the 
earlier commodification of social relations which paved the way for treating workers 
as 'means' of production and only as means of production.57 It is the machine, 
though, which allows of the institutionalization of abstract labour and therefore of the 
subj ectivity/obj ectivity dichotomy.
Having sold his labour power to the capitalist, the worker is mled over by capital 
as by a thing. That is to say, the means of production, the conditions essential for 
labour to take place, are alienated from the worker and assume the character of a 'thing' 
or fetish. The institutionalization of abstract labour eliminates the creative and 
communal character of labour; it eliminates the creative and aesthetic and intellectual 
elements of human productive activity; it eliminates the human sense of activity and 
achievement and interdependence.58 Hence the (mis)perception on the part of 
individual labourers that the 'force' (which is their collective force) is an independent, 
active, producing entity which rules over them (to be discussed further below). 
Indeed, from the point of view available to the labourers this is not a misperception at 
all, since their empirical situation, their lived and felt experience of that situation, is of 
powerlessness, of isolation, of dull, repetitive work, etc. And 'collective labour' is
56 Ibid., pp. 104 - 5.
57 See Sayer (1991), ch. 1.
58 See Marx (1977), p. 32; Colletti (1976ii), esp. p. 84.
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indeed an independent 'force' as against any individual labourer in that labourers can 
only produce their necessities of life by subjecting themselves to that force.59
This is significant in relation to the point made earlier about the transition from a 
mode of subjectivity whereby the personal self-confidence of the artisan is combined 
with a sense of social (subjectively experienced) interdependence to one whereby a 
sense of personal individual independence is combined with a strong sense of objective 
dependence. Pure capitalism institutes a social world of 'things' on which individuals 
depend and these 'things' are seen as independent of and intransigent in the face of 
individual human action, needs or desires. At the same time, there is no sense offelt, 
social, human interdependence. The everydayness of industrial capitalism is 
fragmented, disjointed, abstract, impersonal and objectified.
The institutionalization of abstract labour allows (even requires) that the 
individuality of each labourer be lost from view. The result is that each individual 
labourer is considered to be identical to all the others and the great differences between 
individual labourers are ignored. Individual capacities are treated as separate from real 
empirical individuals. They are regarded as a 'force' separate from the individuals 
whose power they are. As the individuality of individual workers is effaced under 
the real subsumption of labour by capital, so also the consciousness of individual 
workers ceases to be a constitutive element of the production process.
As production becomes an end in itself, it becomes 'indifferent' to the producer 
who is now regarded as an object to be manipulated within a system ready made and 
given. Social power as a relationship between persons is replaced by social power as 
a relationship between things. The worker becomes integrated, as Kosik puts it:
in a transindividual lawlike whole as one of its components. However, this 
incorporation transforms the subject. The subject abstracts from his 
subjectivity and becomes an object and an element of the system. Man 
becomes a unit determined by its function in a lawlike system ... The purely 
intellectual process of science transforms man into an abstract unit integrated 
in a scientifically analysable and mathematically describable system. This 
reflects the real metamorphosis of man performed by capital.60
That real metamorphosis produces homo oeconomicus who is an isolated, apparently 
free, apparently self-activating but intrinsically passive subject. The fabrication of 
homo oeconomicus is achieved through the institutionalization of commodification.
Homo oeconomicus is the atomized individual, another simple abstraction which 
is prefigured in the work of Hobbes and whose institutionalization begins in the 'civil 
society' of the late eighteenth century, when, according to Marx, 'the various forms of
59 Marx (1973b), pp. 242 - 3.
60 Kosik (1976), p. 50. See also Gorz (1989).
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social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private 
purposes, as external necessity'.61 At this point, apparently, a nexus of institutions 
had made its appearance with the capacity to produce a new nodal point, or a new 
kind of human being. Homo oeconomicus is not to be confused with the bourgeois 
subject. While we have noted, in the discussion of Habermas's work on the bourgeois 
public sphere, that a tension existed from the beginning within the public sphere 
between these two kinds of subject, we should be clear that one (the bourgeois 
subject) is capable of transformative communal action; homo oeconomicus, as Olson, 
for example, correctly notes, is not.62 I shall return to this point later.
2: Commodification
For Marx, the commodity form is the 'cell-form' of capitalism, the entity which is the 
basic unit out of which the whole system is constructed. All of the institutional 
effects of industrial capitalism discussed so far relate to the character of the 
commodity. The commodity form structures social relations into quantifiable and 
calculable but opaque economic relations under the guise of equivalence. Whereas 
commodities were found in many earlier cultures, 'they became commodities only 
within the limits of being direct use-values distributed at opposite poles, so that the 
commodities to be exchanged by their possessors must be use-values to both'.63 The 
exchange of commodities remained a marginal activity, carried on mostly at the 
'borders' of communities, at the point where different communities met. To the 
extent that this activity moved towards the 'interior of the community', that 
community began to disintegrate. To the extent that the production of use-values 
remained the predominant form of activity, the community retained its integrity.
The emergence of industrial capitalism marks the beginning of communal 
disintegration, for reasons which should be becoming clear by now:
[T]he products of labour, both use-values and exchange-values -... rise up on 
their hind legs and face the worker and confront him as 'Capital' ... even the 
social form of labour appears as a form o f development o f capital, and hence 
the productive forces of social labour so developed appear as the productive 
forces o f capitalism. Vis-a-vis labour such social forces are in fact 
'capitalized'. In fact collective unity in co-operation, combination in the 
division of labour, the use of the forces of nature and the sciences, of the 
products of labour, as machinery - all these confront the individual workers as 
something alien, objective, ready-made, existing without their intervention, and
61 Marx (1973b), p. 84.
62 Olson (1971).
63 Quoted in Lukdcs (1971ii), pp. 84 - 5 .
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frequently even hostile to them ... The social forms of their own labour - both 
subjectively and objectively - or, in other words, the forms of their own social 
labour, are utterly independent of the individual workers.64
What this means is that dead labour (machinery) predominates over living labour. 
From the point of view of the individual worker, objectivity and subjectivity become 
separated. The objectivity incorporated in the production process is indifferent to 
(does not require the active engagement of) the subjectivity or consciousness of the 
individual worker.65
3: Monetization
For Marx, money is far more than a mere medium of exchange. It is an institution 
which helps to constitute the characteristic subject of pure capitalism.66 What 
exacerbates the alienating effect of the process of commodification is the institution of 
money, its necessary concomitant. Abstract labour, commodification and 
monetization are all internally related; in a sense, to discuss the effects of one is to 
discuss the effects of the others. They all contribute to the constitution of the 
abstracted therefore fragmented subject, necessarily egoistic and competitive; they all 
help to constitute an opaque, impersonal, reified culture, one which appears 
impervious to the needs of individuals; so they all help to constitute the a-social, 
passive subject, the subject whose constitution is described by Althusser. In relation 
to monetization, it is money which allows the fragmentation of production, circulation 
and exchange; therefore it is money which allows the replacement of immediate, direct 
social relations (of the direct exchange of useful products by the direct producers) by 
the abstract, fragmented, fetishized relations of industrial capitalism.
With the advent of the real subsumption of labour under capital, production for 
use becomes subordinated to production for exchange, to commodity production. 
Exchangeability requires calculability and the convertibility of labour and of labour 
output into money. Money comes increasingly to take the place of the fe lt social 
bond. The capitalist sees the worker in terms of a commodity, namely 'abstract' or 
commodified labour; labour somehow detachable from the worker; labour to be sold 
and bought. The capitalist as buyer of a commodity confronts the worker as seller of 
a commodity. They meet in the market-place as personifications of labour and 
capital; not as particular individuals:
64 Marx (1976a), p. 1054.
65 As was noted in chapter four, Althusser fails to understand this crucial characteristic of capitalist 
culture, expecting, as he does, a match between 'consciousness' and individual practice.
66 See Abercrombie et al (1986).
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The only force bringing them together, and putting them into relation with each 
other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each. Each pays 
heed to himself only, and no one worries about the others.67
This is the point at which
money-making appears as the ultimate purpose of activity of every kind ... the 
tendency for all products to be commodities and all labour to be wage-labour, 
becomes absolute. A whole mass of functions and activities which formerly 
had an aura of sanctity about them, which passed as ends in themselves, which 
were performed for nothing or where payment was made in roundabout ways 
... all these become directly converted into wage-labourers \ 68
At this point money comes to have the following remarkable effects:
If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, 
connecting me with nature and man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can 
it not dissolve and bind all ties? Is it not, therefore, also the universal agent o f 
separation? It is the coin that really separates as well as the real binding 
agent - the [...] chemical power of society.
Money ... appears as this distorting power both against the individual and 
against the bonds of society, etc., which claim to be entities in themselves.69
Monetization is essential to the effacement of the social, communal, aspects of 
relationships and therefore the basis for feelings of reciprocity and mutual recognition 
as fellow members of a community.70 Social relations are replaced by legal, 
monetized relations regulated by contract. The wage contract institutionalizes 
individuals as atomistic, possessive, rights-bearing, abstract subjects; as subjects shorn 
of all those characteristics that make them particular and unique individuals. These 
subjects engage with one another in an impersonal, calculating, instrumental fashion. 
As we will see, the sphere of circulation reinforces and reproduces this kind of 
everyday experience.
67 Marx (1976a), p. 280.
68 Ibid., p. 1041.
69 Marx (1977), p. 124.
70 Habermas (1984,1987a).
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The sphere of circulation
Insofar as capitalism also needs to increase human appetites for objects which can 
enhance the accumulation process, objects, that is, produced by means of the division 
of labour and commodification, then these effects will not be confined to the working 
day, but will also take hold of the 'private' sphere. Some of Marx's most vivid and 
damning descriptions of the sphere of circulation are found in his early works, notably 
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. As he sees it, once in the realm of 
circulation, buyers and sellers of the multiplicity of commodities produced by 
capitalism are engaged in
mutual swindling and mutual plundering. Man becomes ever poorer as man, 
his need for money becomes ever greater if he wants to master the hostile 
power... The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the 
economic system, and it is the only need which the latter produces. The 
quantity of money becomes to an ever greater degree its sole effective quality. 
Just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the 
course of its own movement to quantitative being. Excess and intemperance 
come to be its true norm.71
As the worker's activity in the sphere of production is 'a pure abstraction from all 
activity' as well as from sociality, in the sphere of circulation and exchange, 
commodification institutes an abstraction of the need to 'have' from the multiplicity of 
rich needs which the human species being has the potential to cultivate.72
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only 
ours when we have it - when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly 
possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., - in short, when it is used by us 
... In the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the 
sheer estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having. The human being 
had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his 
inner wealth to the outer world.73
The kind of sensuous development encouraged by liberal industrial capitalism is 
limited, incapable of developing the 'richness of man's essential being' or 'the richness 
of subjective human sensibility ... senses capable of human gratification, senses 
affirming themselves as essential powers of man '.74 That is because liberal industrial 
capitalism institutionalizes the need to have rather than the need to do or act. The 
obsession with having rather than doing leads to the proliferation of 'artificial needs'
71 Marx (1977), pp. 101 -2 .
72 Heller (1976).
73 Marx (1977), p. 94.
74 Ibid., p. 96.
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rather than 'rich human needs'. It is in this way that we can make sense of the 
concept of 'artificial' needs from the point of view of a theory which stresses the 
historical specificity of all aspects of human life. Artificial needs are those needs 
which are necessary for capitalism; real or rich human needs are needs which are 
necessary for the human species being. The first kind of needs are required for the 
self-realization of capitalism; the second are required for the self-realization of human 
beings (in the sense discussed earlier in this chapter and pursued further in chapter 
six).
The need for money is the overwhelming need produced by pure capitalism. 
Money is the ultimate fetish, the necessary fetishized form on which all other 
capitalist fetishisms are based. As commodification becomes more widespread and 
more and more human needs become commodified, money produces more and more 
fetishized social relationships; social relationships from which human agency and 
human sociality have been effaced. Money is a power created by humanity which 
dehumanizes humanity in the precise sense used by Marx that it causes humanity to 
'forget' its creativity and sociality. It is a human creation which renders invisible 
human creativity and removes the need for sociality; it inverts the subject/predicate 
relationship; it inverts the causal relationship between humanity and humanity's 
products.
The possession of money allows of the apparent evasion of the concrete, 
particular, embodied character of individuals and their social relations. In money, 
needs and powers come together in an abstract way in that the only needs recognized 
as real are needs which can be realized through money, or commodified needs and 
conversely, only those powers are recognised which possess the money needed for 
their realization. So 'what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my 
individuality'; rather it is determined by the extent to which I have money.75 The 
obsession with having as opposed to being and acting, could not come about without 
the institution of money and it needs constant cultivation and nourishment by fresh 
inflows of money. The preoccupation with money and having leads to the 
preoccupation with maximizing exchange value. Such an emphasis does not lead to 
the development of heterogeneous, diverse new human needs but rather to the 
homogenization of needs as having. It institutes self-interested subjects necessarily 
engaged in endless calculations about the costs and benefits of various social relations 
and practices.
75 Ibid., p. 138.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have read Marx's Capital 1 as a depiction of pure capitalism as an 
historically novel culture characterized by alienated and fetishized social relations, by 
relations, that is, formed by the instituted abstractions of labour, commodification and 
money. By returning to Marx we can achieve greater understanding of the subject- 
effects of the fragmentation discussed in earlier chapters. These subject effects result 
from the attempt to universalize the identitary-assemblist logic discussed by 
Castoriadis. They translate into the apparent a-sociality and resistance to 
humanization posited by post-Marxism (chapter three) and Althusser (chapter four). 
They are understandable in terms of the subjectivity/objectivity and individual/society 
dichotomies which refer us to the cognitive and social-affective impoverishment 
created by capitalism's drive to increase surplus value.
Pure capitalism as exemplified in liberal industrial capitalism is a culture in which 
the commodity form is dominant. Production is for exchange before it is for use. 
Capital is indifferent to the specific nature of production which is dictated by the ease 
or difficulty of selling the commodities manufactured. In addition, it requires that the 
worker be indifferent to the character of work; that he be capable of easy transition 
from one kind of production to another. Capital requires characterless or 'abstract' 
labour power. Labour power is also a commodity, one operating under the wage 
contract. What this means is that social relations are totally fetishized; they are 
mediated impersonally by money and contract. Capitalist and worker confront one 
another in the market-place as buyer and seller. Eventually, human individuals 
become personifications of capital and labour who confront one another as 
commodity owners whose relations involve nothing but money.76 The 'natural laws' 
of political economy constitute subjects so as to render them susceptible to 
commodification in all spheres of life: malleable subjects who will respond in their 
occupational lives to the requirements of capital accumulation and who will possess 
the kinds of needs (in their 'private' lives) whose fulfilment will also contribute to the 
accumulation process.
As mentioned before, an important part of my argument is that the social 
relations described by Marx have achieved their most widespread institutional 
expression in liberal capitalist cultures during the disorganized stage of capitalism, 
when the 'decommodification' effected by the welfare state during the organized stage 
begins to be reversed. However, there are significant differences as well, given that
76 Marx (1976a), pp. 1019 - 1020
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Marx equates pure capitalism with industrial or mass-producing capitalism whereas 
use-value production during the disorganized stage produces quite different 
institutional effects as indicated in chapter three. We will need to return to these 
questions in chapter nine. Next, however, I investigate Marx's account of proletarian 
revolutionary action, which I am describing as transformative communal action.
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Chapter six
Capitalism and collective action: the Marxian account 
Introduction
The task in this chapter will be to return to the problem first addressed in chapter 
three i.e. the problem of constituting political commitment under conditions of 
capitalist fragmentation. Here we will examine Marx’s work on this topic, as 
represented in his account of proletarian revolutionary action. While Marx is 
concerned with analyzing the possibility of the emergence of 'transforming 
practice’'out of practices as ideologically constituted, i.e. practices that are functional 
for the reproduction of existing social relations, it will be seen that this analysis 
involves reflection on the constitution of political commitment to the attainment of 
challenging collective goals. Transforming practice requires a strong form of communal 
political commitment to the goal in question. Discussions in earlier chapters have 
thrown up some ideas in this area, relating to the specific structural character of liberal 
capitalist cultures. An important element is an account of preconditions in terms of a 
specific kind of structural 'decentredness' or 'looseness', as we have seen in our 
discussion of Althusser in chapter two and of post-Marxism in chapter three. 
However, neither of these sources enables us to understand how the kinds of 
subjectivity which they begin to theorize might become the basis for transformative 
communal action. Althusser is largely silent on this matter; he does not suggest how 
we can move beyond the proletarian subject. Similarly post-Marxism's 
undertheorized account of psychic openness to subversive interpellations leaves us 
with the strong sense that the subjects in question - decentred subjects - are unlikely 
to have the capacities to make a sustained commitment to communal concerns. The 
return to Marx in chapter five was prompted by the belief that his work on pure 
capitalism would enhance our understanding of this situation. This work stresses the 
novel kind of passive or contemplative a-social stance towards the world which pure 
capitalism institutes at the level of the (proletarian) subject. Nevertheless, Marx 
argues that pure capitalism will produce its own 'gravediggers' in the shape of a 
revolutionary proletariat which will not only destroy capitalism but establish a 
radically new emancipatory culture.1 It is this argument which will be examined in 
this chapter. The purpose of this examination is to grasp the institutional changes 
needed to reconstitute political commitment. From this point of view, Marx's
1 See Perkins (1993), chs. 2 & 3.
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explanation for the transformation of self-interested subjects into active social subjects 
is of crucial significance.
It should be remembered that in line with the methodological protocols set out in 
chapter two, the structure/agency dichotomy is rejected in favour of the dialectical 
approach derived from Althusser's account of these matters. Rather than an absolute 
opposition between action as a kind of essential, original, individual attribute and 
structure as, on the one hand, the unintended consequence and/or oppressive 
imposition which gets in the way of the individual's exercise of this attribute, or, on 
the other, that which wholly determines individuals as specific kinds of subjects, the 
two entities are seen here as internally, necessarily related, so that structure is both 
necessary means and outcome of human action.2 Here structure refers to the 
principle of unity informing a specific nexus of institutions which constitutes 
culturally specific repertoires of action. It is therefore the means by which the 
human capacity for praxis is more or less realized in culturally specific ways. This 
interpretation, derived from Althusser, is congruent with the Marxian account of 
human nature as interpreted in chapter five.3 Claims that Marx's own work is marked 
by a tension between an 'actionist' and 'structuralist' account of human action can be 
answered and the tension at least partly resolved by interpreting that work in terms of 
(a) the writings that take as their theoretical object 'pure' capitalism as a fetishistic, 
apparently law-driven system and (b) the political sociology which takes as its object 
historically and culturally specific social formations.4
It will be necessary to examine both kinds of texts in this chapter.5 The first 
section will consist in a general exploration of the problem here conceptualized as a 
leap from fetishism (passivity) to freedom (activity). This involves a discussion of 
the nature of 'interests' and of the contradictions which impel collective action. The 
second section will centre on the Communist Manifesto (CM) which is read here as an 
account of 'pure' proletarian revolutionary action.6 An examination of this work will 
produce an understanding of the process whereby contradictions produce conflict and
2 This is Althusser's viewpoint - which is theoretically expressed through his account o f the 
contradictoriness o f the world - a viewpoint whose subtlety has gone unrecognized, partly due to 
Althusser's own overstated anti-humanism and partly due to the persistence of the analytic approach (a 
tribute to the power of theoretical ideology) to the theorizing of human action. See Archer (1995), 
Bhaskar (1989a) for realist attempts to theorize beyond the structure/agency dichotomy. See also 
Giddens (1984).
3 I am interpreting Althusser’s theoretical anti-humanism in a weak sense in this thesis. This weak 
anti-humanism was explained in chapter five.
4 See Gouldner (1980); Rundell (1987). The latter discusses this in terms of two paradigms i.e. 
'actionist' and 'productivist' to be found in Marx's work. See Perkins (1993) chs. 1, 2.
5 Gilbert (1981) discusses Marx's 'two types of theorizing', pp. 3 -18 .
6 While the CM predates the development o f Marx's theory of pure capitalism, we find in it
intimations of this theory and we can therefore take that work as a useful point of departure. In any 
case, Marx himself continued to hold to the account given in this early work, with the addition of one 
significant modification which will be noted later. See the preface to the 1872 German edition: Marx & 
Engels (1967), p. 53. See also Johnson (1980).
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therefore the constitution of collective political commitment. The third section of the 
chapter will elaborate on the concept of 'active union' with which Marx characterizes 
proletarian association in the CM. This elaboration will consist in a brief discussion 
of Marx's writings on the Paris Commune, writings which suggest the nature of his 
objections to bureaucratic social relations. As should be clear by the end of this 
chapter, Marx's prescriptions for the reemergence of sociality out of the atomistic 
social relations constituted by industrial captalism are not wholly persuasive. What 
will need further immediate elaboration will be the theorization of communality and 
cognition as these pertain to transformative communal action. The work of Gramsci 
will offer the means for such elaboration, as will be seen in chapter seven.
I now turn to discuss Marx's account of pure proletarian revolution.
I 
Proletarian revolution as transformative communal action
In chapter five, Marx's Capital 1 was read as an account of a pure industrial capitalist 
culture or total mode of life. This is a culture which is fragmented into dedicated 
spheres of specialized activities all of which are governed by the law of value. What 
this means is that fetishized social relations have produced radically individuated, 
passive subjects; subjects as functionaries for whom sociality is a matter of private 
choice rather than being a cultural imperative. Pure liberal industrial capitalism is a 
kind of expressive totality in which the economic sphere seeks first and last instance 
determinance. This is the world which is described in the CM. It is therefore not an 
actually existing world, but the world to be expected given the full institutionalization 
of pure liberal industrial capitalism. Here description has an active critical intent (to 
be explored further below). It is description intended to aid in the constitution of 
motivations for transformative communal action. For this reason, it stresses action 
rather than impediments to action, offering the proletariat the heroic example of the 
formerly progressive bourgeoisie for inspiration.7 Before engaging further with this 
text, it will be necessary to make some general remarks about the very demanding and 
unlikely leap from fetishism to freedom needed if the proletariat is to become a 
transformative actor.
7 Marx & Engels (1967); Gilbert (1981).
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The proletariat: from passivity to revolution
The proletariat is a class which has been wholly 'produced' or institutionalized by 
industrial capitalism. Therefore it is a class composed of a-social and passive 
subjects. Yet it is the proletariat which has been allotted the task of revolutionary 
transformation. Given the character of social relations instituted by pure capitalism, it 
is no surprise to learn from Marx that the 'changing of circumstances' requires the 
changing of subjects through revolutionary practice:
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or 
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary 
practice .8
Note here the equation of 'human activity' and 'self-changing'. The proletariat, as we 
will see, is to be set the most challenging and arduous task in that it is required to be 
the first wholly self-aware and wholly humanizing communal actor in history.9 
Revolutionary proletarian action requires an ongoing process of self-conscious self­
transformation on the part of the proletariat. In this sense, it is unprecedented in its 
requirements in terms of communal dedication, knowledgeability and self-discipline. 
These requirements were formulated most powerfully in The German Ideology, as 
follows:
For the production on a mass scale o f ... communist consciousness, and for the 
success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, 
an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; 
this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot 
be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it 
can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and 
become fitted to found society anew.10
Note here that revolution is a process whereby the proletariat will transform both 
itself and the culture. It is a process which will effect the complete transformation of 
the proletarian subject. Self-discipline is to be, not only the property of the group as 
a group (in which case it could be imposed by bureaucratic or other coercive means) 
but of individual members of the group as subjects of a specific kind. In other words, 
it requires a form of subjectivity which in some respects resembles that of the 
bourgeois subject as investigated in chapter four. This requirement is related to the 
necessity that the transformative action be radically democratic action. Here
8 Marx (1976b), p. 4.
9 The thrust towards universal humanization is theoretically present in bourgeois ideology but 
empirically unavailable because of the character of capitalism.
10 Marx & Engels (1976), pp. 52 - 3.
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democracy is both means and end. It is an active process whose character is given by 
the ends desired.11
How, though, is this unprecedentedly demanding process to be initiated? For the 
young Marx and Engels, it is a process whose necessity is derived from the very 
character of human nature and its self- and nature-transformative capacities. In effect, 
a new kind of individual and group subjectivity wih emerge out of capitalism by virtue 
of capitalism's own requirements. While pure capitalism was depicted in a wholly 
negative way in chapter five, it will be necessary in this chapter to remind ourselves of 
potentially emancipatory subjective attributes deemed by Marx to have been 
constituted by capitalism itself. So, while capitalism does produce a new kind of 
social and cognitive debility it also, through its novel kind of individuation, contributes 
to the emergence of a new kind of post-capitalist emancipatory culture. As noted 
before, emancipation here refers to the releasing and development of the human 
potential for communality and creativity.
Capitalism has paved the way for this emergence in related ways. First, its 
productivism has created material-cultural conditions for the universalization of praxis 
through the proliferation of different kinds of activities and the development of 
different kinds of capacities, albeit of a kind limited by the requirements of the 
capitalist production process, as discussed in chapter five. Second, it has released 
individuals from paternalistic hierarchical relations of a limited and relatively static 
kind; of a kind in which inequality is naturalized and horizons are necessarily narrow. 
It has forced individuals into a kind of freedom (however inadequate and misleading 
this term may be) in the sense that it interpellates individuals (in both political and 
economic spheres) as originary subjects with specified rights and duties as 
individuals. This is the proletarian subject as 'juridical' rights-bearing subject.12 In 
his function as owner of labour-power the proletarian is interpellated as a free, self- 
motivating subject through practices in the private, political and economic spheres: 
through practices instituted as freely-chosen individual activities such as the making of 
contracts or the casting of votes.13 This limited experience of freedom has real 
effects although it conceals a reality which is far from free, as has been seen in chapter 
five. However, the kind of apparent freedom which constitutes (up to a point) self- 
activating subjects also constitutes radically-individuated a-social subjects. How is 
this kind of subject to be drawn into a new kind of collective action - transformative 
communal action - in which neither individual subject nor group is dissolved? That is 
to say, how is a new kind of subjectivity constituted in which the individual is
11 Avineri (1968), ch. 8; Hunt (1984).
12 Poulantzas (1978a, 1978b).
13 See Marx (1976a), p. 271. This denaturalization of subordination is both cause and consequence of 
the conception and practice of democracy described by post-Marxism and discussed in chapter three.
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sufficiently differentiated so as to sense himself as an active, self-motivating social 
being without at the same time forgetting that he is necessarily culturally constituted? 
What kinds of institutions are required to replace the possessive, atomistic proletarian 
subject by the active social subject required if transformative communal action is to 
emerge?
As already noted, revolutionary action is praxis or action requiring a specific kind 
of theoretical knowledge of the object to be transformed. So,the key point will come 
with the proletariat's 'recognition [Erkennung] of the products as its own, and the 
judgement that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper - 
forcibly imposed...'14 This will be a recognition that objectivity (products) is the 
outcome of collective subjectivity (labour) and therefore the beginning of knowledge of 
the essential characteristics (as opposed to directly experienced 'appearances') of 
capitalism. In other words, at this point, the proletariat will have begun to acquire 
theoretical - rather than merely commonsense15 - knowledge of capitalism.16 This 
knowledge will have arisen out of intra-capitalist changes to be explored further below. 
The translation of this knowledge into revolutionary action requires an ongoing 
process of self-transformation on the part of the proletariat. We can begin to 
understand how the proletariat is expected to take on its heroic task by returning to 
the Marxian notion of contradiction, which was discussed in chapter two.
Contradictions and revolutionary action
As we have seen, the concept of contradiction has a constitutive place in Marx's 
account of pure capitalism and of its transcendence by socialism. To say this is to 
say that the concept of contradiction has a constitutive place in his account of 
revolutionary class action, since for Marx, unlike some later 'orthodox' Marxists, 
revolution is necessarily a. subjective as well as an objective phenomenon.17 
Revolution is change resulting from the combination of enabling 'objective' conditions 
and collective 'subjective' capacities emerging out of and in turn acting back on those 
objective conditions. Revolution as collective praxis is collective action in which 
subjective and objective are united. The subjectivity in question is a collective 
theoretically informed consciousness of a state of affairs from the point of view of its 
transformation; here theoretical collective subjectivity is collective awareness that 
objectivity is the result of human social activity. Of course, collective theoretical 
subjectivity must be the attribute of a group having the social power or potential to
14 Marx (1973b), p. 463.
15 The concept of commonsense will be explored further in chapter seven.
16 For more on the theory/praxis relationship see Heller (1976); Livergood (1967); Lobkowicz (1967); 
Luk&cs (1971ii, 1971iv); Markus (1986).
17 Perkins (1993), chs. 1 & 2.
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effect the desired transformation. Put another way, it must be a class or group 'in' 
itself; it must possess the structural power to prevent the reproduction of the 
relations of production, if it so decides.18 It must be capable of producing significant 
dysfunctionality in the system. The proletariat as abstract labour personified has the 
necessary objectivity or causal powers. However, the activation of these causal 
powers requires communal awareness of this. In effect, without subjectivity, 
objectivity in this instance counts for nothing.19
Marx claims that it is through the working out of its necessary contradictions, as 
manifested in periodic crises, that capitalism will unwittingly initiate a new kind of 
social subjectivity expressive of the human causal powers of sociality and praxis. In 
other words, capitalism itself will bring about the negation of the cognitive and social 
debilities discussed in chapter five. The working out of contradictions produces both 
of the elements necessary for a revolution: the 'objective' conditions and the collective 
'subjective' predispositions and capacities to take action.20 Put another way, the 
qualitative change required to begin to eliminate the kinds of fetishized relations 
described in chapter five will emerge only because that change has already begun to 
take place within capitalist social relations. It is worth discussing in some detail the 
Marxian scenario which centres on the reconstitution of individual motivations for 
communal political action.
Marx identifies (apparently) two major contradictions which produce such 
tendencies (although I shall be suggesting below that these are merely two 
formulations, or differences in emphasis, of the one basic contradiction). The first 
of these is the contradiction between human essence and human existence which 
capitalism engenders. The essence of capitalism, the institutionalization of the law of 
value (or the production of surplus value by abstract commodified labour), contradicts 
the essence of humanity. Capitalism institutionalizes a form of human existence 
which prevents the development of human essence. As noted before, essence is used 
here in an Aristotelian sense to refer to the innate identity of an entity. However 
this identity may be present potentially rather than actually. Any change which is a 
movement towards actualizing the true nature (potentialities) of the entity is a 
necessary change; any change which prevents this is an accidental change.21 From 
this point of view, what is necessary for capitalism is accidental for humanity; what is 
necessary for humanity is accidental for capitalism. So long as capitalism is 
dominant, it institutionalizes social relations which are antithetical to the necessary
18 For a realist Marxist account of class power, see Isaac (1987).
19 See Miller (1982) for more on this. See also Geras (1994); McCamey (1990), ch. 9.
20 Marx himself notes, ‘the objective and the subjective conditions ... are only the two distinct forms 
of the same conditions'. See Marx (1973b), p. 832.
21 See Meikle (1985).
130
development of human nature (and yet which, as we have noted, also secrete the 
potential for emancipation).
The second contradiction is that between forces and relations of production; the 
social relations instituted by the existing ruling class come to act as 'fetters' on the 
further progressive development of the 'forces' of production. It is this contradiction 
which Marx holds to have impelled the bourgeois revolution which overthrew 
feudalism.22 In fact, in the famous 1859 Preface where this idea is most concisely 
formulated, the term contradiction is not used but the concept is present:
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society 
come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely 
expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the 
framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. 
Then begins an era of social revolution 23
Here contradiction has been translated into class conflict but it needs to be stressed 
that this translation (or transition) is not inevitable. We will need to consider whether 
this 'conflict' or 'contradiction' is likely to be the source of an anti-capitalist revolution 
as opposed to mass disorder or rebellion 24 For the moment we should note that 
whereas the first contradiction is undoubtedly a real contradiction whose intra­
capitalist resolution is, by definition, impossible,25 the second may be more apparent 
than real, referring as it does to 'economic' impoverishment and therefore potentially 
resolvable by means of a reinvigorated capitalism.
The early works of Marx and Engels, including The German Ideology and The 
Holy Family, proclaim the first contradiction as the fundamental disintegrative 
contradiction that becomes experienced as oppression and impoverishment by the 
proletariat:
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human 
self-alienation. But the former class finds in this self-alienation its 
confirmation and its good, its own power: it has in it a semblance of human 
existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in its self-alienation; it 
sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. In 
the words of Hegel, the class of the proletariat is in abasement indignation [sic]
22 Marx & Engels (1967), p. 85; Marx 1976a), ch. 32.
23 Marx (1970), p. 21. See Cohen (1978) for an account centred on the famous Preface. For 
discussions of the implications of this account for a theory of collective action, see Lash & Urry (1984); 
Levine & Wright (1980); For more on the two kinds of contradiction see Dupre (1983); Heller 
(1976).
24 We should note here the danger of conflating contradiction and conflict. Giddens (1995) ch. 10 is 
useful on this matter. See also Elster (1978); Godelier (1972).
25 This requires that we accept Marx's conception of capitalism as dehumanizing and, therefore, his 
account of human nature.
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at that abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the 
contradiction between its human nature and its condition of life, which is the 
outright, decisive and comprehensive negation of that nature.26
This is the 'full-grown proletariat' in which the 'abstraction of all humanity, even of 
the semblance of humanity, is practically complete'; the proletariat produced by pure 
capitalism. It is these dehumanized and dehumanizing conditions of life which bring 
the true character of liberal industrial capitalism into clear focus so that the proletariat 
is at once the most dehumanized and the most theoretically aware class. In this early 
work, the dehumanization of the worker is seen as a source of strength because this 
negativity negates itself through producing a theoretical awareness of the loss of 
humanity and therefore the will to eliminate it; a theoretical awareness inculcated 
through 'the stem but steeling school of labour'27 The account presupposes an innate 
human need for sociality and creativity which somehow 'breaks through' even in the 
absence of any social conditions of possibility.28 In other words, it appears to require 
an unsocialized human ‘remainder' which has its own causal powers. Here the human 
capacity for creativity is not some inert property but is experienced as intense need so 
that the proletariat is driven to 'revolt against that inhumanity' through 'urgent, no 
longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need - that practical expression of 
necessity'.29
It is important to note here that need and necessity are used by Marx in different 
senses but it is always related to the essence of a thing, as mentioned before (with the 
exception of 'artificial need' to be explained below). In the remarks just cited, need 
and necessity appear to be used in a philosophical sense, to refer to human needs. 
This is a version of a 'radical needs' account of proletarian revolution and refers to 
truly human needs for creativity and sociality.30 So there are human needs for an 
essentially human kind of development, as discussed in chapter five. There are the 
human being's animal needs for sheer survival (although Marx is quite aware that these 
needs never appear in a purely 'animal' or non-cultural way). There is capitalism’s 
need to expand surplus value. These are all essential needs. As a manifestation of 
capitalism's need for expanded surplus value, human beings institutionalized by 
industrial capitalism come to acquire 'artificial' needs to 'have'. These needs are 
described as 'artificial' because from the point of view of the development of the 
human species being they are accidental rather than essential (these terms being used 
in the Aristotelian sense as explained earlier).
26 Marx & Engels (1975), p. 51.
27 Ibid., pp. 5 2 - 3 .
28 Meikle (1985).
29 Marx & Engels (1975), p. 52.
30 Heller (1976); Meikle (1985).
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These distinctions are important because they enter into the kinds of explanation 
of collective action offered, not only by Marx, but by subsequent Marxists as well as 
by other theorists of collective action.31 To stay with Marx's own account, we have 
seen that the contradiction between human and capitalist essence is offered by the 
young Marx and Engels as the principle informing the proletarian revolution. The 
collective motivation in this case would be derived from a felt sense of frustration of 
essentially human needs. The contradiction between forces and relations of 
production as expressed in various forms of crisis might or might not be productive of 
this kind of motivation. It will certainly be productive of the motivation of 'interest' 
which can be derived from the combination of animal and artificial needs. In some 
places it seems that this is the account being offered by Marx, as will be seen.32
It is not clear why the experience of misery in the shape of either acute poverty 
or dehumanizing working conditions or both should result in revolutionary activity of 
the kind looked for by Marx; that is, revolutionary activity productive of universal 
human emancipation. While it may be believable that either contradiction could 
produce capitalism's downfall, can we be persuaded that that downfall would 
necessarily result in anything other than chaos?33 In an attempt to clarify these 
matters I shall turn to the account of capitalism and proletarian revolution offered in 
the CM.
n
The Communist Manifesto
The CM describes a world which has been wholly colonized by liberal industrial 
capitalism. That is to say, all spheres, including those of religion, education and the 
family, have been rendered functional for the requirements of capitalism in the strong 
sense that all social relations are commodified. So, for example:
The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured 
and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the 
lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers.
31 Exploitation-centred accounts of class action will logically focus on the contradiction between forces 
and relations of production. See e.g. Wright (1997).
32 Marx sees the struggles to shorten the working day as a manifestation of the proletariat's recognition 
of the dehumanizing character of capitalism; or, of the contradiction between the essence of humanity 
and capitalism. The shortening of the working day is the 'basic prerequisite' of the movement from 
'realm of necessity' to 'realm of freedom'. Seee Marx (1981), p. 820. See Cohen (1977) for a useful 
motivational analysis of class struggle; also Marcuse (1986), pp. 433 - 439.
33 Geras (1994).
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The bourgeoisie has tom away from the family its sentimental veil, and has 
reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.34
In effect, the law of value has been instituted in every sphere of human social activity. 
Another way of putting this is to say that fetishized social relations have been 
universalized and therefore the kinds of subjectivities discussed in chapter five are in 
place. The world described in the CM is a world in which a 'world market' has been 
established; in which production has been institutionalized as 'abstract labour'; in 
which monetized relationships have penetrated all spheres of human life including that 
of the family; in which 'feudal relations' have been replaced by 'free competition, 
accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the 
economical and political sway of the bourgeois class'.35 This is a world created by the 
bourgeoisie 'after its own image'.36 It is a world in which artisans have been replaced 
by proletarians and in which the progressive impulse identified by Habermas in the 
notion of the bourgeois public sphere has given way to self-interest.37 It is a world 
characterized by 'class polarization' i.e. a world which constitutes two significant 
collective actors, namely the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, these being the only two 
purely capitalist classes, in Marxian terms. However, this is also a world which will 
effect the metamorphosis of the proletariat from total dehumanization into an 
historically unprecedented revolutionary collective actor. This metamorphosis comes 
about through either the changing or loosening of the institutional grip of capitalism. 
Both of these possibilities are suggested or implied in the CM.
Regarding the first possibility, the strong suggestion in the first section of the CM 
is that the lived, daily experiences of the proletariat will be sufficient to form it into a 
'class-for-itself. It is Marx's claim that capitalism itself, under the duress of 
increasingly severe crises, brings about experiential changes, specifically changes in the 
character of everyday proletarian life in the factory but also changes in other 
spheres.38 Under the capitalist imperative to develop the productive forces, the 
everydayness or workers' direct experience will be broadened beyond the narrow 
atomistic subjectivity instituted by liberal industrial capitalism. As small factories 
give way to bigger and bigger factories with large concentrations of workers, a kind of 
cognitive-emotional effect will take place which will enable the workers to transcend 
(up to a point at least) the fragmenting, alienating effects of capitalist industrial
34 Marx & Engels (1967), p. 82.
35 Ibid., p. 85.
36 Ibid., p. 84.
37 See Maguire (1978), ch. 2 on Marx's conception(s) of the bourgeoisie. Note the usefulness here of 
the distinction between non-economic and economic fractions of the bourgeoisie.
38 In relation to the latter, Marx notes the importance of the political experience derived from the 
formation of tactical alliances between bourgeoisie and proletariat. See Marx (1973a), pp. 262 - 71, 
especially p. 264. See also Cottrell (1984), ch. 1.
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production, to institutionalize new social relations which transcend the 
competitiveness of existing relations. The objective weight of combined proletarian 
potential will thereby become actualized through the fusion of objectivity and 
subjectivity.
Marx offers an account (albeit sketchy) of different kinds of collective action, 
from early local concrete action oriented to the restoration of feudal worker status to a 
more recognizably modem form of trades union action (constantly undermined by 
competitive relations between workers), to 'revolutionary combination, due to 
association'.39 The latter is the embodiment of proletarian class action and therefore 
'entirely foreign to commodity production', as Marx was later to put it.40 It is the 
outcome of a long process whereby a sense of collective identity and cognitive and 
organizational resources develop out of a series of battles with individual capitalists as 
well as changing (and educational) experiences in the workplace; out of the increasing 
equalization of poverty among workers; out of a shared experience of precariousness, 
enslavement and vulnerability. It is this shared experience which begins to transform 
the atomistic subject into the social subject.
The 'good side' of capitalist exploitation has been that isolated workers have been 
brought to associate together in an organized, disciplined and social fashion; that they 
have begun to gain a sense of their combined social power through the social and 
geographical mobility required by the law of value. Here is how this is described by 
Marx in The Poverty o f Philosophy, in a passage which brings out more clearly than 
does the CM the way in which institutional change initiates changes in motivations 
and commitments and therefore changes in subjectivities:
The first attempts of workers to associate among themselves always take 
place in the form of combinations.
Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to 
one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of 
wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in 
a common thought of resistance - combination. Thus combination always has 
a double aim, that of stopping competition among the workers, so that they 
can carry on general competition with the capitalist. I f  the first aim o f
39 Marx & Engels (1967), pp. 89 - 94. Marx comments in a letter written in 1871: ‘[E]very 
movement in which the working class as a class confronts the ruling classes and tries to constrain them 
from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempts by strikes, etc., in a particular 
factory or even in a particular trade to compel individual capitalists to reduce the working day, is a 
purely economic movement. On the other hand the movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., law 
is a political movement. And in this way out of the separate economic movements of the workers 
there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a class movement with the object of 
enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force. While 
these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organization, they are in turn equally a means 
of developing this organization.' (Letter to Bolte, 23/11/1871 quoted in Sitton, 1989, p.160.)
40 See Geras (1971), p. 85.
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resistance was merely the maintenance o f wages, combinations, at first 
isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite 
for the purpose o f repression, and in face o f always united capital, the 
maintenance o f the association becomes more necessary to them than that o f  
wages. This is so true that English economists are amazed to see the workers 
sacrifice a good part o f their wages in favour o f associations, which, in the eyes 
o f these economists, are established solely in favour o f wages. In this struggle - 
a veritable civil war - all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and 
develop. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political 
character.
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the 
country into workers. The domination of capital has created for this mass a 
common situation, common interests.41
Here we see the isolated, individualistic experience of hardship being replaced by an 
increasingly strong sense of shared experience which begins to inculcate a sense of 
class membership as a good in itself 42 Put another way, what is in question here is 
the emergence of communal relations, although Marx himself does not use this 
language at this point. Here, too, we note that the 'interest' motivation as inhering in 
class action does not denote a-social, egocentrism but rather a sense of the social or 
communal good.43
At this point, the proletariat has also begun to gain a sense of the capitalist 
totality and its unique and peculiar functioning. So fetishism in both its cognitive and 
social aspects has begun to dissolve, opening the way for a realistic appreciation on 
the part of the proletariat of the true source of value i.e. its own united, cooperative 
labour power. Put another way, the world-making significance of humanity's capacity 
for sociality and praxis begins to come into view. If at this point, capitalism becomes 
plunged in yet another crisis, we find the co-existence of conditions productive of 
revolutionary proletarian action. The acuteness of the crisis required is described by 
Marx in terms of the pauperization of a worker o f a specific kind', one, that is, already 
escaping from the most dehumanizing aspects of capitalist production. This worker
becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and 
wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer 
to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon 
society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to 
assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting 
him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him.
41 Marx (1978), p. 168 (emphases mine).
42 See Avineri (1968), pp. 141 - 149.
43 For more on the expanded conception of interest in Marx, see Miller (1982), pp. 72 - 86.
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Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence 
is no longer compatible with society.44
Here we find a reference to the creation of a vast army of the unemployed, of those, 
that is, who are released or ejected from the institutional grip of the factory. Since, as 
we have noted, all spheres will have been commodified by this time, we must suppose 
the state of the unemployed to be truly wretched. At the same time, 
decommodification will be an emergent property of the new proletarian associations 
mentioned before. We must also suppose that proletarian associations and the new 
kind of social relations which these will have begun to institute will prevent the 
pauperized from becoming quite speedily a passive or unruly mob i.e. from 
degenerating into a lumpenproletariat.45 At this point we must be persuaded that 
the development which creates the revolutionary 'nodal point' is that which ejects the 
worker from the factory (since what is in question here is large-scale factory 
production) and that therefore escape from institutionalization may constitute the 
coup de grace for capitalism. The intensification of crises together with the alleged 
depletion of the capitalist capacity to respond effectively to successive crises, can be 
seen as a state of institutional breakdown in which capitalism loses control of 
proletarians in the precise sense that these are released from one of the primary 
interpellative institutions i.e. the factory. At this point, to adopt post-Marxist 
language for a moment, subjects as 'moments’ of a signifying chain have been 
transformed into 'elements' available for reinterpellation as 'moments' in a new 
signifying chain.
Here the significance of Marx's suggestion that a stratum of bourgeois intellectuals 
makes such an escape, under the influence of proliferating capitalist crises becomes 
apparent.46 So we have the simultaneous availability of new organic intellectuals of 
the proletariat and an increasing pool of unemployed (and unemployable?) 
proletarians as addressees of the radical theory produced by such intellectuals.47 
Since these proletarians will have begun to rediscover their capacity for communal 
social relations within capitalism itself we now have the basis for transformative 
communal action.
What this means is that deinstitutionalization (unfixity in post-Marxist terms) in 
terms of capitalist culture must be swiftly followed by reinstitutionalization (a new 
kind of fixity) within a new emancipatory culture if the emergent sense of social 
subjectivity is to be fully realized. What is in question is a state of overdetermination
44 Marx & Engels (1967), p. 93.
45 Marx (1973b), pp. 39, 52 - 53.
46 Marx & Engels (1967), p. 91.
47 See Gorz (1982) whose argument about the future emergence of socialism is based on just such a 
process.
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i.e. the condensation of a multiplicity of internally related (constitutive) elements, 
including pauperism, class polarization, the cognitive and social development of the 
proletariat as 'class-for-itself and the presence of organic intellectuals (themselves 
renegades from the bourgeoisie) capable of undertaking the necessary directive and 
organizational tasks in a radically democratic manner.48
From contradiction to revolution
The first section of CM offers an exciting and dramatic narrative of the rise and fall of 
the bourgeoisie, a class which is described with a mixture of respect and horror. A 
direct comparison is made between the past revolutionary activity of the bourgeoisie 
and the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat, both of whom are thrust into 
this heroic role due to their capacities to develop the productive forces by removing 
existing constraining social relations. Here, the contradiction in operation appears to 
be primarily that between forces and relations of production, rather than that between 
the essence of capitalism and human essence. In other words, this can be read as an 
'interest' account rather than a 'radical needs' account of the emergence of a 
revolutionary collective actor, although, as we have noted above, 'interest' can be used 
in a sense which rids it of its individualistic, economistic implications.49 In order to 
make sense of Marx's claim it is necessary to interpret 'interest' in the expanded sense 
to denote a communal interest in the establishment of humanizing praxis. If this route 
is adopted, then the two contradictions discussed above become one, in that the 
contradiction between forces and relations of production becomes an expression of the 
more fundamental contradiction between capitalist and human essences.
If the contradiction between forces and relations of production is interpreted in an 
economistic, productivist sense, it becomes impossible to understand how it might be 
the source of revolutionary proletarian action. Clearly the economism or 
productivism which supposedly constituted the motive for the earlier bourgeois 
revolution would have been revolutionary in relation to feudalism. There would be 
nothing revolutionary about it in relation to the capitalist mode of production, 
though.50 While it may happen that proletarian subjects will organize themselves to 
demand greater productive efficiency as manifested in the capacity to provide jobs and 
pay higher wages, these demands are not intrinsically revolutionary in a capitalist 
context, although their articulation may have unforeseen revolutionary consequences. 
Action stimulated by the 'interest' motivation as narrowly conceived is - in principle
48 See Althusser (1996), pp. 112 - 113; Miller (1982), ch. 1.
49 For more on this distinction, see Heller (1976). See also Cohen (1977) for a discussion of Heller's 
interpretation of Marx on these questions.
50 See Cohen (1982).
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at least - action according to the requirements of capitalism. It is not motivated by 
and cannot be productive of the kind of political commitment required either for 
proletarian revolutionary action or for the more modest intra-cultural transformative 
tasks with which we are concerned in this thesis.
However, Marx believes that the need for greater efficiency is at the same time the 
need for a new goal for production. That is to say, the contradiction between forces 
and relations of production will be experienced in such a way - i.e. as a contradiction 
between humanity and capitalism - that 'interest' as a concern with production and 
distribution as economically conceived will give way to 'interest' as a concern with 
fundamental^cw/tara/ transformation. This will consist in (in addition to more efficient 
production) production for humanity rather than for the hucksterer.51 Here, the use 
of the term humanity alerts us to the qualitative (i.e. revolutionary rather than 
reformist) dimension of proletarian action. What is required is a new kind of 
motivation for action; one not institutionalized by liberal industrial capitalism. Hence 
the concept of 'interest' as applied to revolutionary proletarian action refers to quite a 
different motivation than does that same concept as applied to the bourgeoisie or to 
subjects who have not yet escaped from the kind of institutions described in chapter 
five.
What Marx is concerned with is a theoretically-informed, therefore realistic 
revolutionary demand articulated by a collective actor having the characteristics of a 
new and universal transformative communal actor, an actor, that is, capable of making 
history. The catalyst will be the radicalizing interpretation of shared suffering 
produced by the proletarian capacity to see through appearances to essences. While 
this interpretation must emerge out of the experiences of the proletariat itself, there is 
a suggestion in the CM - already noted - that the proletarianization of intellectuals 
(and of other members of the petty-bourgeoisie) will contribute 'fresh elements of 
enlightenment and progress'.52 These 'fresh elements', though, must have been 
articulated to the proletariat in the sense that they must have cleansed themselves of 
bourgeois or petty-bourgeois 'prejudices'.53 Under these conditions, they can serve 
as tutors of the proletariat, but tutelage is merely a moment in a process which is 
primarily directed and borne by the proletariat itself. If, for example, the CM 
constitutes an attempt to interpellate the proletariat as revolutionary, the proletariat 
will only recognize itself in the account offered because that account is derived from 
knowledge of real processes and real experiences of actual workers. So, the
51 Marx (1975b).
52 Marx & Engels (1967), p. 91.
53 This is a question to which Marx returns in later works. Note particularly his comments in 
‘Critique of the Gotha Programme' in which he reiterates the requirement that the emancipation of the 
proletariat must be a self-emancipation and criticizes the proposal that workers' cooperatives be 
established with the help of the state. See Marx (1974), esp. p. 354.
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Communist Party begins with the 'actual relations springing from an existing class 
struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes' so as to produce 
the theoretical knowledge without which true praxis is not possible. Theory, insofar 
as it is scientific, is connected 'with the real movement of society', as we have seen in 
earlier chapters.54 So the account of class relations and development in the CM is an 
attempt to crystalyze a specific situation, to give systematicity and direction to a 
growing awareness on the part of the proletariat both of itself as a group unified by 
certain experiences and of capitalism as a system necessarily and unavoidably 
responsible for those experiences felt as suffering, deprivation, impoverishment. 
Insofar as this theory 'takes hold of the masses', it becomes a force productive of 
revolution.55
So the Marxian claim remains fundamental. It is because the proletariat is the 
most dehumanized class that it will be receptive to radical theory. Unlike the 
bourgeoisie, which finds 'absolute satisfaction' in the 'process of alienation', the 
proletariat 'is a victim who confronts it as a rebel and experiences it as a process of 
enslavement'.56 The key to proletarian receptivity to the Marxian interpretation of 
collective impoverishment and dehumanization, the element which triggers the leap 
out of capitalist institutionalization, is the contradiction between human essence and 
the essence of capitalism. The significance of the contradiction between forces and 
relations of production is to be interpreted in the light of this more fundamental 
contradiction whose resolution dictates that the character and goal - as well as the 
efficiency - of production be transformed; that it be undertaken in the interests of 
'humanity' rather than the 'hucksterer'.57 At this point, and from the perspective 
afforded by our discussion of the ISAs in chapter four, we may remain unconvinced 
by this account of the leap from fetishism to freedom, given that this leap requires 
transformation at the level of individual proletarian subjects and  that this 
transformation will have been initiated within capitalism itself. Although we may 
have been persuaded by Marx's account of the reconstitution of sociality by means of 
proletarian associations, we remain to be convinced that the proletarian subject will 
have attained the necessary individual characteristics of knowledgeability and 
competence and the quality of expectation and therefore experience implied by the 
centrality of the contradiction just discussed.
As we noted earlier, the experience of the contradiction as a contradiction between 
humanity and capitalism is held by the young Marx and Engels to arise from the total
54 Note his criticism of 'scientific socialism' 'which wants to attach the people to new delusions, 
instead o f limiting its science to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself. 
Marx, (1974), p. 337.
55 See Heller (1976), p. 137.
56 Marx (1976a), p. 990. So alienation and fetishism are experienced in class-specific, more or less 
debilitating ways.
57 Marx (1975b). See also Postone (1993) for an extended treatment of this.
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dehumanization of the proletariat. But it is a requirement of the theory that this 
dehumanization not be translated into the demand for a return to artisanal production. 
So in order to experience the contradiction in the required manner, the proletariat must 
have been 'humanized' in a new way by capitalism itself. That is to say, capitalism 
must have begun to actualize human potential in a radically new way. Two aspects 
of this process have been suggested above: the first is the requirement for a new kind 
of competence at the individual level; the second is the requirement for a new kind of 
collective competence i.e. national scope and therefore a new kind of organization 
(association).58 However, a great leap is required if the kind of limited (fragmented) 
individual competence produced by capitalism is to be translated into an individual 
sense of competence productive of a readiness to engage in demanding, highly risky 
collective action or, if the proletarian subject is to be replaced by the active social 
subject. If individuals are dehumanized or 'enslaved' in the sense suggested in the CM 
and discussed in some detail in chapter five above, how do they come to develop this 
much broader sense of competence? The worker as mere cog in the machine is 
unlikely to have developed the required capacities for demanding transformative action 
and, as we have seen, these capacities need to emerge at the individual level if radical 
democratic activity is to be a possibility.59 In short, we need a stronger and more 
clearly specified account of the constitution of the social self-confident, self- 
disciplined and knowledgeable subject. Before concluding this section, I shall suggest 
a way forward in relation to this problem.
While the early Marx & Engels see the workers' total dehumanization as the 
necessary precondition for the emergence of critical consciousness, we find a 
difference of emphasis in the later work. In fact, this is more than a change of 
emphasis since it hints at a more persuasive account of the emergence of the active 
social subject than we have found in the CM. Capitalism, says Marx in the 
Grundrisse, will have fulfilled its 'historic destiny', as soon as
on the one side, there has been such a development of needs that surplus 
labour above and beyond necessity has itself become a general need arising out 
of individual needs themselves - and, on the other side, when the severe 
discipline of capital, acting on succeeding generations [Geschlechter], has 
developed general industriousness as the general property of the new species 
[Geschlecht] - and, finally, when the development o f the productive powers o f 
labour, which capital incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania for 
wealth, and o f the sole conditions in which this mania can be realised, have 
flourished to the stage where the possession and preservation o f general wealth 
require a lesser labour time o f society as a whole, and where the labouring
58 See Marx (1973a), p. 239.
59 See Braverman (1974); Doray (1988); Edwards (1979); Knights & Willmott (1990); Willmott 
(1990).
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society relates scientifically to the process o f its progressive reproduction, its 
reproduction in a constantly greater abundance ... Capital's ceaseless striving 
towards the general form of wealth drives labour beyond the limits of its 
natural paltriness [Naturbedurftigkeit], and thus creates the material elements 
for the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its 
production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no 
longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural 
necessity in its direct form has disappeared; because a historically created need 
has taken the place of the natural one.60
What this quotation suggests is that the 'paltriness' instituted by capitalism through 
the law of value (as expressed in the requirement that 'labour' become a mindless 
appendage of the machine) becomes at some point inadequate to the needs of that law. 
'Labour' ceases to do what a mere 'thing' could do i.e. individual labourers become more 
actively and knowledgeably involved in the labour process. Put another way, the 
institution of abstract labour begins to dissolve in a manner not considered earlier and 
from this dissolution follows the dissolution of the dichotomies of 
subjectivity/objectivity and society/individual which have constituted the passive 
asocial proletarian subjects of capitalism.61 The point here is that capitalism's own 
requirements result in the institutionalization of subjects who begin to develop an 
awareness of their human potential for 'richness' in the sense of a many-sided 
individuality expressed in the enjoyment of a multiplicity of truly human needs. 
These are subjects who will have begun to develop a stronger sense of individual 
competence than is likely to be found among workers shaped by routine factory work; 
knowledgeable, educated and demanding workers who are encouraged to engaged 
actively with the production process.
What is required is that the character of factory production become transformed 
and/or that new kinds of production become increasingly important for the realization 
of the law of value. Such a suggestion requires detailed institutional specification, 
which cannot be provided here, although this specification will be sketched in in the 
concluding chapter. In order to be productive of the social individual, though, the new 
kinds of institutions would need to have changed their character in the social (as well 
as cognitive) dimension and would, further, require the reinforcement of institutions 
beyond the 'economic' sphere, as has been made plain in chapter four, particularly in 
the discussion of Althusser's account of the ISAs. The combined effects would 
constitute a new kind of awareness of intra- and inter-subjective socio-cultural
60 Marx (1973a), p. 325 (emphasis mine). Postone (1993) offers a comprehensive account of these 
developments.
61 Habermas (1987b), pp. 48 - 50 offers a different interpretation of this passage. See Postone (1993) 
for a criticism of Habermas's interpretation of Marx.
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dependence and a new kind of realization that the human world is the product of 
social co-operative activity.
For the moment, we need only note that the kinds of developments suggested in 
the above quotation open up the possibility of developing a more convincing account 
of how individual proletarians might come to attain the necessary sense of 
competence (if not the communal motivation) required for voluntary participation in 
revolutionary action. Here the leap from fetishism to revolution seems less 
remarkable, so long as we believe that conditions also exist to enable the transition 
from individual self-interest to 'active union' i.e. that cognitive enrichment is 
accompanied by communal enrichment. An answer to this question will be suggested 
in chapter nine. For now, the concept of 'active union' will be explored further by 
looking at the writings on the Paris Commune.
m
Revolutionary proletarian action as transformative communal action
The concept of active union is not developed in any real sense by Marx. 
Nevertheless it is possible, by drawing on Marx's own texts, and by keeping in mind 
the fundamental and general character of his approach, to offer further elaboration of 
this concept now (specifically in relation to questions about organization). For 
example, 'active' is a theoretical term relating to the human capacity for praxis. This 
is an important clue, given the modern propensity to translate organization into 
bureaucratization. As will be seen, Marx's views on bureaucracy are such as to 
preclude the translation of'active union' into bureaucratic organization/integration.62
While Marx is aware of the significance of bureaucracy in the economic sphere, it 
is as a state-related phenomenon that he mostly tends to explore its significance. The 
state as the necessary means of exploita tion  also institutes a fetishized 
(bureaucratized) form of public action.63 This is public action as a process of 
decision-making carried on by specialists as experts.64 As we have seen, revolution 
requires the transcendence of feetishism; of impersonal, abstract social relations. It 
also requires the self-activity and self-discipline of the constituent members of the 
proletariat. Marx never wavers in his conviction that the proletariat must liberate 
(represent) itself. Bureaucratic social relations are by Marxian definition fetishized
62 As Avineri quite correctly notes: ‘an insistence on the importance of understanding bureaucracy 
both historically and functionally runs through all of Marx's writings after 1843'. See Avineri (1968), 
p. 49.
63 For example, see Marx (1973b), p. 92. See also M6sz£ros (1995), ch. 13.
64 Marx (1973a), p. 186; Marx (1974), pp. 206 - 7; Draper (1978).
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social relations since they are impersonal, abstract and hierarchized social relations 
between experts and non-experts. 'Active union1 cannot refer to the kind of 
mechanical or technocratic union arrived at by means of bureaucratic organization. 
Everything we have noted so far suggests that 'active union' must refer to an impulsion 
to self-emancipatory action deriving from a strong sense of shared proletarian 
suffering, misery, enslavement and informed by an account of the social world which 
stresses the need to dissolve precisely those social relations embodied in 
bureaucracies. Indeed, Marx ceaselessly proclaims the 'dead', parasitic, anti­
democratic character of bureaucracy.65 This becomes absolutely clear from Marx's 
account of the Paris Commune.
The Paris Commune: politics and the end o f fetishism
Marx's writings on the Paris Commune will be discussed here in terms of our interest 
in institutional change of a specific kind i.e. change which consists in counteracting the 
effects of fetishism and alienation. I take it that this is the sense of Marx's claim: 'The 
great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special 
measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the 
people.'66 In its 'working existence' the Commune instituted defetishized social 
political relations; social relations of a concrete and transparent kind which undid the 
political effects of the division of labour as manifested in the bureaucracy and standing 
army. In the first draft of 'The Civil War in France', Marx refers to the five 
‘ubiquitous organs' to be abolished and focuses on the contrast between the standing 
army and the militia. The former 'defends the government against the citizens'; the 
latter 'defends the citizens against the power (the government)'.67 In addition to this 
key change, the Commune sought to make all public officials 'elective, responsible, and 
revocable' and to free knowledge production and education from clerical and bourgeois 
power.68
The Paris Commune was to 'serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of 
France.'69 That is to say, local government of a specific kind i.e. based on the election 
of revocable delegates, rather than representatives, was to be the real power centre in 
France, with central institutions fulfilling necessary but few functions in a manner 
strictly accountable to the localities. Note here Marx's approval of delegation (as 
opposed to representation) as proposed by the Paris Commune.70 Delegation refers
65 See, for example, his comments on the French state in Marx (1973a), p. 186. See Poulantzas 
(1978a), pp. 331 -359.
66 Marx (1974a), p. 217.
67 Ibid., p. 251.
68 Ibid., p. 210.
69 Ibid., p. 210. See also Gilbert (1981); Hunt (1984); Johnstone (1978).
70 See Cottrell (1984), p. 53.
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to an active, informed relationship between individuals or groups and their political 
representatives. This is a relationship which prevents the congealing of representation 
into expertize and of sociality into fetishism. In relation to this point, the operation 
of the Commune requires constant, informed and competent participation in public 
affairs on the part of all parties to the relationship. In effect, delegation requires and 
promotes a strong sense of membership and the willingness to contribute in an active 
and effective manner to the activities of the group in question. So delegation suggests 
an active, self-conscious and confident form of group integration. An organization 
based on the principle of delegation will have instituted 'dialogical' social relations 
whereas one based on the principle of representation will have instituted 'monological' 
social relations. The former sustains a sense of communal identity and therefore 
political commitment of the kind in question here. The latter is likely to produce and 
maintain opportunist or instrumentally rational forms of action.71
Conclusion
The class action which Marx hopes for is transformative communal action. It is 
action carried out by active social subjects with a strong sense both of self and of 
group membership; with dedicated commitment to transformation as well as the 
necessary theoretical knowledge of the object to be transformed. This is action which 
is motivated by an expanded conception of 'interest' (interest in humanization rather 
than merely distribution) and strengthened by a strong sense of sociality as a good in 
itself. At the end of this discussion of the theory and practice of proletarian action, 
we are left with the conviction that while Marx produced a promising outline of a 
theory of transformative communal action, he did not give us convincing reasons for 
believing that the proletariat institutionalized by liberal industrial capitalism would be 
capable of engaging in such action. In terms both of the goal and of the means needed 
to attain the goal, Marx's account depends heavily on the idea of the active human 
subject prepared to engage in highly risky and heroic endeavours. Indeed, his 
emphasis on the radically democratic character of the action in question requires 
this.72 This is a notion which demands the liberation of human beings from any form 
of tutelary relations.73 That he can conceive of such subjects is due, not only to the 
influence of Aristotelian and Kantian ideas, but to his own constitution as a bourgeois 
subject (albeit a renegade bourgeois subject) and to his interpretation of the political
71 Offe & Wiesenthal (1980). These authors claim that by the mid-twentieth century monological 
forms of organization had come to prevail in European trades unions.
72 See Hunt (1984); Miller (1982).
73 See Rundell (1987).
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significance of a class composed of such subjects, as manifested in the French 
Revolution.74 We have seen in chapter four what kinds of institutions were required 
to produce this subject. However, we remain to be convinced that a superior version 
of this subject can emerge out of liberal industrial capitalism. (The active social 
subject would be superior because he would not be vulnerable to the corrupting effects 
of the law of value.) The contradiction between human and capitalist essence has to 
bear more explanatory weight than it will hold. The point is not to say that the 
contradiction does not produce manifold effects. It is to question the likelihood that 
such effects will be as Marx expects.75 Marx produced a powerful, systematic and 
still relevant account of capitalism. He produced a less powerful, less systematic but 
nevertheless highly suggestive account of the prerequisites for transformative 
communal action. Whether or not such action will emerge out of the capitalist mode 
of production is a separate question to which I shall return in chapter nine where 
Marx's later perception that capitalism comes to 'enrich' the life of the worker by 
virtue of its own requirements will be considered in relation to the contemporary 
preoccupation with producing knowledgeable workers.
While Marx was aware of the need to recreate immediate felt social bonds between 
individuals subject to capitalism's fragmented institutionalization, he did not theorize 
this requirement, as we have seen. We remain unclear as to how the demanding 
combination of social and cognitive capacities are to be developed if transformative 
communal action is to be undertaken. It will be the purpose of the next chapter to 
show how Gramsci’s analysis of political commitment can help us to make good these 
deficiencies.
74 See Marx & Engels (1976), p. 92; Feher (1984). Cohen criticizes Marx for superimposing the 
French experience of revolutionary politics on the early English experience of industrialization to 
produce his account of proletarian revolution. See Cohen (1982), pp. 9 7 - 103. Wood (1991) notes the 
general disposition among nineteenth century theorists to conflate these two revolutions so as to arrive 
at a model of progress. Avineri (1968) has a different account of Marx's evaluation of the French 
Revolution.
75 For example Bauman (1982) suggests that much trade union activity should be interpreted in terms, 
not of ‘self-interest’, but rather of workers' need for autonomy and self-respect. While Bauman does not 
suggest that this is an expression of the contradiction between human and capitalist essence there are 
good grounds for interpreting it in this way.
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Chapter seven
Transformative communal action: the Gramscian perspective
Marx's analysis of proletarian revolutionary action has been read here as an analysis of 
the subjective requirements for the constitution of radically democratic political 
commitment i.e. of an active, educated collective sense of individual obligation to the 
achievement of collective purposes. As has been seen, this commitment requires the 
transcendence of the cognitive-affective limitations which were discussed in chapter 
five. For Marx this transcendence is an emergent property of the changing 
requirements of capitalism itself. Therefore its initiation will require only marginal 
help from intellectuals. While he does offer some reasons for expecting the required 
intra-capitalist institutional change, these reasons are not supported by the kind of 
specific theoretical development that might render them completely persuasive. A 
more detailed account of the transition from passive a-social to active social subject is 
required. In this chapter, the task is to search the work of Antonio Gramsci for such 
an account. As will be seen, Gramsci shares Marx's concern with the constitution of 
political commitment; with the formation of the active social subject as voluntary and 
self-disciplined class member. This is the 'new type of person that we must work 
towards'.1 However, his point of departure is not a proletariat somehow recovering 
from the effects of fetishization, but a fragmented population composed of classes 
unevenly incorporated into capitalist culture.2 Partly for this reason, he is more 
preoccupied with theorizing political leadership than is Marx. As will be seen, 
Gramsci considers that replacement of radical fragmentation requires dedicated 
visionary leadership of a very specific kind.
In this connection, Gramsci's conception of the kind of subjectivity required to 
advance the transformative project is that of the 'democratic philosopher' or organic 
intellectual: 'his personality is not limited to himself as a physical individual but is an 
active social relationship of modification of the cultural environment'.3 Indeed, 
Gramsci, as does Marx, equates universal emancipation with the realization for all of 
active social subjectivity.4 Unlike Marx, though, Gramsci allocates to the state the 
major tasks of conception and execution and/or supervision of the activities and
1 Gramsci (1995), p. 274.
2 Gramsci (1978). For an account of the historical-cultural context, see Clark (1977); Fiori (1977); 
Forgacs (1990). The fragmentation with which Gramsci is concerned is of the kind analyzed by 
Althusser in CO.
3 Gramsci (1971), p. 350, quoted in Buci-Glucksmann (1980), p. 387.
4 As Piccone puts it:' [T]he goal is none other than the realization of what this [Western] tradition has 
been aiming for; that free social individual described by Marx in the Grundrisse and prefigured even 
earlier in the citizen of the Greek polis or in the Christian soul.' Piccone (1976), p. 493. See Gramsci
(1995), pp. 14 - 16, pp. 269 - 277.
147
processes required. These tasks are conceived of by Gramsci as the 'remaking of the 
people'. In this chapter, I shall be concerned with one aspect of this multi­
dimensional process: namely the constitution of a population of patriot-citizens, the 
inculcation of a form of active political commitment which is a matter of the heart as 
well as of the head.5
The following discussion will be organized in three sections, all of which are 
united by the concern to theorize further Marx's concept of active union. The first 
section will examine Gramsci's conceptual contribution to the dialectical approach.6 
Here we will find new concepts - such as concrete phantasy - which will enable us to 
theorize the capitalist totality from the point of view of its transformation. We also 
find an explicit preoccupation with culture. As we noted in chapter three, post- 
Marxism adopts some of these Gramscian concepts precisely for the purpose of 
theorizing radical collective action. However, the adoption of discourse analysis and 
the rejection of dialectics introduce an unwitting idealism into post-Marxist analysis 
which forecloses on the full development of these concepts. Resituating these within 
a dialectical theory and method will guard against both idealist and materialist 
reductions. The second and third sections will elaborate on the Marxian concept of 
'active union' by means of the further exploration of the force/meaning relationship 
which was discussed in chapters three and four. In fact, post-Marxism's usage of the 
concept of nodal point directs our attention quite fruitfully to the psychic component 
(and implications) of the constitution of political commitment; it makes us aware of 
the utility of articulating psychoanalysis to Gramsci's Marxism. At the same time, a 
return to Gramsci's analysis affords the means of developing a more systematic and 
rigorous explanation of the required processes than has been found in post-Marxism. 
In the second section, these processes will be discussed from the point of view of 
knowledge production. As will be seen, what we get from Gramsci is an argument 
about the way in which knowledge functions to constitute subjects of a specific kind. 
The synthesis of different kinds of knowledge is a key to the transcendence of social 
and cognitive debility. Here we get a new perspective on the concept of'active union'. 
In the third section, this concept will be discussed from an organizational point of 
view. The vehicle for this discussion will be Gramsci's analyses of the relative 
institutional merits of trades unions, factory councils and party. In these analyses we 
will find both confirmation and elaboration of Marx's views on bureaucracy.
5 The other is the creation of a population of self-disciplined, self-aware social subjects willing and able 
to conform 'actively' to the demands of the collective (therefore communal) project which involves the 
completion of industrialization in an unevenly developed Italy. See Gramsci (1971), pp. 279 - 318. So, 
in addition to active and educated political engagement on the part of individual subjects, Gramsci is 
also looking for a specific kind of self-discipline in relation to the requirements of mass industrial 
production. It is not clear that Gramsci is sufficiently aware of the contradictions involved in these 
requirements. However, this is a problem that need not concern us here. See Rutigliano (1977).
6 See Adamson (1980); Finocchiaro (1988); Paggi (1979).
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I now turn to sketch in, briefly, Gramsci's development of a Marxist theory 
adequate to his specific political concerns with active, radically democratic collective 
action.7
I
Gramsci as dialectical Marxist8
Gramsci's development of Marxism has three major strands. First is the 
reinstatement of the centrality of the dialectic; second and relatedly, the retrieval of 
Hegel's account of the state as educator and 'producer' of the community - that is of 
the 'ethical-political' or integral state - and third, the articulation to Marxism of a 
Machiavellian 'politics of inclusion' involving the constitution of popular citizenship 
i.e. of the 'national-popular'.9
The reinstatement of dialectics effects the recognition that capitalism is a total 
way of life with a specific fragmented form, as we have noted in chapter two. Along 
with this goes the further recognition of the centrality of the state as 'culture maker' as 
well as of the active historical (rather than evolutionary law-driven) character of 
human social life. This dual recognition becomes particularly important given the 
absence in Italy of a hegemonic bourgeois class and connectedly of a hegemonic state 
at a time when the transition from liberal to organized capitalism - which Gramsci 
takes to be wholly progressive - requires the most demanding form of political 
leadership.10 Neither the economic nor political 'class' is capable of providing such 
leadership. Hence the attraction of Machiavelli's work which draws our attention to 
the importance of a certain kind of engaged and committed leadership in the 
constitution of political commitment to demanding collective tasks.
Overall, the emphasis is on the production of knowledge facilitating activity 
rather than passivity. It is from this point of view that Gramsci makes his most 
stringent criticisms of orthodox Marxism and it is from this point of view that the 
dialectic approach is most useful.11
The dialectic and collective action
7 Germino (1990); Piccone (1983); Togliatti (1979).
8 See Adamson (1980) ; Finocchiaro (1988); Mansfield (1993); Paggi (1979)
9 See Boggs (1984); Buci-Glucksmann (1982, 1982); Fontana (1993); Mouffe (1981).
10 Piccone (1983), ch. 3, argues that Gramsci seriously underestimates the quality of the Italian 
bourgeoisie as exemplified in e.g. Agnelli and Olivetti. See Boggs (1984) for a different view.
11 See Gramsci (1971), pp. 378 - 472. For more on this see Buci-Glucksmann (1980); Golding 
(1992); Salamini (1981).
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An understanding of Gramsci's dialectical concepts and the way in which they relate 
to one another will lay the foundation for developing the argument about identity- 
formation and political commitment in the next section, while at the same time 
carrying out the task of refurbishing Marxism. As should be expected, all of these 
concepts refer to the necessary relations between entities considered to be 
independent when viewed from an analytical point of view. Here, as with Marx, the 
master concept is praxis, which has been discussed in earlier chapters. In addition, 
Gramsci offers new or refurbished concepts which will need a brief discussion. The 
first of these is the historical bloc.
The historical bloc. This concept is used in various ways, but always to alert us to the 
connectedness (or to the project of connecting or reconnecting) elements which are 
conventionally considered to be contradictory or mutually exclusive). These 
apparently contradictory elements include feeling and knowing, as will be seen later, 
although Gramsci himself uses the concept explicitly in two senses. Thus it is used 
both to refer to the fusion into a new organic unity - the unity of a new collective 
subject - of previously opposed social classes or strata and to the necessary unity of 
the ideal and the material.12 As Gramsci himself suggests, the conception of the 
historical bloc denotes the mutually constitutive relationship of ideology and 'material 
forces':
Material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this 
distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the 
material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the 
ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces 13
This statement is a claim about the inadequacy of the base-superstructure model and, 
relatedly, about the centrality of a programme of action, or ideology, for the 
constitution of the collective subject.14 Since ideology is the means whereby the 
fragments of the totality are knit together, a new worldview - in this case the 
philosophy of praxis - needs to develop an ideology capable of fulfilling this function. 
The concept which Gramsci introduces to capture the character of such an ideology is 
the concrete phantasy.
Concrete phantasy. This concept, while seeming to convey a logical and empirical 
contradiction, in fact relates to the concept of change as Aufhebung. That is to say, it 
draws our attention to the requirement that the end desired must exist as a potential
12 Laclau & Mouffe (1985), ch. 2.
13 Gramsci (1971), p. 377.
14 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) make this point, referring in the process to the historical bloc as a 'new 
totalizing category', p. 67. See also Adamson (1980), p. 179. See also Golding (1992), ch. 5.
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within a particular culture. Gramsci introduces this term in the context of his 
discussion of the political party and its requirement for a specific kind of ideology, 
whose character is conveyed by means of Sorel's notion of the myth.15 This is a
political ideology expressed neither in the form of a cold utopia nor as learned 
theorising, but rather by the creation of concrete phantasy which acts on a 
dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organise its collective will.16
If a transformative ideology fails to engage with the actual so as to identify accurately 
the potential for change, it will be 'arbitrary' rather than 'necessary'. Put another way, 
it will be, not a concrete phantasy, but phantasy pure and simple. We will see in the 
second section of this chapter that the actual or given enters the concrete phantasy in 
two forms: first, through scientific knowledge of the structurally given i.e of those 
aspects of the culture which evade commonsense knowledge; second, through 
interpretive knowledge of the humanly/psychically given as this is manifested in such 
commonsense knowledge.17 The latter becomes available by means of a specific kind 
of interaction between organic intellectuals and people which leads to the fusion of 
intellectual and popular thought and practice so as to render the project of 
transformation feasible. In this way, transformative praxis emerges organically (but 
not in the absence of dedicated human action) out of an existing state of affairs.
The organic. In general, the concept of the 'organic' signals necessary connectedness 
in senses to be explored further in what follows. Organic relations are mutually 
constitutive, necessary (but also necessarily historical) relations. Insofar as the term 
organic is used to refer to social relations it adds to necessity the realization of 
necessity which expresses itself in an affective-cognitive way. That is to say, the 
realization of necessary connectedness should result in a strong fe lt  sense of 
membership; of membership as active, engaged and morally imperative. This is the 
opposite of bureaucratic, mechanical relations and, as will be seen, bureaucratism and 
mechanicism are the enemies of the kind of democratic transformative action which 
Gramsci desires. In the sense intended by Gramsci, organic social relations are also 
hegemonic social relations.
15 See Golding (1992), pp. 114 - 117.
16 Gramsci (1971), p. 126.
17 This will be discussed in section two below.
151
Hegemony.18 Hegemony refers to a form of political activity which is dictated by the 
peculiarly fragmented character of capitalist cultures.19 To describe a form of rule as 
hegemonic is to suggest that it has gained the active consent of the ruled; that the 
values of the culture in question have been internalized - or become experienced at the 
individual subjective level in imperative moral-affective terms - in a manner to be 
explored further in chapter eight. What this means is that insofar as the existing 
bourgeois state is a hegemonic state, organic intellectuals espousing the philosophy of 
praxis will need to engage in an extended period of political and cultural education - the 
war of position - so as to build up mass political commitment prior to taking over the 
state apparatus which they need to complete their transformative tasks.20 From 
Gramsci's point of view, orthodox Marxists have failed to understand the necessity of 
this task and have therefore failed to arrive at the kind of knowledge necessary for 
effective transformative action. Their economism and rationalism have led them to 
neglect the necessary political and cultural dimensions of revolutionary praxis. 
These Marxists have failed to follow up the hints which we have found in Marx's 
political sociology about the importance of 'superstructural' phenomena; they have 
also forgotten Marx's warnings about the dangers of bureaucratism. It is in relation to 
these phenomena that Gramsci's preoccupation with the integral state can be 
understood.21 What is also quite clear, when Gramsci's work is reread in the light of 
that of post-Marxism and Althusser, is that the character of hegemony is better 
understood once psychoanalysis has been articulated to Marxism, since what 
hegemony requires is the cathexis of a new worldview by individuals who by means of 
an educative process (of a kind to be explored below) become active social subjects.
The integral state
In reconceptualizing the role of the state in industrial capitalist cultures Gramsci is 
reminding Marxists of an important political task, namely the constitution and 
reconstitution of subjectivities in fragmented and rapidly changing cultures. The 
theorization of this task requires that the coercive conception of the state be expanded 
as follows.22
18 See Adamson (1980); Buci-Glucksmann (1980, 1982); Femia (1987); Fontana (1993); Laclau & 
Mouffe (1985); Mouffe (1979); Williams (1960) for more on hegemony.
19 Buci-Glucksmann (1980) in a thorough discussion of this matter, argues for continuity between 
Lenin and Gramsci here. See Piccone (1976) for a counter argument, with which I agree.
20 See Gramsci (1971), pp. 125 - 136; Fontana (1993); Sassoon (1980).
21 Bellamy & Schecter (1993); Buci-Glucksmann (1980); Mouffe (1981).
22 In addition to Althusser's (1984a) contribution in this area, see Isaac (1987), ch. 5; Poulantzas 
(1978a, 1978b).
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The integral state is the ethical-political state concerned not merely with coercing 
the intransigent minority, but with educating the majority.23 The aim of the state, 
according to Gramsci
is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation of adapting the 
'civilisation' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities 
of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; 
hence of evolving even physically, new types of humanity.24
Without the integral state, there is no hegemony. A class (or class fraction) seeking 
hegemony will become a progressive class in the full sense only insofar as it gains 
possession of the complex apparatuses of the modem state (as well as of the forces of 
production) to provide a better way of life for most members of the culture.25 It is the 
modem state as hegemonic state which is the necessary instrument of fundamental and 
progressive social change.26 This kind of state cannot rely on coercion; it must create 
consent through the achievement of hegemony. This is the state as political society 
plus civil society, or, as Gramsci himself describes it, the state as 'hegemony protected 
by the armour of coercion'. In this sense, civil society as a multitude of 'so-called 
private initiatives and activities' constitutes the creative arm of the state.27 So the 
hegemonic state is 'the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only maintains its dominance but manages to win the consent of 
those over whom it rules'.28 It is this kind of state which is needed if progress of both 
a qualitative and quantitative kind is to be achieved. The ethical state is necessarily 
concerned with the cultural improvement of its people which cannot be left to chance 
and which should not be expected to emerge automatically from economic 
development.29 Gramsci's explicit preoccupation with culture marks a significant
23 See Bellamy & Schecter (1993).
24 Gramsci (1971) p. 242. This is an example of what Bellamy & Shechter (1993) refer to as 
Gramsci's 'productivism'.
25 'Better' here refers to qualitative (cultural) and quantitative improvements. See Gramsci (1971), p. 
357 for his conception of progress.
26 Gramsci's writings include both narrow and extended definitions of the state, the former indicating 
the governmental apparatus and emphasizing the coercive face of the state; the latter encompassing the 
broader functions of the state as creator and maintainer of civilisation or culture, o f a whole way of life 
for a given population. Much has been made of the contradictions and 'antinomies' in Gramsci's 
writings on the state and civil society and his conceptualizations of the relationship between them. 
See Anderson (1976-77). What becomes clear from the examples cited by Gramsci himself is that the 
relationship between the state and civil society is fluid and changing, rather than static; it varies from 
place to place and over time.
27 See Adamson (1988); Bobbio (1988); Boggs (1984); Cohen and Arato (1992);
28 Gramsci (1971), p. 244.
29 Ibid., p. 258.
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development in Marxist theory so it will be of interest here to explore his usage of this 
capacious term.30
Gramsci on culture and identity
While the concept of culture occupies a crucial place in Gramsci's account of 
subjectivity and transformation, it is not always clear whether he is using this term in 
the broad inclusive sense to refer to a total way of life or in the narrower sense whose 
referent is the meaningful or symbolic as a separable dimension of human social life. 
If we take philosophy to refer to a worldview,31 then, in this sense, the philosophy of 
praxis - i.e. an active philosophy oriented to world transformation - represents culture 
as total way of life. (This is ideology in Althusser's usage.) This is a materialist 
conception of philosophy in that it requires philosophers to engage actively with the 
historical process in an historically novel way, as will be seen in section two. 
However, Gramsci is also and necessarily concerned with the specialized production 
of culture as meaning and, therefore, of culture as the aesthetic-expressive-affective 
dimension of human life which, under conditions of capitalist fragmentation, becomes 
the object of specialized production in a dedicated cultural sphere.32 So both usages 
can be found, the point being to establish how the philosophy of praxis (culture in the 
broad sense) ensures the production of culture (in the narrow sense) which will have 
the desired progressive transformative effects.
In his concern with culture, Gramsci displays his conviction that forms of 
knowledge function as institutions i.e. they help to constitute human individuals as 
specific kinds of subjects. In this connection, the following should be noted:
We need to free ourselves from the habit of seeing culture as encyclopaedic 
knowledge, and men as mere receptacles to be stuffed full of empirical data and 
a mass of unconnected raw facts, which have to be filed in the brain as in the 
columns of a dictionary, enabling their owner to respond to the various stimuli 
from the outside world. This form of culture is really dangerous, particularly 
for the proletariat.
If culture is thus conceived and transformed into practice, what will emerge will be the 
passive proletarian subject. What Gramsci looks for is the following:
Culture is something quite different. It is organization, discipline of one's inner 
self, a coming to terms with one's own personality; it is the attainment of a
30 The contemporary widespread preoccupation with culture (however conceived) is discussed in 
relation to social movements and collective action in Johnston & Klandermans (1995); Melucci
(1996).
31 Gramsci (1971), pp. 323 - 377.
32 Gramsci (1985).
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higher awareness, with the aid of which one succeeds in understanding one's 
own historical value, one's own function in life, one's own rights and 
obligations. But none of this can come about through spontaneous evolution, 
through a series of actions and reactions which are independent of one's own 
will - as is the case in the animal and vegetable kingdoms where every unit is 
selected and specifies its own organs unconsciously, through a fatalistic natural 
law. Above all, man is mind, i.e. he is a product of history, not nature.33
Here we have an expression of the cultural requirements for the constitution of the 
active social subject who will be capable of voluntary, devoted and self-disciplined 
political commitment.
The politics of transformation is necessarily a politics of culture as well, in the 
two senses discussed above. Because of the differentiation of spheres, culture in the 
narrow sense can be seen as an optional extra or as the mere epiphenomenon of more 
fundamental processes and activities. However, culture is in no sense merely an 
ornamental element, or an additional wing added to an already functional building. On 
the contrary, culture is part of the foundations of a sound and enduring structure, 
since it is a constitutive element of group and individual identity and therefore of the 
kinds of relationships and practices which dictate the very nature of the social. 
Progressive transformation is the work of culture, as well as of economics and politics. 
The concrete phantasy becomes concrete through the constitution of a new active 
progressive culture which comes to emerge out of the fusion of existing 'high' 
(philosophical) and 'low' (commonsensical) cultures.34 I now turn to discuss the 
process by means of which such a fusion takes place. This discussion will enable me 
to elaborate further on Marx's concept of'active union'.
n
The formation of the transformative communal actor
It has been noted in chapter six that Marx expects the proletarian revolutionary actor 
to emerge out of institutional changes brought about by capitalism itself. Radical 
intellectuals will have the function of rendering more coherent and systematic 
emergent proletarian theoretical knowledge of the object to be transformed. In 
Gramsci's work, as noted earlier, the emphasis is different, particularly in the work
33 Gramsci (1977), pp. 10-11.
34 Note Althusser's failure to understand this part of Gramsci's theory and therefore his failure to 
appreciate the significance of Gramsci's conception of the philosophy/science relationship. See 
Althusser and Balibar (1970), p. 134 - 5. See Buci-Glucksmann (1980), ch. 1 on Althusser on 
Gramsci.
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produced in prison.35 However, the idea of emergence remains important, in terms 
both of the 'objective' and 'subjective' dimensions of change. That is to say, the 
desired transformation must exist as a potential. It is the task of intellectuals to draw 
attention to this and to indicate how the potential can be actualized. We have seen 
how Marx undertakes this task in the CM by describing the actual in terms of its 
openness to transformation and by suggesting to the proletariat good reasons for the 
necessary transformation. We will now see how Gramsci theorizes this task.
A revitalized Marxism will constitute the intellectual and institutional framework 
within which redescriptions and reemphases can be formulated:
[NJecessity exists when there exists an efficient and active prem iss  
consciousness of which in people's minds has become operative, proposing 
concrete goals to the collective consciousness and constituting a complex of 
convictions and beliefs which acts powerfully in the form of "popular beliefs". 
In the premiss must be contained, already developed or in the process of 
development, the necessary and sufficient material conditions for the 
realisation of the impulse of collective will; but it is also clear that one cannot 
separate from this "material" premiss, which can be quantified, a certain level 
of culture, by which we mean a complex of intellectual acts, and, as a product 
and consequence of these, a certain complex of overriding passions and 
feelings, overriding in the sense that they have the power to lead men on to 
action "at any price".36
The moment at which such consciousness is achieved is referred to by Gramsci as the 
'cathartic moment', which is the moment at which strongly felt political commitment 
to the collective goal becomes established.37 This is the moment at which cultural 
membership will have been internalized; at which the values of the proposed cultural 
transformation will have been cathected by individuals. It is the founding moment of 
a new kind of active social subjectivity. In short it is the moment at which the 
transformative communal actor is formed; at which force and meaning are fused so that 
'ideas become material forces'.38
In order to understand how this important stage has been reached, it is necessary 
to understand how intellectuals gain access to 'popular consciousness'. 'Popular 
consciousness' refers to modes of knowing (and of acting) of the uneducated, or 
relatively uneducated, therefore, in this instance, of a factory proletariat coming to be 
shaped by industrial capitalist institutions and a peasantry whose knowledge of the 
world does not extend beyond its own locality.39 It is the task of organic
35 See Boggs (1984); Germino (1990) who stresses the continuity between 'early' and 'late' Gramsci.
36 Gramsci (1971), pp. 412 - 3.
37 Ibid., p. 366.
38 1 shall be arguing in chapter eight that Freud's psychoanalysis offers us a means of grasping the 
mechanisms whereby this process is completed.
39 See Gramsci (1978), pp. 441 - 507.
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intellectuals to constitute a historical bloc out of these classes i.e. to constitute a new 
collective identity through the transcendence rather than elimination of pre-existing 
characteristics and interests.40
Gramsci's argument centres on the necessary dialectical relationship between 
being and knowledge. What we know - the knowledge we produce - is intimately 
related to the kind of world we inhabit, to the kind of beings we are and to the way in 
which we reproduce or transform that world (ourselves included). The constitution 
of the concrete phantasy involves a process of knowledge renovation which is 
simultaneously a process of subjectivity-reformation, for both 'educators' and 
'educated', as will be seen. This process is an extended one involving relations of a 
specific character between organic intellectuals and people.
Gramsci's awareness of the need for cultural, psychic change leads him beyond 
the 'rational' to a stress on the centrality of directly experienced, felt social relations 
between intellectuals and people. The formation of a new collective actor involves the 
modification of ways of feeling as well as of knowing. The intellectual will not 
achieve this state of affairs
without feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and 
therefore explaining and justifying them in a particular historical situation and 
connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior 
conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated 41
Popular feeling and intellectual knowledge will be fused through the 'passage from 
knowing to understanding and to feeling' on the part of intellectuals and 'vice versa 
from feeling to understanding and to knowing' on the part of the people. In fact, there 
is a process of mutual education in feeling and knowing here ('the educator must be 
educated') and it is this mutuality which leads to the creation of a particular kind of 
social bond between intellectuals and people which results in the formation of a true 
national-popular, therefore integral state. It is in this way that the cognitive and 
social debility effected by capitalism can be transcended.
Gramsci and the role o f organic intellectuals
Gramsci's reflections on political commitment are strongly influenced by Machiavelli's 
writings, which he interprets as an account of visionary politics centred on the 
constitution of a 'national popular' or popular republican nation, that is, of a
40 The discussion that follows does not replace, but rather expands on, that undertaken in chapter three 
above.
41 Gramsci (1971), p. 418.
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population of active, confident, educated and public-spirited citizens.42 So Gramsci's 
Marxism is a Marxism in which Marx's implicit republicanism is brought to the fore 
but which is, in addition, inflected by a kind of nationalism which brings back into 
politics the affective dimension of which it has been drained, apparently, through the 
division of labour. In effect, Gramsci reads Machiavelli through Marxian lenses and 
Marx through Machiavellian lenses. The concept of organic intellectual serves as a 
kind of conceptual bridge between the two. In effect, it is the means of showing how 
the politics of virtue and passion which is implicit in Marx's account of revolutionary 
action can be both theorized and pursued by Marxist intellectuals 43
An active culture will be brought about by intellectuals of a specific kind using a 
variety of means (to be discussed further below) to fuse knowledge, emotion and 
morality. The necessary process of production will require the combined efforts of 
intellectuals as philosophers, scientists and artists who are united as Machiavellian 
(that is creative) politicians to mobilize a population behind a politics of 
transformation.44 These will be new kinds of intellectuals, being neither philosophers 
in the idealist sense nor narrow technicians. Rather, they must combine philosophy 
and practice through the development of an awareness of both the theory underlying 
every practice and of the importance of human activity in the making of history.45
Organic intellectuals, organized in the Party as 'new Prince', set out neither to 
distance themselves from the people as had nineteenth century Italian intellectuals,46 
nor to establish hierarchical technocratic/bureaucratic relations with a population 
viewed as an object to be controlled. Rather, their goal must be to establish social 
relations which will constitute a socio-cultural-political movement oriented to the 
institution of a new collective subject i.e. the united and educated people as citizenry, 
therefore as active collective subject. Put another way, organic intellectuals in this 
sense are embarking on a process whose successful conclusion will herald their own 
redundancy. The logical terminus is that: 'only the social group that poses the end of 
the State and its own end as the target to be achieved can create an ethical State - i.e. 
one which tends to put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create 
a technically and morally unitary social organism'.47
42 Ibid., pp. 125 - 205; Boggs (1984), ch. 6; Fontana (1993), esp. ch. 7.
43 Gramsci sees Machiavelli as the prototype of the organic intellectual who seeks to teach 'those who 
do not know' the means whereby they can found a new state. See Gramsci (1971), p. 126.
44 Gramsci (1971), p. 325.
45 Ibid., p. 10.
46 Gramsci (1985), pp. 256 - 7.
47 Gramsci (1971), p. 259.
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Collective action and the power/knowledge nexus
The production of new knowledge oriented to the transformation of social relations is 
constrained but not determined by existing social arrangements, including existing 
forms of knowledge.48 It is the task of organic intellectuals, guided by philosophy, to 
break through these constraints and renovate these existing forms of knowledge, most 
importantly commonsense and science, so as to render them congruent with the 
requirements of progressive transformation. At the same time, philosophy itself will 
not remain unchanged and therefore neither will the philosophers.
The concrete phantasy will be composed of three knowledge components. Two 
of these components - philosophy and science - are produced by the educated. The 
third - commonsense - comes from the people. It is only if these different kinds of 
knowledges are fused into a historical bloc - i.e. if each is modified by its relation to 
the others so that a new coherent unity emerges - that the concrete phantasy will 
come into being. In fact the constitution of the concrete phantasy is an institutional 
process involving the constitution and reconstitution of social relations between 
organic intellectuals and people.
I shall now discuss each of the constituent knowledges.
Philosophy49
The philosophy of an epoch is 'the ensemble of all individual philosophies and 
philosophical tendencies, plus scientific opinions, religion and commonsense'.50 
Philosophy in this extended sense can be equated with a hegemonic ideology and what 
is contained implicitly in this apparently catch-all definition is Gramsci's theory of 
how a new concrete phantasy can be developed and institutionalized.
As noted earlier, philosophy is here used in the sense of worldview or potential 
culture. The philosophy of praxis constitutes a worldview of a material kind in that, 
unlike earlier speculative philosophies, its goal is to translate this worldview into 
praxis outside the dedicated philosophical sphere.51 Philosophy in this sense works 
on real historical problems, not on preexisting philosophical thought, although clearly, 
the way in which these problems are conceived is informed and constrained by 
existing philosophies, hence Gramsci's polemics with, among others, Croce and 
Gentile.52 However, the point of the polemics is not to build a more beautiful 
philosophical system but to prepare oneself to engage more effectively with real
48 Gramsci (1995), pp. 138 - 159.
49 Gramsci (1971), pp. 323 - 377.
50 Ibid., p. 455. See Bellamy & Schecter (1993) ch. 4 esp. pp. 90 - 9.; Boggs (1984), ch. 4.
51 Gramsci (1971), p. 435.
52 Bellamy & Schecter (1993); Finocchiaro (1988); Germino (1990); Piccone (1973).
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historical problems.53 It is this historical-practical approach which will enable 
philosophers to gain the knowledge needed to carry out transformative, rather than 
merely interpretive, tasks, in particular the task of mass cultural transformation. It is 
to this important question that I now turn.
Transformative politics as cultural revolution
Gramsci develops his ideas on the importance of culture in relation to his criticisms of 
both orthodox or scientistic Marxism and Italian liberal intellectuals, whose neglect of 
this question he considers to have been politically disastrous.54 Explicit and 
systematic cultural development is, in effect, a kind of education of the emotions 
which is a constitutive and ongoing element of emancipatory transformation requiring 
that intellectuals gain access to the 'passions and feelings' of the population.55 This 
access can only be gained, and the task of renovating commonsense knowledge carried 
out, through knowledge of an interpretive rather than scientific kind. As Jay points 
out, Gramsci is in a line of thinkers going back to Vico who focus on the 
impoverishing effects of scientism on the 'sensus communis'.56 These impoverishing 
effects are related to the idea of a universality based on abstract rather than concrete 
reason. The latter is reason embedded in social relations and practices. Organic 
intellectuals will be alert to this distinction and will seek to draw local concrete reason 
(commonsense) into a broader concrete reason by initiating a dialogue between 
themselves and the population in question. This is a dialogue guided by the 
imaginative reconstruction of that commonsense as derived (in part at least57) from the 
study of the cultural artefacts of everyday life. Through the interpretation of these 
artefacts, intellectuals can begin to take the pulse of the people, as it were.
Organic intellectuals communicate with the people through a variety of media and 
mechanisms, through education in the sense of schooling, through directly political 
mobilization in workplaces, but also in a broader sense e.g. through the creation of a 
literature that is at once national and popular.58 In Gramsci's view, it is because 
Italian intellectuals have failed to carry out their educational-cultural tasks of popular 
integration that the Italian state is a legal fiction rather than a cultural reality.59 For 
example, and in contrast to that of France, Italian national literature has not been 
popular and Italian popular literature has not been national. The former has been the
53 Gramsci (1971), p. 324.
54 Ibid., pp. 419 - 72; Bellamy & Schecter (1993), pp 85 - 90; Femia (1981); Morera (1990).
55 See Cirese (1982) on Gramsci on popular culture.
56 For comments on the hermeneutic or interpretive aspects of Gramsci's work, see Jay (1984), ch. 4; 
Salamini (1981).
57 Mansfield (1984) is useful here.
58 Entwistle (1979).
59 Gramsci (1985), pp. 196 - 286. See Forgacs (1990) for a discussion of modem Italian culture.
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product of a 'caste tradition' and is characterized by 'bookish images' and feelings; the 
latter consists of translations of popular novels written in other European languages. 
Italian writers have not assumed a 'national educative' function; 'they have not and do 
not set themselves the problem of elaborating popular feelings after having relived 
them and made them their own'.60 An educational-interpretive process of interaction 
between intellectuals and people is essential if transformative communal action is to 
become possible. I shall now consider this more closely as the renovation of 
commonsense.
The Renovation o f Commonsense61
If philosophy is to become a concrete phantasy it must be grounded in existing 
commonsense. The task then becomes one of renovating that commonsense; of 
cleansing it of those aspects which will prevent the emergence of the new culture i.e. 
the emergence of active social subjectivity. Expressed in psychoanalytic terms, this 
is the route to cathexis of the new culture i.e. to the internalization of the culture's 
values by the relevant individuals.
Existing reality as it is expressed in commonsense is open to renovation because it 
already contains elements which are critical of the existing state of affairs. More than 
this, though, it contains elements - lacking in philosophy and science - whose 
incorporation are vital for the constitution of the concrete phantasy. The critical 
elements are captured by the term 'contradictory consciousness'. The other salient 
characteristics of commonsense are its fe lt  and local nature. Since the latter 
characteristic is no longer significant in relation to contemporary liberal capitalist 
cultures, I shall discuss only the first two characteristics here.
Contradictory consciousness62. Popular consciousness - i.e. the consciousness of the 
uneducated - consists in contradictory elements in the following way. First, it 
contains radical critical, implicit elements derived from directly experienced social 
relations, or everyday activities; second, it contains explicit or verbal elements which 
have been passively accepted or inherited from the past. This imposed or inherited 
consciousness prevents subordinate strata from developing their implicit 
consciousness into an active awareness of things as they actually are and of how they 
might be improved. While Gramsci takes human nature to be 'a historical fact', that is, 
historically variable,63 he also assumes an innate human potential for reflection and
60 Ibid., pp. 206 - 7. Emphasis mine.
61 Gramsci (1971), pp. 323 - 343; 418 - 425.
62 Ibid., p. 324.
65 Ibid., pp. 351 - 357.
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creativity. This is the meaning of his claim that everyone is an intellectual.64 It is this 
innate human capacity for critical reflection which the organic intellectual must work 
on, must bring to life as it were, so as to induce the dissolution of the taken-for- 
grantedness of the given. Implicit critical consciousness is 'displayed in effective 
action', that is to say that on occasions when the grip of the hegemonic class weakens, 
for whatever reason, it is possible to witness the contradiction in action testifying to 
the existence of an implicit critical account of the world, the contradiction of verbal 
affirmations of the official account.65 Implicit radical consciousness is the point of 
entry for a dialogue between organic intellectuals and people; a dialogue which 
therefore makes sense to the groups appealed to in terms of their daily experience. It 
must work on feelings of unease and unarticulated discontents so as to transform them 
into 'good sense'. Through the fusion of this 'good sense' and the world view of the 
intellectuals, a single and coherent conception of the world will be developed, a 
conception grounded in the sociological and psychological realities of popular 
everyday life.66 This is the passage from a consciousness which takes reality for 
granted to a critical self-consciousness which questions that reality; it is the passage 
from passive to active social subjectivity.
Commonsense is felt. We can translate this characteristic into psychoanalytic terms 
by saying that commonsense is cathected i.e. it is invested with libidinal energy. This 
is what makes it so vital to the constitution of a new kind of political commitment. 
Commonsense knowledge ignores (is unaware of) the divorce of knowing and feeling 
allegedly required for the acquisition of scientific knowledge and of philosophy.67 
Commonsense is knowledge based on, indeed embedded in, group membership; it is 
the means whereby the moral demands placed upon people by their necessary 
membership of a group are expressed. The taken-for-grantedness which is an 
important characteristic of commonsense is derived from its embeddedness in group 
membership. Commonsense is sense that is shared; it is 'our' sense and, as Gramsci 
puts it, it is founded on 'faith'. It therefore has an imperative character with respect to 
norms of behaviour. In commonsense, cognition and affect are inextricably related. 
Commonsense conceptions of the world have a solidity which grounds individuals in a 
specific social environment and shapes and controls their behaviour in that 
environment.
As is made clear in his discussion of education, Gramsci seeks to endow 
philosophy with the solidity which is one of the defining characteristics of
66 Ibid., p. 9.
67 Ibid., p. 326.
68 Ibid., pp. 330 - 1.
69 This was always a questionable claim which is now being undermined by science itself. See 
Damasio (1994).
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commonsense. In making this point, he uses Vico's distinction between 'certum' and 
'verum'.68 By articulating certain elements of commonsense knowledge to 
philosophy, the narrow local disabling nature of commonsense will be transcended 
while philosophy will lose its abstract universal nature; it will be embedded in a 
community and acquire the solidity and imperative nature of commonsense.69
The renovation of commonsense is the basis on which the conjoining of'impulse 
and will'70 proceeds so as to constitute the transformative communal actor. 
Commonsense is transformed into 'good sense' through its fusion with philosophy and 
philosophy becomes concrete or practical through the absorption of certain 
characteristics of commonsense. Put another way, the process of constituting the 
concrete phantasy serves also to reintegrate elements of a world fragmented by the 
division of labour and the differentiation of spheres. In this case, the division of 
mental and manual labour has led to the fragmentation of thought and feeling, so that 
the thinking faculty of intellectuals has been overdeveloped at the expense of the 
feeling faculty, as intellectuals have been required to 'privatize' the emotional element 
of their being in order to carry out their functions. The people, on the other hand, 
have suffered the underdevelopment of their rationality but have not experienced the 
fragmentation of rationality and affect undergone by intellectuals. In short, the 
purpose of this process of knowledge reconstitution is to transcend the division of 
labour between mental and manual and the fragmentation of knowledge and affect.
It is through the process of interpretation that the organic intellectual gains the 
kind of knowledge required to fuse progressive elements of commonsense with 
philosophy and science so as to produce an ensemble of practical norms of conduct 
capable of generating a new historical reality for a given people. What will render 
these new norms imperative is that they are the outcome of a dialogue between 
intellectual and people oriented to extracting from commonsense those critical and 
progressive elements which it is likely to contain, while at the same time retaining (by 
virtue of the nature of the relationship between intellectuals and people) that 
imperative felt moral character referred to above. It is to this situation that Gramsci's 
concept of the national-popular refers.71 The national-popular state is a hegemonic 
state which has succeeded in constituting active-democratic popular political 
commitment to collective goals. We may say that it is the form which 'active union' 
takes under specific historical conditions. For Gramsci, certainly, the national-
70 Gramsci (1971), p. 35. Gramsci's attitude to commonsense is more astringent and judgemental 
than is that of Vico. For more on the latter, see Berlin (1969), also Shotter (1981).
71 It is necessary to agree here with Bellamy and Schecter (1993 p. 110) that this approach entails the 
strong risk of degenerating into a more efficient method of social engineering.
72 Gramsci (1971), p. 360.
73 See Nimni (1991) for more on Marxism and nationalism.
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popular is the most progressive form of state at a specific stage of capitalist 
development i.e. that of the transition from liberal to organized capitalism.
However, if the national-popular as a historically and culturally specific form of 
collective political commitment is to be realized, intellectuals will need to have at their 
disposal also more impersonal or 'structural' kinds of knowledge - knowledge which 
Gramsci designates as science. Commitment to achieving the goals set by philosophy 
must be informed, not only by an openness to and understanding of popular 
conceptions and concerns but also by knowledge of the 'necessary and sufficient 
material conditions' for transformation. It is scientific knowledge which provides this 
knowledge. What follows is a very brief discussion of science which will stress the 
dangers of scientism in constituting the transformative communal actor.
Science and transformation72
It should be noted here that Gramsci's account of science is rather simplistic. 
However, it is of interest because it does pinpoint the subject effects of specific kinds 
of knowledge in a way that advances the argument of this thesis. For Gramsci, 
science is the handmaiden of philosophy in the sense that it produces the technical 
knowledge required for instituting the world view proposed by philosophy. Science 
ensures that philosophy remains within the bounds of the possible and that it attains 
its goals in the most efficient way possible.73 It is not the case, for Gramsci, that 
scientists acting as objective observers of an independently-existing reality gradually 
amass a body of increasingly accurate and comprehensive knowledge of that reality. 
The questions that are asked, the problems that are taken to be worth investigating, 
are given neither by 'objective reality' nor by disinterested intellectual curiosity, but 
by the social context. Philosophy produces the questions to which science will seek 
to provide accurate answers.74 What this means is that the content of science is 
constrained but not determined by philosophy and politics. Correct scientific 
knowledge of those elements of the culture and of the natural world which are 
susceptible to being known scientifically (that is, in terms of 'laws' and regularities) is 
possible, and indeed is necessary, for successful transformation. However, the 
necessity and universality of scientific knowledge is dependent on the historical 
affirmation of a group which endows scientific knowledge with its objectivity. For 
Gramsci, objective always means 'humanly objective'. Nature and reality are always
74 Gramsci's chief merits do not lie in his account of science as knowledge but rather in pointing out 
the dangers of scientism. See Golding (1990), ch. 3. See also Morera (1990) for a realist 
interpretation (with which I concur) of Gramsci's historicist account of science. See Callinicos (1983) 
and Hoffman (1984) for a different view.
75 Quoted in Salamini (1981), p. 169.
76 Gramsci (1971), p. 368.
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nature and reality for us, as we have encountered and reconstructed them. 
Objectivity as a universal state or condition may be achieved through political action 
oriented to the cultural unification of humanity.75 Objectivity then is 
culturally/politically constituted but it is constituted on the basis of accurate 
knowledge of the real properties of its constitutive raw materials. Phantasies only 
become actualities if they are constituted on this basis, as we have seen above.
What Gramsci is concerned with is 'human activity (history-spirit) in the 
concrete, indissolubly connected with a certained organised (historicised) "matter" and 
with the transformed nature of man'.76 It is not an idealism which is being asserted 
(for as has been seen, Gramsci sees material/ideal as false dichotomies) but the 
unavoidable historicity of knowledge as well as the present limits of human 
understanding and the potential for transcending those limits. This potential will 
only be realized if we become more aware of the historical nature of our knowledge 
and of the human potential to imagine the new.
From this point of view scientistic social science is a cultural, political danger 
whose character Gramsci is determined to expose. In effect, scientistic social science 
has the effect of institutionalizing passivity by stressing the evolutionary and law- 
driven character of human social life and by forgetting the historically and politically 
constituted nature of these phenomena; it emphasizes the 'passive' rather than 'active' 
components of culture.77 It therefore has the effect of naturalizing the historical- 
cultural in a manner similar to that of the classical political economists, as pinpointed 
by Marx.78 The knowledge produced by this kind of science is not just wrong; it has 
the most deleterious political-cultural consequences, producing, as it does, the most 
passive kind of conformism thereby subverting (albeit unwittingly) the whole Marxian 
project.79 There is an affinity between knowledge thus conceived and bureaucratic 
forms of administration. They are both informed by the same philosophy or 
worldview and they both constitute fetishized social relations - therefore passively 
conformist subjects. I now turn to the final section of this chapter, where Gramsci's 
thoughts on the dangers of bureaucratism will be explored further. This exploration 
will enable us to understand more clearly the importance of 'active union' to the 
constitution of a democratic communal transformative actor.
77 Regarding the existence of an extra-historical and extra-human objectivity, to have access to that 
reality would require a super-human perspective or 'a standpoint of the cosmos itself. See Gramsci 
(1971), p. 372.
78 Ibid., p. 372. His example of the imposition of the concepts of North and South, East and West, 
on the natural world and the resulting expansion, increased complexity and capacity for organising that 
complexity makes clear what he means by this statement.
79 See Timpanaro (1980) for more on these terms. Timpanaro is a dedicated opponent of Gramsci's 
'voluntarism'.
80 See Gramsci (1971), pp. 399 - 402; 425 - 488.
81 Gramsci is particularly critical of the scientistic turn in Marxism, as he identifies this in the work of 
Bukharin, which reduces the philosophy of praxis to a 'sociology'. Gramsci (1971), p. 426.
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mOrganization and transformative communal action: the Gramscian solution
In this final section I provide a more detailed discussion and evaluation of Gramsci's 
organizational prescriptions for the initiation of the concrete phantasy. This will 
enable me to consider further the way in which 'active union' as required by Marx, can 
be brought about, that is, a union composed of social subjects who actively, 
knowledgeably and voluntarily engage in the collective action. As will be seen, 
Gramsci has much to tell us about the kind of organization needed to secure this state 
of affairs. Although he does not provide a theory of institutions, it is clear from 
remarks and insights scattered throughout his work that Gramsci understands the way 
in which institutions shape individuals.80 So he evaluates them in terms of their 
potential to constitute a new kind of active, critical conformity.81 His evaluation of 
the dangers of bureaucracy can be considered from this point of view.
From his earliest writings, his concern to eradicate bureaucratism from workers' 
organizations is clearly visible. Organization matters but the problem of organization 
is subordinate to that of instituting hegemonic relations in the sense discussed above 
and solutions to the problem must be such as to allow such relations to flourish.82 In 
other words, the organizational means must be such as to produce the active social 
subject needed if collective subjectivity (will-formation) of a voluntary, enthusiastic, 
self-disciplined and knowledgeable kind is to emerge. We have seen in section two 
that the constitution of subjectivity of the desired kind is secured through an extended 
and democratic process of cultural transformation. A discussion of the 
organizational prerequisites for this task should clarify matters further. As will be 
seen, Gramsci assesses organization in terms of its compatibility with the elimination 
of the kinds of cognitive and social debility with which we are concerned here. It 
must be such as to allow of the recovery of humanity's innate sociality while at the 
same time revealing the real character of capitalist fragmentations. So organizations 
must put in place emancipatory - i.e. non-bureaucratic and non-technocratic - social 
relations which will enable individual members of the organization to gain knowledge 
of the totality as a totality of many determinations. They must set up an educational 
process which will transform 'society', 'politics' and 'economics' into a total domain of
82 Although this insight seems to desert him when it comes to evaluating the institutional effects of 
Fordism. See Piccone (1983) on Gramsci's failure to comprehend the institutional effects of 
technology.
83 See particularly the comments in Gramsci (1995), pp. 269 - 277.
84 Piccone (1983), ch. 4.
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transparent human activity. Through organization of a certain kind the theoretical 
knowledge needed to inform effective transformative action will become the property 
of all individual members of the group. In short, organizations must be such as to 
advance the cognitive and emotional education required for emancipatory 
transformation. It is in this light that we can understand Gramsci's contrasting and 
changing evaluations of trades unions and factory councils.83 Insofar as these will 
effect the transcendence of 'economic corporative'84 motivations for collective action, 
then they are to be welcomed. His final verdict on trades unions and factory councils 
is that such transcendence cannot be expected from intra-capitalist institutions and 
that a radically new kind of organization, more directly political and more 
systematically and nationally organized - i.e. the political party - must be put in place 
by organic intellectuals. Before discussing this organization, it will be useful to 
explore briefly Gramsci's (later abandoned) positive evaluation of the factory council, 
since this encompasses a more detailed analysis of the processes necessary for the 
constitution of a new kind of individualized and educated sociality than we have 
found in Marx's work. The logic of Gramsci's argument here is that knowledge of 
real human connectedness will emerge out of directly experienced social relations in 
the factory. The argument is therefore quite Marxian in its form.
Factory councils85
The recovery of a sense of sociality depends on the realization of necessary social 
connectedness and interdependence. The early Gramsci hoped that such a recovery 
would be effected through the factory councils. Unlike the trades unions which enable 
the 'bad' (individualistic, competitive and narrow-minded) side of factory life to 
flourish, the factory councils have the following effects:
The Council is the most effective organ for mutual education and for 
developing the new social spirit that the proletriat has successfully engendered 
from the rich and living experience of the community of labour ... It is a joyous 
awareness of being an organic whole, a homogeneous and compact system 
which, through useful work and the disinterested production of social wealth 
asserts its sovereignty, and realizes its power and its freedom to create 
history.86
85 See Gramsci (1977), especially sections II and V. See Bellamy & Schecter (1993) ch. 2; Germino 
(1990), ch. 6; Schecter (1991), ch. 4.
86 Gramsci (1971), p. 16.
87 See Bellamy & Schecter (1993); Buci-Glucksmann (1980); Postone (1983); Sassoon (1987); 
Schecter (1991).
88 Gramsci (1977), pp. 100 - 101. Gramsci was not to maintain this lyrical conception of factory 
councils. See Schecter (1991) for a detailed account of Gramsci's changing evaluations of the factory 
councils.
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Here we find expressed the hope that factory councils will provide both cognitive and 
affective means of instituting the social subject. They will effect the transcendence of 
the debilitating dichotomy discussed in chapter five. They will do this by inculcating 
in the individual worker a consciousness of himself as producer rather than wage 
earner, as part of a collective producer oriented to the production of real objects rather 
than profits. The producer is one who 'has acquired an awareness of his role in the 
process of production, at all its levels, from the workshop to the nation and the 
world'. Contrary to what we might think, the 'producer mentality' is the 'mentality of 
a creator of history'.87 So the term producer is here drained of its economism and 
takes on instead active, future-oriented, transformative-cultural associations. Factory 
councils will constitute producers rather than capitalist workers because they 
constitute a kind of active orientation which is expressed through the delegative rather 
than representative character of of its organization. Moreover, this is an active 
orientation towards the whole productive process.88 Through participation in factory 
councils, workers will become aware of the complexity and connectedness of the 
fragments of capitalist culture. They will become capable of questioning taken-for- 
granted fragmentations of the world into 'economic' and 'political', into 'private' and 
'public'. Factory councils will engender in individual workers the awareness that 
objectivity is, to a significant degree, the product of their combined subjectivity. In 
doing so, they will render transparent the necessary connectedness of apparently 
isolated fragments of the capitalist world and work to reconstitute the felt social bond 
even beyond the individual factory.
Furthermore, factory councils emerge out of the capitalist labour process; they are 
the workers' own organizations and therefore the immediate expression of their 
commonsense insofar as this is 'good sense'. They are institutions which are rooted in 
and grow out of the everydayness of workers' experience, not rationalist abstractions 
which are imposed on workers by radical elites.89 The councils, then, meet Marx's 
stringent requirements for democratic transformative politics. In fact, they appear to 
be the emergent solution to the fatal split between citizen and subject first discussed 
by Marx in 'On the Jewish Question'.90 However, while they may transcend 
fragmentation within the factory, they leave us with the problem of articulation at the 
broader level beyond the factory. In any case, there is a more fundamental objection 
to the councils in that, emerging as they do out of that most capitalist of institutions -
89 Gramsci (1977), p. 101.
90 Ibid., pp. 316-7 .
91 Here the Marxian tone of Gramsci's comment on the bureaucratic, undemocratic character of German 
Social-Democracy should be noted. See Gramsci (1977), p. 143.
92 Marx (1994). Schecter (1991, p. 183) comments on this aspect of council communism. From this 
point of view, factory councils would be the means of transcending the economy/politics fragmentation. 
He nevertheless sees Gramsci's enthusiasm for the councils as an expression o f 'economism'. See 
Germino (1990) for a different view.
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the factory - they cannot carry out either the cognitive or social tasks required. Hence 
the need for a more explicitly political and national social movement.
From council to party91
The party is needed to ensure the emergence of new kinds of social relations and 
subjectivities conducive to radically democratic transformative politics. So Gramsci 
notes:
The Communist Party is the instrument and historical form of the process of 
inner liberation through which the worker is transformed from executor to 
initiator, from mass to leader and guide, from brawn to brain and purpose.92
The element of 'spontaneity' is not sufficient for revolutionary struggle; it 
never leads the working class beyond the limits of the existing bourgeois 
democracy. The element of consciousness is needed, the 'ideological' element: 
in other words, an understanding of the conditions of the struggle, the social 
relations in which the worker lives, the fundamental tendencies at work in the 
system of those relations, and the process of development which society 
undergoes as a result of the existence within it of insoluble antagonisms, etc.93
The party will be the means of constituting a new nodal point out of fragmented 
capitalist cultures. That is to say, it will ensure the emergence of mutually reinforcing 
institutions governed by the principle of praxis. The party will effect the collective 
realization of necessary social connectedness and interdependence. At the same time, 
the new party will be a mass party, not a vanguard party of professional 
revolutionaries, although it will need a strong leadership or General Staff. However, 
this leadership will be composed of organic intellectuals, whose character has been 
explored in section two above.94 In effect (and this is one of the significant ways in 
which the Gramscian party differs from the Leninist party) the party is articulated to 
a social movement with which it is in continuous and radically democratic 
communication.95 This processual and democratic connectedness between social 
movement and party minimizes the danger that the latter will come to constitute an 
institution 'for itself over against the movement's interest. We have seen in section 
two how Gramsci hopes to avoid the institutionalization of hierarchy, bureaucratism
93 See Bellamy & Schecter (1993); Davidson (1974); Schecter (1991).
94 Gramsci (1977), p. 333.
95 Gramsci (1978), p. 288
96 Germino (1990) wants to argue for continuity between councils and party. See his extended and 
partisan discussion (ch. vii) of Gramsci's January 1924 letter in which he (Gramsci) criticizes Bordiga's 
sectarianism and rationalism and outlines a new strategy for a party of organic intellectuals.
97 See Melucci (1996), ch. 15.
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or paternalism. A few concluding remarks will be sufficient here in relation to this 
problem.
The political party as New Prince
Gramsci's conception of the political party is derived not only from Bolshevism, but 
also from the work of Machiavelli, whose influence on Gramsci was noted earlier. It 
is in the centrality (derived from Machiavelli's The Prince) of the character of 
membership - namely personal, felt, intensely loyal - and on the related cultural 
transformative work discussed in section two above that the Gramscian party is to be 
distinguished from that of Lenin.96 While Bolshevism is a powerful influence in the 
formulation of Gramsci's ideas about the party, his Machiavellian turn serves to give 
these ideas a nationalist republican and therefore very unLeninist flavour.97 For this 
reason, he is able to offer prescriptions for the neutralization of bureaucratism which 
were not available to Lenin (who was also, it should be noted, apprehensive in relation 
to this matter98). It is these prescriptions that I want to discuss briefly here because 
they reveal Gramsci's hope that the immediacy, democracy and organicism which he 
held to be the great strength of the factory councils could be transferred to the party.
In pursuit of this aim, he makes a strong distinction between bureaucratic and 
democratic centralism which we can understand as a distinction between mechanical 
and organic relationships or between inflexible and flexible organizational forms.99 
The former requires unthinking and immediate 'passive and servile' obedience to orders 
rather than the 'conscious and lucid assimilation of the directive to be fulfilled' which 
Gramsci sees as desirable.100 The significance of an intermediate stratum of party 
members between the General Staff and the masses is that it will prevent the kind of 
isolation of the leadership which might result in its bureaucratic degeneration.
Nowhere is Gramsci's concern with the institutional/relational (as opposed to 
organizational) aspects of organs of political mobilization expressed more clearly than 
in the following:
The error of the party has been to have accorded priority in an abstract fashion 
to the problem of party organization, which in practice has simply meant 
creating an apparatus of functionaries who could be depended on for their 
orthodoxy towards the official view. It was believed, and it is still believed,
98 Gramsci (1971), p. 125
99 see Sassoon (1987); Golding (1992).
100 Lenin (1949); See Colletti (1976); Lewin (1969).
101 Gramsci (1971), p. 21; Finocchiaro (1988), pp. 162 - 3.; Sassoon (1987), Pt. III.
102 quoted in Sassoon (1987), p. 215
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that the revolution depends only on the existence of such an apparatus; and it 
is sometimes even believed that its existence can bring about the revolution.101
What matters is that the party create a multiplicity of links with the population to be 
mobilized, that it unite organically intellectuals and the 'largest and most numerous 
national popular energies'.102 Unity and discipline must be based on loyalty and 
conviction, rather than on formal bureaucratic mechanisms. Neither a loose unity of 
interrelated parties nor a mass loyalty manipulated by 'moralising sermons, emotional 
stimuli, and messianic myths of an awaited golden age' provides a model for the kind 
of party Gramsci envisages.103 The party is not merely the means to an end; in the 
character of its membership's relationships and the constant work of education which 
it undertakes it is the embryonic form of the culture which it hopes to universalize. 
Gramsci's prescription of a 'monolithic' character for the party should be understood 
in these terms. What the 'monolithic' signifies here is that no fundamental cultural 
divide exists between leaders and led, or, that such a divide is seen as a dangerous 
problem requiring speedy solution. It is on the basis of such a divide that the organic 
party may degenerate into the bureaucratic party. The call for 'homogeneity between 
the leadership and the rank and file, between the leaders and their mass following' is a 
call for intensive and energetic commitment to education in pursuit of a culture of 
active social subjects and for the elimination of inequalities as speedily as possible. 
Thus the significance of its activity on all 'fronts', cultural as well as economic and 
political.
What Gramsci wants is a party neither of 'volunteers' nor of the marginalized but 
of homogeneous social blocs. Here homogeneity refers to active voluntary 
conformity of the kind we have examined in chapter four in the discussion of the 
bourgeois subject.104 It is an expression of the Marxian concept of active union. 
Parties of volunteers are like 'vanguards without armies or commandos without 
infantry or artillery'.105 The passion and activity of the volunteers is matched by the 
passivity of the mass membership which is left untouched and unchanged by its 
membership of the party. It is the active, ongoing, organic engagement of leaders and 
led which will produce the homogeneous social blocs and which will coax individuals 
into a new kind of group membership, a membership which transcends the 'economic 
corporate' level. The constantly reiterated importance of the organic character of 
relationships between leaders and led relates to Gramsci's conviction that collective 
political commitment should be the outcome neither of purely rational adherence to a
103 Gramsci (1978), pp. 197-8
104 quoted in Sassoon (1987), p. 215
105 Gramsci (1971), pp. 149 - 50.
106 See Gramsci (1995), p. 274, on active conformity.
107 Gramsci (1971), p. 203.
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body of ideas ('abstract rationalism') nor of the kind of manipulated unquestioning 
loyalty to a charismatic leader found in the fascist movements of his day. Gramsci's 
goal is to create sustained, intelligent, intense commitment to a set of collective goals 
on the basis of the fusion of rationality and emotion. As stated before, the fusion of 
feeling, knowing and understanding is what determines the character of relationships 
between leaders and led and, therefore, establishes the character of the party itself. It 
is what ensures that the party will be 'organic' rather than 'bureaucratic'. It is only on 
the basis of such relationships that 'interest' ('economic corporative') motivations will 
be replaced by 'national popular' motivations (interest in the broader sense discussed 
in chapter six). Gramsci's constant reiteration of the virtues of the organic and the 
vices of the bureaucratic and of rationalism is an expression of his awareness of the 
need for the felt social bond in order to combine intensity of commitment and radical 
democratic participation with the scope and efficiency of modem and large-scale 
organizational forms.106
Unfortunately, there are reasons (both theoretical and empirical) to be pessimistic 
about the likelihood of such a party remaining true to organicism in the sense just 
discussed.107 As we have seen, intellectuals attempting to establish a position of 
hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) need the most exquisite combination of political 
skills: the most intense dedication, high levels of accurate knowledge of specific kinds 
and the capacity to empathize with groups whose experience of life is quite different 
from their own. Hence Gramsci's admiration for Machiavelli whom he considers to 
have exemplified these characteristics. His writing on the New Prince anticipates 
(and attempts to avoid) the excesses which were to emerge in the Soviet Union. 
However, Gramsci's depiction of the organic party is unlikely to be persuasive 
today.108 Nevertheless, his theorization of emancipatory social relations between 
intellectuals and people retains its force and relevance in terms of contemporary 
conditions in liberal capitalist cultures, as will be argued in the concluding chapter.
Conclusion
Having argued in chapter six that Marx's conception of 'active union' refers to a 
process of group formation whereby a new kind of political commitment to 
transformative action is formed, I turn in this chapter to show the way in which 
Gramsci's work seeks to complete Marx's account of this process. Gramsci takes as 
his primary theoretical object the constitution of political commitment under
108 for more on these questions, see Calhoun (1982, 1991).
109 See e.g. Rowbotham (1979).
110 See Boggs (1982, 1986).
172
conditions of radical fragmentation and unevenness. In order to analyze that object 
Gramsci expands on Marx's dialectic by developing some new 'totalizing' categories 
i.e. historical bloc and concrete phantasy. These facilitate the development of a non- 
reductive analysis of necessarily related social processes and activities. In thinking 
beyond the economic, he begins to show us how the cognitive-affective limitations 
discussed in chapter five can be transcended. In effect, Gramsci elaborates on Marx's 
claim that effective collective action in the modern world demands a 'feeling of 
community, national links ... [and] a political organization'.109 Here Marx's hope that 
the process in question will be initiated and controlled by a proletariat more or less 
adequately educated to the demands of its task through its experience in the factory, is 
replaced by the certainty that organic intellectuals organized in a specific kind of 
political party will be needed to initiate, design and control the necessary educative 
process. We have seen in the discussion of the factory councils that the goal of the 
process is the restoration of sociality at a translocal level through a growing awareness 
of the true character of the capitalist totality. So here theoretical knowledge is 
internally related to the restoration of sociality, since it is through theory (as opposed 
to commonsense) that awareness of real (rather than merely directly experienced) 
connectedness is possible. This is not to diminish the importance of direct lived 
experience but to suggest that its character needs to change if political commitment is 
to be sustained in fragmented capitalist cultures. However, if this is to happen, the 
character of relations between elites and people must also change; hence Gramsci's 
constant reiteration of the virtues of the organic and the vices of the bureaucratic. His 
insight that the theoretical knowledge needed to initiate transformative action under 
modem conditions must be fused with feeling - that knowing alone (rationalism) will 
not be adequate to the task - retains its power and relevance as does his stress on the 
required character of social relations between organic intellectuals (as visionary 
politicians) and people. His analysis of the subject effects of different kinds of 
knowledge adds an important dimension to our understanding of the requirements for 
active union. In this connection, as we have seen, Gramsci depends for the 
reconstitution of the social bond on a pre-capitalist form of commonsense possessing 
an imperative moral affective character. However, our discussion of post-Marxism's 
account of contemporary liberal capitalist cultures has given us reasons to believe that 
no such commonsense exists in these cultures, so that sociality must be reconstituted 
ex nihilo, as it were. I shall return to this matter in chapter eight, where a 
psychoanalytic analysis of different forms of subjectivity will be undertaken so as to 
bring out more clearly the significance of the various institutional analyses developed 
up to this point. Psychoanalysis offers the resources for theorizing beyond the
111 Marx (1973a), p. 239
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feeling/knowing (and therefore also the rationality/irrationality) dichotomy which 
capitalist fragmentation has institutionalized.
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Chapter eight
Capitalism and collective action: a psychoanalytic perspective 
Introduction
In this chapter, I begin to draw together the different strands of the argument by 
carrying out a systematic integration of the psychoanalytic and Marxist components 
of the thesis. This will be done by relating different accounts of subjectivity - the 
bourgeois active, social subject, proletarian passive subject and the decentred, volatile 
or 'virtual' subject - to the periodization that informs this thesis. While such exercises 
have been carried out up to a point as we have seen (by e.g. Habermas, Althusser and 
post-Marxism), these are underdeveloped because their conceptual borrowings from 
psychoanalysis are un- or undertheorized. Moreover, the different components of 
these accounts of subjectivity are unevenly developed, leaving us with an incomplete 
and sometimes confusing analysis.
In an attempt to rectify this situation, I shall proceed as follows. Following the 
Frankfurt School's attempted synthesis of Marxism and psychoanalysis, the Freudian 
theory of the psyche will be read uncontroversially as an account of the bourgeois 
subject.1 That is to say, the subject whose development Freud is interested in 
nurturing is taken to be quite close to the active, social subject whose institutional 
requirements have been indicated by Habermas and discussed in chapter four. 
Habermas's analysis will have shown that the theory and (up to a point) actuality of 
this subject emerged before the real subsumption of labour under capital (as discussed 
in chapter five) had been completed. It is important to remember that this real 
subsumption proceeded unevenly both in class and spatial-temporal terms. 
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the requirements of organized 
capitalism were beginning to produce institutions which would have the effect of 
transforming the bourgeoisie, as well as the proletariat, into functionaries i.e. into 
proletarian subjects. It is this transformation that the Frankfurt School seeks to chart, 
stressing in the process the transition from a relatively autonomous to a conformist 
subject. However, from the point of view of this thesis, the bourgeois subject is also, 
and necessarily, a conformist subject, the difference being that this is an active 
conformity based on culturally constituted intra- and inter-subjective processes of 
deliberation, whereas the conformity of the proletarian subject can be wholly passive
1 Adomo (1967-68); Adomo & Horkheimer (1979); Fromm (1971); Horkheimer (1947, 1972, 1974); 
Marcuse (1970,1987).
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i.e. can be the product of unreflective acceptance of rules generated systemically.2 
Expressed in Freudian terms, the bourgeois subject is constituted mainly, but not 
wholly, through a process of sublimation whereas the proletarian subject is 
constituted solely through repression, although it is an open question whether or not 
this subject possesses a strong super-ego.3 The decentred subject as described by 
post-Marxism appears to be governed mainly by id.
As Freud's work is read as a psychically-focussed account of the bourgeois 
subject, so the work of Lacan is read as a psychically-focussed account of the subject 
of pure capitalism, although, as noted before, I am making a distinction between the 
proletarian and decentred subject. If we accept that internalization productive of a 
strong super-ego rather than ego depends on intensely-felt intimate relations with a 
parental figure (normally the father) who is also strongly feared, then we should not 
look for internalization in either the proletarian or decentred subject.4 However, the 
possibility of internalization is also related to the degree of responsiveness to his 
needs experienced by the subject-in-formation.51 shall be arguing in chapter nine that 
this is an important distinction between the proletarian and decentred subject.
Lacan's work suggests a subject wholly repressed, but, more than that, it suggests 
the impossibility of sublimation as a fate for the instincts. In fact, talk of sublimation 
is interpreted by him as theoretical apologetics for a utilitarian culture.6 The subject 
according to Lacan is 'nothing but what is said about him.'7 This subject is the 
product of a culture in which the reality principle is inoperative and in which,
g
therefore, sublimation is not available.
The articulation of psychoanalysis to a clearly-specified Marxist analysis of 
everydayness will enable us to understand more clearly that individual subjects are 
simultaneously embodied, individual, social, cultural and historical.9 In addition, as 
Kovel points out, Freud's conception of the human organism shares the following
2 Reich (1957). See Gramsci (1995), pp. 269 - 277 on individualism and conformity. Note 
particularly his (partly but not wholly dismissive) comments on Freudianism (pp. 273 - 4).
3 Freud himself is not clear on the relationship between repression and the super-ego. See Brennan 
(1992), esp. chs. 2 & 5. If we accept the 'end of internalization1 position adopted by Adomo and 
Horkheimer, then we must assume that proletarian subjects do not have a strong super-ego. See 
Adomo & Horkheimer (1979); Adomo (1967-68); Benjamin (1977).
4 Poster (1978) is useful on this question.
5 Freud (1985iv), p. 337; Freud (1985iii), pp. 191 - 2. See also Lasch (1978, 1985); Lichtman 
(1982); Marcuse (1987); Schneider (1975).
6 Lacan (1980i, 1980iv).
7 Borch-Jacobsen (1991), p. 157.
8 Wilden (1980), p. 29, notes: 'Lacan's analysis has opened up the text o f Marx to new readings.' It 
is vital, though, to complete this thought by reminding ourselves that Lacan, in turn, needs to be read 
through Marx's eyes. Piccone's (1980) interesting suggestion that Marx's 1844 Manuscripts can be 
read as an analysis of the narcissistic personality should be noted here.
9 See Flax (1990), p. 17; Marcuse (1987), ch 2, pp. 34 - 5. In addition to Marcuse and other 
members of the Frankfurt School, the following argue for the fruitfulness of the articulation of Marxism 
and psychoanalysis: Jacoby (1975); Kovel (1988i); Lichtman (1982); Osborn (1965); Schneider 
(1975).
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characteristics with that of Marx: 'a concrete, dialectical psychology, not bound to
conscious subjectivity yet postulating a subjective core of resistance; an inner realm
which cannot be counted down into exchange value; one, therefore, that contains the
wish to be free.'10 Not mentioned by Kovel but of equal importance is the concept of
sublimation which opens the way to the development of a psychic account of
capitalist dehumanization. Marxism and psychoanalysis are complementary in ways
11 12not explored by Habermas, Althusser or post-Marxism.
The chapter is organized in three parts. Parts one and two develop further the 
psychic analysis of historically specific forms of subjectivity first indicated in 
chapters three and four. In the first part, Freud's work is read as an attempt to rescue 
the bourgeois subject by showing the familial basis of his constitution. In effect, it is 
an expression of the decline of the bourgeois subject as the real subsumption of labour 
by capital comes to affect the bourgeoisie itself i.e. as ownership of productive 
property becomes 'systemic' and impersonal.13 The second part discusses the 
significance of Lacan's 'return' to Freud as an attempt to capture the subjective realities 
of a fetishized world of commodity production. Here, the significance of the social 
and cognitive debility produced by this mode of life is explored in terms of psychic 
functioning i.e. in terms of the apparent institutionalization of the primary process 
and of the unavailability of sublimation. The third part returns to the questions raised 
in chapters six and seven and shows that the active social subject required to 
undertake communal transformative action is a subject constituted by sublimation 
rather than repression and governed by the secondary rather than primary process. In 
order to make this argument, I shall return to Freud's general account of mental 
functioning which will be read as an account of the necessary affective and relational 
basis of thinking. It is through the combination of sublimation and secondary process 
thinking that the required mix of sociality and rationality is ensured and that the kind 
of knowledge adequate to effective action on the capitalist world - i.e. theoretical 
knowledge - can be acquired and understood at the level of the subject. In short, these 
psychoanalytic concepts constitute the theoretical basis for understanding the psychic 
requirements for the kind of radical democratic mass mobilization looked for by Marx 
and Gramsci. They will also enable us to understand more clearly the erosion of 
political commitment in contemporary liberal capitalist cultures.
10 Kovel (1988i), p. 183.
11 For a relevant criticism of the Frankfurt School, see Postone (1993); Schneider (1975), pp. 271 - 
282.
12 But see Althusser (1996), pp. 105 - 124.
13 Habermas (1989). Schorske (1980) analyses the cultural and cognitive fragmentation forming the 
background to Freud's work. See also Gay (1995).
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IFreud, materiality and meaning
The ambiguous, even contradictory character of Freud's corpus has been frequently 
noted. Real or apparent contradictions between the drive theory and object relations 
theory, between a biologistic (scientistic) and a culturalist (hermeneuticist) Freud have 
been discussed at great length.14 Here Freud's work will be used as a source for 
thinking such apparent oppositions as a unity.15 So, for example, the concept of the 
drive (instinct in Strachey's English translation) will be understood as a dialectical 
concept which enables us to discuss the biological-cultural as a unity.16 It enables us 
to understand that the biological is accessible only by means of the cultural without at 
the same time effacing the biological itself. Interpreted in this way, Freud's work 
becomes compatible with the reading of Marxism offered in earlier chapters, in that it 
also stresses the individual-culture nexus as a nexus of simultaneous constraints and 
enablements founded on the innate plasticity (historicity) of the human organism, but 
informed also by an account of that organism in terms of its capacities for creativity
17and sociality, as noted above. Freud's texts are a resource for understanding the 
human organism as a mode of necessarily meaningful materiality. It is the political 
implications of this unavoidable cultural fact about human life which Althusser draws 
to the attention of Marxists. A return to certain Freudian texts affords the possibility 
of improving on Althusser's rather muddled analysis of subjectivity as the 
establishment of culture within the individual human organism.
14 Greenberg & Mitchell (1983).
15 The dialectical character of Freud's work has been noted by e.g. Althusser (1996); Rycroft (1991). 
But see Lichtman (1982) for a different view. For an interpretation of Freud along the lines suggested 
here see Flax (1990). For the 'mixed'- i.e. hermeneutic/energetic - character of Freud's work, see 
Brennan (1992); Ricoeur (1970), also Wollheim (1973).
16 At this point, Freud's ambiguity in his usage of the term 'drive' should be noted. As the editor of 
Freud's work points out, Freud's usage of the terms Trieb (translated by Strachey as instinct) and 
Triebrepresentanz (translated as instinctual representative) is ambiguous. At times he makes no 
distinction between these two, as in the following which claims that instinct is 'the concept on the 
frontier between the somatic and the mental... the psychical representative of the stimuli originating 
from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for 
work in consequence o f its connection with the body' (Freud, 1985ciii p. 118). Elsewhere, though, he 
makes a sharp distinction between instinct and psychical representative as when he claims that 'An 
instinct can never become an object of consciousness - only the idea that represents the instinct can. 
Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea 
...When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual 
impulse... we can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative o f which is 
unconscious' Freud, (1985v, p. 179). (For the editor's comments, see ibid., pp. 108 - 9.) 
Furthermore, he claims that an instinctual representative is 'an idea or group of ideas which is cathected 
with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or interest) coming from an instinct' (Freud, 1985iv, p. 
152). See Bettelheim (1982) for a relevant critique of the English translation of Freud's work. See 
Althusser (1996), pp. 102-3.
17 The latter is a controversial claim in relation to the work of Freud himself (although not to later 
Freudians). My argument to this effect is based on the inherent logic of the concept of sublimation.
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Freud and the psychic dimensions o f culture
Freud's work is read here as an an analysis of the entry of the human organism into
culture which is effected by means of biological (material-energetic), social and cultural 
18(symbolic) elements. It is the prematurity of the human organism which forces it 
into culture i.e. into extended meaningful social relations.19 More specifically, and of 
great relevance to questions about agency and commitment, it is the human organism's 
extended period of dependence on others which requires or enables it to develop the
capacity for a kind of thought which produces the characteristics needed to act
20intentionally and effectively in relation to its environment. That is to say, the 
capacity for thought and the way in which this capacity is developed is ineradicably 
connected to, on the one hand, human bodily needs and, on the other, culturally
specific relations with other humans. So, as Marcuse expresses it, the 'memory of
21gratification is at the origin of all thinking'. Therefore, relations with other human
beings are also at the origin of all thinking. This is the implication (or sometimes
22outright declaration) of a number of works which inform the following discussion.
In Civilization and its Discontents (CD), the significance of malleability is explored in
23terms of 'civilization's' requirement for 'an expedient distribution o f ... libido'. This 
flexibility is achieved through the exercise of 'displacements of libido' which benefits 
the individual human organism too, since it is the means of fending off suffering on the 
part of the psyche.24 Libido, says Freud in Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the 
Ego (GP), is 'the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude ... of those instincts
25which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word "love"'. Love is 
used here in an inclusive sense to refer, not only to sexual love but to 'love for parents
and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to
26concrete objects and to abstract ideas.' However, since, for Freud, sociality is 
imposed rather than innate and also bound up with memories of frustration as well as 
satisfaction, it is never completely accepted by individuals so that: 'A good part of the 
struggles of mankind centre round the single task of finding an expedient 
accommodation ... between this claim of the individual [for an original 'primitive'
18 At the same time Freud warns of the danger of ignoring the limits to malleability. See Freud 
(1985iv), p. 337.
19 See Greenberg & Mitchell (1983), for different post-Freudian accounts of sociality.
20 Freud (1966, also 1976, chs 6 & 7); Bion (1962a, 1962b, 1970); Brennan (1992); Marcuse (1987); 
Winnicott (1991).
21 Marcuse (1987), p. 31. For a discussion of (and disagreement with) this account of the origin of 
intellection, see Hamilton (1993).
22 See Freud (1966, 1976, 1984vi).
23 Freud (1985iv), p. 293.
24 Ibid., p. 267.
25 Freud (1985ii), p. 119. See also Laplanche & Pontalis (1973), p. 239.
26 Freud (1985ii), p. 119.
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97freedom] and the cultural claims of the groups'. It is the innate flexibility of the 
instinctual structure which constitutes the basis for achieving some kind of balance 
here.
While the distribution of energy and the way in which it can achieve discharge has 
a somatic source, the character and behaviour of the instinctual structure becomes 
known to the emergent subject 'beyond the somatic' as it were. Put another way, it 
becomes known at the point at which the somatic becomes the psychic or, at which 
the biological becomes the cultural. As noted earlier, this is a process into which the 
individual human organism is drawn by virtue of its 'prematurity'. It is a 
differentiating process whereby this individual becomes individuated as a subject i.e. 
comes to have a culturally specific sense of itself as both distinct from and related to 
others.28 This sense of an inside/outside comes about through the subordination of the 
pleasure principle to the reality principle, to be discussed further below. It is a sense 
whose emergence cannot be accounted for from either purely causal-energetic-passive 
or hermeneutic-intentional-active perspectives. Both strands must be synthesized in 
a satisfactory explanation of both the emergence of subjectivity and of significant
29differences between different kinds of subjectivity.
What Freud claims is that instincts which have their source in the body, are open
30to change in terms of 'pressure', 'aim' and 'object'. Pressure refers to the quota of
31'affect' (or quantity of energy) which is attached to a particular instinct. Aim refers 
to the apparently straightforward goal of discharging energy so as to experience 
gratification i.e. the reduction or elimination of tension (to be discussed further below). 
Object can refer to another person, to a part-person, or to an idea, doctrine etc. Of 
the four 'fates' or 'vicissitudes' which Freud suggests for an instinct, we will be
32concerned mainly with two in this chapter, namely repression and sublimation. In 
relation to these two fates, Freud's notion of the primary and secondary processes are 
also important, since sublimation requires that the subject be governed by the 
secondary process. While Freud himself takes these processes (and the transition 
from one to the other) to be universal, it is more likely that the distinction and
33trajectory involved and implied in the argument are culturally specific. Read in this 
way, the distinction will be of prime importance in aiding understanding of the 
requirements for the formation of the bourgeois subject and therefore for the
27 Freud (1985iv), p. 28 (square brackets mine). However, a more ambiguous account of sociality is 
given in Freud (1985ii).
28 See Lichtman (1982), ch. 7.
29 Ricoeur (1970).
30 See Freud (1984iii).
31 See Laplanche & Pontalis (1973), pp. 13 - 14.
32 Freud (1985iii), p. 123.
33 See Cavell (1993), ch. 8 for a critical discussion of the primary process. For claims about the 
cultural specificity of Freud's distinctions, see Baudrillard (1993), ch. 6; Kakar (1981); Obeyesekere 
(1990).
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constitution of political commitment in the strongly individuated cultures of liberal 
capitalism, as will be argued in section three of this chapter.
For the moment, we need note merely that repression and sublimation are two 
modes of accommodating the needs of the human organism to the requirements of 
culture. They differ in that the first involves the individual in sacrifice without 
compensation whereas the second does not. As will now be seen, it is Freud's 
intention to show us how sublimatory rather than repressive redistributions of 
psychic energy (by means of libidinal cathexes) may be effected to the benefit of both 
individual subject and 'civilization'. The Oedipal family, when functioning optimally, 
is the institutional means of effecting this outcome. I now turn to discuss this family. 
What this discussion should reveal is the centrality of directly experienced, sustained 
and stable intimate relations to the emergence and sustenance of the bourgeois subject.
Freud on the constitution of the bourgeois subject
We need to understand how it is that the different principles of distribution, as well as 
the different processes introduced above, are brought into alignment with specific 
socio-cultural requirements. Freud takes the subject (in this case the subject as 
'organized ego') to be the result of a painful and long-drawn out process of 
reconciliation of the pleasure and reality principles. Expressed in terms of the 
bourgeois subject, the completion of this process is secured through the resolution of 
the Oedipal complex. At this point, the boy child manages to reconcile, however 
precariously, his need for gratification with specific cultural (reality) requirements.34 
At the same time, he comes to develop a strong sense of a self with enduring and 
specific inner 'contents'. The constitution of the apparently autonomous subject is a 
process of active and painful engagement between the individual human organism and 
others, in particular the father, with whom the child has an ambivalent relationship. 
This is a highly personal, affect-laden process whereby the child comes to cathect 
(invest) certain objects, i.e. his parents, with psychic energy. These objects are 
always and necessarily culturally constituted objects (objects as subjects) which 
means that the apparently private process of subject formation described by Freud 
(and taken by him to be a universal human process) is in effect the formation of 
culturally specific bourgeois subjects who (if the process reaches successful 
completion) actively conform to the strenuous requirements of their (early liberal
34 Freud (1977i, 1977iii). See also Benjamin (1990); Brennan (1992); Mitchell (1975) on the 
peculiar trajectory of the girl child.
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35capitalist) culture. Here the constitution of the subject is a process in which the 
individual concerned plays an active part, initially through resistance but subsequently 
through 'voluntary' conformity. That is to say, there is a kind of dialectical 
relationship between the individual human organism and its environment, between an 
'inside' and an'outside'.
It is important to note here that the emergent bourgeois subject requires an 
environment which is not unresponsive to his needs. The environment in question 
offers enablements as well as constraints. In fact, as will be seen, the constraints 
form a necessary component of the enablements. As Brennan notes, the threat of 
castration constitutes a powerful motivation for the internalization of accommodation 
between instinctual and cultural needs.36 This is a crucial distinction between the 
Freudian and Lacanian conception of the 'inside'/'outside' relationship to which I shall 
return to in section two below. The environment of the bourgeois subject is both 
knowable and (up to a point) lovable. It is this combination which enables the 
bourgeois subject to act in and on that environment in an effective manner. The 
'completed' or relatively formed bourgeois subject does not experience the sharp sense 
of discontinuity between the socio-cultural and himself, since the socio-cultural can be 
experienced as the purposeful outcome of the combined, voluntary, intra- and inter- 
subjective deliberations and actions of individual bourgeois subjects, as was noted in 
chapter four. The further implication is that the socio-cultural is experienced as 
'friendly', as responsive to the requirements (wants, needs, wishes) of the individual 
subject.
As was suggested in chapter four, the bourgeois subject is the fragile achievement 
of an unprecedented nexus of institutions which apparently maintained a balance
37between the communal and the radically individuated (atomistic) subject. These 
institutions constituted social relations which remained explicitly and experientially 
social and personal, while at the same time allowing the privacy and cultural raw 
materials necessary for the constitution of introspection.38 The bourgeois subject is 
both point of departure and of arrival for Freud's psychoanalysis in the sense that he 
assumes the constitution of this subject as both possible and desirable. It is in this 
uncontroversial way that his dictum 'Where id was there ego shall be' can be 
interpreted.39 The replacement of id by ego means that prematurity has given way to
35 See Cascardi (1992) for a critical account of the bourgeois subject. Touraine (1995) is more 
enthusiastic.
36 Brennan (1992).
37 But see Benjamin (1990) who emphasizes the affective impoverishment of the bourgeois subject.
38 The historicization of the Oedipal family began in the 1930s with the work of Horkheimer and 
Lacan. See Dews (1995). See Lyons (1986) on the 'disappearance of introspection'.
39 Freud (1973i), p. 112. Lacan's significantly different understanding of this should be noted. See 
Lacan (1980iv), pp. 128 - 9. Lacan (1979), p. 44. See also Bowie (1987), pp. 122 - 3; Ragland- 
Sullivan (1986), pp. 51 - 2.
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maturity in the form of the ability to make correct judgements about oneself and the 
external world and to act on those judgements so as to secure for oneself more 
substantial and enduring forms of satisfaction. As will be argued below, these forms 
of satisfaction can be understood by means of the concept of sublimation and the 
process whereby sublimation is effected is the secondary process. Here the concept 
of sublimation is interpreted as requiring libidinal ties i.e. sociality. Understood in 
this way, the resolution of the Oedipal complex takes us out of a solipsistic 
Hobbesian world and into the world of the active social subject. As noted before, I am 
stressing here the sociality of the bourgeois subject, as described by Habermas. This 
is a subject constituted by a rising bourgeoisie, that is, by a bourgeoisie which has not 
yet institutionalized pure capitalism, as described in chapter five. As we have seen, 
until the real subsumption of labour under capital (and eventually the real 
subsumption of the bourgeoisie itself under the law of value), institutions retain the 
sociality which characterizes all human institutions prior to the advent of pure 
capitalism.
For the moment, following Freud, I shall take it that sociality is an emergent 
rather than innate property of the individual organism who is forced into sociality as 
he is forced into culture.40 Freud's account of the development of the ego enables us 
to understand this process.41 The ego is formed out of that part of the id which is in 
immediate contact with the outside world. Whereas the id is totally governed by the 
pleasure principle (and therefore by the primary process) and seeks immediate 
instinctual satisfaction, the ego has the task of guarding against the damage wrought by 
the id's insatiable demands while at the same time attempting to ensure the maximum 
amount of satisfaction congruent with the requirements of culture. So it works both 
to satisfy and to influence the id, to bring it to bridle its passions and modify its aims 
or even to give these up in return for some compensation. In short, the ego is that 
part of the psyche which seeks to advance the pleasure principle by rendering the 
demands of the id compatible with cultural (reality) requirements. Freud compares 
the relationship of the ego to the id to that of a rider to his horse:
The horse supplies the locomotive energy, while the rider has the privilege of 
deciding on the goal and of guiding the powerful animal's movement. But only 
too often there arises between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal 
situation of the rider being obliged to guide the horse along the path by which 
it itself wants to go.42
40 In fact, as Freud makes clear, the bourgeois subject constitutes a fragile synthesis of contradictory 
instincts towards separation and fusion. This state of affairs is finally expressed in the idea of the life 
and death instincts. See Freud (1984vi, also 1985iv). See also Freud (1984iii) on ambivalence. See 
also Borch-Jacobsen (1988); Marcuse (1987).
41 Freud (1984vi).
42 Freud (1973i), pp. 109 - 110.
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Ego's control over the id is always precarious and dependent on the amount of energy 
which it can attract to itself from the id. One means of 'borrowing' energy from the id 
is through identifications as 'precipitates of object-cathexes'. That is, the ego finds 
favour with the id by identifying itself with actual or abandoned objects, thereby 
attracting to itself the energy previously cathected to (invested in) these objects.43 
At this point, I shall say a few words about the role of identifications in Freud's 
account of subject-formation.
Freud on identifications
Identifications are the foundation of cultural membership.44 They are the means 
whereby culture is internalized or cathected by the human organism. Identifications 
are initiated within the family, which, for Freud, is necessarily the Oedipal family. 
The Oedipal family is that family in which the role of the father, rather than the 
mother, is held to be the key to the successful transition from prematurity to maturity 
or, from the pleasure principle to the reality principle.45
In 'The Dissection of the Psychical Personality', Freud defines the process of 
identification as
the assimilation of one ego to another one, as a result of which the first ego 
behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up 
into itself. Identification has been not unsuitably compared with the oral, 
cannibalistic incorporation of the other person 46
Freud stresses that identification should not be confused with object-choice. Whereas 
the former leads the individual to wish to be like the object in question, the latter leads 
him to wish to have the object in question.47 Identification is related to object-choice 
in the sense that loss of an object-choice may result in identification with that lost 
object as a means of compensation. It is identification which constitutes cultural 
membership i.e. the installation of the super-ego. The latter is the result of 'successful'
48identification with the 'parental agency'. In this case, identification is a
43 Ibid., p. 109.
44 Freud (1985ii), ch. 7; (1985e), p. 359. For an account o f the aporias in Freud's account of 
identifications, see Borch-Jacobsen (1988); Wollheim (1974).
45 Benjamin's (1990) critique of this account should be noted.
46 Freud (1973i), p. 94.
47 However, as Freud himself suggests in a late paper, in the beginning identification and object- 
choice (i.e. the wish to be like and to have) are one. (Indeed, the words just cited contain this 
suggestion.) This idea is encapsulated in the words: 'I am the breast'. See Freud (1964), p. 299. See 
also Borch-Jacobsen (1988).
48 Freud (1973i), p. 95.
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compensation to the child for the renunciation of'the intense object-cathexes which he 
has deposited with his parents'.49 This is the first, and in terms of emotional 
intensity and importance, the most important of a series of identifications which will 
take place throughout life, identifications with educators, teachers and people chosen 
as ideal models, although later identifications lack the emotional intensity of those of 
early childhood.
Identification, as manifested in the resolution of the Oedipus complex, is, for 
Freud, 'the earliest and original form of emotional tie'.50 There are other versions of 
identification, one of which - identification through the perception of a common 
quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct - 1 
shall discuss in the third section of this chapter. It is important to remember that 
those ties that are lasting between people are achieved through the inhibition of the 
aims of 'sexual impulsions'.51 To inhibit an aim is to replace immediate and complete 
instinctual gratification by a more limited and long-term form of gratification. This 
inhibition accounts for the origin of feelings of affection and sociability; it is an 
incipient form of sublimation, to be discussed further in section three below.
Identification and the super-ego52
53The super-ego represents society's values within the individual. It is observer, 
regulator and punisher; it is the source of powerful guilt feelings.54 It is installed 
within the individual by a process of identification with the father at the point at 
which the Oedipus complex is abandoned. The abandonment of the Oedipus complex 
is brought about through a mixture of motives including fear of castration and the 
dawning realization that possession of the mother is beyond the capacities of the 
child. So the instantiation of the super-ego comes about through a combination of 
intensely-felt intimate relations (primarily with the father, for Freud) and intense fear 
of castration. If the forced relinquishment of the mother as a love object is 
accompanied by a consolatory identification with the father, the entry into culture will
49 Ibid.,
50 Freud (1985ii), p. 136.
51 Ibid., p. 146.
52 Lasch (1985), ch. 5 offers a lucid account of the changes in Freud's own views on the ego ideal and 
super-ego, as well as on the confusion of views about these matters among contemporary 
psychoanalysts. Borch-Jacobsen (1988), p. 25, denies any conceptual significance to the distinction. 
But see Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985).
53 See Freud (1985iv), chs. 7 & 8. Freud also claims that the super-ego is the 'representative for us of 
every moral restriction, the advocate of a striving towards perfection...the higher side o f human life', in 
Freud (1973), p. 98. However, it can also be interpreted as the individual's own aggressive impulses 
directed at and projected onto parents or parental surrogates and, finally, against the ego itself. See 
Lasch, (1985), p. 175; Reich (1953, 1954).
54 Freud (1984iv) chs. 5 & 6.
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not be experienced as wholly coercive, frustrating and painful and the possibility 
emerges of sublimating, rather than repressing instinctual needs.
In identifying with the father, the child seeks to become as like the father as 
possible.55 Here it should be remembered that Freud has in mind the strong, 
patriarchal father, the father whose constitution, as we know from Habermas, 
requires private, personal ownership of productive property (of means of 
production). This is a father as subject both 'in' and 'for' himself. The importance of 
this cannot be overstressed.56 Identification, then, involves the introjection of
parental objects i.e. the transposition of the qualities and characteristics of those 
objects from 'outside' the child to its 'inside'. This involves a judgement on the part of 
the child that this transposition will result in deferred rather than abandoned 
gratifiction. That is to say, by identifying with his father, the child is assured that in 
the future he will enjoy possession of a mother-like object. Here the intense wish for 
immediate and total satisfaction of instinctual needs is transmuted into loving family 
relations of a culturally specific kind. What this means is that cultural membership - 
i.e. the constitution of subjectivity - is grounded in bodily processes as these are 
shaped and experienced by means of culturally constituted social relations with 
parental figures. Identification leads to imitation which in turn leads to empathy, as
57Freud notes in GP. What identification suggests is that cultural membership is 
grounded in a strong emotional commitment to the culture, albeit one marked by 
ambivalence. Cultural membership involves the experience, recognition and 
acceptance of limits and boundaries. However, the ambivalence which marks the 
genesis of bourgeois cultural membership is also the source of struggle against these
58limits. Hence the claim of Horkheimer and Adorno that the Oedipal family 
represents the possibility of individual autonomy.59
At this point it is important to note that identification must be such as to produce 
in the child an awareness of the distinction between self and other (that which is 'not- 
self,, rather than a complete absorption of the child by the father. This is attained, as 
Borch-Jacobsen points out, by the exhortation to both be like and not be like the 
father e.g. and especially, the child must be unlike the father in that he cannot possess 
his mother.60 With the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the child loses its illusion 
of omnipotence together with the feeling of 'oceanic' peace and union. At the same 
time, it is this loss of the 'oceanic' feeling which institutes (if all goes well) a love
55 See Freud (1984vii), ch. 3.
56 What Freud fails to note, except in passing, is the need for a strong mother capable of offering the 
necessary emotional support to the child during the painful passage to adulthood. Hamilton (1993) 
offers a lucid account of this need.
57 Freud (1985ii), ch. 7.
58 See Melucci (1996), ch. 6, on the significance of limits for identity-formation.
59 Horkheimer (1947, 1972). See also Benjamin (1977); Dews (1995).
60 Borch-Jacobsen (1988), esp. pp. 221 - 222,
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within the child for the external world as an external world. It institutes a form of 
sociality in which subjectivity is social and active. That is to say, objects viewed as 
external to the child and as sources of satisfaction can be loved without being 
incorporated into the ego.61 The subject is not dissolved in the socio-cultural and the 
socio-cultural is not dissolved in the subject. Put another way, what we find in the 
culture which constitutes the bourgeois subject is neither the horde nor the Hobbesian 
war of all against all. I shall return to this question in section three below.
To sum up, Freud's work has been read as an account of the biological-cultural 
constitution of the bourgeois subject. This subject emerges out of a specific
trajectory involving a triangular relationship between mother, father and boy child,
62although, as we have seen, Freud has little to say about the mother. The bourgeois 
subject is the subject with a strong 'organized' ego, that is, an ego which establishes a 
relatively comfortable balance between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. 
The successful resolution of the Oedipal complex consists in a consolatory
63introjection of (or identification with) the father by the (male) child. It is this 
process which paves the way for the displacement rather than renunciation of 
gratification; for sublimation rather than repression. Sublimation connects to the idea 
of voluntary self-discipline. That is to say, the subject experiencing sublimation is 
governed by the secondary process in an active, self-consciously social and voluntary 
way. Given the optimal functioning of the Oedipal family and the extra-familial 
institutional conditions described by Habermas and discussed in chapter four above, 
this outcome will have been achieved.
I now turn to discuss quite a different state of affairs, namely, the constitution of the 
proletarian and decentred subjects, as read from the work of Lacan.
n
From Freud to Lacan: from Oedipus to Narcissus
Turning to Lacan, we see that, whereas the preoccupation with the Oedipal complex 
remains, what we find is in fact something quite different than the bourgeois subject. 
The subject with whom Lacan is concerned is a subject whose culture has eliminated 
the conditions productive of the bourgeois subject although the ghost of the latter
61 Freud (1984iii). Freud discusses these questions further in 'On Narcissism', in which he says: 'we 
must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, 
we are unable to love', in Freud (1984ii), p. 78.
62 See Freud (1985vii), n l, p. 370. See also Benjamin (1990); Mitchell (1975).
63 See Brennan (1992) for a discussion of these matters from the woman's point of view.
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lingers in the shape of the Law of the Father. Lacan is writing of a culture in which 
directly experienced social relations (whether intimate or not) are being overwhelmed 
by systemic imperatives. Personal authority has been replaced by impersonal 
authority or even by the dissolution of all authority.64 (I shall be arguing in chapter 
nine that the end of authority is a characteristic of the disorganized stage of 
capitalism.) The individual is in the grip of a system which - while promising total 
satisfaction - cannot or will not satisfy his desires. This is a system, moreover, which 
is unknowable at the level of everyday or commonsense experience. In short, this is 
the pure capitalism with which Marx is concerned in Capital I .65
As Ferrell has pointed out, the Lacanian subject has no 'essence' but is 
nevertheless highly specific.66 What needs to be added is that the Lacanian subject is 
highly specific in contrast to the bourgeois subject in that he experiences himself as 
having no essence. He experiences himself as being without an inner self with a 
unique history which has laid down layers of memory and of ways of being in the 
world which have durability and continuity. This is what I seek to show by adopting 
a Marxian approach to Lacan's work, one, that is, which is informed by a weak, rather 
than strong version of anti-humanism. Such an approach takes its point of departure 
from Marx's claim that 'the properties of a thing do not arise from its relations to
67other things, they are, on the contrary, merely activated by such relations'. In 
relation to the human being this assertion needs to be modified in the sense that human 
properties are both activated and developed by social relations. What the statement
reminds us of is that there are both 'entities' and relations, rather than either one or the
68other. Psychoanalytic drive theory privileges the entities at the expense of relations; 
Lacanian psychoanalysis (and post-Marxism, as we have seen) privileges the relations 
at the expense of the entities which bear the relations. Most interestingly, though, 
and contrary to the object relations school of psychoanalysis, Lacan conceptualizes 
relations largely in systemic, impersonal terms.69
The significance of Marx's reminder in the present context is that Lacan's 
emphasis (derived from Saussure's work which was discussed briefly in chapter three) 
on the relational constitution of subjectivity must be interpreted in historical 
institutional terms. The claim that there exist nothing but relations whose bearers 
(entities) are merely the nodal points of such relations, is expressive of a specific 
culture which constitutes subjects without substance. That is to say, it must be read,
64 See Horkheimer (1972i).
65.Schneider (1975) points to the complementarities between psychoanalysis's account of repression 
and Marx's of alienation.
66 Ferrell (1996), p. 83.
67 Marx (1976a), p. 149.
68 See Greenberg & Mitchell (1983).
69 Benjamin (1990) offers a relevant example of the object relations approach. See also Greenberg & 
Mitchell (1983) for a general discussion. See Goux (1994) for a criticism of Lacan on these grounds.
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not as a claim about universal human subjectivity, but about historically, culturally 
specific forms of subjectivity. So we must historicize the universalist tenor of much 
of Lacan's work.
Lacan's work will be read as an account of the psychic constitution of the subjects
70of pure capitalism, of the subjects produced by a fetishized, abstract culture. As 
MacCannell points out, Lacan is writing about a post-Oedipal culture which, as she 
says'... marches on dividing, disconnecting and making (pseudo-) unifications - but no
71longer in the familiar forms of love, family, sociability.' His work expresses the
77sense of fragmentation and external control that characterizes capitalist cultures. 
This claim will be argued for on the basis of the following related characteristics of 
that work. First is the stress on the symbolic as wholly impersonal and systemic i.e. 
the marginalization or even effacement of directly-experienced embodied social familial 
relations. Second, is the virtual naturalization of narcissism and of the primary 
process. Third is the ejection of sublimation as a desirable or indeed possible 
instinctual fate. What connects these three characteristics is the unwillingness or 
inability to conceive of a reality which is, one, relatively stable and durable and 
therefore knowable, and two, relatively benign and therefore loveable (in the sense in 
which love has been used in section one above). As we will see, the subject as
described by Lacan is incapable both of satisfying the pleasure principle and of
73accommodating himself to the reality principle. The significance of this will be made 
clear in section three.
70 Wilden (1980), p. 30, offers this suggestion but does not develop it. As MacCannell (1986) 
points out, Lacan's patient is culture itself. He sets out 'to criticise human culture and its 
misadventures' (p. xiv). MacCannell remarks that Lacan's readers have tended to 'over-identify Lacan's 
analysis of the culture of the signifier with Lacan, with his own stance on that culture', ibid, p. 19. 
Read against its apparently universalist grain, Lacan's work offers us a psychoanalytic perspective 
which is in effect a profound criticism of the capitalist mode of life and its subject effects. See Borch- 
Jacobsen (1991); Dews (1989); Jameson (1988); MacCannell (1986). However, as Dews notes 
following a sympathetic discussion o f his views, Lacan's theory has a debilitating rather than 
radicalizing effect. See Dews (1987), p. 108. Others e.g. Finlay (1989); Flax (1990) Goux (1991, 
1994) are harsher in their criticisms. Goux (1994), p. 141, charges that Lacan saw the shift from 
'living dialogical speech' to the machine but decided to privilege the latter.
71 MacCannell (1986), p. 70. Brennan (1993) also stresses the historical-cultural, critical character of 
Lacan's work.
72 See Finlay (1989); Frosh (1989); Wilden (1980).
73 Lacan's deconstruction of the bourgeois subject can also be read as a revelation of the inherently 
bogus character of symbolic promises and therefore as an instigation to the refusal of the reality 
principle. See Borch-Jacobsen (1991); MacCannell (1986).
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From ego to system
Beyond the bourgeois subject
As we have noted, liberal industrial capitalism is historically deviant in terms of the 
radical fragmentation of culture which it necessarily institutes and of the character of 
subjectivity and experience which results from that fragmentation. It is a culture 
which renders sociality (the directly-experienced social bond) voluntary rather than 
necessary; which institutes subjects who experience themselves as subjectively 
(personally) independent and objectively totally dependent. During the stage of 
organized capitalism, the bourgeois subject gives way to the proletarian subject. The 
bourgeois subject is the self-motivating subject who achieves self-discipline through a 
process of identification with a strong father (self-discipline strengthened by libidinal 
bonds and motivated in the first instance partly by fear of castration74). The 
proletarian subject produces reliable, disciplined behaviours as a result of an imposed 
disciplinary process which involves repression but which may or may not involve 
internalization i.e. the instantiation of the super-ego.75 The decentred subject (as 
posited by post-Marxism) appears to be governed more by id than by either ego or 
super-ego. It is this development that Lacan's work in part expresses and it is to the 
banishment of ego and super-ego that he appears dedicated.
The symbolic
While it is Lacan's stated aim to recover the 'real' Freud by reinstating the unconscious 
as the central psychoanalytic discovery, his work effects some significant and 
fundamental departures from Freud whose character will alert us to the nature of
76cultural changes effected by the transition from liberal to organized capitalism. 
These departures include most significantly the marginalization of the drives and of 
face-to-face social relations in the constitution of subjectivity and the decentering of 
the ego. Whereas Freud starts with and centres on individual actors and their directly- 
experienced social relations as bearers of the symbolic or cultural, Lacan takes the 
symbolic (linguistic) order, rather than embodied, directly encountered social relations,
77as the force which shapes individuals as specific kinds of subjects. That is to say,
74 See Brennan (1992), ch. 1.
75 As we have seen, Althusser apparently claims internalization. However, see Adomo (1967-8). See 
also Benjamin (1977).
76 See Lacan (1979), ch. 2. For differences between the Freudian and Lacanian unconscious, see 
Archard (1984), ch. 3; Bowie (1987); Dews (1987), pp. 81 - 6. See also Fink (1995).
77 In taking the symbolic as his point of departure, Lacan is intending to counteract the biologism 
(and therefore determinism) of certain forms of psychoanalysis by privileging the social or symbolic
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culture is rendered largely in impersonal, systemic terms. For Lacan the symbolic is 
the moment of Oedipal resolution whereby the small child is introduced to the Law of 
the Father which is the 'order of objectifying language' whereby cultural membership is 
secured. That is to say, the 'Oedipal' stage of subject-formation is an impersonal, 
disembodied process whose dynamic appears to derive wholly from culture rather
78than from the drives. As he says: 'It is the world of words that creates the world of
n q
things. ... Man speaks ... but it is because the symbol has made him man.'
Furthermore, the pre-Oedipal moment, as captured by the concept of the imaginary, is
80also presented in disembodied terms. The infant's misrecognition of himself as a
subject (as whole and empowered) comes, not so much through the loving gaze of the
mother, as through the infant's own gaze as reflected in the mirror
In Lacan, we find the mirror stage as producer of the virtual subject, of the subject 
81as simulacrum. The stress on the symbolic as constitutive, when allied to the 
interpretation of Saussurean linguistics discussed in chapter three (i.e. on an 
interpretation which makes the referent disappear) results in the withdrawal of the
possibility of being for the subject, who becomes the mere artefact (unstable, volatile
82artefact) of a language which refers to nothing but itself. Here the human organisms 
- child and mother - are spoken by the language and therefore, logically, are incapable 
of entering into a dialogue productive of a relatively enduring sense of subjectivity on 
the part of the child. Indeed the mother, given her own subjectivity, is incapable of 
offering the child the kind of recognition needed to experience himself as an active 
social subject. Therefore, the moment of misrecognition is nothing but that and, 
moreover, can never be anything but that. Subjectivation is nothing but alienation. 
The secondary process is in the language, as it were, leaving the subjects at the mercy
83of a primary process which can produce nothing but frustration, as will be seen.
While this disjunction of the biological and the symbolic is intended by Lacan to 
counteract the alleged functionalism of ego-psychology,84 it can also be read (and is 
indeed read here) as an expression of the novel, peculiarly abstract character of 
capitalist culture.85 As we noted in Althusser’s account (and indeed in that of post-
moment in the constitution of the subject. For a discussion of Lacan's 'structuralism', see Dews 
(1987); Merquior (1986). See also Zizek (1989), ch. 4.
78 See Forrester (1981).
79 Lacan (1980iii), p. 65. Lacan is here rejecting the word/thing distinction advanced by Freud. See 
Bowie (1987); Flax (1990).
80 See Lacan (1980i); Flax (1990), ch. 4.
81 Ferrell (1996); Finlay (1989); Frosh (1991).
82 Finlay (1989), pp. 50, 61.
83 From this point of view, psychoanalytic prescriptions for healthy subjectivation - such as we find in 
Winnicott, for example, are nothing but (furthermore can be nothing but) utopian dreams. It is 
informative here to contrast Lacan's and Winnicott's accounts of this stage of infant development. Lacan 
(1980i); Winnicott (1971). For a useful comparison, see Finlay (1989).
84 Lacan (1980ii, 1980iv).
85 Brennan (1993) stresses the historicity of Lacan’s account of the subject, as does Dews (1995) and 
MacCannell (1986). See Lacan (1980ii), esp. pp. 28 - 9.
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Marxism) culture is experienced as an imposition on the to-be-humanized infant.
Expressed otherwise, what is in question is an organism without the innateness to
humanness which might render the process of humanization not wholly painful. The
infant posited by Lacan (and by post-Marxism and Althusser) appears to be wholly
nonhuman (pure animality), as resistant to the disciplines and as blind to the joys of
86humanization as we must assume other kinds of animals to be. Furthermore, this 
state of affairs is posited as universal or innate. However, and relatedly, this infant, 
unlike the Freudian infant, is doomed to repression and frustration. It does not have 
the option of finding a path midway between no satisfaction and complete 
satisfaction. So, we find no basis at all for the emergence of sociality i.e. of the 
capacity to engage in relatively satisfying and enduring, directly experienced social 
relations. We find no basis for the emergence of the organized ego or indeed for the 
super-ego as an internalized 'conscience'. Given this state of affairs, the subject as 
depicted by Lacan can only experience itself as in a state of captivity.87 The 
possibility of transcending the contradiction between individual and culture (which 
exists in Freud's work because of the contradiction within the developing human 
organism between sociality and self-absorption) does not exist. The Lacanian 
decentred subject is, in effect, the narcissistic subject.
The narcissistic subject
As Benjamin points out, 'Narcissus rivals Oedipus as the dominant metaphor of
88contemporary psychoanalysis.' The transition from Oedipus to Narcissus is related 
to the weakening of the father's role, therefore the weakening of personal authority 
and the superego. The narcissistic subject is condemned to a world of unbridgeable 
gaps between himself and others. In fact, others are merely internally constructed 
representations or ideas whose reality appears to depend wholly on the libidinal 
energy invested in them. In a sense, reality is experienced by the narcissistic subject
89as a changing figment of his own imagination. This subject was first encountered in 
chapter three. As discussed there, the Lacanian analysis of humanization - as
interpreted by Zizek and incorporated (up to a point) in post-Marxism's analysis - 
privileges a universal resistance to this process deriving from the experience on the
86 The difference is that this particular kind of animal, unlike other kinds of animals, has the potential 
to be humanized. Nothing much is concluded from this remarkable distinctiveness, though.
87 Honneth (1995), ch. 13.
88 Benjamin (1990), p. 137. Freud (1984ii) is the point of departure for the theorization of 
narcissism. See also Brennan (1992, 1993); Frosh (1991); Grunberger (1979); Kovel (1988ii); Lasch 
(1978, 1985); Reich (1953). Marcuse (1987) offers a more benign interpretation of narcissism which 
he, following Freud (1984ii), relates to the possibility of sublimation.
89 Flax (1990).
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part of the subject-to-be of an ineliminable gap, lack or the 'non-realized'.90 This in 
turn derives from the 'fact' that culture (the symbolic) produces desires that it 
inevitably fails to satisfy. More strongly, it is the production of unsatisfiable desires 
which instantiates both the unconscious and subjectivity and cultural membership. 
So the subject according to Lacan is either a subject governed by repression (therefore 
a subject open to discipline) or a subject whose acute sense of frustration is such as to 
render him totally resistant to any discipline whatsoever. The former is in danger of 
regressing to primary process functioning since secondary process functioning is 
based on sacrifice of rather than compensation for loss of gratification. The latter is 
in some respects constituted so as to function according to the primary process.91 
In both cases, if culture conquers the subject, this is an incomplete and uneasy
92conquest which necessarily produces restless and unhappy subjects.
Lacan's return to Freud is in fact a specific reading of Freud which marries the 
narcissistic conception of the ego found in 'On Narcissism' to selected elements of
93'The Ego and the Id'. In a very real sense, it takes as 'normal', a form of subjectivity 
which Freud had taken to be neurotic.94 For Flax, it transforms Freud's concept of 
narcissism into an 'incontestible and ontological theory of human nature'.95 That is to 
say, narcissism is taken to be an unavoidable human fate.96
From secondary to primary process
The naturalization of the primary process necessarily follows from what has just been 
said, since its replacement by the secondary process requires a strong sense of both 
inner and outer reality. As noted above, the subject with which Lacan is concerned 
does not possess such a sense. In order to explain the theoretical steps which result 
in Lacan's apparent naturalization of the primary process, I need to return briefly to 
Freud's work on dreams which, as he claimed, contained the essential concepts of his 
discoveries of the unconscious. Condensation and displacement, the two central 
modes of functioning of dreams, are also those of the functioning of the unconscious. 
They refer to real processes based on two principles of distribution of psychical 
energy. Lacan claims that the same functions and processes are to be found in
90 Lacan (1980ii).
92 I shall return to this point in chapter nine.
92 Freud (1985iv) himself offered a tragic account of this contradiction.
93 See Freud (1984ii, 1984iii).
94 See Flax (1990), ch. 4; Hamilton (1993). Flax reads Lacan as 'a phenomenology o f what it is like 
to be confined within the narcissist's universe'. Flax (1990), p. 93.
95 Ibid., p. 91.
96 However, as we have seen, Brennan and MacCannell interpret Lacan as a critic of this narcissism. I 
do not need to adjudicate on this here, since the important point is that Lacan's work, however he 
intended it, is useful for revealing the subjectivity instituted by pure capitalism. It is the 
psychoanalytic complement to Marx's account of pure capitalism.
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language, so that condensation is equated with metaphor (the replacement of one 
signifier by another) and displacement is equated with metonymy (signifier to signifier 
movement). These two constitute the signifying function as such. They are the 'two
0 7great poles of language' by which meaning is constituted. By making this 
connection, Lacan unites psychoanalysis and linguistics, unites the unconscious and 
discourse in a relationship in which the latter constitutes the former, as noted above. 
So, he claims
The unconscious from Freud onwards is a chain of signifiers which somewhere 
in another scene...repeats itself and insists so as to interfere in the breaks 
offered by the discourse and the thought that the discourse informs. In this 
formulation ... the crucial term is the signifier, revived from ancient rhetoric by
98modem linguistics.
Saussure's claim about the arbitrariness of the relationship between signifier and 
singnified is the basis of Lacan's claim about the fundamental volatility and 
slipperiness of the signifier. The signifier, unlike a sign which is a vehicle for stable 
meaning - e. g. smoke/fire - has its own laws since it signifies nothing beyond itself." 
It is not tied to a referent.100
We need to mark and beware of Lacan's naturalizing thrust here.101 Recall that, 
for Freud, condensation and displacement are the laws of functioning of the primary 
process. We are now being told by Lacan that these laws of functioning are 
constitutive also of language as such, therefore constitutive, not only of the 
unconscious, but of culture as such. If subjects are constituted by the symbolic i.e. if
107'things' are constituted by 'words', if 'the unconscious is structured like a language' , 
if language itself is governed by processes of condensation and displacement claimed 
by Freud to be primitive or primary, then we must conclude that culture is also 
governed by the primary process.
Lacan is here apparently forgetting that the state of affairs being described is 
culturally and historically specific. It is not culture as such, but the culture of pure 
capitalism, which (in relation to the achievements of the bourgeois subject at least)
103traps subjects in the primary process. So his claim about the universal character of
97 see Coward & Ellis (1977), p. 99.
98 quoted in ibid., p. 100.
99 See Dews (1987), ch. 2. Lacan's discussion o f Poe's short story 'The Purloined Letter' is an 
extended illustration of his claim about the signifier. See Lacan (1980v) and the discussion in Bowie 
(1987). See Borch-Jacobsen (1991), ch. 5 for the 'slipperiness' of Lacan's usage o f these different 
linguistic terms.
100 See Ragland-Sullivan (1991a); Thom (1981).
101 We noted a similar naturalizing thrust in post-Marxism's analysis, discussed in chapter three.
102 Lacan (1980ii), p.20. For more on this opaque claim, see Althusser (1996); Bowie (1987); 
Brennan (1992), p. 105; Ferrell (1996).
103 As noted before, this distinction between primary and secondary process is also a culturally 
specific distinction which may not be applicable in non-capitalist cultures.
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language must be translated into a claim about the immaturity of subjects constituted 
by an innately narcissistic and a-social capitalist culture.104
In universalizing the primary process, Lacan is universalizing the cognitive and 
emotional debility which necessarily accompanies this process. Since volatility, 
slipperiness and instability are constitutive features of the constitutive signifier, there 
appears to be no way out. The search for satisfaction is futile and its futility is 
intrinsically associated with the substitutability (metonymy) which is characteristic of 
the primary process and of language itself. As MacCannell puts it, substitutability 
reigns because there is no ultimate, real satisfaction so 'one thing is as good as another 
in attempting the impossible'.105 This is a forceful expression of the obsolescence of 
judgement in the Lacanian account of subjectivity and therefore in the lived experience 
of decentred subjects (since I read Lacan as an analysis of that experience). What this 
means is that substitutability is not merely an intra-psychic attribute but is rather 
culturally constituted. Substitutability is the result of the displacement (metonymic 
causality) which characterizes pure capitalism as instituted in contemporary liberal 
capitalist cultures.
However, the sense gained from Lacan's analysis is that 
substitutability/volatility derive from the constitutive and therefore unavoidable sense 
of lack which constitutes all kinds of subjects. If this is the case, there is no hope of 
effecting a reconciliation between the pleasure-seeking subject and his environment. 
So there is no motivation for the demanding and sustained engagement with 'reality' 
which may produce secondary process thinking and a form of cultural membership 
based on sublimation rather than repression.106 If the possibility of 'reality-testing' is 
foreclosed, then the subject necessarily remains caught up in a phantasy world. A 
brief return to Freud will be useful at this point.
Freud, reality and phantasy
For Freud the capacity for thought is derivative of the capacity to test reality and is 
therefore related to the capacity to act effectively on reality. Central to the 
development of these capacities is a strongly felt and stable relationship with primary 
carers i.e. a reliable, stable but also fairly responsive external world (reality). As he 
puts it: '[A] precondition for the setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have 
been lost which once brought real satisfaction.’ Identifying such objects is a matter of 
judgement based on memory of past satisfactions:
104 Frosh (1991); Kovel (1988ii).
105 MacCannell (1986), p. 166.
106 Marcuse (1987), chs. 2, 10.
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Judging is the intellectual action which decides the choice of motor action,
which puts an end to the postponement due to thought and which leads over
107from thinking to acting.
Where no satisfaction is possible, the development of memory- therefore of the 
capacity for making judgements (testing reality and arriving at reliable conclusions) - 
is foreclosed. Movement beyond the pleasure principle is impossible. This results in 
the situation naturalized by Lacan i.e. it produces an insatiable subject forever trapped 
in a state of desire which has been constituted by a culture as inherently unsatisfiable. 
Being left in a state of permanent frustration, the individual is left necessarily in a 
state of emotional and cognitive debility.108 The urge to relieve frustration produces 
the habit of daydreaming, as discussed by Freud.
For Freud, day-dreaming involves a 'disorder of attention', an 'absence of mind' or 
state of distraction from reality. It involves the turning of attention inwards, away 
from the world towards a kind of 'private theatre'.109 The introduction of the reality 
principle involves the splitting off of one species of 'thought activity', namely 
'phantasying, which begins already in children's play, and later, continues as day­
dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects'.110 It follows from what has been 
said above that the inward-turning of attention involved in day-dreaming results in a 
diminution of this capacity to engage in action.111 Since day-dreams also provide 
instant gratification, it may be further supposed that this is also a diminution in the 
capacity to exercise self-discipline. Finally, since satisfaction is sought from 
phantastic rather than real objects, sociality either fails to emerge or, where it is 
emergent or present as a capacity, is bound to atrophy. The capacity for thought, for 
sustained attention directed towards a given object is constitutively related to the 
exercise of self-discipline, or the capacity to delay gratification but also to the 
availability of (human) objects in the environment capable of and willing to grant 
satisfaction. It is only on the basis of this relatively reliable availability that the kind 
of cognitive and affective development required for political commitment in strongly 
individualized and complex cultures will emerge. What is in question is an affective- 
cognitive complex. Day-dreaming arises where the development of these capacities is 
rendered difficult and it then becomes an additional obstacle to any further 
development of these related capacities. It is partly in these terms that we can begin 
to understand the subject effects of different institutional clusters characterizing
107 Freud (1984i), p. 440. See also Freud (1984i), p. 38; Freud (1976), pp. 758 - 9.
108 Bion (1962a).
109 Brennan (1992), p. 99.
110 Freud (1984i), p. 39.
111 Brennan (1992), p. 93.
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different stages of capitalism and therefore different capacities for action and 
112relationship. For the moment we must note that the subject posited by Lacan is a 
daydreaming subject. Daydreaming subjects are subjects who fail to undergo action- 
strengthening identifications and who therefore experience passive rather than active 
forms of gratification.113
Daydreaming subjects are necessarily incapable of fulfilling the requirements for 
transformative communal action which have been discussed in chapters six and seven. 
They are also incapable of the more modest requirements for commitment to intra- 
cultural collective tasks. I shall now go on to support this claim by elaborating on the 
psychic requirements for the constitution of such commitment in strongly 
individuated capitalist cultures. This will take the form of an analysis of the concepts 
of sublimation and secondary process.
m
In this section I shall argue that the constitution of a transformative communal actor 
requires subjects who are, first, governed by the secondary process and second, 
capable of sublimating rather than repressing their need for instinctual gratification. 
These are essential requirements for the kind of radically democratic political 
mobilization called for by Marx and Gramsci. The use of psychoanalytic concepts 
should enable us to develop a more clearly specified analysis of the requirements for 
such action by, for example, offering a psychoanalytical analysis of the organic 
character of the relations between intellectuals and people held by Gramsci to be 
necessary if radically democratic transformative action is to get under way. Freud's 
account of the optimally functioning Oedipal family is an account of the requirements 
for instituting a strongly-felt individual sense of cultural membership; one, moreover, 
in which the individual is not 'oversocialized' or engulfed in his culture. This is 
precisely the kind of cultural membership looked for by Marx and (more explicitly) 
by Gramsci. In all three theorists there is a stress on self-mastery of a specific kind as 
a good, both for the individual and for the culture.114 This stress is expressed in 
Marx's concept of praxis; it is elaborated in Gramsci's concept of culture; it is given its 
psychic expression in Freud's concept of sublimation. It is to a discussion of the 
latter that I now turn.
112 Hyperbolic claims about the end or murder of reality, as made by Baudrillard (1996) can then be 
interpreted as claims about the world as lived experienced in liberal capitalist cultures. At the same 
time, the experience of the world has constitutive - or deconstitutive - effects as well, as I have been 
arguing.
113 Jacobson (1954).
114 For more on this question see Jacoby (1980); Piccone (1980).
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The bourgeois subject: from repression to sublimation
Subjectivity and repression
In terms of the problems explored in this thesis, the fundamental difference between 
repression and sublimation is that the former takes place behind the back of the 
subject whereas the latter is the product of conscious reflection and judgement. 
Expressed in this way, the reason for the mapping on of these terms to the proletarian 
and bourgeois subjects respectively should become clear. In fact, as Freud himself 
acknowledges, civilization, (late nineteenth, early twentieth century capitalism) is 
based almost wholly on repression as opposed to sublimation.115 Furthermore, 
insofar as sublimation exists, it is enjoyed only by a minority of the population 
concerned.116
The fate of the instincts is related, on the one hand, to the organism's need to 
relieve tension by maintaining a bearable level of energy and, on the other, its need to 
comply with (or evade) the 'super-ego' i.e. the requirements of its culture. If we think 
of the matter in terms of 'internal' and 'external' stimuli, then in the case of the latter, 
evasion or flight is possible up to a point, but not in relation to the former. The 
unavailability of the flight option leaves the possibility of repression, judgement or 
condemnation of an instinctual impulse which is forbidden by the culture. 
Repression is considered by Freud to be midway between condemnation and flight.
The original or foundational repressions are of incest and patricide, both being
117direct expressions of the Oedipus complex. In relation to these two related 
instinctual impulses, it is clear that the individual is in a contradictory situation since 
gratification of these impulses is almost bound to lead to punishment (whether 
inflicted by himself or the culture) and therefore a simultaneous loss of gratification.118 
Given an unfavourable balance in favour of the latter, the forbidden impulse will be 
repressed. Repressed items are either items which fail to emerge from the 
unconscious into consciousness, or which have been pushed down from consciousness 
into the unconscious. From the point of view of the individual organism, repression 
is clearly the most undesirable fate of the instincts since, unlike sublimation, it 
involves renunciation without compensation and produces painful symptoms whose
115 This is conceptualized by Marcuse (1987), ch. 2, in terms of 'surplus repression' and the 
'performance principle'
116 Freud (1985iii), pp. 191 - 2. We have the beginnings here o f a class-inflected account of 
sublimation, and repression.
117 Freud (1984iv). In this sense, Freud considers repression to be a universal fact of human life, 
coexistent with the unconscious. In this sense, too, the unconscious is both culturally and 
biologically constituted. Marxists such as Lichtman (1982) and Schneider (1975) will want to argue 
though, for the historical specificity of the unconscious and of repression.
118 See Freud (1974i), for a clear account of this point.
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precise nature need not concern us here.119 The maintenance of repressions requires 
high levels of energy; energy which would otherwise go to strengthen and nourish the 
ego. Put another way, where cultural membership is based largely on repression, 
what we find is a weakly-organized ego - one who is subject to the contradictory 
dictates of the id and the super-ego. The subject constituted by repression is clearly 
not the subject required for communal transformative action since this subject is a 
fragile, guilt- and anxiety-ridden subject whose repressions are likely to erupt in 
various forms of neurotic behaviour. Let us now see how sublimation differs from 
repression.
Sublimation
120Sublimation is one of Freud's most underdeveloped concepts. Ricoeur goes so far
121as to describe it as an 'empty' concept. Nevertheless, it is an indispensable concept 
here for two related reasons. First, it is central to the general project of articulating
psychoanalysis to Marxism. Second, it is the means of developing a theoretically
122enriched account of the institutionalization of a transformative communal actor. It 
is this concept which can help us to understand the requirements for reintegrating 
individuality, self-discipline and self-realization with communal social relationships. 
It will be of interest then, to see what Freud has to say about it.
Whereas repression results in the non-satisfaction of instincts, sublimation brings 
about substitute satisfactions, thereby effecting the best possible reconciliation 
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. According to Freud, 
sublimation makes possible 'higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or
123ideological'. It is related to the forming of an ideal and is
a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct's directing 
itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; 
in this process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality. Idealization is 
a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any alteration in 
its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind.124
However, it should be remembered that the formation of an ego ideal can lead to 
repression rather than sublimation. Idealization is not in itself sublimation. It
119 Freud (1984iv, 1984v). See Brennan (1992), ch. 2.
120 See Freud (1985iii).
121 See discussion in Ricoeur (1970), pp. 483 - 92.
122 Seve (1978), p. 149, in assessing Freudian psychoanalysis as a possible candidate for providing 
Marxism with its necessary psychology, rejects it on the sole grounds that it has nothing to say about 
'labour'. In fact, Freud's concept of sublimation is the basis for a thorough critique of abstract labour 
and commodity fetishism.
123 Freud (1985iv), p. 267.
124 Freud (1984ii), p. 88, (emphasis in original).
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involves an overestimation of an object and therefore the impoverishment of the 
subject.125 While the ego ideal demands sublimation, it cannot enforce it.126 In fact, 
insofar as the ego ideal is interpreted as a response to a 'narcissistic hurt', it is unlikely 
to result in identifications productive of either the strong ego (sublimation) or 
superego.127 Sublimation is the outcome of 'an abandonment of sexual aims'; it 
requires the displacement but not the repression of energy. It is connected with the 
alteration of the ego by means of identifications. It requires, not the engulfment of 
the ego in an idealized object, but, rather, a strong ego with an active and libidinal 
orientation towards objects. It is in this way that we can understand the psychic 
requirements for membership of radically democratic cultures and therefore for 
communal transformative action.
Freud relates the phenomenon specifically to social relations, as when he says 'A
certain kind of modification of the aim and change of the object, in which our social
128valuation is taken into account, is described by us as "sublimation"'. At this point, 
Freud refuses to follow through, or turns away from, his own insight. That is to say, 
he balks at stating that sublimation as a possible fate for the instincts is dependent, 
not only on innate human characteristics, but on cultural conditions, although many of
129his own statements imply this. The sublimation of instincts relates to the capacity, 
as well as the culturally-available opportunity, to turn outwards, to act upon the 
world in a transformative manner. While Freud himself does not always insist on the 
necessary sociality of sublimation, this is implicit at least in most of his formulations 
and it is clearly a crucial component of the concept if it is to be articulated to 
Marxism.
This is what Freud has to say about the relationship between the transition from 
pleasure to reality principle and its relationship to sublimation:
[T]he endopsychic impression made by this substitution [of the reality 
principle for the pleasure principle] has been so powerful that it is reflected in 
a special religious myth. The doctrine of reward in the after-life for the - 
voluntary or enforced - renunciation of earthly pleasures is nothing other than 
a mythical projection of this revolution in the mind. Following consistently 
along these lines, religions have been able to effect absolute renunciation of 
pleasure in this life by means of the promise of compensation in a future 
existence; but they have not by this means achieved a conquest of the pleasure 
principle. It is science which comes nearest to succeeding in that conquest;
125 Mitchell (1975), p. 35.
126 Freud (1984vii) discusses this further, p. 369. See also Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985); Jacobson 
(1954); Reich (1953, 1954).
127 Reich (1954), p. 219.
128 Freud (1973iii), p. 129.
129 See F reud (1985iv) particularly.
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science too, however, offers intellectual pleasure during its work and promises
130practical gain in the end.
So, the true conquest of the pleasure principle is through sublimation, not repression,
131whether the latter be achieved through coercion or mystification. At times, Freud 
seems to suggest that sublimation, in relation to the demands of civilization, is 
possible only for the exceptional, as in the following:
Another technique for fending off suffering is the employment of the 
displacements of the libido which our mental apparatus permits of and through 
which its function gains so much inflexibility. The task here is that of shifting 
the instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration 
from the external world. In this, sublimation of the instincts lends its 
assistance. One gains the most if one can sufficiently heighten the yield of 
pleasure from the sources of psychical and intellectual work. When that is so, 
fate can do little against one. A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist's joy 
in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a scientist's in solving problems or 
discovering truths, has a special quality which we shall certainly one day be
132able to characterize in metapsychological terms.
Note here again, as in the quotation above, the reference to science, as well as art, as 
offering a particularly fruitful avenue to sublimation. However, this avenue may be 
also open to those without exceptional talents or capacities. So
When there is no special disposition in a person which imperatively prescribes 
what direction his interests in life shall take, the ordinary professional work 
that is open to everyone can play the part assigned to it in Candide, to 
cultivate one's garden, Voltaire's wise advice. It is not possible, within the 
limits of a short survey, to discuss adequately the significance of work for the 
economics of the libido ... The possibility it offers of displacing a large amount 
of libidinal components, whether narcissistic, aggressive, or even erotic, on to 
professional work and on to the human relations connected with it lends a 
value by no means second to what it enjoys as something indispensable to the 
preservation and justification of existence in society. Professional activity is a 
source of special satisfaction if it is a freely chosen one - if, that is to say, by 
means of sublimation, it makes possible the use of existing inclinations, of
133persisting or constitutionally reinforced instinctual impulses.
As Freud is aware, then, sublimation is fundamentally and constitutively a socio­
cultural rather than intra-psychic phenomenon. It requires institutional means of 
development i.e. it requires the cultivation of human sociality through appropriate
130 Freud (19841), p. 41.
131 See Freud (1985iii).
132 Freud (1985iv), p. 267.
133 Ibid., p. 268, n. 1.
201
intimate familial relations. However, the concept and the empirical possibility to 
which it refers depends heavily on a capacity for, and striving towards, sociality, as 
well as a related capacity for self-fulfilment in 'freely chosen' activity in the world. In 
Freudian terms, the institutionalization of sublimatory rather than repressive social 
relations renders less painful the contradiction (within the individual) between self­
absorption and sociability. As noted before, Freud's account of sublimation is 
assimilable to Marx's account of 'labour' as praxis as discussed in chapter five above. 
Both sublimation and praxis are the most satisfying, humanly-fulfilling 'fate' for the 
subject. Both require and nurture sociality (libidinal bonding) and the capacity for 
directing sustained, self-disciplined attention at valued objects in the world. As 
noted before, this latter capacity is developed as the subject makes the transition from 
primary to secondary processes.
The primary process
In order to understand this process, we need for the moment to view the human 
organism as a mental apparatus (psyche) at the service of a system of matter-energy 
whose goal it is to observe the constancy principle.134 The observance of this
135principle requires the 'mastering [of] stimuli'. It is the infant's dawning realization 
of the impossibility of this endeavour which leads it to progress from the primary 
process to the secondary process, as follows.
The primary process is based on a hallucinatory reaction to stimulation. That is 
to say, it involves the indiscriminating, instant cathexis of psychical energy to 
hallucinatory objects. The psyche governed by the primary process has neither 
memory nor the capacity for judgement and attention. Put another way, it cannot tell 
reality from phantasy. There is no sense of judgement or discrimination in terms of 
the object cathected with energy. By the process of displacement one idea may yield 
to another (or receive from another) the whole of its energy; by the process of 
condensation it may receive the total sum of energy previously cathected to several 
other ideas. In fact, the processes of displacement and condensation are the 
distinguishing marks of the primary psychical process, as noted before. That is to 
say, the extreme mobility of energy or lack of fixity is a mark of the early stages of 
development of the human being.
134 This can be interpreted as either (a) maintaining the level of energy at a dynamic equilibrium or (b) 
reducing it to a minimum level. See Freud (1966) Sect. 1, Pt. Ill; (1984iii), pp. 115, 117; (1984vi) 
especially p. 360. See also Brennan (1992), pp. 108 - 9; Laplanche & Pontalis (1973), p. 346.
135 Freud (1984iii), p. 116. See also Freud (1966) where this idea first makes its appearance.
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This extreme mobility led Freud to speculate in The Dissection of the Psychical 
Personality', that the energy of the 'instinctual impulses' arising from the id is different 
than that found in other regions of the mental apparatus, being 'far more mobile and
136capable of discharge'. This is free energy which 'flows towards discharge in the
137speediest and most direct fashion possible', as opposed to bound energy which 
accumulates and remains within particular neurones or systems of neurones. Bound
138energy 'holds fast' to its cathexes. It is necessary both for thinking and for the 
formation and maintenance of strong and stable social relations.
The attempt to master stimuli leads the human organism to an understanding of 
the difference between itself (an 'inside') and an independently existing environment 
(an 'outside') as it comes to identify different sources of stimuli and different ways of 
mastering, failing to master, or of accommodating itself to these. At the same time, the 
infant is somehow required to 'take in' to himself what is outside. In the Freudian 
account of subject-formation, this 'taking in' is crucial. If all goes well - i.e. if the 
external environment is neither too indulgent nor too indifferent - the child will 
develop its human capacities for thought and self-discipline (capacity to delay 
gratification) and for libidinal cathexis. Such developments allow the infant to 
identify real, as opposed to hallucinatory, sources of satisfaction. This involves the 
development of a sense of a reality which is the source simultaneously of frustration
1 IQand of satisfaction. Moreover, it requires that the infant learn to overcome (rather 
than being overwhelmed by) its sense of frustration. Here cognition and affect are 
inextricably intertwined as the need to get to know the world initiates in the infant a 
process of thinking and of libidinally bonding with objects in the world
From primary to secondary process
The development from primary to secondary process can be understood in terms of 
the emergence of the capacity to direct attention outwards.140 It should be stressed, 
though, that the direction of attention outwards also requires a direction of attention 
inwards. Attention connotes the self-conscious, active and sustained direction of 
psychic energy towards specific objects, purposes or projects. However, as noted 
above, this kind of attention is produced only as the result of a process of differention 
which is also an educative process whereby the individual human organism develops a 
strong sense of both a self and an independently existing external world. Chapter four
136 Freud (1973i), p. 107. This is attributed to Breuer in Freud (1984v), p. 190.
137 Laplanche & Pontalis (1973), p. 171.
138 Freud (1966). See also Freud (1984vi); Brennan (1992).
139 See Bion (1962a); Brennan (1992); Winnicott (1991).
140 Brennan (1992), ch. 3.
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has offered a discussion of the institutional requirements for the production of this 
dual inward and outward orientation in bourgeois subjects. In effect, my argument is 
that the secondary process becomes institutionalized under specific cultural historical 
conditions rather than being, as Freud takes it to be, the universal form of human 
development.141
It is in the 'Project' that Freud first discusses attention.142 The term connotes 'an 
active deployment of psychophysical energy, or rather is an act of deployment of that 
energy', activity here being associated with externality.143 As Strachey points out, in 
the 'Project' Freud treats attention, which he relates to the function of'reality-testing', 
as 'one of the principal forces at work in the mental apparatus'.144 It is based on a 
correct assessment of the possibility of gratification. In order to make a correct 
assessment, delay between the point of stimulation and gratification is essential. 
Reality-testing requires inhibition (delayed gratification) and can only take place on 
the basis of memory. Through the development of memories of occasions of past 
satisfactions and frustrations, the psyche learns to discriminate between imagined 
objects of desire and real objects of desire. This is a turning outwards towards an 
independently-existing 'real world'. In fact, the first memory is the point from which 
the ego develops, since it is the capacity to discriminate between reality and phantasy 
which is the defining characteristic of 'ego organization'. Unlike the primary process 
which involves hallucination and extreme volatility of cathexes, the secondary process 
involves a strong sense of the relative stability of internal and external objects, i.e. of a 
self and a knowable and known environment. The latter is known and knowable 
because it affords fairly (but not wholly) predictable, reliable sources of gratification 
to the individual subject. It is a source, not only of constraints or frustrations, but 
also of enablements or gratifications. It is this combination which is vital for the 
emergence of the active social subject.
The ego is, as Brennan puts it, 'a mass of constantly cathected neurones or 
established pathways; it is the totality of psychical cathexes at a given time'.145 The 
subject with a well-developed ego is a subject with the capacity for exercising 
judgement by the fixing of attention on (cathecting) the external world in a sustained 
and knowledgeable manner. This ability in turn elicits an active attitude towards the 
world. For Freud, there is a relationship between the ability to concentrate, to think 
systematically and the capacity to bind energy.146 Here we have a biological-cultural 
explanation - which is also an affective-rational explanation - for the origin and
141 See Baudrillard (1993), ch. 5; Kakar (1981).
142 Freud (1966).
143 See ibid.; also Brennan, (1992), p. 96; Ricoeur (1970), pp. 69 - 86; Wollheim (1973).
144 in Freud (1984v), Fn. 2, p. 197.
145 Brennan (1992), p. 112.
146 Ricoeur (1970), p. 82.
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development of intellection.147 This is an explanation which maps onto Gramsci's 
account of the relational and knowledge requirements for the constitution of the 
transformative communal actor, as discussed in chapter seven.
The replacement of the primary process by the secondary process is, in effect, 
the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle, or as Freud puts it, 
the emergence of the 'definitive reality-ego' out of the 'initial pleasure-ego'.148 It 
should be noted though that this is a development which does not negate, but rather 
advances the purposes of the pleasure principle. It does this by aiding the correct 
identification of objects which are not only 'good' (i.e. potentially satisfying) from the 
point of view of the emergent subject but also 'real' i.e. are available in the external 
world so that the child has access to them whenever necessary.149 Moreover, these 
objects are considered to be 'good' on the basis of real experience, that is to say, they 
are objects which have become lost but 'which once brought real satisfaction'.150 In 
this way: 'A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in 
order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time.'151 The emerging 
capacity to think, to correctly evaluate the character of oneself and one's environment 
leads both to postonement of satisfaction and the later enjoyment of a more genuine 
and enduring satisfaction. It is in this way that we can come to understand how 
apparently a-social (or even anti-social) human organisms can come to have cathected 
(invest with energy) objects which do not afford the possibility of immediate 
gratification; that they can come to love in the broad sense mentioned above. To the 
degree that sociality is taken to be innate, then the trajectory becomes both more 
understandable and more reliably to be expected. It becomes less open to anti-social 
eruptions. Where the external environment (the culture) is inherently confusing, 
indifferent or even hostile, then, as Freud himself notes, internalization is not to be 
expected and sublimation is therefore impossible.
I now turn to relate the concepts of sublimation and secondary process to the account 
of radically democratic political mobilization.
147 See Moi (1989).
148 Freud (19841), p. 439.
149 Ibid.
150 Freud (1984i), p. 440.
151 Ibid., p. 41, (emphases in original). For a more extended discussion of religion and science in 
terms of effecting a reconciliation (or even transcendence) of the pleasure principle and reality principle, 
see Freud (1973ii).
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Psychoanalysis and political mobilization
Identifications
1 ^9The concept of identification is central to Freud's account of political mobilization.
It is through identifications based on a shared emotional quality that lasting bonds are 
constituted between individuals, for Freud. That shared quality is likely to consist in 
a 'tie with a leader', although it may also be a shared ideal or doctrine.153 In fact group 
members experience a double tie, with each other and with the leader.154 A path leads 
from identification, through imitation to empathy. At this point, it is important to 
note the character of relationship deemed by Freud to obtain between leader and led.
As will be seen, Freud's own work on groups (or on 'political love', as Borch- 
Jacobsen155 puts it) cannot be used in conjunction with that of Gramsci, since he 
(Freud) can conceive of groups only as 'hordes' i.e. as groups characterized by a 
specific kind of manipulative relationship between leaders and led. That is to say, he 
privileges the role of the group leader and, furthermore, equates the relationship 
between leader and led with that between hypnotist and subject. What this means is 
that group members are deemed to be in a passive relationship with the leader whose 
commands are followed in an automatic, unselfconscious and uncritical manner, 
although, from the followers' point of view, 'as if the actions were their own. This is 
a kind of 'heteropathic' identification whereby the group becomes absorbed in the 
leader.156 It is emphatically not the kind of ego-strengthening, enriching identification 
which Freud sees as necessary for the emergence of the bourgeois subject and which 
Gramsci sees as necessary for proletarian revolutionary action and therefore for a 
strong form of political commitment. The boy child's identification with the strong 
father is a nurturing, enabling identification which will result in a strong ego and 
therefore the emergence of those capacities which have been discussed above. Here 
submission to (internalization of) authority is the basis for achieving some distance 
from that authority (and therefore a sense of individual personal efficacy and 
competence). Insofar as the parental relationship to the male child is both loving and 
demanding, it lays the basis for a relatively autonomous adult; one who experiences a 
balance between attachment and detachment i.e. a strong active social subjectivity.
Since it is precisely those capacities which are required for the emergence of the 
transformative communal actor, as described by Gramsci, then Freud's essay on group 
psychology is not the place to look for a psychoanalytic account of political
152 Freud (1985ii), ch. VII.
153 Ibid., p. 137.
154 Ibid., ch. V.
155 Borch-Jacobsen (1988), pp. 153 - 163.
156 Ibid., pp. 211, 213, 275 en. 57.
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mobilization. This essay shows precisely what is not required if transformative 
communal action is to take place. In the Freudian account, rationality rests with the 
leader and libidinal bonding does not eventuate in sublimation. Rather, it has a 
religious character, and therefore rests on repression.157 I shall now return to 
Gramsci so as to pursue the matter further.
Political mobilization: the Oedipal model
Recall that both Gramsci and Marx are aware of the political significance of the 
affective and cognitive debility brought about by capitalism as well as of the 
inadequacies of purely local pre-capitalist knowledge. To remain with Gramsci, what 
he seeks to bring about is the synthesis of the affective strength of local face-to-face 
relationships and the cognitive strength of philosophical and scientific knowledge. 
By these means, it will be possible to constitute a transformative communal ('national 
popular1) actor i.e. a group which is not a 'horde', or a tactical coalition of sub-national 
groups, or an aggregate of self-interested individuals. Moreover this synthesis is to 
be achieved by means of the voluntary, educated and enthusiastic commitment of 
individual members of the collective actor. Expressed in psychoanalytic terms, this is 
a synthesis of sublimation and the secondary process.
I suggest that it is fruitful to think of the Gramscian (and indeed the Marxian) 
organic intellectual in terms of the categories of sublimation and secondary process. 
Whereas all intellectuals are necessarily governed by the secondary process, not all 
have sublimated their need for instinctual gratification by channeling their energies into 
socially valuable and demanding activities of the kind with which we are concerned, 
activities, that is, requiring empathy, or - in Freud's terms - activities requiring 
libidinal bonds. The Gramscian term 'organic' as applied to intellectuals refers to the 
latter capacity, while the terms 'mechanical' or 'rationalistic' refer to intellectuals as 
experts and bureaucrats who are incapable of engaging in the kinds of relationships 
needed to effect progressive (voluntary and self-conscious) transformation in a given 
population. Bureaucrats (of the kind discussed by Marx and Gramsci) are governed 
by the secondary process but are unlikely to be capable of sublimation. Whereas 
sublimation is impossible without the secondary process, it is possible to find the 
secondary process without sublimation. Where the secondary process is undiluted by
158sublimation, what we find is rationalization. Or at least, there is a constant 
temptation towards rationalistic, mechanistic relations, relations moreover which are 
inherently and permanently hierarchical.
157 Freud (1985iii).
158 For Benjamin (1990), this is the most likely (even inevitable) outcome of the Oedipal complex, 
given Freud's stress on the father.
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As we have seen, the emergence of the bourgeois subject was effected through a 
nexus of institutions productive of directly-experienced personal social relations in 
different spheres. Through these institutions, neither the individual nor the social 
was effaced. Directly experienced social relations enabled the emergent subject to 
experience his environment as separate but not wholly hostile or deaf to his desires. 
We have found when examining Gramsci's work in chapter seven that he is concerned 
with providing a similar nexus of institutions productive of the active, social, self- 
disciplined subject. Hegemony requires attentiveness to the needs (both 'economic' 
and 'cultural') of the population to be mobilized. Through such attentiveness, that 
population will come to identify with (will cathect with libidinal energy) the goal of 
universal human liberation as a real concrete goal i.e. as embodied in social relations. 
As the constitution of the bourgeois subject is an ongoing process which is challenging 
and difficult (but also ultimately rewarding) for parents and children, so too is the 
constitution of the transformative communal actor. Both require the development of 
affective and cognitive capacities (which are in any case intertwined). In this sense, 
the psychoanalytic account of the origin of intellection offers support for Gramsci's 
sense that thought, affect and the capacity for transformative action are inter­
related.159
The party: sublimation or repression? 160
Before concluding I need to address the question of the party. As we have seen in 
chapter seven, Gramsci is hoping that an organically constituted party will be capable 
of avoiding the rationalizing, bureaucratic character of modernizing politics. The 
stress on organic intellectual rather than professional revolutionary is intended to 
convey this point. Such a party would function as a law of the stem but loving father; 
it would be a new and genuine source of authority (genuine in the sense that it would 
educate and bring to maturity the population over whom it exercized its authority). 
Gramsci's 'New Prince' would be, in effect, a mass social movement whose activities 
would be coordinated by a vanguard party which would avoid the dangers of 
vanguardism because of the kinds of social relations which it had been set up to foster. 
Such a party would constitute a new source of authoritative relations which would be 
at the same time relations between (equal) active social subjects. In effect, the 
constitution of the party - the very source of its authoritative power - would be 
simultaneously the constitution of such subjects who would, by definition, be 
available for neither coercive nor manipulative forms of mobilization. The law of the
159 See Bion (1962a); Moi (1989). See Damasio (1995) for more recent evidence from the world of 
neurology.
160 Lichtman (1982) touches on this question, but unfortunately fails to develop a coherent argument.
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father would be transmuted into the law of the party i.e. the principle of universal
human emancipation. This would be the only acceptable form of authority in a
radically democratic age.
In fact, any talk of authority is likely to be translated by its critics into talk of
domination.161 In addition, unified and all-embracing projects of emancipation such
as that proposed by Gramsci are now viewed with universal suspicion as either
fundamentally misguided or as a disguise for power politics of the most oppressive 
162kind. Local and pluralistic politics is the form taken by radical politics now. The 
claim that a 'New Prince' could be the means of transcending the social and cognitive 
debility instituted by pure capitalism is unlikely to attract many adherents, post-
163Marxism being exemplary in this respect. Those seeking to initiate transformative 
communal action must look elsewhere for the necessary organizational means of 
education/coordination. The Gramscian party cannot now be the basis of a concrete 
phantasy.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have begun to bring together the different elements of the argument 
by developing further its psychoanalytic component. The task has been to reveal the 
psychic aspect of both the social and cognitive requirements for transformative 
communal action and the peculiar social and cognitive debility instituted by pure 
capitalism. The work of Freud on the founding and development of the ego (the 
bourgeois subject) has been the vehicle for the first; the work of Lacan on the 
proletarian and decentred subjects (the subjects of pure capitalism) has been the 
vehicle for the second.
Whereas Freud's own work is marked by the kind of suspiciousness of the 
emotional which we would expect from modem scientific intellectuals (most marked in 
his confused work on social psychology) he does afford the theoretical means of 
transcending dichotomous and disabling thought. Indeed this is one of the great 
virtues of his work. Freud's account of the Oedipal family has afforded the means of 
thinking systematically about the cognitive-affective foundations of the bourgeois 
subject. We have seen the importance of directly experienced, embodied, stable and 
reliable social relations in the emergence and development of an active social
161 Benjamin (1977) is a useful and relevant example here.
162 Of the new school of collective action theorists, Touraine (1981) comes closest to Gramsci in that 
he focuses on the role of radical intellectuals in facilitating the emancipation of marginalized groups. 
At the same time he resolutely rejects any notion of the vanguard party.
163 In this respect, it is interesting to note post-Marxism’s reticence on the matter of organic 
intellectuals. See Laclau (1990iii), pp. 177 - 196.
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subjectivity of the kind required for the constitution of political commitment in 
strongly individuated capitalist cultures. These social relations constitute the first 
reality for the emergent subject. We have noted the significance of a strongly felt 
sense of a stable, enduring and not wholly hostile or unresponsive (but also not 
wholly accommodating) reality outside of the subject for the development of 
individual capacities for thought, judgement and a reliable sense of memory. This 
development endows the individual with the necessary sense of sociality and of 
competence as well as the motivation to engage in an active social manner with the 
outside world.
Turning to Lacan, we receive the message that no such world exists or, that the 
world of directly experienced social relations is the mere artefact of an impersonal and 
overwhelming system i.e. the symbolic. Lacan's stress on the symbolic has the effect 
of subsuming the embodied and relational character of subject-formation under the 
symbolic as systemically experienced imperative and of ejecting both innate and 
emergent sociality from his account of human nature.164 Hence the expected 
painfulness of and resistance to the humanization process, as we have seen above. 
While Lacan sees this as the necessary effect of the universal logic of language, I am 
arguing that this painfulness is also (and more significantly) related to the cognitive 
opacity and lack of responsiveness of the world in which the capitalist subject finds 
himself. Hence the preoccupation with the 'gap', 'lack' or insatiability experienced by 
the subject as conceptualized by Lacan. Hence the erosion of political commitment as 
pinpointed by post-Marxism.
From my point of view, the profound significance of the impossibility of filling 
the 'gap', or sense of fragmentation and lack which characterizes the decentred subject 
is that it eliminates the possibility of achieving sublimation, since sublimation requires 
a strong 'organized' ego which is formed by means of identifications of a particular 
kind.165 This is a subject who has effected a consolatory identification with a parent 
(most importantly the father in Freud's account) through the inhibition of libidinal 
aims. The ability to inhibit aims in this way is directly related to the capacity to form 
'permanent ties' with others.166 What should be clear from the discussion of Lacan's 
work is that the process required for this outcome - i.e. the successful resolution of 
the Oedipus complex - is not and cannot be in place in liberal capitalist cultures.
167Therefore sublimation becomes unavailable as a vicissitude of the instincts. This 
is a subject who has been formed by the abstract institutions constituted by
164 In fact, Borch-Jacobsen (1991), p. 129, suggests that Lacan is attempting to rescue sociality by 
means of a 'therapy of the socius'.
165 See Hamilton (1993) for an argument about the continuity rather than discontinuity between the 
human infant and its socio-cultural environment.
166 Freud (1985ii), p. 172.
167 Lacan has little to say about this matter. See Lacan (1980v), pp 165 - 6.
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capitalism - i.e Althusser's specialized legal, political and ideological relations - which
168'brand men in their flesh and blood, just as the production relation does.' Insofar as 
pure capitalism has been instituted, then secondary process thinking will be expressed 
in rationalization i.e. in a world of fetishized social relations oriented to the production 
of surplus value. In such a world, the strong social sense needed to effect sublimation 
will not be present. The subject will be the monadic atomistic subject. As was 
argued in section three of this chapter, secondary process functioning and sublimation 
express the combined characteristics of sociality, creativity and the specific kind of 
cognitive theoretical abilities required to carry out effective transformative action on 
capitalist cultures. The psychoanalytical categories therefore complete the theoretical 
framework needed to explain the erosion of political commitment in liberal capitalist 
cultures.
In the final chapter, I recapitulate the argument while at the same time grounding 
it more precisely in the stages of capitalism which were first discussed briefly in 
chapter two.
168 Althusser (1990v), p. 238.
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Chapter nine
The argument concluded
In this final chapter, I complete the argument by showing the institutional basis of the 
decentred subjectivity whose character and political consequences were first explored 
in chapter three. This discussion will be prefaced by a brief examination of 
organized capitalism which will help to clarify claims about the significance of the 
displacement/condensation contrast and bring out the distinctiveness of disorganized 
institutions. The account will be informed by the dichotomous categories which I am 
using to capture the debilitating character of capitalist forms of subjectivity.
I 
Organized capitalism and the proletarian subject
The individual/society dichotomy
The characteristics of organized capitalism were indicated in chapter two and the 
exploration of its subject effects was begun in chapter four by means of Althusser's 
work on the ISAs. As we noted there, this work is seriously underdeveloped but 
nevertheless highly suggestive and useful in terms of the argument of this thesis. In 
addition to pointing the way towards a more rigorous and systematic articulation of 
psychoanalysis to Marxism than was achieved by members of the Frankfurt School, 
Althusser hints at the source of the a-sociality which he appears to take as innate to 
the to-be-humanized organism. This hint points us towards the 'violence of 
abstraction' inflicted on these organisms by capitalist cultures and returns us to Marx 
for an explanation of this abstraction. I suggest that it is this violence rather than any 
innate human characteristic which produces the sense of lack experienced by these 
subjects.1 In view of this lack and the claims made by post-Marxism about its 
political effects, we need to explore further the (apparent) docility implied by 
Althusser in his portrayal of capitalist subject-constitution: 'kneel down, move your 
lips in prayer and you will believe'. This suggests an internalization of cultural values 
for which Althusser's discussion had not prepared us, as noted in chapter four. The
1 I am not arguing, however, against the possibility of the existence of an intra-psychic contradiction, 
as posited by Freud (1985iv). See also Deleuze and Guattari (1983). This contradiction, though, is 
not necessarily (although it may be) experienced as the acute sense of lack with which we are concerned 
here.
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suggestion that habituation results in internalization is at odds with Althusser's own 
account of subjectivity but points us in the direction of more fruitful explorations. If 
docility does in fact exist during the organized stage of capitalism, it may be due either 
to the total malleability of humanity - a position in accord with Althusser's theoretical 
anti-humanism but not with his portrayal of resistance to humanization in FL - or to 
the relative benignancy of organized capitalism. The latter possibility is derived 
from Freud's belief that 'an internalization' of 'cultural prohibitions' by 'suppressed 
people is not to be expected.'2 I shall now discuss the likelihood that the 
characteristics of organized capitalism are such as to invoke internalization. If this is 
the case, then political commitment to the attainment of collective goals remains a 
possibility during this stage of capitalism.
To begin with, we need to note that the requirements of organized capitalism 
serve to mitigate the alienation3 instituted by pure capitalism. This mitigation comes 
about in two related (although also contradictory) ways. First, the socialization of 
labour through mass production produces some of the effects of association expected 
by Marx (discussed in chapter six); it reinstitutes sociality of a kind, albeit 
unwittingly. Second, the decommodification put in train through state-directed 
activity renders the social bond visible. The characteristic use-value production of this 
stage of capitalism - i.e. iron and steel, as noted in chapter two - requires mass 
production, efficient coordination, standardization and bureaucratization.4 These 
requirements produce an overt and explicit partnership between state and market - a 
partnership which receives its theoretical apotheosis in the work of Keynes.5
Keynesianism is not just a set of economic prescriptions for reinstating capital 
accumulation and economic growth, but a metanarrative which links the fates of 
different classes and strata within the state which can thereby be experienced by a 
particular population as a nation-state.6 This, though, is a metanarrative which is 
translated into functionally-related practices kept in place by political power in the 
shape of the state. The result is that the contradictory character of capitalism is 
experientially insignificant during this period, as is also displacement (i.e. metonymic 
causality). Put another way, subject-positions are relatively coherent and also 
relatively fixed. Moreover, because the state is visibly involved in benign activities 
on behalf of the population at large, the social bond is visibly expressed through a
2 Freud (1985iii), p. 191.
3 I am using the concept of alienation to refer to the social debility instituted by capitalism. The 
concept of fetishism refers to cognitive debility. While these two forms of debility are related, they 
can also be differentially instituted in different stages of capitalism, as will be seen.
4 Aglietta (1979); Reich (1991).
5 Middlemass (1979).
6 See Poulantzas (1978a, 1978b).
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range of bureaucratic measures (i.e. welfare provision).7 The welfare state institutes 
respect for workers through the partial decommodification of labour. So some of the 
most dehumanizing aspects of industrial capitalism (as described by Marx) are 
marginalized through combined changes in the labour process and through 
Keynesianism. At the same time (and relatedly), these workers are beginning to 
experience a relatively new kind of enjoyment, namely the consumption of 
commodities (satisfaction of artificial needs, in Marxian terms).8 Workers who are 
becoming affluent are workers who are turning to the joys of consumption and to the 
'private' intimate familial sphere.9 In terms of the social relations which it institutes, 
the dynamic of organized capitalism is a contradictory dynamic of 
socialization/atomization. Socialization by means of association in the factory faces a 
two-fold threat: first, the bureaucratization of trades unions; second, the atomization 
(privatization) of increasingly affluent workers. This two-fold threat involves the 
displacement of individual attention from the public to the private sphere. Put 
another way, insofar as it is realized, it produces political passivity, or at most a 
limited kind of interest group politics (Gramsci's 'economic-corporative' politics) 
which largely takes the form of corporatism.10
As noted above, organized capitalism institutes a relatively fixed form of 'lived 
experience' for the subjects it constitutes. The proletarian subject is interpellated in a 
relatively fixed mode through career structures for professional strata, jobs for life for 
manual workers and 'cradle to grave' provision of welfare services for all.11 
Furthermore, the individual subject experiences relatively stable and embodied social 
relations in the different spheres making up the totality. Therefore the capacity for 
sociality does not atrophy. What this means is that the individual as functionary is 
subordinated to cultural imperatives which are (or can be) experienced as relatively 
benign.12 This can help us to understand the docility of the proletarian subject as the 
docility induced by the 'one-dimensional' or 'totally administered' society.13
For these reasons a minimal sense of the social bond remains at the experiential 
level under organized (welfare state) capitalism, although always rendered vulnerable 
to the individual/society dichotomy. Expressed in psychoanalytic terms, the nexus 
of institutions produced by this stage of capitalism represents the Lacanian Law of 
the Father (the symbolic)14 whose interpellations can be experienced as authoritative
7 Baldwin (1990) refers to this in terms of the 'politics of social solidarity1.
8 Falk (1994); Haug (1987); Honneth (1995); Marcuse (1986). Plant (1992) provides an account of the 
significant body of French post-1945 theory concerned with these questions.
9 Goldthorpe et al (1968).
10 See Goldthorpe (1984); Lash & Urry (1987), ch. 8; Maier (1984); Schmitter (1974).
11 See Baldwin (1990) on welfare provision;Sampson (1995) on the occupational structure.
12 Thomas (1984) offers a Marxist argument to this effect.
13 Keane (1984); Marcuse (1986).
14 See Donzelot (1980) on the 'patriarchal state'. See also Barrett & McIntosh (1982).
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(and therefore be internalized) because, although systemically engendered, they remain 
to a significant degree instituted by means of personal rather than impersonal relations 
and are furthermore not wholly indifferent to the needs of individual subjects. So 
long as the welfare state is in operation and reliable and relatively well-paid work is 
available, the environment is not experienced as wholly unresponsive by proletarian 
subjects. The result is that popular energies can be mobilized to some degree for 
collective purposes. In effect, the individual/society dichotomy is not fully instituted 
during the organized stage of capitalism which combines socializing and atomizing 
practices. This is not to say, though, that the 'work of culture' is achieved by means 
of sublimation. It is through repression rather than sublimation that the requirements 
of organized capitalism are secured. Collective purposes are fulfilled up to a point by 
such subjects, but not in the active, knowledgeable and participatory way which is 
required for sublimation, as discussed in chapter eight. I now turn to the second 
dichotomy.
The subjective/objective dichotomy
Unlike the individual/society dichotomy, the subjective/objective dichotomy is fully 
instituted during this stage of capitalism, in both economic and political spheres. In 
the former, abstract labour is instituted; in the latter bureaucratic collective action 
(albeit supported by a kind of passive communal impulse, as just noted). Expressed 
in psychoanalytic terms, the organized stage of capitalism institutes the secondary 
process at the systemic rather than subjective level. It is in this way that the 
cognitive debility to which Marx alerts us can be psychically expressed. A brief 
recapitulation of Marx's account will be helpful at this point.
The institution of abstract labour requires the division between mental and 
manual labour and the reduction of individual labourers to appendages of machines. 
As the individuality of workers is effaced under the real subsumption of labour by 
capital, so also the consciousness of individual workers ceases to be a constitutive 
element of the production process. Continuity between subjective and objective - as 
experienced by the bourgeois subject - becomes unnecessary and even impossible as 
individual workers are reduced to minute - and interchangeable - elements in myriad 
different production processes whose overall character they are not required to 
comprehend. Workers are placed in the service of machines which are in turn minute 
elements in one particular part of one production process; they are at the service of a 
functional type of rationality - identitary-assemblist logic, in Castoriadis's terms.15 
This is a type of rationality which inheres in the system rather than the individual; a
15 See also Castoriadis (1987); Habermas (1987b), esp. Appendix.
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type of rationality whose operation would be impeded rather than aided by the active 
involvement of individual workers. The latter are required to carry out, without 
question, and as efficiently and as speedily as possible, sets of instructions of which 
they need have little or no understanding.16 Furthermore, these machines are seen 
by workers as the property and power of capital, as objective, impersonal power, 
rather than as the outcome of the social power of past labour. That is to say, 
organized capitalism institutes fetishism in the economic sphere. It involves the real 
subsumption of labour under capital. Otherwise expressed, it involves the 
constitution of the proletarian subject rendered passive in the face of the opacity of 
the vast impersonal system of which the subject is the support (although this 
hollowing out is mitigated by other developments discussed above).
This passivity is enhanced through the bureaucratization of collective action in 
the public sphere. As mentioned before, the kind of collective action which is 
characteristic of organized capitalism is bureaucratic action.17 Bureaucratic action is 
action carried out by elites as experts on behalf of or upon the population at large or 
targeted strata of the population. What it requires from a population is compliance 
rather than active involvement. In fact, such action can be carried on without any 
conscious engagement on the part of the population involved. Bureaucratic action 
intensifies the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. It constitutes a 
population as passive recipients of (and passive contributors to) public welfare. 
Under organized capitalism, the reality principle becomes increasingly elusive, as the 
complexities of the economic and political spheres and the increasing intrusion of 
expert knowledge into the intimate familial sphere undermine the possibility of an 
interactive process of development between individual and environment to which that 
principle refers.18 Reality testing takes place at the systemic, rather than individual 
level. This is what is meant by the claim that the secondary process is instituted at 
the collective rather than individual level and it is this state of affairs (one in which 
systematicity - i.e. functionality between the different spheres and practices - is 
institutionally sustained by means of state action) that Althusser's account of the 
ISAs expresses.
I now turn to discuss the disorganized stage of capitalism. In this section, the task is 
to render an institutional account of the 'dislocation' and 'surplus of meaning' whose 
subject effects have been intimated by post-Marxism, as discussed in chapter three.
16 Hence Taylorism's preference for unintelligent workers capable of performing as 'trained monkeys'. 
See Gorz (1989), ch. 3, also Kosik (1976), ch. n.
17See Lash & Urry (1987); Offe (1984).
18 Barrett & McIntosh (1982); Donzelot (1980); Lasch (1977, 1985); Poster (1978).
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II
Disorganized capitalism and the decentred subject
In this section, I complete the argument that disorganized capitalism in its pure form 
is productive of neither the cognitive nor affective capacities needed for sustained 
political commitment. This is because the dual dichotomies discussed in chapter five 
come close to full instantiation only during this period. As we have seen, these 
dichotomies produce novel kinds of cognitive and affective debilities which fragment 
and disable individual subjects in a culturally unprecedented manner. Expressed in 
terms of our psychoanalytic concerns, pure capitalism is a culture which is neither 
loveable nor knowable at the level of commonsense knowledge. In fact, the cognitive 
opacity of this culture is intensified during the disorganized stage due to the effects of 
microchip technology. At the same time, disorganized capitalism - unlike the 
organized stage just discussed - requires a new kind of active, knowledgeable subject 
and therefore apparently institutionalizes the knowledge requirements for confident, 
competent and effective action on the world. We will need to consider whether this 
development heralds the end of that 'paltriness' of labour which the law of value has 
required during the organized stage of capitalism and whether this is likely to have the 
political effects looked for by Marx and discussed in chapter six. These effects 
include the emergence (at the level of the individual subject) of action-facilitating 
knowledge of the world (which in reference to capitalist cultures is necessarily 
theoretical in the sense discussed in chapters two and six above) and the recovery of a 
directly experienced sense of social connectedness and interdependence. I have 
examined these requirements from a psychic point of view in chapter eight with the 
help of the psychoanalytic concepts of secondary process functioning and 
sublimation. To begin with, a brief recapitulation of the arguments made there will be 
useful.
Recall that the development of the cognitive and affective capacities needed for 
active social subjectivity requires a process of continuous, active engagement between 
individual infant and its environment. The latter must be experienced as fairly, but 
not wholly, responsive to the infant's needs. This enables the infant to experience a 
balance between total satisfaction and total frustration. It induces a toleration of 
temporary frustration which ensues in the willingness to tolerate delay; to effect a 
break between the wish (for gratification) and the realization of that gratification. 
What this tolerance of delay signifies is the initiation of a process of cognitive 
development whereby the infant begins to realize his potential for thought. Intra­
individual motivations for developing this potential emerge and are sustained as the
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small child comes to know that delay affords the possibility of experiencing less 
immediate but ultimately more satisfying forms of gratification. This is the transition 
from primary to secondary process thinking and (possibly) from repression to 
sublimation.19 Cognitive development is also simultaneously affective development 
since satisfaction is obtained through the ministrations of human 'objects' or, in 
Marxian terms, through social relations of a specific kind.
Lacan's work has been read as an analysis of the capitalist subject and therefore of 
the impossibility of making the transition from repression to sublimation. It is 
because Lacan's work (due to its hyperbolic character) best expresses the reality of 
this form of subjectivity (in the same way that Marx's thought experiment in Capital 
expresses the reality of pure capitalism) that he is so useful to us here. The linguistic 
turn as manifested in Lacan's privileging of the symbolic is an expression of fetishized 
social relations i.e. of impersonal social relations which produce atomistic subjects 
possessing a strong sense of impersonal dependence and personal independence. 
These are subjects who have lost their sense of necessary, human social 
connectedness and interdependence. At the same time, these are subjects without 
substance, that is to say, subjects without a strong sense of a self with enduring and 
stable contents. Hence the preoccupation in Lacanian theory with the split subject, 
the insatiable subject in the grip of substitutability.20 We have found that these 
subjects are governed to a significant degree by the primary process and are, in 
addition, incapable of the inhibition of libidinal aims required for sublimation, 
therefore for durable social ties. Lacan's interpretation of both the imaginary and 
symbolic as first, narcissistic, and second, impersonal in their functioning can enable 
us to understand why this is the case. Indeed the contrast between the hubris of the 
imaginary moment and the tyranny of the symbolic moment expresses quite neatly 
this state of affairs. Both 'moments' are expressive of a capitalist culture which 
promises individual autonomy while in fact constituting individuals as 'bearers of 
structures'. Such subjects are necessarily incapable of fulfilling the requirements for 
transformative communal action which have been discussed in chapters six, seven and 
eight. Moreover, they are not to be expected to commit themselves to more modest 
intra-cultural collective obligations. I shall now conclude my argument by going on to 
specify further the institutional nexus which produces this state of affairs.
Disorganized capitalism: an institutional analysis
19 In this work I can merely indicate the requirements for the instantiation of sublimation. Further 
work in this area requires the development of feminist arguments such as those of e.g. Benjamin (1990) 
and Brennan (1992).
20 Lacan (1979), ch. 16.
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Whereas organized capitalism mitigates the fetishizing and alienating effects of pure 
capitalism, disorganized capitalism intensifies these in ways which were first 
discussed in chapter three. During this stage of capitalism decommodification is 
reversed as the state advances the institutionalization of the law of value in spheres of 
activity hitherto protected from its effects. Moreover, the fragmentation and 
volatility produced by this change is intensified through the use of new kinds of 
technology. The result is the decentred subject. I shall now discuss these 
developments under the headings of dislocation and surplus o f meaning.
Dislocation As was seen in chapter three, post-Marxism uses the concept of 
dislocation to explain the volatility and fluidity of social relations experienced by 
decentred subjects. These are subjected to myriad interpellations which fix and unfix 
them in myriad subject positions which may or may not be congruent with one 
another. What dislocation refers to is the end of that post-1945 period of relative 
stability when, as noted above, the contradictoriness and displacements (metonymic 
causality) produced by free market capitalism were mitigated by welfare state 
capitalism.
Disorganized capitalism introduces volatility and the marked dilution of the social 
bond in several related ways. First, it reinstates the market as prime expression of 
that bond, with all the effects analyzed by Marx in Capital 1.21 Now the state is 
required to oversee the reinstatement of the law of value or even its introduction into 
spheres hitherto protected from it. Keynesianism is replaced by neo-liberalism so 
that individuals are now reinterpellated as self-interested, self-reliant, active, 
knowledgeable and flexibile subjects capable of taking charge of those matters hitherto 
under the direction of the state and of responding speedily and effectively to the 
requirements of the market. In effect, individuals are given new responsibilities for 
self-maintenance; they are interpellated as possessive subjects in MacPherson's sense, 
who owe nothing to and who should expect nothing from their culture, although they 
can make demands on others with whom they have contractual relationships. This 
contractualism becomes a feature of trade union membership, in that trades unions are 
transformed from collective to individualized organizations by means of legislation.22 
Put another way, with the institutionalization of the 'free' market, any form of
21 For a psychoanalytic analysis of the subject effects of the 'free market', see Richards (1984, 1989a, 
1989b esp. ch. 7).
22 See Strinati (1990).
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authority is dissolved, since authority requires a sense within the individual of some 
transindividual entity worthy of respect.23
At the same time, the basis for self-reliance becomes shredded as the permanently 
revolutionary character of capitalism is intensified through the use of electronics 24 
The new technologies allow of more flexible working arrangements and social 
relationships. They also require fewer workers so that unemployment becomes 
institutionalized.25 In addition, self-employment, part-time work, short-term 
contracts, begin to take the place of life-time employment, of predictable and 
graduated career structures 26 There is a new temporariness in the structures of both 
public and private practices which means that both public and private relationships 
are marked by transitoriness. Short-termism and adaptability, pluralism, 
fragmentation and change are upheld as new values. In fact, these are the values 
whose implementation Marx expected and described in the CM, where, as we have 
seen in chapter six, he described a wholly commodified culture.
Third, disorganized capitalism institutes a new global division of labour which 
marginalizes the experience and significance of industrial production for populations 
in liberal capitalist cultures. Disorganized capitalism is a stage of capitalism whereby 
changes in the global division of labour result in the significant deindustrialization of 
the advanced industrial cultures of the West and the speedy industrialization of the 
formerly 'peripheral' countries, those of East and South East Asia in particular. 
Populations in liberal capitalist cultures now become predominantly producers of 
services, messages and meanings rather than of things.27 (I shall return to this matter 
below.) All boundaries are experienced as porous, all allegiances as temporary, all 
contracts as short-term. There emerges a new preoccupation with flexibility deriving 
from the conviction that a capitalism freed from the need for earlier overt and explicit 
forms of political regulation and armed with the technological means of moving 
resources around the globe apparently at will, requires populations to be permanently
23 Richards (1984, 1989a, 1989b). Giddens's work expresses this state of affairs (which he views as 
progressive) quite well up to a point See Giddens (1990, 1991). See also Rustin (1995). Note 34 
below also refers.
24 Piore & Sabel (1984); Reich (1991); Rifkin (1995); Sherman & Judkins (1995).
25 Head (1996); Lash & Urry (1987); Reich (1991); Rifkin (1995); Sherman & Judkins (1995); 
Western (1995).
26 Reich (1991); Sampson (1995); Sherman & Judkins (1995).
27 Hence Baudrillard's hyperbolic and misleading pronouncement on the 'end of production'. See 
Baudrillard (1993), ch. 1. See Callinicos (1989) for an argument against this interpretation. Both are 
wrong in the sense that, while consumption is internally related to production (so one cannot take 
place without the other, as Callinicos argues) it is nevertheless the case that the 'end of production' in 
liberal capitalist cultures has subjective and therefore political effects which Callinicos appears unable 
to understand.
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mobilized to respond to its demands.28 It becomes imperative for populations to be 
mobilized to produce the kinds of subjects (highly skilled in the new technologies, 
highly mobile and flexible and therefore radically disembedded) required to attract 
capital29 For employed as well as the growing pool of the long-term unemployed, 
these changing conditions are experienced as insecurity and as the loss of a strong 
sense of place in the world.30 In effect, individuals are being interpellated as 
possessive, self-reliant, independent subjects at a time when the 'objective' basis for 
the emergence of such self-reliance just does not exist. These are subjects on whom 
culture places heavy demands without troubling itself as to how these demands are to 
be fulfilled, to paraphrase Freud.31
The culture of disorganized capitalism has neither the stability nor 
responsiveness needed to constitute active social subjects. Indeed, it is governed by 
the principle of the 'obsolescence of replaceable experience' which, as Lichtman puts 
it, 'threatens to dissolve the self.'32 The nature of this threat should be clear from the 
discussion in chapter eight, as to speak of the 'obsolescence of replaceable experience' 
is to speak of the obsolescence of the reality principle. It is in this way that we can 
understand the psychic (and therefore political) consequences of the 'ontology of flux'. 
The latter phrase expresses the lived experience of subjects who are subjected to 
(indeed must expect nothing but) rapid, unceasing and unpredictable displacements. It 
is in this way that we can interpret the language used by post-Marxism to describe 
social relations and subjectivity.33
Recall that this language includes the concepts of the signifying chain and 
metonymy to refer to the constant movement of signifiers and, therefore, to the 
constant changes in subjects' positionalities ('obsolescence of replaceable 
experience').34 It includes the concept of lack to refer to the subject's alleged
28 Reich (1991); Hirst & Thompson (1996); Miyoshi (1993). There also emerges a new 
preoccupation with 'risk'. See Beck (1992); Beck et al (1994). See also Hoggett (1989) on the 'crisis 
of all certainty' in these cultures.
29 Piore & Sabel (1984); Reich (1991). See also Eiger & Smith (1994). Reich also stresses the 
related need for low-paid, low-skilled occupations, as does Wright (1997). The latter also notes the 
proletarianization of new areas.
30 Sherman & Judkins (1995), ch. 11, discuss the wider social and personal effects of unemployment.
31 Freud (1985iv), ch. VIII, esp. p. 377.
32 Lichtman (1982), p. 279.
33 As Jameson (1983a), pp. 124 - 125, points out, poststructuralist critiques of the humanist subject 
have a high descriptive value. Their explanatory value is negligible, though.
34 They also imply that such subjects are not merely at the mercy of the myriad interpellations of 
which they are the focus but can choose to accept or reject such interpellations. From this point of 
view, the decentred subject is the active reflexive subject who evaluates, accepts or rejects 
identifications available from the external world. This is the subject, then, who has, apparently, 
developed the cognitive capacities discussed in chapter eight under the rubric of the secondary process; 
a subject who is capable of resisting both coercion and manipulation and of pursuing a self-determined 
course of self-development through the use o f his reflexive capacities. See Laclau & Mouffe (1985); 
Giddens (1991); Lash & Urry (1994).
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receptivity to such changes i.e. a receptivity posited on the hope of experiencing a 
'fullness of being' which is so elusive (indeed impossible) in capitalist cultures. So a 
strong sense of self becomes unavailable in a situation in which selves are expected to 
be self-activating and responsible. In effect, what post-Marxism is describing is the 
narcissistic subject, as discussed in chapter eight, but this is the narcissistic subject 
who is expected to adopt an active, outward orientation towards the world. The 
narcissistic subject is the overdetermined result of a nexus of institutions all of which 
are governed by the logic of volatility, of speediness, of change as permanent 
revolution. The logic of volatility is the logic of the primary process. It is a logic 
which renders reality-testing in the Freudian sense extremely difficult and which 
therefore inhibits the emergence of the secondary process at the level of the individual 
organism. It also and relatedly inhibits the development of sociality. In effect, for the 
individual subject, reality-testing becomes impossible at a time when reality testing 
becomes imperative. I now need to discuss a hitherto unexplored dimension of this 
volatility by a further consideration of the 'surplus of meaning' adumbrated by post- 
Marxism.
The 'surplus of meaning'
The culture o f contemporary liberal capitalist cultures
As noted above, changes in the global division of labour result in the migration of 
industrial production from the 'advanced' capitalist countries to those of the hitherto 
unindustrialized. The former now become producers of services, of meanings and 
messages. The preoccupation with discourse expresses this change (as the 
preoccupation with 'production' expressed the changes put in place by the first 
capitalist industrialization in nineteenth century England) whereby practices become 
not only less immediately and solidly material but also, as we have noted, increasingly 
volatile and evanescent. The effect is that words, meanings and things are less 
reliably related. However, there is another aspect to this change which I shall now 
discuss.
Post-Marxism's preoccupation with the surplus of meanings which constitutes 
and reconstitutes the decentred subject offers a useful clue to the distinctiveness of 
liberal capitalist cultures. This distinctiveness resides in first, the ever-increasing 
significance of the cultural sphere i.e. of the specialized production of meanings and 
second, the intensification and transformation of consumption as a practice
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increasingly necessary to confer a sense of self on decentred subjects.35 Volatility in 
the private and economic spheres is supported and intensified by volatility in the 
cultural sphere. What the individual subject takes in from external reality is - in every 
sphere of activity - volatility.36 The response to this volatility is a withdrawal from 
external reality to an internal world of one's 'private theatre'. The decentred subject is 
the narcissistic subject who withdraws libido from real persons and things (found to 
be unsatisfactory) and redirects it to phantasy objects. Put another way, what is 
cathected is the internal reality of the subject, for whom the external world becomes 
the raw material for an ongoing process of self-making and remaking.37 This is the 
response of a subject in jeopardy whose inward turn is an attempt to sustain a sense 
of self.38 It is in such a world that culture in the narrow sense, (in the sense, that is, 
of a body of 'meanings', representations, etc., produced by specialists in a dedicated 
sphere) assumes a new kind of institutional significance. Now we witness the 
intensification of that process of commodification of culture which Habermas noted in 
relation to the early twentieth century period.39 Such a process - one which results 
in the 'fictionalization o f reality ' 40 - constitutes individuals as passive consumers of 
images rather than active participants in a living popular culture, or in Appadurai's 
striking phrase, phantasy becomes 'a social practice' in the sense that 'ordinary lives 
today are increasingly powered not by the givenness of things but by the possibilities 
that the media (either directly or indirectly) suggest are available.'41 Honneth, who 
takes the view that culture is 'both the bearer and the ideology of capitalist growth 
processes' will see no contrast here between phantasy and the given, since phantasy 
now becomes the capitalist product par excellence.42 From this point of view the 
electronic media and the phantasies which they disseminate are, along with the 
speeded-up consumerism characteristic of the contemporary world, manifestations of 
systemic imperatives and therefore an intrinsic part of the 'givenness of things'. 
Phantasies take the place of earlier identities grounded in a sense of place and of 
function derived from location within the family and the occupational structure 43
35 Baudrillard (1983) esp. chs. 3 & 4; Bowlby (1993); Haug (1987). Here the equation of having and 
being goes beyond Marx's analysis discussed in chapter five above. See also Brennan (1992, 1993).
36 See Richards (1989b), ch. 2.
37 This becomes expressed in the preoccupation with 'difference' and the celebration of inessentialism 
as the necessary precondition for emancipation. See Butler & Scott (1992) on the politics of difference. 
See Fuss (1989) on essentialism and its critics.
38 Brennan (1992), ch. 3.
39 Habermas (1989); Honneth (1995).
40 Honneth (1995), p. 223 (italics in original).
41 Appadurai (1991), pp. 198, 200. This is one of several claims about the social significance of 
phantasy in the contemporary world. See also Baudrillard (1994); Fuss (1989) ch. 6; Honneth (1995), 
ch. 13.
42 Pecora notes capitalism's tendency 'to make fleeting pleasure a use-value and thereby recreate it as 
pure exchange-value'. See Pecora (1988), pp. 138-9.
43 See Sennett (1977) on the debilitating political effects of phantasy.
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The cultural sphere replaces the familial and economic spheres as shaper of 
subjectivities and as the output of the 'culture industry' increases through the 
remarkable proliferation of technologies described above. It is these technologies 
which produce the 'surplus of meaning' whose subject effects post-Marxism 
describes.44 As noted before, these subject effects are describable under the rubric of 
primary process functioning i.e. a way of functioning involving the indiscriminateand 
instantaneous (therefore necessarily temporary) cathexis of objects which, in the case 
of the infant are hallucinogenic but in the case of adults engaging in daydreaming are 
phantastic.45 The cognitive-affective effects of daydreaming have been described in 
chapter eight. These effects are now constituted as everyday experience in that 
disorganized capitalism has commodified phantasy so that reality becomes phantasy 
and phantasy becomes reality. This is the thrust of the analyses of Appadurai and of 
Honneth mentioned above and this is the novel twist that electronic technology adds 
to the depiction of pure capitalism offered by Marx. It is this development which 
intensifies the related cognitive and affective debilities first identified by Marx and 
explained from a psychic point of view by psychoanalysis. In view of this 
intensification, the new preoccuption with producing knowledgeable workers cannot 
be expected to have the emancipatory significance expected by Marx and examined 
briefly in chapter six. However, before concluding, it will be useful to explore this 
question briefly.
Disorganized capitalism as the end o f abstract labour?
The idea that the mental/manual split as institutionalized in mass industrial 
production is no longer functional for capitalism (or indeed for the cultures which 
require its flourishing) has become widely disseminated in recent years 46 What is 
happening, apparently, is that the needs of capitalism dictate the end of that 
'paltriness of labour' noted by Marx and discussed in chapter six. They also dictate 
that social mobility that Marx considered to be a prerequisite for the attainment of the 
systemic knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the totality as a totality of many 
determinations) needed to implement effective radically democratic transformative 
action. Indeed, Reich's 'symbolic analysts' appear to exemplify the required kind of 
worker, whose task-specific knowledgeability should be enhanced by the kind of
44 Poster (1984, 1990, 1995); Thompson (1995).
45 Brennan (1992).
46 According to Konosuke Matsushita (a Japanese electronics magnate): '[BJusiness has become so 
complex, the survival o f firms so precarious, and our environment increasingly unpredictable, 
competitive and dangerous, that firms' continuing existence depends on their day-to-day mobilisation 
of every ounce of intelligence'. Quoted by Wheeler & Sillanpaa (1997). For an academic examination 
of this kind of claim, see Eiger & Smith (1994).
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knowledge of capitalism's real nature (derived from its high mobility requirements) 
which we have discussed in chapter six. However, as is clear from Reich's own 
analysis, these symbolic analysts lead lives which become increasingly privatized and 
deterritorialized. They are possessive subjects in the strong sense that their needs are 
supplied largely through 'market forces' and so, apparently, by means of their own 
autonomous efforts. Therefore they cannot be expected to feel a sense of obligation 
to the wider group.47 The possibility remains that the growth of unemployment 
among this stratum might have the kinds of effects looked for by Marx,48 but in the 
absence of association (rather than atomized trades unions) the institutional means for 
such emergence appears to be lacking.49 In any case, it is evident that the speediness 
of change and the increased complexity and fragmentation accompanying that 
speediness results in an opacity beyond the cognitive grasp of the most highly 
educated.50 So, Reich's symbolic analysts should be expected to exemplify in the 
strongest possible form the characteristics of the decentred subjectivity with which I 
am here concerned. That is to say, they should exemplify the a-social characteristics 
of the narcissistic subject whose activity is necessarily directed towards self rather 
than group maintenance or repair.5!
For this reason, the kind of pluralist democracy discussed by post-Marxism is 
bound to be a narcissistic (atomistic, individualistic) form of democracy centring on 
self-development and self-expression of a kind not compatible with the transcendence 
of 'self-interested' motivations for political action, although these motivations may be 
expressed in terms of the politics of 'difference' rather than of distribution.52 This is 
clearly quite different from the kind of radical democracy looked for by Marx and 
Gramsci, as discussed in chapters six and seven. The latter, as has been noted in 
chapter eight, requires the active social subject. However, this is precisely what the 
culture of disorganized capitalism is incapable of instituting.
It should be clear from what has been said that disorganized capitalism institutes 
social relations which are not only instrumental (because governed by market
47 Indeed, Reich himself is quite gloomy about the prospects for the nation state. See Hirst & 
Thompson (1996) for a different view.
48 Sherman & Judkins (1995, p. 88) point to the significance of a growing 'overclass' of educated 
unemployed whose numbers rose by 267% from 1990 to 1994.
49 Lichterman (1996) sees a basis for the emergence of commitment in local voluntary groups in the 
United States. However, he sees this threatened by an 'individualized morality' preoccupied by 
'personal empowerment' (ch. 7, p. 229). Mouffe (1992) also discusses this question. Rifkin looks 
for the reinstitution of the social bond by means of an emergent 'third sector' i.e. of a new sphere of 
voluntary activity between state and market. See Rifkin (1996), chs. 16 & 17. Leadbeater (1997) 
looks to 'social entrepreneurs' for a solution to the problem.
50 Carchedi (1983); Jameson (1991). Baudrillard's work exemplifies the most powerful expression of 
this fact of contemporaiy liberal capitalist cultures.
51 Brennan (1992) offers an excellent account of why this has to be the case.
52 See MacCannell (1991); Sennett (1977). See Fraser (1995) on 'distribution' versus 'difference' 
motivations for political action.
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principles) but also fleeting, so the possibility of sociality engendered by organized 
capitalism disappears. In being forced into culture, the decentred subject of 
disorganized capitalism is not at the same time forced into sociality. This is the 
strikingly novel characteristic of pure capitalism which we have noted in Marx's 
account. It is because liberal capitalist culture in its disorganized form approximates 
so closely to this state of affairs that the problem of political commitment has become 
so urgent. It is in these cultures that the dual subjective debility expected by Marx in 
the mid-nineteenth century begins to become most clearly visible. However, as has 
been noted, developments in the late twentieth century intensify this debility in ways 
unimaginable by Marx.53
Conclusion
Disorganized capitalism (as instituted in liberal capitalist cultures) constitutes 
subjects without the cognitive or affective attributes needed for political commitment. 
The subjects of disorganized capitalism are narcissistic subjects whose lack of a 
stable sense of inner and outer worlds results in a preoccupation with self rather than 
group maintenance. These are therefore by definition incapable of the kind of 
sublimation - i.e. the libidinal bonding with human 'objects' in external reality - 
required for political commitment.54 This is the state of affairs which is expressed 
by post-Marxism. In fact, the 'post' problematic of which post-Marxism is a 
recognizable element expresses quite forcefully the 'superstructural' accompaniment of 
pure capitalism as analyzed by Marx.55 However, as we have seen, the explanation 
offered by post-Marxism for the state of affairs which it correctly describes, is 
inadequate. A return to Marx, guided in part by the preoccupations and insights of 
post-Marxism itself, and enhanced by a more systematic use of psychoanalysis, has 
afforded the means of developing a fuller and more historically-informed analysis of 
the problem.
Political commitment requires the reinstitution of sociality through practices 
which render visible the necessary connectedness of human beings. Pure capitalism 
renders invisible this necessary connectedness through the instantiation of impersonal
53 Jameson has discussed this in terms of the 'waning of affect' and the difficulty of'cognitive mapping' 
which is experienced by subjects in these cultures. These express quite elegantly the 
individual/society and subjective/objective dichotomies which have organized the arguments in this 
thesis. Jameson (1992), esp. pp. 6, 25. Baudrillard's (1996) less measured account refers to 
hyperreality and the murder of reality 'the perfect crime'.
54 It is striking that most of the new kinds of direct collective action which have emerged in recent 
years are concerned with the suffering of non-human nature.
55 See Jameson (1992) for one version of this claim.
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forms of mediation, as first noted by Marx. While the recovery of a sense of 
necessary connectedness must emerge out of changes in directly-experienced 
processes, it requires the aid of theoretical knowledge if contradictoriness is to become 
the basis of an effective humanizing politics. It is because of the extreme cognitive 
elusiveness of these cultures that theoretical knowledge is necessary. Here 
knowledge will help to counteract the fetishizing and alienating effects of fragmented 
capitalist cultures while at the same time indicating where and how political action can 
be most efficient and effective. Theoretical knowledge has the related functions of 
first, bringing to the attention of hitherto atomized subjects the fact of necessary 
human social connectedness and second, enhancing the emergent sense of competence 
and confidence required to act effectively on fragmented capitalist cultures.56 At the 
same time, as has been seen in chapters six and seven, such knowledge must be an 
emergent property of directly experienced social relations if a radical democratic 
politics is to be possible.
In relation to questions of collective commitment and action, Gramsci's analysis 
draws our attention most fruitfully to the importance of non-reifying non-scientistic 
knowledge. He stresses the importance of knowledge which incorporates concrete 
rather than abstract rationality; which incorporates 'feeling' as well as 'knowing'. He 
thereby offers us the means of transcending the rational/irrational dichotomy. 
Psychoanalysis has afforded the means of understanding more systematically the 
importance of this claim of Gramsci's by showing the necessary internal relationship 
between feeling and knowing. Moreover, it alerts us to the conditions needed to 
convert feeling into sociality (sublimation), thereby ensuring that knowing (secondary 
process functioning) will not be expressed in scientistic, fetishizing knowledge. This 
psychoanalytic point of view affords the possibility of a fruitful reassessment of 
Marx's emphasis on association and theory and Gramsci's emphasis on the concrete 
phantasy. However, in its stress on intra-psychic contradiction it also alerts us to 
the dangers of political hubris as manifested in earlier forms of Marxist politics.57
Finally, it is worth repeating Marx's insistance upon the openness and historicity 
of human life and therefore the necessary transitoriness of any state of affairs. 
Transitoriness is the effect, not only of contradictoriness, but of the innate human 
capacity for praxis. For these reasons, the colonizing or totalizing propensity of
56 Peasants engaged in subsistence agriculture do not require theoretical knowledge because they can 
act with confidence and effectiveness on the basis of commonsense knowledge. In this sense, they are 
more autonomous than capitalist subjects. This difference in the character and possibilities of everyday 
life is ignored by theorists such as de Certeau (1988) who seek to romanticize the 'ordinary' which in 
liberal capitalist cultures is saturated with expert knowledge and therefore not open to the kinds of 
refusal and subversion still possible in 'underdeveloped' cultures. For an example of the latter, see 
Ayoade (1988).
57 Freud's (1985iv) comments on the necessary shortcomings of the Soviet experiment remain 
relevant here.
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capitalism is constantly open to the possibility of disintegration and/or subversion. 
The instantiation of pure capitalism would exemplify a pure structural determinism 
such as is suggested by the base-superstructure metaphor. As we have seen, Marx 
himself assumes the instantiation of pure capitalism for two reasons: first, as a 
thought experiment oriented to scientific understanding; second, as a polemic oriented 
to facilitating revolutionary proletarian action. In the concrete world, though, what 
we find are greater or lesser approximations to pure capitalism and therefore greater or 
lesser degrees of the social and cognitive debility which has been described in this 
thesis.
In contemporary liberal capitalist cultures there is a high degree of such debility 
but also manifestations of 'outraged humanity', as noted in the introduction. A 
renovated and more modest Marxism can help to clarify the sources and 
connectedness of different experiences of outrage and thereby contribute to the 
emergence of an effective radical politics without courting the dangers of hubris.58
58 See Geras (1994).
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